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ABSTRACT	
This	 PhD	 offers	 an	 original	 assessment	 of	 the	 EU	 policies	 aimed	 at	 developing	 the	
institutional	 structures	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 (SGC),	 focusing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	
attempted	Europeanisation	of	energy	governance	in	the	SGC	countries:	Turkey,	Georgia	and	
Azerbaijan.		
Underpinned	by	Rational-Choice	Institutionalism	and	its	mid-range	adaption	–	the	External	
Incentive	Model	–	the	PhD	rests	on	two	levels	of	analyses:	one	describing	EU	ambitions	in	this	
policy	 domain	 and	 the	 other	 assessing	 the	 empirical	 success	 of	 those	 ‘Europeanising’	
ambitions.	
At	the	first	level,	the	PhD	describes	the	ways	in	which	the	EU	aims	to	liberalise	access	to	the	
transit	 pipelines	 along	 the	 SGC	 in	 line	 with	 its	 own	 preferences.	 This	 means	 subjecting	
natural	gas	supply	via	the	SGC	to	ostensibly	“depoliticised”	free-market	dynamics,	as	opposed	
to	 political	 bargaining	 among	 the	 various	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors.	 In	 other	 words,	 EU	
policy	endeavours	to	create	a	regulatory	buffer	zone	in	the	EU	neighbourhood,	which	would	
ensure	"domestic	level"	safety	in	external	energy	supply.	In	tying	third	countries	to	the	rules	
of	its	own	making,	the	EU	seeks	to	institutionalise	its	soft	power	vis-à-vis	others,	enabling	it	
to	 influence	 the	 behaviour	 of	 actors	without	 the	 coercive	 use	 of	military	 and/or	 economic	
means.	
At	 the	 second	 level	 of	 analysis,	 the	 PhD	 argues	 that	 such	 endeavours	 have	 been	 largely	
unsuccessful.	In	the	absence	of	EU	membership	prospects	or	membership	aspirations,	the	net	
domestic	 adoption	 costs	 in	 the	 target	 SGC	 countries	 explain	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
Europeanisation	strategy	in	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.	These	domestic	costs	stem	from	
the	SGC	countries'	rational	national	interest	in	controlling	the	supply	and	transit	of	natural	
gas	 from,	 to	 and	 across	 their	 sovereign	 territories	 in	 order	 to	 further	 national	 strategic	
and/or	economic	ends.	Such	interests	are	intrinsically	incompatible	with	the	EU's	conception	
of	competitive	and	depoliticised	energy	supply	and	transit.		
Consequently,	 the	 PhD	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 SGC	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	
geopolitical	and	(geo)economic	motivations/interests	of	the	transit	states	concerned,	which	
will	render	the	EU	supply	of	natural	gas	via	this	corridor	uncompetitive	and	politicised;	and	
from	the	EU	perspective,	potentially	insecure.	
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INTRODUCTION	
The	 idea	of	developing	a	new	European	Union	(EU)	natural	gas	supply	corridor	 towards	the	Caspian	Basin	(CB)	and	the	Middle	East	(ME)	dates	back	as	far	as	the	late	1990s,	born	from	the	necessity	of	providing	for	the	rising	energy	demand	in	the	EU	and	the	availability	of	alternative	natural	gas	reserves	in	these	regions.	The	predecessor	to	the	idea	was	the	oil	supply	corridor	from	Azerbaijan	to	the	Turkish	Mediterranean	port	of	Ceyhan.	The	latter,	since	 2005,	 has	 supplied	 Caspian	 oil	 to	 the	 world	 markets	 and	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	development	 of	 the	 further	 critical	 infrastructure	 to	 evacuate	 other	 hydrocarbon	resources	from	this	landlocked	region.	The	Caspian	Basin-EU	strategic	energy	partnership	again	shot	to	the	top	of	the	agenda	in	energy	policy	circles	in	the	middle	of	the	first	decade	of	the	current	century.	This	followed	the	successive	Russian	gas	supply	cut-offs	to	the	EU	across	Ukraine	and	its	(geo)political	and	(geo)economical	repercussions	on	the	EU-Russia	bilateral	and	multilateral	relations.	The,	 so	 called,	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 (SGC)	 of	 the	 EU	 consequently	 emerged	 as	 a	 new	favourite	topic	 in	policy	and	scholarly	discussions,	which	envisages	connecting	the	EU	to	the	 natural	 gas	 reserves	 in	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Turkmenistan	 (CB),	 as	well	 as	 Iran	 and	 Iraq	(ME).	As	a	strategy	of	diversification	of	natural	gas	supplies	and	transportation	routes,	the	SCG	has	 inspired	 scholarly	 research	 that	 investigates	 the	 potential	 contribution	 of	 the	 gas	reserves	in	the	Caspian	Basin	and	Middle	East	to	ensuring	energy	security	of	the	EU.	This	has	 tended	to	 focus	on	the	reserve	potential	of	 these	alternative	energy	basins	and	their	prospective	contribution	to	reducing	the	economic	and	political	dependence	of	the	EU	on	the	Russian	Federation.	In	this	regard,	the	SGC	came	to	be	known	as,	what	one	might	call,	a	geopolitical	 hardware	 strategy;	 a	 strategy	 that	 concentrates	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	necessary	 infrastructure	 to	 diversify	 EU	 natural	 gas	 supply	 sources	 and	 transportation	routes	with	the	aim	of	changing	the	balance	of	power	between	the	EU	and	Russia.	This	was	and	 remains	an	 important	 research	 topic	 in	academia.	Nevertheless,	 very	 little	research	attention	has	been	devoted	to	the	investigation	of	energy	security	risks	stemming	from	the	development	and	future	operation	of	the	SGC	itself.	Nor	are	the	EU’s	institutional	policy	actions	aimed	at	addressing	these	risks	thoroughly	researched.	On	the	latter	point,	academic	 literature	 on	 the	 SGC	 has	 been	 lagging	 behind	 the	 literature	 on	 EU	 domestic	energy	 market	 integration	 in	 general,	 which	 places	 enormous	 emphasis	 on	 the	development	of	formal	institutions	(rules	and	organisations),	or	what	one	might	term	the	
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software	governing	the	single	EU	natural	gas	market.	Especially	following	the	adoption	of	the	 so	 called	 EU	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 in	 2009,	 the	 Union’s	 institutional	 approach	 to	addressing	 energy	 security	 risks	 (by	 liberalising	 and	 depoliticising	 the	 energy	 markets	within	the	EU	borders)	has	gained	substantial	scholarly	interest	and	has	been	extensively	investigated	by	the	academic	literature.1	In	contrast,	no	comprehensive	research	has	been	undertaken	 to	 investigate	 the	 institutional	 aspects	 -	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 (or	 software)	that	 is	 to	govern	the	EU	natural	gas	supply	via	 the	SGC2	and	 its	potential	contribution	to	the	EU’s	conception	of	energy	security.	This	gap	 in	the	academic	 literature	 is	notable	given	the	existence	of	numerous	EU	policy	initiatives,	which	aim	at	the	institutionalisation	of	energy	supply	via	the	SGC	under	the	EU	natural	 gas	 market	 model;	 in	 short,	 the	 Europeanisation3	 of	 the	 SGC.	 The	 idea	 of	Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 an	 especially	 strategic	 objective	 for	 the	 EU	 given	 that	different	gas	volumes	to	be	supplied	via	this	corridor	from	different	sources	will	have	to	travel	more	 than	 3000	 km	 and	will	 potentially	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 transit	 risks	 of	(geo)political	 and	 (geo)economic	nature	before	 reaching	 the	EU	borders.	In	 this	 respect,	this	alternative	energy	corridor	risks	producing	new	challenges	to	the	EU	energy	security,	similar	 to	 the	ones	 it	was	originally	 conceived	 to	 resolve	vis-à-vis	 the	old	energy	supply	partners.	In	this	regard,	although	the	EU	lacks	formal	competences	in	market	regulation	beyond	its	borders,	(external)	Europeanisation	constitutes	its	preferred	approach	to	tackling	energy	security	 risks	 along	 the	 SGC.	 In	 its	 relevant	 policy	 documents,	 the	 EU	 has	 specifically	pointed	out	that,	transit	issues	along	the	SGC	have	to	be	resolved	in	line	with	the	principles	
                                                            1	 See	 e.g.	 Jonathan	 Stern,	 Security	 of	 European	 Natural	 Gas	 Supplies:	 The	 Impact	 of	 Import	 Dependence	 and	
Liberalisation	 (London:	Chatham	House,	2002);	 Jonathan	Stern	and	Howard	Rogers,	 ‘The	Transition	 to	Hub-Based	 Gas	 Pricing	 in	 Continental	 Europe’,	Oxford	 Institute	 for	 Energy	 Studies,	 2011;	 Katja	 Yafimava,	The	 EU	
Third	 Package	 for	 Gas	 and	 the	 Gas	 Target	Model	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 Institute	 for	 Energy	 Studies,	 2013);	 David	Buchan,	Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change:	 Europe	 at	 the	 Crossroads	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 Institute	 for	 Energy	 Studies,	2009);	Miguel	Vazquez,	Michelle	Hallack	and	Jean-Michel	Glachant,	‘Designing	the	European	Gas	Market:	More	Liquid;	Less	Natural?’,	Economics	of	Energy	&	Environmental	Policy,	1.3	(2012);	Aad	Correljé,	Martijn	Groenleer	and	Jasper	Veldman,	Understanding	Institutional	Change:	The	Development	of	Institutions	for	the	Regulation	of	
Natural	Gas	Transportation	Systems	in	the	US	and	the	EU,	Robert	Schuman	Centre	for	Advanced	Studies	Loyola	de	Palacio	Programme	on	Energy	Policy	(European	University	Institute/	Florence	School	of	Regulation,	2013).	2	Here	 the	 research	 focus	 is	 on	 institutional	 (regulatory)	 aspects	 of	 the	non-EU	 segments	of	 the	 SGC,	which	include	the	territories	of	Azerbaijan,	Georgia	and	Turkey.	3	Here	Europeanisation	is	in	the	meaning	of	“the	influence	of	EU	policies	and	values	on	the	'rest	of	the	world',	i.e.	
non-member	 states."	 In	 fact	 the	 term	“EU”-isation	would	be	a	more	accurate	word	 to	use.	However,	 I	will	go	along	with	the	widely	used	term	Europeanisation.	See	e.g.	Adrienne	Heritier,	 ‘Europeanization	Research	East	and	West:	 A	 Comparative	 Assessment’,	 in	The	 Europeanization	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 ed.	 by	 Frank	Schimmelfennig	 and	Ulrich	 Sedelmeier,	 Cornell	 Studies	 in	 Political	 Economy	 (Ithaca,	 NY:	 Cornell	 University	Press,	2005),	pp.	199–209	(p.	200).	
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of	the	EU	acquis4	(accumulated	legislation,	which	constitute	the	body	of	the	EU	law),	which	the	Union	aims	to	export	to	the	SGC	countries.		In	this	context,	the	gap	in	academic	literature	on	the	SGC	manifests	itself	in	several	ways.	Firstly,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 systematic	 investigation	 of	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC;	especially	 missing	 is	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 energy	 related	 rule	 expansion	 and	enforcement	mechanisms	under	the	EU’s	latest	external	Europeanisation	tool	-	the	Eastern	Partnership	 (EaP),	 which	 is	 the	 sub-dimension	 of	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	(ENP)	focusing	on	Eastern	European	countries.	Secondly,	 the	existing	 literature	does	not	provide	 detailed	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 EU	 energy	 (natural	 gas)	 acquis	 could	potentially	 address	 energy	 security	 risks	 along	 the	 SGC.	 Finally,	 there	 is	 very	 limited	systematic	academic	research	on	 the	 factors	 that	condition	 the	success	and/or	 failure	of	the	EU	external	 energy	governance	 (external	Europeanisation)	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	SGC	within	the	disciplines	of	International	Relations	and	EU	studies.5	Against	this	backdrop,	instead	of	putting	the	geopolitical	rationale	of	bringing	Caspian	and	Middle	 Eastern	 natural	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 analysis,	 this	 research	 takes	 the	implementation	of	the	EU-sourced	formal	institutions	(rules	and	organisations)	in	the	SGC	countries	 as	 the	main	 focus	 of	 investigation	 and	 assesses	 their	 potential	 contribution	 to	the	 EU’s	 conception	 of	 energy	 security.	 Having	 all	 these	 important	 issues	 in	 mind,	 this	thesis	aims	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:	I. What	 is	 the	 main	 political-economic	 rationale	 behind	 the	 EU	 policy	 of	
Europeanisation	towards	the	institutional	governance	of	the	SGC?	II. What	factors	condition	the	success/failure	of	the	EU	efforts	to	Europeanise	the	
SGC?	In	 investigating	 the	 first	 research	 question	 this	 PhD	 argues	 that,	 the	 EU’s	 conception	 of	energy	 security	 equates	 this	 with	 the	 diversity	 of	 energy	 supplies	 under	 competitive	market	conditions	–	that	is	to	say,	not	affected	by	the	factors	unrelated	to	the	supply	and	demand	 balance	 in	 the	 market.	 In	 this	 regard,	 although	 as	 a	 new,	 alternative	 energy	corridor	the	SGC	will	bring	diversity	to	the	EU	energy	market(s),	the	emergence	of	transit	risks	along	the	SGC	undermines	the	competitiveness	of	energy	supply	via	this	very	energy	corridor.	 Underpinned	 by	 the	 territorial	 sovereignty,	 non-EU	 transit	 states	 of	 the	 SGC	
                                                            4	 ‘Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review:	 An	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	 Solidarity	 Action	 Plan,	 COM(2008)	 781’	(European	 Commission,	 2008),	 p.	 2;	 ‘European	 Council	 Presidency	 Conclusions,	 7224/1/07’	 (The	 Council,	2007),	p.	16;	‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’	(European	Commission,	2011),	p.	7.	5	It	is	important	to	point	out	that	External	Europeanisation	is	fairly	mainstream	in	the	study	of	the	EU	external	relations.	The	uniqueness	of	this	research	is	rather	its	investigation	in	relation	to	the	EU	external	energy	policy	actions	vis-à-vis	the	SGC	and	not	to	the	EU	external	policies	in	general.	
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(Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	 Azerbaijan)	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 control,	 interfere	 with	 or	 even	facilitate	 the	 flow	 of	 energy	 resources	 that	 cross	 their	 territories	 in	 order	 to	 realise	national	(geo)economic	and/or	(geo)political	ends.		In	 this	 context,	 I	 empirically	 argue	 that,	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 institutional	(regulatory)	governance	of	 the	SGC	 is	 aimed	at	 the	 liberalisation	of	 access	 to	 the	 transit	pipelines	along	the	SGC	under	the	EU	model.	This	would	make	natural	gas	supply	via	the	SGC	subject	 to	 free-market	dynamics,	as	opposed	to	political	bargaining	among	the	state	and	non-state	actors6	involved.	Indeed,	by	deploying	the	EU	internal	market	rules	(acquis)	externally,	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC	 would	 reduce	 strategic	 and	 commercial	
uncertainty	 in	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 in	 influencing	 the	 energy	supply	 and	 transit.	 Consequently,	 market-based	 energy	 provision	 would	 facilitate	 the	depoliticisation	of	energy	supply,	while	ensuring	 that	 the	 latter	 is	not	used	as	a	political	tool	 in	 international	 interaction	between	 the	EU	and	 the	new	energy	partners	 along	 the	SGC.	 In	 this	 context,	 although	 the	 EU	 has	 repeatedly	 justified	 its	 market	 approach	 to	securing	 external	 energy	 supplies	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 efficiency,	 I	 contend	 that	 this	 bears	certain	 geopolitical	 implications	 on	 the	 target	 countries.	These	 geopolitical	 implications	differ	 in	modus	 operandi	when	 compared	 to	 the	 strategies	 of	 other	 international	 actors;	especially	 Russia,	 who	 has	 been	 using	 energy	 as	 a	 physical	 tool	 of	 power	 politics	 in	 a	classical	realpolitik.	In	contrast,	the	EU	has	been	successful	in	dressing	its	external	energy	policies,	as	one	expert	put	it	“in	the	finer	cloaks	of	rules-based	discourse".7		In	practice,	however,	through	the	spread	of	the	domestic	practices	and	policies	beyond	the	borders,	 the	EU	external	governance	would	 lead	 to	 the	emergence	of	a	 regulatory	buffer	
zone	in	the	EU	neighbourhood,	which	ensures	"domestic	level"	of	safety	in	external	energy	supply;	at	times	without	the	hassles	of	an	enlarged	membership	structure.	In	practice,	the	emergence	of	 this	buffer	zone	has	 the	capacity	 to	change	 the	balance	of	power	 in	energy	security	asymmetrically	 in	 favour	of	 the	EU.	This	would	be	underpinned	by	 the	ability	of	the	 EU	 to	 influence	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 actors	 beyond	 its	 border	 by	 gaining	
institutionalised	soft	power8,	for	the	rules	the	latter	would	be	bound	with	are	made	in	the	
                                                            6	E.g.	supply	and	transportation	companies.	7	Richard	Youngs,	Europe’s	External	Energy	Policy:	Between	Geopolitics	and	the	Market	(Brussels:	CEPS,	Centre	for	European	Policy	Studies,	2007),	p.	8;	Andrey	Konoplyanik,	‘A	Common	Russia-EU	Energy	Space	(The	New	EU-Russia	 Partnership	 Agreement,	 Acquis	 Communautaire,	 the	 Energy	 Charter	 and	 the	 New	 Russian	Initiative)’,	Journal	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	Law,	27.2	(2009),	258–91.	8	Here,	the	difference	between	institutionalised	soft	power	and	conventional	soft	power	is	that,	while	the	latter	is	underpinned	by	the	ideational	influence	over	the	third	counties	through	the	promulgation	of	one's	informal	ways-of-doing-things,	 the	 former	uses	 formal	 rules	 to	 tie	 the	behaviour	of	 third	countries	 to	one's	domestic	preferences.	 Essentially,	 difference	 is	 between	 "getting	 others	 to	 want	 what	 you	 want"	 and	 getting	 others	
contractually	signed	up	to	what	you	want	without	resorting	to	material	means	of	coercion,	such	as	economic	or	military	might.	For	soft	power	in	a	conventional	sense,	see	Joseph	S	Nye,	The	Paradox	of	American	Power:	Why	
the	World’s	Only	Superpower	Can’t	Go	It	Alone	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	pp.	8–12.	
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EU.	 Ultimately,	 this	 would	 limit	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 SGC	 countries	 to	 use	 energy	supply/transit	as	a	tool	of	their	strategic	policy-making;	hence,	diminishing	their	relative	national	power	vis-à-vis	the	EU.	Having	set	this	descriptive	terrain,	this	thesis	then	aims	to	provide	explanatory	analysis	of	the	 factors	 that	 impact	 upon	 the	 success/failure	 of	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC	 and	then	 link	 it	 to	 the	 prospects	 of	 EU	 natural	 gas	 supply	 under	 competitive,	 depoliticised	market	 conditions	 via	 this	 alternative	 energy	 corridor.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 argue	 that,	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 the	 EU	 membership	 prospects	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 membership	 aspirations,	 the	 net	
domestic	 adoption	 costs	 in	 the	 target	 SGC	 countries	 inhibit	 their	 energy	 Europeanisation.	
Since	these	domestic	costs	stem	from	the	SGC	countries'	rational	national	interests	to	control	
the	 supply	 and	 transit	 of	 natural	 gas	 to	 and	 across	 their	 sovereign	 territories	 in	 order	 to	
further	 national	 strategic	 and	 economic	 ends,	 they	 are	 intrinsically	 incompatible	with	 the	
EU's	conception	of	competitive,	hence,	depoliticised	energy	supply	and	transit.	Consequently,	the	 SGC	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 (geo)political	 and	 (geo)economic	motivations/interests	of	the	transit	states	concerned,	which	will	render	the	EU	supply	of	natural	gas	via	this	corridor	uncompetitive	and	politicised	–	not	subject	to	the	free-market	dynamics	as	envisaged	by	the	EU’s	notion	of	energy	security.	Of	course,	with	or	without	EU-sourced	institutional	reforms	of	the	SGC,	the	supply	of	any	new	natural	gas	volumes	via	this	corridor	will	bring	diversity	to	the	current	EU	natural	gas	market(s)	in	general	terms.	This	will	be	an	improvement	over	the	pre-existing	situation	-	supply	vulnerability	stemming	from	high	dependence	on	Russian	gas.	As	is	the	old	rule	in	energy	supply,	it	is	always	better	to	have	two	problematic	suppliers	(Russia	and	SGC)	than	one.	Hence,	the	analysis	of	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	must	not	lose	sight	of	these,	so	called,	 hardware	 aspects	 when	 analysing	 the	 future	 contribution	 of	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	 EU	energy	security.	In	this	regard,	although	the	investigation	of	the	formal	institutions	(regulatory	dimension)	along	the	SGC	is	at	the	core	of	this	PhD,	the	analysis	of	the	hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	also	provides	an	important	contribution	to	the	literature	on	energy	security.	The	latter	is	especially	 the	 case,	 given	 that	 the	 current	 research	has	 taken	place	during	 the	period	of	political	 and	 commercial	 negotiations	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SGC.	 Therefore,	 it	provides	an	up-to-date	and	timely	discussion	on	the	design	of	this	energy	corridor	and	its	contribution	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 supply	 in	 quantitative	 terms.	Additionally,	such	an	analysis	is	also	vital	due	to	the	particularity	of	supply	of	natural	gas	as	a	primary	source	of	energy.	In	contrast	to	other	fuel	types,	transportation	of	natural	gas	and	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 natural	 gas	 market(s)	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 fixed	
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infrastructure	 -	 pipelines.	This	 affects	not	 only	 the	practical	 flow	of	 energy,	 but	 also	 the	application,	implementation	and	consequences	of	the	development	of	the	markets	rules	in	natural	gas	sector,	for	the	rules	get	practically	expressed	in	the	functioning	of	the	relevant	infrastructure.	 Hence,	 a	 separate	 analysis	 of	 the	 hardware	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	important	 in	 order	 to	 translate	 the	 broader	 abstract	 assumptions	 of	 the	 institutional	elements	of	this	energy	corridor	into	the	practical	implications.	
Chapter	outline	With	all	these	in	mind,	in	Chapter	I,	I	first	set	out	the	objectives	of	this	thesis	and	present	the	 main	 research	 questions	 and	 arguments	 related	 to	 the	 regulatory	 (institutional)	aspects	 of	 the	 SGC.	 Secondly,	 I	 define	 the	 EU's	 conception	 of	 energy	 security,	 which	underpins	 the	 institutional	 policy	 initiatives	 undertaken	 by	 the	 EU	 with	 regard	 to	 this	alternative	energy	corridor.	Then,	I	continue	to	analyse	the	institutional	dimension	of	the	SGC	as	 an	EU	external	 energy	policy	 in	 conceptual	 terms.	The	 latter	 locates	 the	 focus	of	this	 research	 within	 practices	 of	 EU	 external	 governance	 that	 envisage	 the	Europeanisation	 of	 non-EU	 countries.	 Thirdly,	 I	 review	 extant	 relevant	 literature	 on	 the	SGC	 and	 identify	 in	 greater	 detail	 the	 above-mentioned	 gap	 in	 this	 prevailing	 literature,	which	 this	PhD	will	 address.	 Fourthly,	 I	 assess	 the	explanatory	arguments	of	 realist	 and	liberal	 approaches	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 SGC	 and	 present	 Rational-Choice	 Institutionalism	(RCI)	 and	 its	 first-order	 adaption	 External	 Incentive	 Model	 (EIM)	 as	 my	 preferred	theoretical	 framework	 for	 this	 thesis,	 as	 they	 better	 engage	 with	 the	 main	 research	questions.	Finally,	I	outline	the	research	design	and	methods,	which	I	employ	in	order	to	achieve	the	objectives	of	this	thesis.		Chapter	II	empirically	presents	the	SGC	in	 infrastructure	(hardware)	terms	and	provides	an	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 development	 of	 this	 alternative	 energy	 corridor.	 There	 I	describe	how,	 following	almost	a	decade	of	negotiations,	 the	hardware	dimension	of	 the	SGC	is	crystallising.	With	the	necessary	agreements	in	place,	the	SGC	has	entered	the	final	home	stretch	with	modest	but	qualitatively	new	gas	volumes	 from	Azerbaijan	 slated	 for	the	 EU	 markets	 in	 2020	 via	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 South	 Caucasus	 Pipeline	 expansion	(SCPx),	 Trans-Anatolian	 Pipeline	 (TANAP),	 Trans-Adriatic	 Pipeline	 (TAP)	 and	Interconnector-Greece-Bulgaria	(IGB).	These	volumes	will	help	to	ease	the	dependence	of	Southern	 and	 South-eastern	 European	 countries	 on	 Russian	 gas,	 while	 increasing	 their	security	of	supply.		As	 such,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 hardware	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 also	 provides	 an	 important	contribution	to	the	literature	on	energy	security,	for	the	current	research	has	taken	place	during	 the	 period	 of	 political	 and	 commercial	 negotiations	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
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SGC.	Therefore,	it	provides	an	up-to-date	and	timely	discussion	on	the	design	of	the	energy	corridor	in	tangible	terms.		Nonetheless,	 the	 main	 emphasis	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that,	 while	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	necessary	infrastructure	along	the	SGC	will	contribute	to	the	diversity	of	energy	supply	to	the	EU,	further	measures	are	required	to	ensure	the	elimination	of	the	transit	risks	along	the	 corridor.	 These	 regulatory	 measures	 are	 outlined	 and	 analysed	 in	 Chapter	 III.	 The	main	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 present	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	governance	 vis-à-vis	 the	 SGC	 and	 investigate	 the	 major	 EU	 policy	 initiatives	 that	 are	designed	to	that	end.	In	doing	so,	Chapter	III	argues	that,	the	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	aimed	at	depoliticising	the	access	to	new	gas	sources	and	transit	capacity	along	this	very	 new	 energy	 corridor	 by	 promoting	 regulated	 gas	 market	 governance	 therein.	 It	includes	measures	 geared	 towards	 reducing	non-market	 risks	 by	 shifting	 energy	 supply	from	 bilateral	 political	 domain	 onto	 the	 multilateral	 market	 domain.	 If	 successful,	 this	dimension	would	 create	 the	 institutional	milieu	 through	which	 the	 EU	 could	 pursue	 its	energy	interests	in	a	preferred	–	free-market	setting.	Chapter	 III	 indicates	 that,	 the	 emergence	 of	 transit	 risks	 along	 the	 SGC	 could	 affect	 the	future	 natural	 gas	 supply	 not	 only	 from	 Azerbaijan,	 but	 also	 from	 Iraq,	 Iran	 and	Turkmenistan.	 Therefore,	 the	 elimination	 of	 these	 risks	 across	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	Azerbaijan	(non-EU	transit	segments)	is,	from	the	EU	perspective,	a	priority.	In	this	context,	Chapter	 III	contends	that,	 the	regulatory	dimension	of	 the	SGC	cannot	be	called	a	foreign	energy	diplomacy	of	the	EU	in	a	traditional	foreign	policy	sense.	The	EU	is	not	 a	 state	 and	 its	 external	 action	 capacity	 in	 energy	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 the	integration	 of	 energy	 policy	 domestically.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 EU	 policies	 targeting	 the	regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 are	 only	 the	 reflection	 of	 the	 internal	 Europeanisation	
externally.	This	 lack	of	EU	competences	 in	 foreign	energy	policy,	however,	should	not	be	pre-judged	against	the	potential	utility	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	vis-à-vis	the	SGC.	 Indeed,	 successful	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 externally	 has	 the	 potential	 to	alter	 the	 international	 environment	 that	 the	 Union	 interacts	 with,	 by	 reducing	(geo)political	 and	 (geo)economic	 uncertainty	 for	 transit	 of	 natural	 gas	 along	 the	 SGC	route.	Hence,	in	the	absence	of	the	classical	actorness	of	the	EU	in	international	relations,	the	 lack	of	conventional	capacity	 for	external	 action	 is	being	potentially	compensated	by	absorbing	 the	 external	 into	 the	 internal	 in	 institutional	 terms.9	 Accordingly,	 Chapter	 III	argues	 that,	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance	 entails	 power	 implications,	 for	 if	
                                                            9	For	original	conceptual	discussions	on	this	matter,	see	Michael	Smith,	‘The	European	Union	and	a	Changing	Europe:	Establishing	the	Boundaries	of	Order’,	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies,	34.1	(1996),	5–28.	
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successful,	it	will	limit	the	capacity	of	the	SGC	countries	to	use	energy	supply/transit	as	a	tool	 of	 their	 strategic	 policy-making,	 consequently	 diminishing	 their	 relative	 national	power	vis-à-vis	the	EU.	Within	 this	 broader	 goal,	 Chapter	 III	 also	 investigates	 the	 specific	 elements	 in	 the	 EU	energy	 legislation	 that	 is	 most	 relevant	 to	 eliminating	 transit	 and	 market	 access	 risks	along	the	SGC.	These	elements	will	serve	as	benchmarks	for	comparatively	describing	the	success	or	the	failure	of	the	EU's	external	energy	governance	in	Chapters	IV,	V	and	VI		(in	other	 words,	 whether	 the	 SGC	 countries	 and	 natural	 gas	 infrastructure	 projects	 are	 in	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis	or	not).	In	 Chapters	 IV,	 V	 and	 VI,	 I	 concentrate	 on	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 regulatory	dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 three	 key	 SGC	 transit	 countries,	 namely,	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	Azerbaijan	 and	argue	 that,	 multiple	 domestic	 adoption	 costs	 have	 so	 far	 prevented	 the	Europeanisation	 of	 the	 natural	 gas	 sectors	 in	 these	 countries.	 These	 costs	 present	 a	pattern	 but	 are	 not	 identical	 in	 all	 three	 countries.	 In	 Chapter	 IV,	 I	 investigate	 the	Europeanisation	 of	 Turkey's	 natural	 gas	 legislation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 country's	 EU	accession	negotiations,	highlighting	 that	 the	 transposition	and	 implementation	of	 the	EU	energy	acquis	have	not	taken	place.	Several	factors	are	noted	to	have	played	an	inhibitive	role	in	this	regard.	Despite	Turkey’s	decade-long	candidate	status,	the	achievement	of	the	final	 reward	 (EU	membership)	 is	 still	 uncertain,	which	diminishes	 the	motivation	of	 the	Turkish	 government	 to	 adopt	 EU	 natural	 gas	 legislation.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 uncertainty	with	regard	to	eventual	EU	membership	only	partially	explains	this	state	of	affairs,	as	the	application	of	the	general	EU	energy	acquis	to	Turkey	has	been	selective	rather	than	non-existent.			The	Turkish	government	has	been	keen	to	capitalise	on	the	EU	experience	in	certain	areas	of	 energy	policy	 (especially,	 renewable	 energy,	 electricity	 sector	 and	 in	 terms	of	 energy	efficiency),	 but	 reluctant	 in	 others	 (natural	 gas).	 This	 reluctance	 is	 assessed	 through	 an	evaluation	of	 the	net	domestic	costs	 that	Turkey	would	 incur	 in	adopting	the	EU	natural	gas	 legislation	 without	 receiving	 credible	 and	 foreseeable	 membership	 prospects	 in	return.	Turkey	is	not	only	a	net	gas	consumer,	but	also	a	key	transit	country	between	the	Caspian	 Basin/Middle	 Eastern	 gas	 reserves	 and	 the	 EU	 markets.	 It	 presents	 the	 only	commercially	and	politically	viable	corridor	for	the	evacuation	of	these	gas	reserves	to	the	EU	 using	 pipeline	 transportation.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 political	 control	 over	 the	main	 transit	 lines	 contributes	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 muscles	 of	 the	 Turkish	government	 and	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 Turkey's	 (geo)economic	 and	 (geo)political	strategy.	The	institutionalisation	of	Turkish	natural	gas	sector	in	accordance	with	the	EU	
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template,	 therefore,	 would	 diminish	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	 to	 a)	 secure	ample	and	cheap	gas	supplies	for	its	domestic	consumers	and	b)	capitalise	on	its	strategic	geographical	 location	when	pursuing	(geo)political	goals	both	vis-à-vis	 the	EU	and	other	regional	countries.	Thus,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 in	 this	 area	 at	 least,	 the	Turkish	 government	 seems	 to	 be	paying	only	 lip	 service	 to	 harmonising	 its	 domestic	 policies	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 ensuring	freedom	 of	 gas	 transit	 across	 its	 territory	 in	 a	 liberalised	 and	 depoliticised	 manner.	 In	reality,	 however,	 the	 government	 is	 keen	 on	 holding	 onto	 its	 formal	 capacity	 to	 exert	control	 over	 the	 transit	 of	 gas	 across	 its	 sovereign	 territory	 and	 thereby,	 influencing	regional	(and	continental)	energy	supply	and	geopolitics.	This	state	of	affairs	potentially	endangers	the	freedom	gas	transit	and	overall	gas	supply	potential	 of	 this	 alternative	corridor.	 Transit	 hurdles	 across	 Turkey	will	 still	 have	 to	 be	addressed	at	the	political	level	(as	opposed	to	under	market	governance)	if	additional	gas	volumes	from	Iraq,	Turkmenistan,	Iran	(whenever	politically	feasible)	and	Azerbaijan	are	to	 be	 supplied	 to	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 future.	 This,	 consequently,	 renders	 the	 EU	 strategy	 to	depoliticise	its	energy	supply	corridors	unsuccessful	and	leaves	gas	supply	via	the	Turkish	segment	 of	 SGC	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 conflicting	 political	 and	 economic	 interests	 of	 the	Turkish	government.	In	 Chapters	 V	 and	 VI,	 I	 investigate	 the	 regulatory	dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 relation	 to	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	 in	 the	context	of	 their	 further	 integration	with	 the	EU	under	 the	Eastern	 Partnership.	 Georgia	 is	 legally	 (contractually)	 committed	 to	 approximate	 its	domestic	 legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 as	 part	 of	 the	 signature	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	Association	Agreement	(AA).	The	same	commitment	is	also	expected	to	be	undertaken	by	the	Georgian	government	when/if	it	joins	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	(EnCT)	following	the	on-going	 accession	negotiations.	Georgia	pursues	EU	membership	 aspirations	 and	 is	keen	on	signing	up	for	a	closer	partnership	with	the	EU,	which	it	is	hoped,	will	improve	its	EU	 membership	 prospects	 in	 the	 long-term.	 However,	 in	 the	 short-to-medium	 term	Georgia	 is	 concerned	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 its	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 on	 the	 transit	benefits	and	cheap	domestic	gas	that	it	currently	receives	from	Azerbaijan.	This	situation	is	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	Georgia	 is	not	directly	 linked	to	the	single	EU	market	and	cannot	engage	in	liberalised	energy	trade	from	the	Union.	Therefore,	in	order	to	minimise	the	 economic	 and	 energy	 security	 costs	 of	 rule	 adoption	 in	 the	 absence	 of	membership	prospects	 under	 the	 EaP,	 the	 Georgian	 government	 intends	 to	 balance	 the	 depth	 and	timeline	of	its	adoption	of	the	EU	acquis	against	its	needs	to	receive	these	benefits.	
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Unlike	Georgia,	Azerbaijan,	 examined	 in	Chapter	VI	of	 this	 thesis,	has	not	undertaken	 to	transpose	EU	acquis	 domestically.	Moreover,	 rule	 adoption	 in	 the	natural	 gas	 sector	has	not	 taken	 place	 as	 part	 of	 the	 non-binding	 EU	 programmes	 that	 Azerbaijan	 has	 been	participating	 during	 the	 past	 decade.	While	 the	 absence	 of	 EU	membership	 aspirations	coupled	with	 its	 stronger	bargaining	position	vis-à-vis	 the	EU,	due	 to	 its	 supplier	 status,	can	 be	 considered	 as	 factors	 underpinning	 the	 failure	 of	 rule	 adoption	 by	 Azerbaijan,	 I	argue	 that	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 constitute	 decisive	 reasons.	 More	 significant	 are	 the	domestic	and	strategic	 (opportunity)	costs	 that	 the	approximation	of	 the	Azeri	domestic	legislation	to	the	EU	acquis	would	entail.	The	adoption	of	the	EU	acquis	would	decrease	the	energy	 revenues	 of	 Azeri	 government	 by	 opening	 up	 the	 domestic	 gas	 market	 to	competition.	 In	 addition,	 it	would	 incur	 opportunity	 costs	 by	 facilitating	 the	 freedom	of	transit	of	Central	Asian	gas	to	the	European	markets	via	Azerbaijani	territory	and	transit	lines,	which	would	eventually	compete	against	Azeri	gas	in	the	EU	and	Turkish	markets	in	a	way	that	may	not	be	favourable	to	the	country’s	commercial	and	(geo)political	interests.	Chapters	 IV,	V	and	VI	 reveal	 that,	 the	Europeanisation	of	 the	key	 transit	 countries	along	the	SGC	has	failed	so	far,	for	reasons	related	primarily	to	net	adoption	costs	by	the	target	countries.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 adequate	 rewards	 from	 the	 EU,	 the	 implementation	 of	external	EU	governance	preferences	would	incur	sizeable	costs	that	are	not	justified	by	the	potential	 benefits.	As	 a	 result,	 each	non-EU	 segment	 of	 the	 SGC	will	 be	 governed	by	 the	transit	and	market	access	rules	established	by	the	relevant	regional	actors,	which	do	not	necessarily	share	similar	transit	and	supply	interests	with	the	EU.	This	will	allow	them	to	tailor	the	access	of	third-party	gas	producers,	especially	from	Central	Asia	and	the	Middle	East,	to	the	European	markets	to	their	own	commercial	and	(geo)political	interests.	The	Southern	Gas	Corridor	 is	 currently	slated	 to	bring	10	bcm/a	gas	 to	 the	EU	 from	the	year	2020.	These	volumes	could	be	tripled	or	even	quadrupled	if	other	potential	regional	suppliers,	 such	 as	 Iran,	 Iraq	 and	 Turkmenistan	 were	 linked	 to	 the	 SGC.	 Failure	 of	Europeanisation	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 Georgia	 and	 Turkey,	 however,	 is	 likely	 to	 hamper	 these	prospects.	 Indeed,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 future	potential	 of	 the	 SGC	 remains	uncertain,	 as	 the	regulatory	hurdles	may	well	create	capacity	bottlenecks	for	the	Central	Asian	and	Middle	Eastern	gas	suppliers.	This	will	also	negatively	affect	the	competitiveness	of	the	EU	natural	gas	supply	via	the	SGC.		
Contribution	By	 investigating	 the	 SGC	 in	 a	 two-dimensional	 policy	 framework	 (hardware	 and	
regulatory),	 the	contribution	of	 this	PhD	transcends	the	boundaries	of	any	single	subject	domain.	 Firstly,	 it	 contributes	 to	 Security	 Studies/International	 Relations	 and	 in	
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particular,	 work	 on	 energy	 security.	 With	 its	 special	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 formal	
institutions	in	dealing	with	challenges	to	energy	supply	in	a	strategic	context,	it	presents	an	important	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 bridging	 the	 diverging	 positions	 of	 the	 Liberal	 and	Realist	approaches	to	energy	security	in	Security	Studies	domain.	The	 thesis	 also	 makes	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	 EU	 Studies,	 particularly	 work	 on	external	 relations	 and	 Europeanisation.	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 EU	Eastern	 Partnership	 strategy,	 which	 as	 a	 young	 policy	 framework	 has	 yet	 to	 be	comprehensively	 researched	 in	 an	 academic	 setting.	 Therefore,	 by	 investigating	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 formal	 institutions	 in	 the	 natural	 gas	 sectors	 of	 Azerbaijan	 and	Georgia,	the	two	of	the	six	EaP	countries,	this	thesis	does	not	limit	itself	with	the	analysis	of	 energy	 security	 alone.	It	 also	provides	a	 first-hand	empirical	 analysis	of	 the	EU's	new	external	policy	tool,	which	seeks	the	extension	of	the	EU's	regulatory	space	over	the	ENP	countries	without	providing	EU	membership	prospects.	This	 PhD	 also	 provides	 a	 substantial	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 EU	international	relations.	In	this	view,	the	significance	of	this	thesis	is	in	its	investigation	of	the	inter-relations	between	the	scope	of	the	EU	internal	energy	policy	and	the	EU	external	policy	action	in	natural	gas	sector.	In	support	of	the	existing	theoretical	literature,10	hence,	this	 PhD	 brings	 together	 the	 internal	 and	 external	aspects	 of	 the	 EU's	 International	Relations	 and	 provides	 first-hand	 empirical	 investigation	 on	 the	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	success	and	failure	of	the	EU	external	policy	actions.	Finally,	 by	 providing	 comprehensive	 factual	 analysis	 of	 each	 of	 the	 individual	 policy	strands	pursued	by	 the	EU	 in	relation	 to	 the	SGC,	 the	 thesis	contributes	 to	 the	empirical	knowledge	 in	 the	 growing	 literature	 on	 the	 EU	 energy	 security	 in	 particular.	 This	 is	especially	relevant	given	the	fact	that	a	big	number	of	milestone	events	related	to	the	SGC	took	place	during	the	accomplishment	of	this	PhD.	Therefore,	the	research	can	serve	as	a	source	of	 information	for	a	potential	secondary	analysis	of	 the	EU	energy	security	 in	the	future.		
                                                            10	Christopher	Hill,	The	Changing	Politics	of	Foreign	Policy	 (Houndmills,	Basingstoke,	Hampshire ;	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	 2003);	Michael	 E.	 Smith,	 ‘Institutionalization,	 Policy	 Adaptation	 and	 European	 Foreign	Policy	Cooperation’,	European	Journal	of	International	Relations,	10.1	(2004),	95–136.	
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CHAPTER	I:	FOCUS,	OBJECTIVES	AND	THE	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	OF	THE	RESEARCH	
1.	Introduction	
Energy	security	is	one	of	the	most	significant	and	seemingly	daunting	problems	of	modern	societies.	Energy	security	is	problematic	not	simply	because	it	is	the	backbone	of	everyday	human	activities,	but	because	it	is	plagued	by	different	interpretations	and	implications	of	the	 major	 concepts	 (energy	 as	 a	 strategic	 vs.	 ordinary	 commodity)	 and	 definitions	(producers'	 vs.	 consumers'	 definition	 of	 energy	 security)	 throughout	 the	 spectrum	 of	energy	 politics.	 These	 differences	 in	 opinion	 create	 problems	 for	 researchers	 and	policymakers	 alike	 and	 are	 often	 aggravated	 by	 the	 contentions	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	problem,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 disagreements	 about	 the	 real	 problems	 on	 the	 ground	 as	opposed	to	the	perceptions	thereof.	As	 if	 these	were	not	enough,	time	brings	forth	a	new	dimension	for	complication,	where	differences	in	opinion	vary	and	evolve	throughout	the	timespan	producing	new	concerns	that	previously	were	not	part	of	the	political	strategies.	Against	the	backdrop	of	these	uncertainties	and	plurality	of	opinion,	the	main	aim	of	this	thesis	is	the	assessment	of	the	regulatory	aspects	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	strategy	of	the	EU,	which	aims	to	ensure	the	energy	security11	of	the	EU	member	states	by	diversifying	energy	 supply	 towards	 massive	 and	 yet	 largely	 untapped	 natural	 gas	 reserves	 of	 the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	East	(see	Fig.	1).	The	SGC	strategy	emerged	as	one	of	the	top	priorities	of	 the	EU	energy	policy	 following	the	successive	gas	cut-offs	to	the	EU	in	2006	and	 2009,	 caused	 by	 the	 disputes	 between	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	 its	main	 supply	transit	country	Ukraine.	Gas	reserves	in	the	Caspian	and	Middle	Eastern	regions	present	a	unique	opportunity	for	the	EU	not	only	in	terms	of	ensuring	diversity	of	energy	provision,	but	also	due	to	the	relatively	low	costs	associated	with	gas	production	therein.	The	latter	represents	a	competitive	advantage	vis-à-vis	the	Russian	gas	supplied	from	Western	and	Eastern	Siberia.12	In	 general	 terms,	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 is	 a	 broad	 geographical	 area	 encompassing	 all	 the	Caspian	 littoral	 states,	 as	well	 as	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 South	 Caucasus	 and	 Central	 Asia,	
                                                            11	Although	the	definition	of	energy	security	encompasses	all	the	available	sources	of	energy	supply,	including	oil,	 gas,	 coal,	 nuclear,	 solar,	 wind,	 hydro,	 bio-energy,	 etc.,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 PhD	 I	 will	 be	 specifically	referring	to	natural	gas	security,	unless	explicitly	mentioned	otherwise.	12	Mert	Bilgin,	 ‘Geopolitics	 of	European	Natural	Gas	Demand:	 Supplies	 from	Russia,	 Caspian	 and	 the	Middle	East’,	Energy	Policy,	37.11	(2009),	4482–92	(p.	4485).	
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which	do	not	have	direct	 access	 to	 the	Caspian	 Sea	 as	 such.	The	 area	 includes	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	 Georgia,	 Iran,	 Kazakhstan,	 Russian	 Federation,	 Turkmenistan,	 Tajikistan,	Kirgizstan	 and	 Uzbekistan.	 However,	 when	 referring	 to	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 natural	 gas	reserves,	 I	 will,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 refer	 specifically	 to	 Azerbaijan	 and	Turkmenistan,	unless	stated	otherwise.	Both	Russia	and	Iran	directly	border	the	Caspian	Sea	and	possess	 the	 first	and	the	second	 largest	gas	reserves	 in	 the	world.	However,	 the	major	geographical	areas	of	energy	production	 for	either	 country	are	Siberia/Arctic	and	the	 Persian	Gulf	 (Middle	 East),	 respectively.	 Therefore,	 neither	 is	 considered	 as	Caspian	energy	producers.	Additionally,	although	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan	possess	natural	gas	reserves,	all	of	 the	produced	natural	gas	 in	either	country	 is	used	for	domestic	purposes	and	 are	 not	 export-oriented.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 Caspian	 region	 countries	 do	 not	 possess	natural	 gas	 resources.	 Additionally,	when	 referring	 to	 the	Middle	 Eastern	 gas	 reserve,	 I	will	have	Iran	and	Iraq	in	mind.	
Fig.	1:	Conceptual	map	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor		|	Created	by	the	author	using	publically	available	info.	
		In	this	context,	this	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	argue	that,	although	the	SGC	strategy	of	the	EU	has	attracted	a	great	deal	of	academic	research	in	the	past,	the	existing	literature	has	largely	 ignored	 the	 institutional	 aspects	 of	 the	 development	 of	 this	 alternative	 energy	corridor,	which	concerns	the	role	of	the	market	rules	and	practices	in	energy	supply	and	transit.	By	putting	the	analysis	of	these	issues	at	the	heart	of	this	thesis,	I	aim	to	present	a	
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new	 outlook	 to	 the	 prospective	 role	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 ensuring	 the	 EU	 energy	 security	 and	contribute	to	academic	knowledge	from	the	perspective	of	the	EU	external	governance.	Below,	I	first	describe	the	research	focus	and	outline	the	main	research	questions	and	the	arguments	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Secondly,	 I	 examine	 the	 definition	 of	 energy	 supply	 in	 the	 EU	context	 and	 analyse	 the	 institutional	 aspects	 of	 the	 SGC	 within	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	policy	 in	 conceptual	 terms.	 The	 latter	 locates	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 research	 within	 the	 EU	external	governance,	which	envisages	the	Europeanisation	of	non-EU	countries.	Thirdly,	I	present	the	literature	review	on	the	SGC	and	demonstrate	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	addressing	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 academic	 literature.	 Fourthly,	 I	 present	 Rational	 Choice	Institutionalism	(RCI)	and	its	first-order	adaptation	External	Incentive	Model	(EIM)	as	my	preferred	theoretical	framework,	as	they	better	engage	with	the	research	questions	of	this	thesis.	 Finally,	 I	 outline	 the	 research	 design	 and	 methods,	 which	 I	 employ	 in	 order	 to	achieve	the	objectives	of	this	thesis.	
2.	Research	focus	and	objectives	
Energy	 security	 is	 not	 a	 constant	 concept,	 but	 an	 evolving	 and	 expanding	 one.	 If	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 energy	 security	 of	 the	 European	 countries	 was	associated	with	ample	and	diverse	supply	of	oil	 (which	was	 imported	 from	abroad)	at	a	reasonable	price,13	this	approach	changed	at	the	end	of	the	same	century.	Although	today	the	 European	 countries	 have	 a	much	more	 diverse	 energy	mix,	 consisting	 of	 both	 fossil	fuels	and	renewable	energy	sources	(RES),	in	2012	34%	and	23%	of	total	domestic	energy	demand	was	still	met	by	oil	and	natural	gas,	respectively.	Moreover,	90%	of	oil	and	66%	of	consumed	 gas	 is	 supplied	 to	 the	 EU	 by	 third	 countries,	 while	 indigenous	 European	production	 is	 in	 continuous	 decline.	 Against	 this	 backdrop	 and	 due	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	energy	to	economic	growth,	as	well	as	to	national	security,	pursuing	strategies	to	ensure	adequate	energy	supply	has	come	to	constitute	one	of	the	top	priorities	of	the	EU	policy-making.	The	 beginning	 of	 the	 EU's	 energy	 policy	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 Treaties	 establishing	 the	European	Economic	Community	 in	 the	1950s.	The	European	Coal	 and	Steel	Community,	founded	by	the	Treaty	of	Paris	in	1951,	was	the	first	step	in	instituting	a	common	energy	policy	of	 the	predecessor	of	 the	modern	EU,	but	also	 the	very	existence	of	 the	European	Economic	Community	that	was	fully	established	later	in	1957	by	the	Treaty	of	Rome.	The	
                                                            13	Daniel	Yergin,	‘Energy	Security	and	Markets’,	in	Energy	and	Security:	Toward	a	New	Foreign	Policy	Strategy,	ed.	by	Jan	H.	Kalichi	and	David	L.	Goldwyn	(Washington,	D.C.:	Woodrow	Wilson	Centre	Press,	2005),	pp.	51–64	(p.	52).	
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Treaty	of	Paris	envisaged	a	common	policy	and	control	over	the	coal	and	steel	production,	which	 were	 the	 bedrocks	 of	 war	 industries	 at	 the	 time.	 It	 later	 followed	 by	 the	establishment	of	 the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	 (EAEC	or	Euroatom)	 in	1958.	Euroatom	 was	 the	 first	 common	 policy	 in	 ensuring	 energy	 security	 throughout	 the	Community	territory	as	the	switch	from	coal	to	oil	raised	the	concerns	about	the	scarcity	of	oil	reserves	in	the	territory	of	participant	states	and	thereby	manifested	the	necessity	of	diversifying	energy	supply	mix.	It	also	marked	the	start	of	supranational	level	integration	in	 securing	 energy	 supply	 via	 creation	 of	 common	 rules	 governing	 (nuclear)	 energy	provision	and	streamlining	the	policies	of	individual	members.14	The	 Community-wide	 policy	 on	 natural	 gas,	 however,	 did	 not	 appear	 on	 the	Union/Community's	daily	agenda	until	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	when	the	Gas	Transit	
Directive	was	adopted	in	1991	in	order	to	facilitate	the	access	to	gas	pipelines	 in	Europe	after	fall	of	the	Socialist	camp.	Later,	in	the	mid-1990s	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	ruling	recognised	natural	gas	a	good	"like	any	other",	which	paved	way	to	the	community	policy-making	on	natural	gas	in	the	context	of	the	development	of	internal	energy	market	(IEM).15	 Subsequently,	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 policy	 saw	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 First	 (1998),	
Second	 (2003)	 and	 Third	 (2009)	 Energy	 Packages,	 each	 taking	 the	 liberalisation	 and	integration	of	the	natural	gas	markets	of	the	member	states	a	step	further,	while	at	times	running	ahead	of	Treaty	clauses.16	In	line	with	the	overarching	principles	of	the	EU	energy	policy	-	competitiveness,	security	of	
supply	 and	 sustainability,17	 EU	 policy	 on	 natural	 gas	 is	 aimed	 at	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	single	 EU-wide	 competitive	 natural	 gas	 market,	 which	 envisions	 policy	 actions	 at	 two	levels18:	 1)	 hardware	 (physical	 integration	 of	 the	 national	 markets	 of	 the	 EU	 member	states),	 and	 2)	 software	 (establishment	 of	 rules	 regulating	 the	 single	 market;	 in	 order	words	the	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	market	rules	of	the	member	states).	As	I	will	further	analyse	 in	Chapter	 III,	 the	 latter	 is	 aimed	at	 liberalisation	and	depoliticisation	of	the	 supply	 of	 energy	 to	 the	 consumers	 and	 make	 it	 subject	 to	 competitive	 market	
                                                            14	 José	María	Marín	Quemada,	Carlos	Velasco	and	Beatriz	Muñoz,	 ‘Energy	Security	of	Supply	and	EU	Energy	Policy’,	 in	Energy	Security	for	the	EU	in	the	21st	Century:	Markets,	Geopolitics	and	Corridors,	ed.	by	José	María	Marín	 Quemada,	 Javier	 García-Verdugo,	 and	 Gonzalo	 Escribano	 (London;	 New	 York:	 Routledge,	 2012),	 pp.	195–209;	Buchan,	Energy	and	Climate	Change:	Europe	at	the	Crossroads,	p.	6.	15	Yafimava,	The	EU	Third	Package	for	Gas	and	the	Gas	Target	Model,	p.	2;	see	also,	Buchan,	Energy	and	Climate	
Change:	Europe	at	the	Crossroads,	p.	9.	16	Buchan,	Energy	and	Climate	Change:	Europe	at	the	Crossroads,	p.	9.	17	Green	Paper:	A	European	Strategy	for	Sustainable,	Competitive	and	Secure	Energy,	COM	(2006)	105	(European	Commission,	 2006);	 ‘European	 Council	 Presidency	 Conclusions,	 7224/1/07’,	 p.	 11;	 ‘Treaty	 of	 Lisbon:	Amending	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Treaty	 Establishing	 the	 European	 Community’,	 Official	
Journal	of	the	European	Union,	50.C	306	(2007),	Article	176A.	18	A	Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	Policy	COM(2015)	
80	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	2015),	pp.	8–10.	
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dynamics.	 Although	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 single	 market	 serves	 as	 an	 underlying	framework	 for	 ensuring	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 supply	 security,	 the	 latter	 also	 necessitates,	among	others,	the	diversification	of	sources	and	routes	of	supply	of	imported	energy.19	In	order	to	facilitate	the	diversity	of	energy	supplies,	it	was	in	its	Second	Strategic	Energy	Review	 (SSER)	 that	 the	 EC	 identified	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	(SGC)20	as	an	important	policy	strategy,	aimed	at	sourcing	significant	amounts	of	gas	from	the	 Caspian	 Basin	 and	 the	 Middle	 East	 (namely,	 Azerbaijan,	 Turkmenistan,	 Uzbekistan,	Iran,	Iraq	and	Mashreq	countries).21	The	SGC	strategy	serves	as	an	external	enabler	of	the	EU's	domestic	market	integration	policy,22	as	it	is	to	bring	new	volumes	to	the	EU	markets	from	 previously	 untapped	 sources	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 necessary	infrastructure	(hardware).	These	new	volumes	can	reduce	supply	risks	by	compensating	the	 decline	 of	 the	 indigenous	 EU	 production,	 bringing	 about	 competitive	 market-based	supply	 security	 and	 improving	 the	 overall	 resilience	 of	 the	 system	 by	 reducing	vulnerability	 against	 unexpected	 supply	 shocks;	 including	 (geo)political	 challenges	stemming	 from	over-reliance	 on	 concentrated	 supply	 sources.	 In	 other	words,	 SGC	 is	 to	contribute	 to	 addressing	 the	pre-existing	 challenges	by	diversifying	energy	 supplies	 and	transportation	routes.		Nonetheless,	the	policy	objectives	promoted	by	the	EU	in	relation	to	the	SGC	is	not	limited	to	 the	 physical	 establishment	 of	 the	 necessary	 infrastructure	 to	 transport	 new	 gas	volumes	to	the	EU	market(s).	Mirroring	the	policies	undertaken	within	the	EU	borders,	the	SGC	strategy	also	includes	policy	actions	in	relation	to	the	institutional	(software)	aspects	of	the	development	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	This	is	an	especially	germane	issue	for	 the	EU	given	 that	gas	volumes	 to	be	supplied	via	 the	SGC	 from	different	sources	will	have	 to	 travel	more	 than	3000	km	and	will	 potentially	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 transit	
risks	of	(geo)political	and	(geo)economic	nature	before	reaching	the	EU	borders.	Although	EU	 lacks	 formal	 competences	 in	 market	 regulation	 beyond	 its	 borders,	Europeanisation	remains	its	preferred	policy	tool	for	tackling	non-market	risks	to	energy	supply	and	ensuring	freedom	of	transit	along	the	SGC,	too.	In	its	relevant	policy	documents,	
                                                            19	A	Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	Policy	COM(2015)	
80,	pp.	4–5;	‘Green	Paper	-	Towards	a	European	Strategy	for	the	Security	of	Energy	Supply,	COM	(2000)	0769’	(European	Commission,	2000),	p.	2.	20	 Officially,	 Southern	 Corridor	was	 first	mentioned	 in	 the	 Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review	 of	 the	 European	Commission	in	2008.	The	term	later	came	to	refer	to	the	alternative	natural	gas	corridor	across	Turkey,	which	is	to	link	EU	with	the	Caspian	Basin	and	Middle	Eastern	gas	reserves;	thus	evolving	into	Southern	Gas	Corridor	(SGC)	in	the	official	EU	documents	and	legislative	acts.	21	 ‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’,	p.	4;	
Council	 Conclusions	 on	 ‘Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review	 -	 An	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	 Solidarity	 Action	 Plan’	(Brussels:	The	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2009);	A	Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	
Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	Policy	COM(2015)	80,	p.	4.	22	Energy	2020:	A	Strategy	for	Competitive,	Sustainable	and	Secure	Energy,	COM(2010)	639,	2010,	p.	10.	
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the	EU	has	specifically	pointed	out	that,	transit	issues	along	the	SGC	has	to	be	resolved	in	line	with	 the	principles	of	 the	EU	acquis23	 (accumulated	 legislation,	which	 constitute	 the	body	of	the	EU	law).		In	 itself,	 the	 export	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 presents	 not	 only	 a	 potential	 model	 for	 the	organisation	of	 the	non-EU	markets	 in	general,	but	also	helps	 to	make	up	 for	 the	 lack	of	state	attributes	(external	energy	competencies)	of	the	EU	in	dealing	with	non-EU	actors	at	the	political	level.	By	expanding	EU	acquis	beyond	its	borders,	the	EU	is	aiming	to	establish	a	 political	milieu	 through	which	 it	 can	 pursue	 its	 (energy)	 preferences	 at	 the	 technical-expert	 level	 where	 it	 enjoys	 extensive	 expertise.	 As	 the	 champions	 of	 the	 external	governance	 literature	 put	 it,	 "[t]he	 EU	 is	 best	 at	 expanding	 governance	 where	 it	 can	
translate	political	problems	into	technocratic	ones,	and	where	it	can	deal	with	technocrats,	
bureaucrats	and	market	actors."24	In	order	to	facilitate	this	objective,	the	Declaration	of	the	Prague	Summit	on	Southern	Gas	Corridor	on	May	8,	2009	stated	that	the	SGC	concept	is	a	synergy	of	different	policy	instruments,	inter	alia,	EU-Azerbaijan,	EU-Georgia	Partnership	and	 Cooperation	 Agreements,	 Association	 Agreement	 with	 Turkey,	 European	Neighbourhood	 Policy/Eastern	 Partnership	 (ENP/EaP),	 EU-Azerbaijan	 memorandum	 of	understanding	on	energy	and	other	bilateral	and	multilateral	documents	signed	by	the	EU	and	 relevant	 third	 countries.25	 As	 I	 will	 investigate	 in	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 III,	 these	 policy	initiatives	 aim	 at	 integrating	 the	 relevant	 third-countries	 to	 the	 EU	 markets	 by	harmonising	 their	 domestic	 market	 rules	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 and	 constitute	 an	external	element	of	the	EU	energy	policy	in	general.	Indeed,	if	the	alternative	gas	supplies	via	the	SGC	are	to	play	a	significant	role	in	ensuring	the	competitiveness	of	the	EU	gas	suppliers,	then	EU-sourced	regulatory	treatment	of	the	SGC	 beyond	 the	 EU	 borders	 is	 only	 the	 logical	 continuation	 of	 the	 EU's	 domestic	 gas	market	 policy.26	 This	 is	 especially	 encouraged	 by	 the	 fact	 that,	 unlike	 other	 EU	 pipeline	corridors	(i.e.	Norwegian,	Russian,	Algerian/Libyan),	the	SGC	will	allow	the	EU	to	tap	into	several	 production	 basins	 simultaneously.	 Thus,	 the	 necessity	 of	 ensuring	 free-market	governance	and	reducing	 transit	 risks	 for	gas	supply	along	 the	SGC	make	 it	all	 the	more	
                                                            23	 See	 e.g.	 ‘Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review:	 An	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	 Solidarity	 Action	 Plan,	 COM(2008)	781’,	p.	4;	‘European	Council	Presidency	Conclusions,	7224/1/07’,	p.	16;	‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’,	p.	7.	24	Glada	Lahn,	Stephen	Padgett	and	Sandra	Lavenex,	External	European	Union	Governance	 in	Energy	and	 the	
Environment	(Chatham	House:	Energy,	Environment	and	Development	Programme,	16	September	2009),	p.	9;	see	 also,	 Michael	 Smith,	 ‘Between	 Two	Worlds?	 The	 European	 Union,	 the	 United	 States	 and	World	 Order’,	
International	Politics,	41.1	(2004),	95–117.	25	‘Prague	Summit	Declarations:	Southern	Corridor’	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2009),	p.	2.	26	Following	the	proposal	by	the	EC,	this	was	explicitly	endorsed	by	the	Council	 in	its	conclusions	on	Second	Strategic	Energy	Review.	Council	Conclusions	on	 ‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review	-	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	
Solidarity	Action	Plan’,	p.	3.	
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relevant	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 also	 foster	 EU	 acquis-based	 regulation	 of	 this	 alternative	 energy	corridor.		Although,	 as	 I	 demonstrate	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 section,	 EU's	 efforts	 to	 export	 its	energy	acquis	to	non-EU	countries	has	been	considerably	acknowledged	by	the	academic	literature,27	 the	major	 and	 considerably	 new	 avenues	 of	 this	 rule	 extension	 have	 so	 far	been	under-investigated.	Especially	lacking	is	the	thorough	analysis	of	the	energy	related	rule	expansion	and	enforcement	mechanisms	under	the	latest	contractual	commitments	in	relation	 to	Azerbaijan	 and	Georgia	within	 the	ENP/EaP	policy	 framework.	This	 is	 partly	conditioned	by	the	 fact	 that,	 the	 latter	policy	 instrument	 is	considerably	new	in	the	EU's	external	 governance	 repertoire	 and	 its	 contractual	 outcome	 materialised	 only	 in	 2014.	Secondly,	 the	existing	 literature	does	not	provide	detailed	empirical	 analysis	of	how	 the	EU	energy	 (natural	 gas)	acquis	 can	potentially	 address	 transit	 risks	 along	 the	 SGC.	Even	less	so,	there	is	a	deficiency	of	systematic	academic	research	on	the	factors	that	condition	the	success	and/or	failure	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	in	the	context	of	the	SGC	within	 the	 discipline	 of	 International	 Relations	 and	 EU	 studies,	where	 this	 PhD	 aims	 to	address	the	gap	in	the	academic	literature.	Having	all	these	important	issues	in	mind,	this	thesis	aims	to	address	the	following	research	questions:	I. What	 is	 the	 main	 political-economic	 rationale	 behind	 the	 EU	 policy	 of	
Europeanisation	towards	the	institutional	governance	of	the	SGC?	II. What	factors	condition	the	success/failure	of	the	EU	efforts	to	Europeanise	the	
SGC?	This	is	not	to	claim	that	there	is	no	research	on	this	subject.	For	example,	Bosse,28	Finon,29	Escribano	 Francés30	 make	 a	 broad	 conceptual	 reference	 to	 the	 potential	 implications	 of	Europeanisation	of	energy	corridors	to	the	EU	energy	security,	without	providing	detailed	
                                                            27	See	e.g.	Youngs,	Europe’s	External	Energy	Policy:	Between	Geopolitics	and	the	Market;	Oscar	Pardo	Sierra,	‘A	Corridor	 through	 Thorns:	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	 the	 Southern	 Energy	 Corridor’,	 European	 Security,	 19.4	(2010),	 643–60;	 Buchan,	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change:	 Europe	 at	 the	 Crossroads,	 p.	 84;	 Lahn,	 Padgett	 and	Lavenex,	 External	 European	 Union	 Governance	 in	 Energy	 and	 the	 Environment;	 Giselle	 Bosse,	 ‘The	 EU’s	Geopolitical	 Vision	 of	 a	 European	 Energy	 Space:	 When	 “Gulliver”	 Meets	 “White	 Elephants”	 and	 Verdi’s	Babylonian	 King’,	 Geopolitics,	 16.3	 (2011),	 512–35;	 Dominique	 Finon	 and	 Catherine	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	 Geopolitics?’,	Energy	 Policy,	 36.1	 (2008),	423–42	 (p.	 427);	 Gonzalo	 Escribano	 Francés,	 ‘Market	 or	 Geopolitics?	 The	 Europeanization	 of	 EU’s	 Energy	Corridors’,	ed.	by	John	Psarras,	International	Journal	of	Energy	Sector	Management,	5.1	(2011),	39–59.	28	Bosse,	‘The	EU’s	Geopolitical	Vision	of	a	European	Energy	Space:	When	“Gulliver”	Meets	“White	Elephants”	and	Verdi’s	Babylonian	King’;	see	also	Sohbet	Karbuz,	‘Review	of	the	EU	Strategy	on	Energy	towards	the	Black	and	Caspian	Sea	Basins’	(presented	at	the	European	Union’s	stress	test	for	its	multilateral	approach:	Prospects	for	fostering	regional	cooperation,	Tallinn:	EU4seas,	2011),	p.	8.	29	Dominique	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	
OPEC	Energy	Review,	 35.1	 (2011),	 47–69;	 Finon	and	Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	European	Gas	 Interdependence:	Could	Contractual	Trade	Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	427.	30	Escribano	Francés,	‘Market	or	Geopolitics?	The	Europeanization	of	EU’s	Energy	Corridors’.	
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analysis	 of	 external	 governance	 in	 natural	 gas	 sector	 in	 general	 and	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor	 in	 particular.	 Additionally,	 although	 the	 research	 undertaken	 by	 Winrow31	 in	relation	 to	 the	 SGC	 is	 empirically	 extensive,	 it	 does	 not	 present	 a	 conceptually	 and	theoretically	well-grounded	analysis	of	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC.	Furthermore,	Winrow	concentrates	only	on	 the	Turkish	section	of	 the	SGC	and	does	not	extend	 the	analysis	 to	the	other	parts	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor	(Georgia	and	Azerbaijan).	Furthermore,	other	scholars,	among	others,	Pardo	Sierra	have	made	brave	initial	steps	in	analysing	 the	 potential	 factors	 affecting	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC,	 where	 he	attributes	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 EU	 external	 governance	 towards	 the	 SGC	 to	 external	(regional)	 factors	 and	 to	 the	legitimacy	concerns	 of	 the	 state	 actors	 along	 the	 SGC.32	Studies	carried	out	by	Samuel	Lussac,	on	the	other	hand,	lack	detailed	specific	institutional	analysis	of	the	EU	external	governance	despite	providing	valuable	primary	investigations	of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 along	 the	 SGC.33	 Prange-Gstöhl,	 on	 the	other	hand,	presents	“demand	side”	explanatory	factors	in	explaining	why	third	countries	would	 be	 interested	 in	 adopting	 the	 EU	 rules.34	 However,	 since	 his	 analysis	 does	 not	evaluate	 the	 practical	 outcome	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 rules,	 his	 broader	 conceptual	position	 remains	 empirically	 invalidated.	 Furthermore,	 Prange-Gstöhl	 does	 not	 engage	with	the	factors	that	place	constraints	on	the	adoption	of	the	EU	natural	gas	rules	by	third	countries.	 Thus,	 as	 I	 further	 demonstrate	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 section,	 there	 is	 no	comprehensive	research	that	investigates	the	role	of	the	domestic	constraints	in	affecting	the	success	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	in	natural	gas	sector	vis-à-vis	the	SGC.		In	 order	 to	 account	 for	 different	 cross-cutting	 elements	 within	 the	 SGC	 strategy	 and	address	the	main	research	questions,	this	thesis	presents	a	two-dimensional	structure	for	analysis	of	this	alternative	energy	supply	corridor:	I. Hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	-	on	the	one	hand,	is	aimed	at	the	development	of	physical	 infrastructure	 in	order	 to	 reduce	 the	vulnerability	of	 the	EU	natural	gas	provision.	 As	 such,	 the	 practical	 role	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 physical	
                                                            31	Gareth	M.	Winrow,	 ‘Problems	and	Prospects	 for	 the	Fourth	Corridor:	The	Positions	and	Role	of	Turkey	 in	Gas	Transit	to	Europe’,	Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies,	NG	30,	2009;	Gareth	M.	Winrow,	‘The	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	Turkey’s	Role	as	an	Energy	Transit	State	and	Energy	Hub’,	Insight	Turkey,	2013,	145–63;	see	also,	Saban	Kardas,	 ‘Turkish–Azerbaijani	Energy	Cooperation	and	Nabucco:	Testing	the	Limits	of	the	New	Turkish	Foreign	Policy	Rhetoric’,	Turkish	Studies,	12.1	(2011),	55–77.	32	 Pardo	 Sierra,	 ‘A	 Corridor	 through	 Thorns:	 EU	 Energy	 Security	 and	 the	 Southern	 Energy	 Corridor’;	 Oscar	Pardo	 Sierra,	 ‘No	 Man’s	 Land?	 A	 Comparative	 Analysis	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 Russia’s	 Influence	 in	 the	 Southern	Caucasus’,	Communist	and	Post-Communist	Studies,	44.3	(2011),	233–43.	33	See	e.g.	Samuel	James	Lussac,	‘Ensuring	European	Energy	Security	in	Russian	“Near	Abroad”:	The	Case	of	the	South	Caucasus’,	European	Security,	19.4	(2010),	607–25;	Samuel	James	Lussac,	The	State	as	a	(Oil)	Company?	
The	Political	Economy	of	Azerbaijan,	February	2010.	34	Heiko	Prange-Gstöhl,	 ‘Enlarging	 the	EU’s	 Internal	Energy	Market:	Why	Would	Third	Countries	Accept	EU	Rule	Export?’,	Energy	Policy,	37.12	(2009),	5296–5303.	
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infrastructure	is	to	diversify	supply	sources	and	routes	towards	the	Caspian	Basin	and	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 accordingly,	 allow	 the	 EU	 to	 address	 pre-existing	 gas	supply	risks	largely	stemming	from	a	high	dependence	on	Russian	gas	supplies.		II. Regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	-	on	the	other	hand,	is	aimed	at	liberalising	and	
depoliticising	the	access	to	new	gas	sources	and	transit	along	the	SGC	by	promoting	market	 governance	 that	 ensures	 competitiveness	 of	 gas	 supply	 to	 the	 EU.	 This	involves	shifting	energy	supply	from	a	bilateral	political	domain	into	a	multilateral	market	domain	and	is	to	be	achieved	via	the	extension	of	the	EU's	domestic	energy	legislation	 along	 the	 entire	 route	 of	 the	 SGC.	 In	 a	 bigger	picture,	 if	 the	hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	to	allow	the	EU	to	address	pre-existing	gas	supply	risks	by	providing	supply	and	route	diversity,	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	concept	is	to	help	 the	 EU	 to	 (also)	 address	 supply	 and	 transit-related	 non-market	 risks	stemming	 from	 the	 SGC	 itself	 by	 bolstering	 depoliticisation	 along	 the	 corridor.	Hence,	although	 the	development	of	physical	 infrastructure	 is	 intrinsically	 linked	to	the	development	of	formal	rules	governing	them,	the	two	should	be	investigated	separately	in	order	to	unearth	their	contribution	to	different	objectives	of	the	EU's	conception	of	energy	security,	as	I	will	illustrate	in	the	following	section.		Having	 set	 this	 structure,	 this	 thesis	 then	 sets	 off	 to	provide	 explanatory	 analysis	 of	 the	factors	that	impact	upon	the	success/failure	of	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	and	link	it	to	 the	 prospects	 of	 EU	 natural	 gas	 supply	 under	 competitive,	 depoliticised	 market	conditions	via	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	In	doing	so,	I	argue	that,	 in	the	absence	of	
the	 EU	 membership	 prospects	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 membership	 aspirations,	 the	 net	 domestic	
adoption	costs	in	the	target	SGC	countries	inhibit	their	energy	Europeanisation.	Since	these	
domestic	costs	stem	from	the	SGC	countries'	rational	national	interests	to	control	the	supply	
and	 transit	 of	 natural	 gas	 to	 and	 across	 their	 sovereign	 territories	 in	 order	 to	 further	
national	 strategic	 and	 economic	 ends,	 they	 are	 intrinsically	 incompatible	 with	 the	 EU's	
conception	of	competitive,	hence,	depoliticised	energy	supply	and	transit.	Consequently,	the	SGC	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 (geo)political	 and	 (geo)economic	motivations/interests	of	the	transit	states	concerned,	which	will	render	the	EU	supply	of	natural	gas	via	this	corridor	uncompetitive	and	politicised	–	not	subject	to	the	free-market	dynamics	as	envisaged	by	the	EU’s	notion	of	energy	security.	Since	 I	 rely	 on	qualitative	methodology,	 it	 also	 allows	me	 to	 reveal	 and	analyse	 country	specific	particularities	of	general	domestic	costs	in	individual	SGC	countries	in	the	relevant	empirical	chapters.	The	analysis	of	inter-relations	between	EU	external	energy	governance	and	 the	 domestic	 constraints	 in	 the	 target	 countries	 in	 a	 cause	 and	 effect	 manner	
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(domestic	adoption	costs	as	a	cause	while	the	failure	of	rule	adoption	as	an	effect)	serves	as	the	core	contribution	of	this	PhD	to	academic	literature.	Nonetheless,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 hardware	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 also	 provides	 an	important	contribution	 to	 the	 literature	on	energy	security,	 for	 the	current	 research	has	taken	 place	 during	 the	 period	 of	 political	 and	 commercial	 negotiations	 on	 the	establishment	of	the	SGC.	Therefore,	it	provides	up-to-date	and	timely	discussions	on	the	design	of	 the	 energy	 corridor	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	diversity	of	 the	EU	natural	 gas	supply	 in	 quantitative	 terms.	 In	 contrast	 to	 other	 fuel	 types,	 the	 transportation	 and	 the	very	 existence	 of	market(s)	 in	 natural	 gas	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 fixed	 infrastructure,	especially	 pipelines.	 This	 affects	 not	 only	 the	 practical	 flow	 of	 energy,	 but	 also	 the	application,	 implementation	 and	 consequences	 of	 development	 of	 the	 markets	 rules	 in	natural	gas	sector,	for	the	rules	get	practically	expressed	in	the	functioning	of	the	relevant	infrastructure.	 Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 translate	 the	 broader	 abstract	 assumptions	 of	 the	institutional	 elements	of	 the	SGC	 into	 the	practical	 implications,	 separate	analysis	of	 the	
hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	vital.	Such	a	de-construction	of	the	SGC	strategy	has	high	policy	relevance,	as	breaking	it	down	into	 component	 parts	 might	 enhance	 the	 predictability	 of	 the	 official	 policy-making	 by	bringing	attention	to	the	nodes	of	energy	politics,	which	might	otherwise	be	overlooked	if	treated	in	unison.	This	is	also	conditioned	by	the	very	definition	of	energy	security	 in	the	EU	 context,	 which	 places	 great	 importance	 both	 on	 the	 diversity,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
competitiveness	of	energy	supplies.	Hence,	before	 reviewing	 the	academic	 literature	on	 the	SGC	and	defining	 the	 theoretical	terrain	of	this	thesis,	it	is	also	important	to	assess	the	definition	of	the	EU	energy	security	in	order	to	ensure	the	coherence	of	this	research,	as	well	to	place	the	research	focus	into	a	broad	conceptual	framework.	Since	this	thesis	puts	the	main	emphasis	on	the	efforts	of	the	EU	to	expand	its	sphere	of	influence	in	regulatory	(institutional)	terms,	it	is	important	to	assess	the	broad	rationale	of	the	policy	actions	taken	in	relation	to	non-EU	actors	and	the	nature	 of	 relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 relevant	 third	 countries	 in	 the	 context	 of	implementation	of	these	policies.	To	that	end,	after	assessing	the	definition	of	EU	energy	security,	 the	ensuing	sections	analyse	the	EU	external	governance	 in	relation	to	 the	SGC,	which	aims	at	Europeanisation	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	The	purpose	here	is	not	to	identify	individual	rules	(regulations,	directives)	that	the	EU	aims	to	export	to	the	SGC	countries	(which	I	accomplish	in	Chapter	III),	but	to	provide	a	global	overview	of	external	governance	as	a	strategy	to	deal	with	external	risks	and	challenges.	
 31 
3.	Defining	energy	security	
Security,	 as	 an	 important	 concept	 of	 international	 relations	 has	 traditionally	 been	associated	primarily	with	military	security.35	In	the	decades	following	the	energy	crisis	of	the	early	1970s,	the	concept	has	been	broadened	to	 include	non-military	challenges,	too.	Ullman	 proposed	 to	 define	 security	 as	 a	 “sequence	 of	 events”	which	 in	 a	 short	 period	 of	time	can	“degrade	the	quality	of	 life	 for	the	 inhabitants	of	a	state”	or	remarkably	“narrow	
the	 range	 of	 policy	 choices	 available	 to	 the	 government	 of	 a	 state	 or	 to	 private,	 non-
governmental	entities	(persons,	groups,	corporations)	within	the	state”.36	These	incorporate	threats,	 among	 others,	 stemming	 from	 the	 “interruptions	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 critically	 needed	
resources	 or,	 indeed,	 a	 dwindling	 of	 the	 available	 global	 supply”.37	 In	 this	 respect,	 like	military	 threats,	 interruptions	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 necessary	 resources	may	 have	 a	 profound	negative	effect	on	the	quality	of	life	of	the	population	and	the	general	wellbeing	of	a	given	society.	Consequently,	 this	point	necessitates	 regarding	 the	secure	provision	of	essential	resources,	inter	alia,	energy	resources	as	a	matter	of	security.	However,	calling	an	issue	a	matter	of	security,	whether	economic	or	military,	does	not	necessarily	signal	the	policies	designed	to	ensure	it.	Due	to	its	centrality	to	the	current	research,	it	is	important	to	define	the	concept	of	energy	security	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 investigating	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 EU’s	 pursuits	 to	establish	 alternative	 energy	 corridor	 towards	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 and	 the	 Middle	 East.	Defining	 energy	 security	 will	 not	 only	 explicate	 the	 main	 concept,	 but	 also	 serve	 as	 a	general	 benchmark	 against	 which	 I	 will	 assess	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	 EU’s	energy	security	needs	down	the	line	in	this	PhD.	In	addition	to	its	implications	on	academic	research,	the	definition	of	energy	security	also	entails	 political	 and	 economic	 consequences.	 In	 the	 energy	 domain	 effective	 security	counter-measures	 require	 costly	 investments	 and	 financial	 allocations,	 especially	 in	natural	 gas	 industry.	 In	 a	 liberal	 international	 economic	 order,	 where	 the	 principles	 of	efficiency	 and	 vulnerability	 are	 archenemies,	 decision-making	 in	 costly	 fund	 allocations	requires	 rigorous	 justification	 of	 the	 policy	 objectives.	 In	 this	 view,	 the	 international	energy	 companies	 that	 make	 up	much	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	 the	Western	 energy	 system	 can,	especially,	 be	 reluctant	 to	 invest	 in	 contingency	 measures,	 such	 as	 emergency	 supply	infrastructure,	 energy	 storage,	 etc.,	 which	 they	 will	 not	 be	 using	 for	 their	 regular	 daily	
                                                            35	Walter	 Lippmann,	U.	 S.	 Foreign	 Policy:	 Shield	 of	 the	 Republic	 (Little	 Brown,	 1943),	 p.	 51;	 Arnold	Wolfers,	
Discord	 and	 Collaboration:	 Essays	 on	 International	 Politics:	 Essays	 in	 International	 Politics,	 New	 edition	 (The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1965),	p.	150.	36	Richard	H.	Ullman,	‘Redefining	Security’,	International	Security,	8.1	(1983),	129–53	(p.	129).	37	Ullman,	‘Redefining	Security’,	p.	135.	
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operations,	 regardless	 of	 additional	 costs	 incurred.38	 Therefore,	 the	 definition	 of	 energy	security	 has	 to	 offer	 a	 sense	 of	 common	 understanding	 and	 the	 predictability	 for	 the	policies	to	be	pursued,	which	will	subsequently	affect	the	outcome	thereof.		In	this	context,	as	important	as	it	may	be,	agreeing	on	the	definition	of	energy	security	has	been	as	difficult	as	agreeing	on	the	policies	to	ensure	it,	for	it	entails	different	meanings	to	different	actors	(from	producers	to	transit	and	consumer	countries)	across	different	time	horizons	within	the	international	energy	system.39	Furthermore,	the	perception	of	energy	security	 differs	 even	 across	 the	 spectrum	 of	 consumer	 countries,	 too.	 For	 the	 United	States,	 energy	 independence	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 decrease	 its	 oil	 import	 dependence	 is	 of	foremost	concern.	For	other	consuming	 leviathans,	especially	 for	China	and	India	energy	security	 is	 related	 to	 the	 necessity	 that	 (lack	 of)	 energy	 does	 not	 hamper	 burgeoning	economic	 growth	 and	 entail	 social	 consequences.40	 In	 the	 EU	 context,	 however,	 energy	security	 has	 largely	 (but	 not	 exclusively)	 been	 associated	with	 over-dependence	 on	 gas	imports	 from	the	Russian	Federation.	 In	general,	 the	European	Commission	argued	 that,	
“Energy	 supply	 security	 must	 be	 geared	 to	 ensuring	 […]	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	
economy,	 the	 uninterrupted	 physical	 availability	 […]	 at	 a	 price	 which	 is	 affordable.	 […]	
Security	 of	 supply	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 maximise	 energy	 self-sufficiency	 or	 to	 minimise	
dependence,	but	aims	to	reduce	the	risks	linked	to	such	dependence”,41	although	later	the	EC	acknowledged	 that	 the	 risks	 to	 uninterrupted	 energy	 supply	 grows	 as	 the	 import	dependence	increases.42	 In	this	regard,	the	EU's	interpretation	of	energy	security	offers	a	general	 idea	 of	 the	 latter's	 overarching	 vision	 of	 energy	 security;	 however,	 it	 does	 not	necessarily	 provide	 a	 detailed	 components	 thereof,	 although	 they	 are	 present	 in	 the	individual	policy	actions	already	undertaken	to	that	end.	The	aim	here	is,	thus,	to	identify	an	 operational	 definition	 of	 natural	 gas	 security	 in	 the	 EU	 context,	 which	 will	 make	 it	practical	to	examine	the	policies	designed	to	resolve	the	problem.	In	general,	mainstream	academic	definitions	of	energy	security	of	the	consumer	countries	can	be	categorised	in	three	strands	of	benchmarks:	• Diversity	and	ampleness,	• Affordability	and,	
                                                            38	See	e.g.	Stern	and	Rogers,	‘The	Transition	to	Hub-Based	Gas	Pricing	in	Continental	Europe’,	p.	20.	39	Paul	Isbell,	‘Paul	Isbell	Revisits	the	Energy	Security	Debate’,	Oxford	Energy	Forum,	2007,	3–6;	Daniel	Yergin,	‘What	 Does	 “Energy	 Security”	 Really	 Mean?’,	 Wall	 Street	 Journal,	 11	 July	 2006	<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115258420318203023.html>	[accessed	25	April	2012].	40	Yergin,	‘What	Does	“Energy	Security”	Really	Mean?’	41	‘Green	Paper	-	Towards	a	European	Strategy	for	the	Security	of	Energy	Supply,	COM	(2000)	0769’,	p.	2.	42	Towards	a	Common	European	Foreign	Policy	on	Energy,	A6-0312/2007	(European	Parliament,	2007),	p.	1.	
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• Reliability	of	energy	provision.	Kalichi	 and	 Goldwyn	 suggested	 that:	 “energy	 security	 is	 […]	 the	 provision	 of	 affordable,	
reliable,	 diverse	 and	 ample	 supplies	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 (and	 their	 future	 equivalents)	 [...]	 and	
adequate	 infrastructure	 to	 deliver	 these	 supplies	 to	 market”.43	 The	 International	 Energy	Agency	 (IEA)	 similarly	 noted	 that,	 “Energy	 security,	 broadly	 defined,	 means	 adequate,	
affordable	and	reliable	supplies	of	energy”.44		Firstly,	 diversity	 of	 energy	 supply	 is	 the	 most	 straightforward	 element	 of	 any	 energy	security	 strategy.	 The	 aim	 of	 diversity	 is	 not	 to	 maximise	 energy	 self-sufficiency	 or	 to	minimise	 import	 dependency,	 but	 to	 reduce	 the	 risks	 linked	 to	 such	 dependency	 by	increasing	 the	 number	 of	 energy	 supply	 sources,	 transportation	 routes	 and	 supply	counterparts.	 The	 practical	 contribution	 of	 diverse	 energy	 supplies	 is	 the	 reduction	 of	
energy	vulnerability,	which	is	 incurred	by	the	geographic	concentration	of	supply	sources	and	 the	 (lack	of)	 flexibility	of	 the	 relevant	 infrastructure.45	By	 reducing	 the	geographical	concentration	of	energy	supply,	diversity	allows	to	have	many	suppliers	of	energy,	instead	of	one,	where	the	relative	importance	of	any	of	them	is	not	very	great.46	This,	on	the	other	hand,	 allows	 compensating	 the	 shortage	 of	 energy	 from	 one	 source	 by	 many	 others.	Winston	Churchill’s	historical	statement	before	the	WWI	-	“safety	and	certainty	in	oil	lie	in	
variety	 and	 variety	 alone”47	 -	 is	 probably	 the	 first	 historically	 recorded	 example	 of	attempting	 to	 secure	 diverse	 supplies	 of	 energy.	 Accordingly,	 the	 level	 of	 variety	(diversification)	has	come	to	constitute	an	essential	principle	of	the	states’	sound	energy	security	strategies	in	modern	times.48	
                                                            43	 Jan	H.	 Kalichi	 and	David	 L.	 Goldwyn,	 ‘Introduction:	 The	Need	 to	 Integrate	 Energy	 and	 Foreign	 Policy’,	 in	
Energy	 and	 Security:	 Toward	 a	 New	 Foreign	 Policy	 Strategy,	 ed.	 by	 Jan	 H.	 Kalichi	 and	 David	 L.	 Goldwyn	(Washington,	D.C.:	Woodrow	Wilson	Centre	Press,	2005),	pp.	1–16	(p.	9).	44	World	Energy	Outlook	2007:	China	and	India	Insights.	(Paris:	IEA,	2007),	p.	160;	José	Goldemberg,	Thomas	B	Johansson	and	Dennis	Anderson,	World	Energy	Assessment:	Overview	(New	York:	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	Bureau	for	Development	Policy,	2004),	p.	42;	for	similar	definitions,	see	also	Douglas	R.	Bohi	and	Michael	A.	Toman,	The	Economics	of	Energy	Security	(Boston:	Springer,	1996);	Energy	Security:	Managing	Risk	
in	a	Dynamic	Legal	 and	Regulatory	Environment,	 ed.	 by	Barry	Barton	and	others	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004).	45	 Gonzalo	 Escribano	 and	 Javier	 García-Verdugo,	 ‘Energy	 Security,	 Energy	 Corridors	 and	 the	 Geopolitical	Context:	A	Conceptual	Approach’,	 in	Energy	 Security	 for	 the	EU	 in	 the	 21st	 Century:	Markets,	 Geopolitics	 and	
Corridors,	 ed.	 by	 José	 María	 Marín	 Quemada,	 Javier	 García-Verdugo,	 and	 Gonzalo	 Escribano	 (London;	 New	York:	Routledge,	2012),	pp.	26–37	(p.	30).	46	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	the	EC/	DG	Energy,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	47	Yergin,	‘Energy	Security	and	Markets’,	p.	52.	48	It	must	be	noted	that,	supply	diversity	as	an	element	of	energy	security	 is	not	universally	accepted	across	the	energy	spectrum,	especially	by	the	producer	countries.	The	latter	have	been	vocal	about	defining	energy	security	in	terms	of	security	of	supply	and	have	called	for	more	demand	side	guarantees	for	their	energy	sales.	During	the	Group	of	Eight	(G8)	summit	in	St.	Petersburg	Russian	president	Vladimir	Putin	presented	Russia’s	vision	for	global	energy	security.	In	doing	so,	he	insisted	on	the	necessity	of	“providing	demand	guarantees	for	
the	 producers,	 and	 sharing	 responsibilities	 and	 risks	 among	 energy	 suppliers,	 consumers,	 and	 transit	 states”.	Cited	 in	 Ariel	 Cohen,	 ‘Russia:	 The	 Flawed	 Energy	 Superpower’,	 in	 Energy	 Security	 Challenges	 for	 the	 21st	
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Secondly,	 affordability	 is	 related	 to	 the	 price	 of	 a	 given	 fuel	 type.	 In	 order	 to	 be	economically	feasible,	the	utilised	fuel	must	be	purchased	at	reasonable	and	stable	prices.	However,	the	affordability	of	energy	supply	is	not	a	straightforward	notion,	as	it	denotes	different	meanings	for	producer	and	consumer	countries.	If	the	former	seek	affordability	as	the	highest	possible	price	in	energy	sales,	for	the	latter	it	is	the	lowest	price	for	imported	energy.49	 Such	 irreconcilable	 positions	 are	 further	 aggravated	 by	 the	 aspirations	 of	 the	producers	to	increase	their	share	in	the	consumer	markets	and	ensure	their	dominance	in	price	setting.	In	this	regard,	in	order	to	reduce	bias	against	either	party,	Escribano	García-Verdugo	suggests	that,	“the	requirement	that	prices	be	‘affordable’	is	assumed	to	mean	that	
the	price	of	 energy	 should	not	be	driven	upward	by	market	 imperfections	unrelated	 to	 the	
shifts	in	global	or	regional	supply	and	demand”.50	In	other	words,	affordability	of	energy	is	not	 a	 benchmark	 of	 successful	 energy	 politics,	 but	 an	 outcome	 of	 energy	 supply	 under	
competitive	market	conditions,	where	price	of	the	consumed	energy	is	determined	by	the	supply	and	demand	balance	and	not	by	the	political	bargaining	power	among	the	involved	parties.	 This	 by	 definition	 means	 that,	 the	 adequate	 level	 of	 energy	 supplies	 to	 the	consumers	 (ampleness)	 is	 also	 determined	 by	 the	 market	 signals,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	central	planning	efforts	of	the	public	authorities.	The	 reliability	of	energy	supply,	 finally,	 refers	 to	 the	 resilience	of	energy	supplies	 to	 the	arbitrary	political	disturbances,	as	energy	imports	from	and	through	politically	unreliable	countries	 substantially	 increase	 the	 risks	of	 energy	 supply	 to	 the	 consumers.51	Here	 too,	market-based	 energy	 provision	 is	 favoured	 by	 the	 EU	 not	 only	 for	 competitive	 price	determination,	 but	 also	 for	depoliticisation	of	 energy	 supply	 -	 in	other	words,	 to	 ensure	that	 supply	 of	 natural	 gas	 is	 not	 used	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 in	 international	 political	interaction.	This	 is	 especially	 an	 important	 issue	 in	natural	 gas	 sector,	 for	 gas	 to	 the	EU	markets	is	hauled	predominantly	via	pipelines.	Pipeline	transportation,	on	the	other	hand,	entail	natural	monopoly	-	whoever	controls	the	conduits	can	also	exercise	power	over	the	access	 of	 other	 suppliers	 to	 the	 same	 networks	 for	 political,	 as	 well	 as	 economic	considerations.	 In	 order	 to	 remove	 the	 conflict	 of	 interests	 among	 different	 actors	 in	energy	 supply	 and	 transit,	 competitive	 and	 reliable	 energy	 supply	 necessitates	 the	
                                                                                                                                                                              
Century :	 A	 Reference	 Handbook,	 ed.	 by	 Gal	 Luft	 and	 Anne	 Korin	 (Santa	 Barbara,	 Calif.:	 Praeger	 Security	International,	2009),	pp.	91–108	(p.	93).	49	 Bassam	 Fattouh,	 ‘How	 Secure	 Are	 Middle	 East	 Oil	 Supplies?’,	 in	 Energy	 And	 The	 Transformation	 Of	
International	 Relations:	 Toward	 A	 New	 Producer-Consumer	 Framework,	 ed.	 by	 Andreas	 Wenger,	 Robert	 W	Orttung,	and	Jeronim	Perovic	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	91–117	(p.	95).	50	 Escribano	 and	 García-Verdugo,	 ‘Energy	 Security,	 Energy	 Corridors	 and	 the	 Geopolitical	 Context:	 A	Conceptual	Approach’,	p.	27.	51	 Escribano	 and	 García-Verdugo,	 ‘Energy	 Security,	 Energy	 Corridors	 and	 the	 Geopolitical	 Context:	 A	Conceptual	Approach’,	p.	31.	
 35 
establishment	of	the	relevant	regulatory	institutions	to	serve	as	a	framework	within	which	free	market(s)	can	operate,52	which	I	will	further	analyse	in	Chapter	III.		Hence,	in	the	context	of	the	establishment	of	the	SGC	the	operational	definition	of	the	EU	energy	security	can	be	summed	up	as:	Energy	security	is	the	diversity	of	energy	supplies	
under	 competitive	market	 conditions,	which	 ensures	 its	affordability	and	 reliability.	This	 definition	 will	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 assessment	throughout	 this	 research	 and	 support	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 of	 this	 PhD.	 It	 is	especially	 helpful	 for	 analysing	 the	 SGC	 in	 a	 two-dimensional	 framework,	 where	 the	physical	 establishment	 of	 the	 corridor	 (hardware	 dimension)	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	diversity	of	supplies	to	the	EU,	while	its	Europeanisation	(regulatory	dimension)	is	(also)	to	 bring	 about	 competitiveness	 of	 supply	 and	 transit	 via	 the	 SGC,	 while	 ensuring	 its	affordability	and	reliability.	It	is	worth	noting	that,	there	is	also	a	rational	link	between	energy	supply	and	the	broader	normative	political	engagement	of	the	EU	with	foreign	supplier	and	transit	countries.	This	especially	relates	to	those	countries,	which	do	not	necessarily	share	the	same	normative	governance	values,	 such	as	democracy,	 rule	of	 law	and	human	rights,	 as	 the	EU.	The	EU	Commissioner	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Action	 Miguel	 Arias	 Cañete	 has	 recently	 noted,	
"When	 it	 comes	 to	 energy,	 don't	 put	 your	 fate	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 autocratic	 regimes".53	 This,	accordingly,	requires	foreign	energy	policies	to	be	pursued	in	close	synergy	with	broader	common	and	 foreign	security	agenda	of	 the	EU.	Although	 this	 is	an	 important	 issue	 that	any	research	on	energy	security	should	be	conscious	about,	 I	will	not	 investigate	energy	security-normative	governance	nexus,	largely	due	to	space	and	time	constraints.	The	next	section	 will	 assess	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 broad	 conceptual	 terms	 as	discussed	before.	
4.	External	governance	perspective	and	the	SGC		
The	EU	acquired	its	first	direct	Treaty	competences	in	energy	sector	under	the	Article	194	of	 the	 TFEU	 (Article	 176A	 -	 Lisbon	 Treaty)	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 establishment	 and	functioning	of	the	internal	market,	which	include:		
i. "ensuring	the	functioning	of	the	energy	market";		
                                                            52	For	a	general	analysis	of	the	competition	in	natural	gas	markets,	see	e.g.	Peter	D.	Cameron,	Competition	in	
Energy	Markets:	Law	and	Regulation	in	the	European	Union	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007).	53	Miguel	Arias	Cañete,	Speech	by	EU	Climate	Action	and	Energy	Commissioner	Miguel	Arias	Cañete:	 ‘Europe’s	
Energy	 Security	 Challenges:	 La	 Unión	 Hace	 La	 Fuerza’’	 (Washington	 D.C./USA:	 Atlantic	 Council,	 4	 February	2015)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4086_en.htm>	[accessed	21	June	2015].	
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ii. "ensuring	the	security	of	energy	supply	in	the	Union;	and"		
iii. "promoting	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 energy	 saving	 and	 the	 development	 of	 new	 and	
renewable	forms	of	energy;	and"	iv. "promoting	the	interconnection	of	energy	networks."	However,	 the	same	article	goes	on	 to	caution	 that,	measures	 taken	at	 the	EU	 level	 "shall	
not	 affect	 a	 Member	 State's	 right	 to	 determine	 the	 conditions	 for	 exploiting	 its	 energy	
resources,	its	choice	between	different	energy	sources	and	the	general	structure	of	its	energy	
supply".54	This	article	leaves	the	EU	in	such	a	situation,	where	it	can	establish	the	rules	for	the	 organisation	 of	 the	 internal	 energy	 market(s),	 while	 competencies	 for	 determining	domestic	 energy	 mix,	 quantities,	 (internal	 and	 external)	 sources	 and	 routes	 of	 energy	supply	 lie	 exclusively	 within	 the	 remits	 of	 individual	 member	 states	 (and/or	 energy	companies).	To	put	it	into	perspective,	the	EU,	under	the	current	Treaties,	cannot	engage	in	common	or	individual	gas	purchasing	on	behalf	of	the	member	states	or	prevent	them	from	buying	gas	from	certain	suppliers,	 force	or	stop	member	states	from	engaging	with	third-party	 actors	 on	 the	 determination	 of	 new	 energy	 supply	 routes,	 build	 necessary	pipelines	 or	 address	 external	 challenges	 (e.g.	 transit	 risks)	 to	 its	 energy	 supply	 via	traditional	foreign	policy	instruments.	Such	a	discrepancy	between	the	energy	security	goals	of	the	EU	and	the	relevant	EU-level	competences	 are	 further	 aggravated	 by	 the	 traditional	 collective	 action	 problems	stemming	 from	 the	 “egoistic”/rational	 behaviour	 of	 the	 individual	 member	 states	 in	cooperating	with	third	 countries.	Member	 states	way	 too	 often	 conduct	 external	 energy	policies	 that	 are	 beneficial	 from	 the	 national	 interests	 point	 of	 view,	 but	 lead	 to	 the	emergence	 of	 further	 energy	 security	 challenges	 for	 the	 EU	 as	 a	whole.	 Hence,	 national	level	optimal	decisions	on	(external)	energy	supply	and	route	have	a	tendency	to	lead	to	sub-optimal	outcomes	at	the	system	(EU)	level.	In	the	past	this	was	exemplified	with	Germany	breaking	ranks	with	other	EU	countries	and	supporting	Russian	 Nord	 Stream	pipeline.	 The	 latter	 linked	 Russian	 Federation	 directly	with	 the	 German	 market	 while	 bypassing	 (and	 strategically	 undermining)	 Eastern	 EU	member	 states;	 as	 Russia	 would	 no	 longer	 have	 to	 reckon	 with	 the	 latter	 and	accommodate	 their	 concerns	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 out	 to	 German	 market,	 which	constitutes	Russia’s	biggest	natural	gas	consumer.55	A	similar	discrepancy	between	the	interests	of	the	member	states	on	the	one	hand	and	the	
                                                            54	 ‘Treaty	 of	 Lisbon:	 Amending	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Treaty	 Establishing	 the	 European	Community’,	Article	176A.	55	See	e.g.	Jeffrey	Mankoff,	Eurasian	Energy	Security	(New	York:	The	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	(CFR),	2009).	
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EU	(as	a	whole)	on	the	other	was	also	observed	in	relation	to	the	SGC.	While	the	EU	had	designated	strategic	importance	to	the	SGC	to	bolster	EU	energy	security56,	not	all	member	states	would	benefit	from	it,	hence,	demonstrated	lukewarm	or	even	conflicting	attitudes	towards	this	corridor.	Even	the	direct	beneficiaries	-	South-East	European	countries,	who	had	 declared	 their	support	 to	 the	 SGC	 right	 from	 the	 beginning,	 also	 signed	 up	 for	the	competing	Russian	South	Stream	pipeline	project,	which	could	have	undermined	 the	SGC	 should	 the	 EU	 level	 regulatory	 hurdles	 were	 surmounted.	 SGC	 offered	 an	 optimal	choice	 for	 the	 EU	 as	 whole,	 while	 arguably	 SS	 offered	 benefits	 only	 to	 a	 number	 of	individual	member	states.57			Similar	collective	action	problems	are	also	observed	today,	as	Russian	Gazprom,	together	with	its	German	and	Dutch	partners	venture	to	build	Nord	Stream	2	pipeline,	calculated	to	completely	 zero	 Russia’s	 dependence	 on	 Ukrainian	 (and	 Eastern	 EU)	 transit	 route.	 If	reducing	 supply	 dependence	 on	Russian	 gas	 is	 an	 ultimate	 strategic	 goal	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	whole,	then	Germany’s	support	to	NS2,	arguably,	undermines	this	goal.58		Hence,	 the	 lack	 of	 external	 energy	 security	 competences	 of	 the	 EU	 limits	 the	 space	for	maneuver	and	the	options	available	in	the	EU	policy	toolbox	for	dealing	with	external	risks	 to	 its	 energy	 security.	 As	 the	 relevant	 competences	 are	 shared	 with	 the	 member	states,	 the	 EU	 (at	 the	 supranational	 level)	 lacks	 the	 ability	 to	 act	 on	 external	 energy	security	issues	in	 a	 similar	 fashion	 to	 state	 actors	 of	 international	 relations.	In	 order	words,	 the	European	Union	 lacks	 the	political	attribute	 in	 the	matters	of	external	 energy	
policy.59	The	 lack	 of	 agency	 or	 actorness	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 a	 traditional	 foreign	 policy	 sense	 is,	accordingly,	 reflected	on	 the	EU	external	energy	policies,	which	considerably	differ	 from	the	bilateral	political	approach	of	 the	member	states.	This,	on	the	other	hand,	requires	a	new	approach	for	a	research	design	in	order	to	analyse	the	policy	actions	taken	aimed	at	addressing	 external	 challenges	 to	 energy	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC.	 External	 governance	
                                                            56	 ‘President	Barroso	and	Commissioner	Piebalgs	Welcome	 the	Signature	of	 the	Nabucco	 Intergovernmental	Agreement,	Press	Release,	-	IP/09/1114’,	European	Commisison,	7	October	2009.	57	For	good	discussions,	see	e.g.	Pavel	K.	Baev	and	Indra	Øverland,	‘The	South	Stream	versus	Nabucco	Pipeline	Race:	Geopolitical	and	Economic	(ir)rationales	and	Political	Stakes	in	Mega-Projects’,	International	Affairs,	86.5	(2010),	1075–90;	Caroline	Dieckhoner,	‘Simulating	Security	of	Supply	Effects	of	the	Nabucco	and	South	Stream	Projects	for	the	European	Natural	Gas	Market’,	The	Energy	Journal,	33.3	(2012),	153–81;	‘Signature	of	Nabucco	Intergovernmental	 Agreement	 Marks	 New	 Era	 in	 EU	 Energy’,	 European	 Commission,	 2009	<http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/press_releases/2009/pr0985_en.htm>	[accessed	27	June	2012].	58	Barbara	Lewis,	‘Ten	EU	Nations	Say	Nord	Stream	Gas	Extension	Not	in	EU	Interests’,	Reuters,	27	November	2015	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-nordstream-idUSL8N13L4MG20151127>	 [accessed	 3	March	2016].	59	 Finon,	 ‘The	 EU	 Foreign	 Gas	 Policy	 of	 Transit	 Corridors:	 Autopsy	 of	 the	 Stillborn	Nabucco	 Project’,	 p.	 49;	Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	426;	Lussac,	 ‘Ensuring	European	Energy	Security	 in	Russian	“Near	Abroad”:	The	Case	of	 the	South	Caucasus’.	
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perspective	 presents	 a	 powerful	 tool	 to	 that	 end.	 Amounting	 to	 more	 than	 simple	cooperation,	external	governance	is	understood	here	as	the	extension	of	the	boundary	of	the	EU's	domestic	 institutions	to	cover	its	relations	with	third	countries.	Sandra	Lavenex	notes	 that,	 “[i]n	 contrast	 to	 co-operation	under	an	 international	agreement	or	 convention,	
external	governance	 takes	place	when	parts	 of	 the	acquis	 communautaire	are	 extended	 to	
non-member	 states".60	 Moreover,	 Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfenning	 explain	 that	 the	 main	characteristic	of	 the	external	governance	 is	 the	rejection	of	 the	"projection	of	 the	unitary	
state	 actor	 model"	 on	 the	 EU	 and	 concentration	 on	 the	 "institutional	 processes	 of	 norm	
diffusion	and	policy	transfer".61	Hence,	“[w]hereas	a	foreign	policy	perspective	concentrates	
on	countries	or	regions	as	units	of	analysis,	the	governance	perspective	takes	systems	of	rules	
as	its	point	of	departure.”62	In	 the	absence	of	 the	 traditional	 foreign	policy	competences	 for	dealing	with	 the	 foreign	actors	and	thereby	containing	the	threats,	EU	external	energy	governance	takes	a	different	outlook	to	the	resolution	of	the	problem.	Through	the	politics	of	inclusion63	 it	rather	aims	to	 absorb	 the	 external	 disturbances	 in	 to	 the	 common	 regulatory	 framework,	 which	previously	 has	 been	 successful	 in	 addressing	 similar	 challenges	 within	 the	 EU	 borders.	Thereby,	 since	 the	 EU's	 domestic	 approach	 to	 ensuring	 energy	 security	 is	 based	 on	 a	
regulated	market	model,	its	external	energy	governance	envisages	the	export	of	this	model	beyond	 its	 geographical	 borders.64	 Similarly,	 Lavenex	 argues	 that	 external	 governance	fulfills	"a	dual	purpose":	"It	is	not	only	motivated	by	benevolent	civilian	‘milieu	goals’,	but	is	
also	driven	by	strategic	‘possession	goals’	[…].	External	governance	combines	a	foreign	policy	
strategy	geared	at	stabilisation	and	integration	with	the	attempt	to	bind	third	countries	to	
the	 pursuit	 of	 internal	 policy	 goals	 and	 thereby	 benefit	 from	 the	 latter’s	 political	 and	
material	problem-solving	resources."65		In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 SGC,	 external	 governance	 perspective	 allows	 to	 analyse	 the	(resolution	of)	external	transit	and	supply	risks	through	the	export	and	application	of	the	
                                                            60	Sandra	Lavenex,	‘EU	External	Governance	in	“Wider	Europe”’,	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	11.4	(2004),	680–700	(p.	683);	In	energy-specific	context,	see,	e.g.	Konoplyanik,	‘A	Common	Russia-EU	Energy	Space	(The	New	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 Agreement,	 Acquis	 Communautaire,	 the	 Energy	 Charter	 and	 the	 New	 Russian	Initiative)’,	p.	263.	61	Sandra	Lavenex	and	Frank	Schimmelfennig,	‘EU	Rules	Beyond	EU	Borders:	Theorizing	External	Governance	in	European	Politics’,	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	16.6	(2009),	791–812	(pp.	792–794).	62	Lavenex	and	Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	Rules	Beyond	EU	Borders:	Theorizing	External	Governance	in	European	Politics’,	 p.	 795;	 see	 also,	 Governing	 Europe’s	 Neighbourhood:	 Partners	 or	 Periphery?,	 ed.	 by	 Katja	 Weber,	Michael	E.	Smith,	and	Michael	J.	Baun	(Manchester ;	New	York:	Manchester	University	Press,	2007).	63	Smith,	‘The	European	Union	and	a	Changing	Europe:	Establishing	the	Boundaries	of	Order’,	p.	23.	64	For	a	similar	argumentation,	see	e.g.	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	 Nabucco	 Project’,	 p.	 49;	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	Contractual	Trade	Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	427.	65	Lavenex,	‘EU	External	Governance	in	“Wider	Europe”’,	p.	694.	
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EU's	relevant	domestic	norms	and	practices	to	the	countries	along	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	However,	the	nature	of	EU	rule	export	policy	is	different	in	intensity	in	relation	to	different	countries	along	the	SGC	(Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan),	which	necessitates	the	analysis	of	the,	so-called,	modes	of	rule	expansion	of	the	EU.		To	start	with,	Turkey,	the	territory	of	which	constitutes	the	longest	segment	of	the	SGC,	is	a	 candidate	 country	 for	 EU	 membership.	 As	 such,	 Turkey	 is	 by	 default	 required	 to	transpose	the	whole	body	of	the	EU	law	into	the	domestic	legislation	before	it	can	be	let	it.	Thus,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 along	 the	 SGC,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	relations	 between	 Turkey	 and	 the	 EU	 is	 hierarchical.66	 With	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Georgia,	however,	it	is	less	so.		In	general,	since	the	latest	enlargement	in	2004	and	2007,	the	EU’s	external	borders	have	changed	considerably	and	 the	Union	has	 come	 to	neighbour	with	 regions	and	countries,	which	previously	were	considered	as	distant	regions.	Consequently,	the	EU	has	introduced	a	 new	 institutionalised	 mechanism	 -	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 (ENP)	 -	 in	 its	relationships	 with	 the	 neighbours.67	 Since	 inception	 in	 2004,	 the	 ENP	 has	 promoted	different	 initiative	 to	 construct	 the	 Union’s	 relations	 with	 the	 neighbour	 in	 a	 dense	manner,	 virtually	 in	 every	 sector,	 but	 under	 the	 membership	 line.	 In	 2008	 Poland	 and	Sweden	 introduced	 the	Eastern	dimension	 to	 the	ENP,	 called	Eastern	Partnership	 (EaP),	which	 encompasses	 neighbours	 to	 the	 East	 of	 the	 EU,	 namely,	 Armenia,	 Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Georgia,	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	In	general	terms,	the	goal	of	the	EaP	is	“to	create	
the	 conditions	 to	 accelerate	 political	 association	 and	 deepen	 economic	 integration	
between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Eastern	 European	 partner	 countries”,68	 which	 also	 includes	comprehensive	partnership	in	the	field	of	energy	security.		In	 this	regard,	with	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia,	 the	EU’s	relations	are	constructed	under	 the	
membership	line	as	far	as	the	rule	expansion	is	concerned.	That	is	to	say,	neither	Georgia,	nor	Azerbaijan	has	been	granted	a	candidate	status	and	the	latter	has	not	even	expressed	its	desire	to	apply	for	EU	membership	in	the	foreseeable	future.	Therefore,	 the	nature	of	relations	between	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	on	the	one	hand	and	the	EU	on	the	other	is	less	asymmetrical	 than	 the	 latter	 and	 Turkey.69	 In	 this	 regard,	what	we	 see	 here	 is	 two	 tier	
                                                            66	See	e.g.	The	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	Cornell	Studies	in	Political	Economy	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2005).	67	The	European	Neighbourhood	includes	Algeria,	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Egypt,	Georgia,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	 Libya,	 the	 Republic	 of	Moldova,	Morocco,	 the	 Occupied	 Palestinian	 Territories,	 Syria,	 Tunisia	 and	Ukraine.	68	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’	(European	Commission,	High	Representative	of	the	EU	for	FASP,	2012),	p.	3	(emphasis	original).	69	 See	 e.g.	 Kataryna	Wolczuk,	 ‘Perceptions	Of,	 and	Attitudes	 Towards,	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 amongst	 the	Partner	Countries’	Political	Elites’,	Eastern	Partnership	Review,	2011;	Kataryna	Wolczuk,	‘Convergence	Without	
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power	relationships	between	the	EU	and	the	main	actors	of	the	SCG.	Thus,	any	analysis	of	the	export	of	EU’s	energy	acquis	must	 take	 into	account	different	modes	of	relationships	between	the	EU	and	the	SGC	countries.	In	 conceptualising	 the	 differences	 in	 intensity	 of	 external	 governance	 during	 the	enlargement	 process	 and	 the	 current	 neighbourhood	 policy,	 Schimmelfenning,	 Lavenex,	Lehmkuhl	 and	 Wichmann	 identify	 three	 modes	 of	 rule	 expansion	 towards	 the	 partner	countries:	hierarchy,	network	and	markets	modes.70	
Hierarchy	mode	-	envisages	power	asymmetries	between	the	“rule	exporter”	and	the	“rule	importer”,	 the	EU	and	 the	 candidate	 countries	 and	 requires	 the	 existence	of	 exact	 rules,	procedures,	 monitoring	 and	 sanctioning	 mechanisms	 “for	 the	 effective	 exercise	 of	
conditionality	as	a	mode	of	top-down	policy	transfer	on	the	basis	of	external	incentives”.71	In	a	nutshell,	hierarchy	mode	of	external	governance	envisages	the	export	of	the	EU	rules	and	policies	 on	 to	 the	 candidate	 countries,	 acceptance	 of	 which	 will	 be	 rewarded	 with	 full	membership	in	the	Union.	In	terms	of	mechanism	of	rule	expansion,	it	entails	vertical,	top-
down	 (leverage)	 wholesale	 export	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 and	 requires	 harmonisation	 of	 the	candidate	 countries’	 rules	 and	 institutions	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 in	 principle,	 is	considered	 to	 undermine	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 candidates	 over	 their	 legislation.	 Thus,	hierarchy	mode	 of	 external	 governance	 targets	 the	 entire	 polity	 (rather	 than	 individual	sectors)	and	has	been	the	primary	mode	of	rule	expansion	during	the	EU	enlargement.72	It	is	currently	aimed	at	candidate	countries,	including	Turkey.	
Network	mode	 -	 in	 formal	 terms	entails	 symmetric	power	 relations	between	 the	EU	and	third	countries,	where	the	latter	retains	its	autonomy.	In	this	mode,	although	the	EU	acquis	and	 policies	 dominate	 the	 agenda	 partner	 countries	 are	 expected	 to	 "agree	 with	 the	
selection	of	 topics	of	 co-operation	and	can	bring	 in	 their	own	priorities”.73	 In	other	words,	rule	selection	(legalisation)	is	carried	out	based	on	joint	ownership	principle.	Nevertheless,	as	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 through	 primary	 policy	 investigations,	 there	 is	 little	 difference	
                                                                                                                                                                              Finalité:	EU	Strategy	Towards	Post-Soviet	States	in	the	Wider	Black	Sea	Region’,	 in	The	Black	Sea	Region	and	
EU	Policy:	The	Challenge	of	Divergent	Agendas,	ed.	by	Carol	Weaver	and	Karen	Henderson,	2010,	pp.	45–48	(pp.	45–48);	Nicu	Popescu,	Andrew	Wilson	and	European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	The	Limits	of	Enlargement-
Lite:	 European	 and	 Russian	 Power	 in	 the	 Troubled	 Neighbourhood	 (London:	 European	 Council	 of	 Foreign	Relations,	2009).	70	Lavenex	and	Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	Rules	Beyond	EU	Borders:	Theorizing	External	Governance	in	European	Politics’;	 Sandra	 Lavenex,	 Dirk	 Lehmkuhl	 and	 Nicole	 Wichmann,	 ‘Modes	 of	 External	 Governance:	 A	 Cross-National	and	Cross-Sectoral	Comparison’,	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	16.6	(2009),	813–33.	71	Lavenex	and	Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	Rules	Beyond	EU	Borders:	Theorizing	External	Governance	in	European	Politics’,	p.	797.	72	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 different	 mechanisms	 of	 rule	 expansion,	 see	 e.g.	 Sandra	 Lavenex	 and	Frank	 Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	 Democracy	 Promotion	 in	 the	 Neighbourhood:	 From	 Leverage	 to	 Governance?’,	
Democratization,	18.4	(2011),	885–909.	73	 Lavenex,	 Lehmkuhl	 and	Wichmann,	 ‘Modes	 of	 External	 Governance:	 A	 Cross-National	 and	 Cross-Sectoral	Comparison’,	p.	816.	
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between	 the	 network	 and	 hierarchy	 modes	 of	 external	 EU	 governance,	 as	 far	 as	 the	selection	of	 rules	 (to	be	exported)	 is	 concerned.	Additionally,	unlike	 the	hierarchy	mode	institutional	organisation	of	the	relationships	(institutionalisation)	can	be	both	centralised	and	 decentralised	 and	 ties	 can	 be	 formal	 and	 informal.	 Therefore,	main	 rule	 expansion	mechanism	tends	to	be	more	horizontal	and	sectoral,	where	the	EU	is	trying	to	insert	 its	norms	into	the	sectoral	administrative	governance	(governance	and	linkage	mechanism),74	rather	 than	 the	 entire	 polity.75	 Finally,	 the	 monitoring	 of	 the	 policy	 and	 rule	implementation	 is	 political	 compared	 to	 judicial	 monitoring	 of	 hierarchy	 mode.76	 I	 will	further	analyse	the	rule	selection,	institutional	organisation	and	monitoring	aspects	of	the	EaP	in	the	context	of	the	SGC	in	Chapter	III.	
Market	mode	-	envisages	more	of	a	coordination	of	relations	between	the	parties	on	ad	hoc	basis,	 without	 “overarching	 legal	 commitment	 to	 co-operation,	 and	 approximation	 to	 the	
acquis	is	not	the	point	of	reference”.77	As	such,	market	mode	of	external	governance	is	less	relevant	for	the	EU’s	relations	with	the	SGC	countries,	where	both	sides	have,	in	principle,	agreed	to	building	deep	and	comprehensive	institutionalised	partnership	on	a	permanent	basis.	Therefore,	in	this	PhD	I	will	concentrate	on	hierarchy	and	network	modes	of	external	energy	governance	of	the	EU	towards	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan,	respectively.	To	 sum	 up,	 since	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 EU's	 SGC	 strategy	 envisages	 the	liberalisation	 and	 depoliticisation	 of	 this	 alternative	 energy	 corridor,	 conceptually,	 this	policy	 is	 underpinned	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance,	which	 aims	 at	 the	 (external)	Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC.	 In	 relation	 to	 Turkey,	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance	envisages	the	export	of	the	EU	rules	in	hierarchical	manner,	for	Turkey	is	an	EU	candidate	country.	In	relation	to	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan,	however,	EU	external	energy	governance	is	
                                                            74	 In	 conceptualising	 the	 EU's	 democracy	 promotion	 in	 its	 neighbourhood	 Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfenning	identify	 three	 models	 of	 mechanisms	 of	 change	 in	 the	 third	 countries:	 leverage	 (top-down	 conditionality),	
linkage	 (bottom-up	 socialisation)	 and	governance	models	 (horizontal	 partnership).	 In	 this	 regard,	while	 the	first	 model	 envisages	 intergovernmental	 conditionality	 placed	 upon	 the	 third	 countries,	 the	 linkage	 model	targets	 civil	 society	and	attempts	 to	enable	and	empower	 "societal,	 non-governmental	actors	 to	work	 for	 the	
democratisation	of	their	home	country	from	below".	Lavenex	and	Schimmelfennig,	‘EU	Democracy	Promotion	in	the	Neighbourhood:	From	Leverage	to	Governance?’,	pp.	890–891.		In	 contrast,	 being	 less	 top-down	 than	 leverage	 and	 less	 bottom	 up	 than	 linkage,	 governance	 approach	
"operates	at	the	level	of	democratic	principles	embedded	in	the	governance	of	individual	policy	fields	and	unfolds	
through	 the	 deepening	 of	 trans-governmental,	 horizontal	 ties	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 third	 countries’	 public	
administrations". ⁠	 Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	 Democracy	 Promotion	 in	 the	 Neighbourhood:	 From	Leverage	to	Governance?’,	p.	887.	75	 Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfennig,	 ‘EU	 Democracy	 Promotion	 in	 the	 Neighbourhood:	 From	 Leverage	 to	Governance?’	 However,	 as	 I	will	 illustrate	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 of	 this	 PhD	 that,	 as	 far	 as	 the	energy	sector	is	concerned,	the	EaP	is	little	different	from	the	accession	process	in	terms	of	the	density	of	the	rules	the	EU	is	trying	to	export	without	membership	prospects.	76	 Lavenex,	 Lehmkuhl	 and	Wichmann,	 ‘Modes	 of	 External	 Governance:	 A	 Cross-National	 and	 Cross-Sectoral	Comparison’,	p.	816.	77	 Lavenex,	 Lehmkuhl	 and	Wichmann,	 ‘Modes	 of	 External	 Governance:	 A	 Cross-National	 and	 Cross-Sectoral	Comparison’,	p.	815.	
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based	 on	 network	 mode,	 for	 the	 countries	 at	 the	 receiving	 end	 have	 to	 agree	 to	 the	selection	 of	 rules	 and	 can	bring	 their	 own	priorities	 to	 the	 table.	 In	 accounting	 to	 these	issues,	 this	 thesis	 draws	 a	 great	 deal	 from	 the	 Europeanisation	 literature	 in	 order	 to	investigate	 the	 EU	 policies	 pursued	 under	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 and	 the	factors	conditioning	their	success	or	failure.		It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that,	 (external)	Europeanisation	 is	 a	 broad	 concept	 and	 refers	 to	
“the	influence	of	EU	policies	and	values	on	the	'rest	of	the	world',	 i.e.	non-member	states”.78	Such	 a	 broad	 conception	 of	 the	 term	 encompasses	 external	 material	 and	 ideational	influence	of	the	formal	EU	policies	and	legislation	(acquis),	as	well	as	the	EU	(European)	identity	and	discourse	on	the	political,	economic	and	cultural	outcomes	in	third	countries.	Admittedly,	 the	 level	 of	 material	 and	 ideational	 influence	 in	 external	 Europeanisation	varies	depending	on	the	target	spheres/sectors	in	question.	The	extent	to	which	political,	economic	 and	 social	 outcomes	 in	 third	 countries	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 change	 of	 ideas	preceding	 the	 policy	 choices	 (as	 a	 consequence	 of	 Europeanisation)	 is,	 arguably,	dependent	 inter	 alia	 on	 the	 formality	 and	determinacy	of	 the	 rules	 that	 bring	 about	 the	outcomes	in	question.	Existing	EU	policies	underpinned	by	dense	and	determinate	formal	rules	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 external	 Europeanisation	 in	 material	 terms.	While	 less	dense	and	less	determinate	EU	policies	and	norms	are	likely	to	have	a	more	ideational	and	discursive	 influence	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 third	 countries.79	 For	 example,	 external	Europeanisation	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 democratic	 governance	 entails	 both	 material	 and	ideational	changes	in	the	target	countries,	as	democracy	requires	the	existence	of	certain	formal/material	institutions	in	the	polity,	but	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	single	formal	model	of	 governance.	 It	 needs	 to	 be	 complemented	 with	 ideational	 transformations	 in	 third	countries	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 legitimate	 way(s)	 of	 state	 governance,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
governors	and/or	the	electorate	and	in	general,	the	process	of	socialisation	through	which	EU	 (and	 international)	 norms	 are	 internalised	 into	 domestic	 practices	 in	 the	 target	countries.80	 However,	 the	 scope	 for	 ideational	 transformations	 is	 non-existent	 or	insignificant,	 if	 the	 Europeanisation	 aims	 to	 install	 a	 ready-made	 formal	 model	 of,	 for	example,	 third-party	access	 regime	 to	 transmission	pipelines	 in	 third	countries.	Whether	
                                                            78	Heritier,	‘Europeanization	Research	East	and	West:	A	Comparative	Assessment’,	p.	200.	79	 However,	 these	 two	 types	 of	 external	 influences	 should	 not	 necessarily	 be	 mutually	 exclusive.	 The	differentiation	is	made	here	only	to	point	out	to	the	dominant	influence	of	the	formal	and	dense	EU	acquis	on	the	material	outcomes	in	third	countries.	80	 See	 e.g.	 The	 Persistent	 Power	 of	 Human	 Rights:	 From	 Commitment	 to	 Compliance,	 ed.	 by	 Thomas	 Risse-Kappen,	Stephen	C.	Ropp,	and	Kathryn	Sikkink	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013);	Thomas	Risse,	
A	Community	of	Europeans?:	Transnational	Identities	and	Public	Spheres	(Ithaca	[N.Y.]:	Cornell	University	Press,	2010);	Ian	Manners,	 ‘Normative	Power	Europe:	A	Contradiction	in	Terms?’,	JCMS:	Journal	of	Common	Market	
Studies,	40.2	(2002),	235–58;	Maria	Green	Cowles,	James	A.	Caporaso	and	Thomas	Risse-Kappen,	Transforming	
Europe:	 Europeanization	 and	 Domestic	 Change	 (Cornell	 University	 Press,	 2001);	 Richard	 Youngs,	 ‘European	Union	Democracy	Promotion	Policies:	Ten	Years	On’,	European	Foreign	Affairs	Review,	6.3	(2001),	355–73.	
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the	target	countries	consider	the	EU	model	legitimate	or	not,	is	irrelevant	and	it	does	not	require	the	change	of	identity	or	thinking	in	order	to	implement	it	properly.	The	EU	rules	in	 this	 sphere	 are	 very	dense	 and	determinate	 and	 do	 not	 necessarily	 dependent	 on	 the	process	of	socialisation	in	order	to	ensure	their	correct	implementation,	which	avails	itself	to	empirical	observation	(although,	admittedly,	not	always	quantifiable).	Hence,	since	this	PhD	focuses	only	on	the	influence	of	the	EU	natural	gas	rules,	which	are	dense	 and	 determinate,	 on	 the	 relevant	 third	 country	 policies,	 the	 notion	 of	
Europeanisation	I	 am	 interested	 in	 is	 also	 limited	 to	 its	 formal	 and	 material	 outcomes.	Consequently,	for	the	purpose	of	this	PhD,	the	"Europeanisation	of	the	SGC"	refers	only	to	the	 influence	of	 the	determinate	EU	acquis	 and	policies	on	 the	natural	gas	 sectors	 in	 the	target	 countries,	 namely,	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	 Azerbaijan	 (and	 not	 the	 entire	 policy	 or	society).	The	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 provides	 the	 review	 of	 academic	 literature	 on	 the	 SGC,	while	the	subsequent	section	defines	the	theoretical	terrain	of	this	thesis.	
5.	Literature	Review	on	Southern	Gas	Corridor	
The	contemporary	 literature	on	energy	security	 is	probably	one	of	 the	 fastest	expanding	strands	of	academic	research	on	security	issues	and	has	traditionally	been	studied	within	the	 subject	 field	Security	 Studies	 -	 a	 sub-field	of	 International	Relations.	However,	 in	 the	last	 couple	 of	 decades,	 energy	 as	 a	 subject	 matter	 has	 transcended	 the	 boundaries	 of	Security	 Studies/International	 Relations	 and	 become	 an	 important	 topic	 for	 academic	research	in	Economics	and	Legal	Studies.	The	diversity	of	approach	to	academic	research	on	energy	security	is	driven	not	only	by	the	relevant	 academic	 background	 of	 individual	 scholars,	 e.g.	 politics,	 economics,	 law	 and	sociology.	 It	 is	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 very	 definition	 of	 energy	 security	 by	 individual	countries	 or	 group	 of	 countries	 and	 the	 fuel	 type	 that	 they	 relate	 their	 energy	 security	with.	 Daniel	 Yergin,	 one	 of	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	 re-generate	 academic	 interest	 to	 energy	security,	 argued	 that	 for	 the	 United	 States,	 energy	 independence	 and	 the	 desire	 to	decrease	 its	 oil	 import	 dependence	 is	 of	 foremost	 concern.	 For	 other	 consuming	
leviathans,	 especially	 for	 China	 and	 India,	 energy	 security	 is	 linked	 to	 their	 economic	growth	 and	 ensuring	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 (all)	 energy	 supplies	 does	 not	 stymie	 thereof.81	According	 to	Daniel	Yergin,	"for	Russia,	 the	aim	 is	 to	reassert	 state	control	over	 “strategic	
resources”	and	gain	primacy	over	the	main	pipelines	and	market	channels	through	which	it	
                                                            81	Yergin,	‘What	Does	“Energy	Security”	Really	Mean?’	
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ships	 its	 hydrocarbons	 to	 international	 markets."82	 Even	 when	 the	 priorities	 within	 the	widespread	definition	of	energy	security	("the	provision	of	affordable,	reliable,	diverse	and	
ample	 supplies	 of"	 energy	 resources	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 adequate	 infrastructure)83	 are	concerned,	 the	national	differences	are	quite	stark.	For	example,	while	 the	US	and	China	puts	the	emphasis	on	the	reliability	of	supplies,84	the	European	Union	places	the	priorities	on	the	security	of	supply	and	competitiveness	(and	sustainability)	of	energy	supply,85	while	policy	debates	centre	around	the	ways	of	managing	the	dependence	on	imported	natural	gas.86			In	 general,	 literature	 on	 the	 SGC	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 security	 can	 be	separated	into	two	distinct	but	interrelated	themes/storylines:	1) Energy	geopolitics	and	‘regions	and	empires’,	2) Energy	interdependence	and	‘markets	and	institutions’.87	The	 following	 sections	 review	 these	 storylines	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 SGC	 and	 locate	 this	research	in	the	broader	academic	literature.	
5.1.	SGC	in	the	’regions	and	empires’	debate	
Scholars	 in	 this	 group	 take	 a	 geopolitical	 approach	 to	 external	 energy	 supply	 and	 argue	that	energy	strategies	of	the	supplier	countries	are	tainted	with	their	national	interests	in	a	Hobbesian	 sense.	Therefore,	external	energy	supply	has	a	structural	quality	 to	advance	the	foreign	policy	agenda	(both	geopolitical	and	geo-economical)	of	the	supplier	countries.	Markets	 alone	 cannot	 eliminate	 these	 risks,	 thus	 supply	 of	 energy	must	 be	 treated	 as	 a	matter	of	national	security.88	From	the	perspective	of	 the	EU	natural	gas	security,	 the	main	emphasis	 is	placed	on	 the	traditional	 security	 implications	 of	 the	 EU’s	 over-dependence	 on	 Russian	 natural	 gas	supplies,	as	well	as	increasing	international	competition	over	the	scarce	energy	resources.	More	 specifically,	 Zeyno	 Baran	 argues	 that,	 “Russian	 power	 and	 influence	 is	 no	 longer	
                                                            82	Daniel	Yergin,	‘Ensuring	Energy	Security’,	Foreign	Affairs,	85.2	(2006),	69–82	(p.	71).	83	 Kalichi	 and	 Goldwyn,	 ‘Introduction:	 The	 Need	 to	 Integrate	 Energy	 and	 Foreign	 Policy’,	 p.	 9	 (emphasis	added).	84	Brenda	Shaffer,	Energy	Politics	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2009),	p.	93.	85	Green	Paper:	A	European	Strategy	for	Sustainable,	Competitive	and	Secure	Energy,	COM	(2006)	105.	86	Yergin,	‘Ensuring	Energy	Security’,	p.	71.	87	For	comprehensive	discussions	on	these	storylines,	see	e.g.	Study	on	Energy	Supply	Security	and	Geopolitics	(The	Hague,	the	Netherlands:	Clingendael	International	Energy	Programme	(CIEP),	Institute	for	International	Relations	 ‘Clingendael’,	 2004);	 Richard	 Youngs,	 Energy	 Security:	 Europe’s	 New	 Foreign	 Policy	 Challenge	(London:	 Routledge,	 2011);	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	Contractual	Trade	Channel	Geopolitics?’	88	Yergin,	‘Ensuring	Energy	Security’.	
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measured	 in	 ballistic	 missile	 accuracy	 or	 bomber	 production	 but	 in	 miles	 of	 pipeline	
constructed	 and	 barrels	 of	 oil	 per	 day	 exported,	 and	 for	 Europe,	 this	 energy	 invasion	 has	
already	 begun”.89	 Similarly,	 Ariel	 Cohen	 indicates	 that	 Russia,	 "has	 demonstrated	 its	
readiness	to	use	hydrocarbon	muscle	and	newfound	wealth	as	a	political	tool	in	its	relations	
with	 neighbouring	 states".90	 Furthermore,	 Robert	 Larsson	 argues	 that	 Russian	 energy	strategy	 is	 based	 on	 imposing	 asymmetric	 dependence	 on	 the	 EU,	 while	 ensuring	 its	independence	in	foreign	policy	choices.91	Extant	 literature	 on	 the	 SGC	 has	 largely	 grown	 from	 the	 discussions	 in	 this	 group	 of	research	 and	has	 rather	 been	presented	 as	 a	 foreign	policy	 action	 of	 the	EU	 in	 order	 to	counter-balance	 its	 dependence	 on	 Russia.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 conventional	 geopolitical	approach,	it	is	argued	that	EU’s	political	support	to	directly	connecting	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	Eastern	energy	reserves	to	the	EU	markets	via	new	energy	infrastructure	bypassing	Russia	will	reduce	the	Union’s	dependence	and	geopolitical	vulnerability	vis-à-vis	 the	 latter.	 Mert	 Bilgin	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 "western	 energy	 corridor	 through	
Turkey	(WECT)"	(a	euphemism	for	SGC)	and	argues	that,	inner-Caspian	states	-	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan	 and	 Turkmenistan	 together	 present	 a	 potent	 alternative	 energy	 source	 to	counter-balance	the	EU's	current	dependence	on	Russia.92	What	is	more,	similar	to	Baran,93	he	posits	that	directly	linking	this	region	with	the	EU	will	also	expand	secure	zone	in	the	
                                                            89	Zeyno	Baran,	 ‘EU	Energy	Security:	Time	to	End	Russian	Leverage’,	The	Washington	Quarterly,	30.4	(2007),	131–44	(p.	131).	90	Cohen,	‘Russia:	The	Flawed	Energy	Superpower’,	p.	92.	91	Robert	L.	Larsson,	Russia’s	Energy	Policy:	Security	Dimensions	and	Russia’s	Reliability	as	an	Energy	Supplier	(Stockholm:	FOI:	Swedish	Defence	Research	Agency,	2006),	p.	4;	see	also,	Harley	Balzer,	‘The	Putin	Thesis	and	Russian	Energy	Policy’,	Post-Soviet	Affairs,	21.3	(2005),	210–25;	Andrew	Monaghan,	Russian	Oil	and	EU	Energy	
Security	(Defence	Academy	of	the	United	Kingdom:	Conflict	Studies	Research	Centre,	2005);	Per	Högselius,	Red	
Gas:	Russia	and	the	Origins	of	European	Energy	Dependence	(New	York,	NY:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012).	92	Mert	Bilgin,	 ‘New	Prospects	 in	 the	Political	Economy	of	 Inner-Caspian	Hydrocarbons	and	Western	Energy	Corridor	Through	Turkey’,	Energy	Policy,	35.12	(2007),	6383–94;	Bilgin,	‘Geopolitics	of	European	Natural	Gas	Demand:	 Supplies	 from	 Russia,	 Caspian	 and	 the	 Middle	 East’;	 see	 also,	 Erkan	 Erdogdu,	 ‘Bypassing	 Russia:	Nabucco	 Project	 and	 Its	 Implications	 for	 the	 European	 Gas	 Security’,	 Renewable	 and	 Sustainable	 Energy	
Reviews,	 14.9	 (2010),	 2936–45;	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security:	 Gazprom’s	 Dominance	 and	 Caspian	 Supply	
Alternatives,	ed.	by	Svante	E	Cornell	and	Niklas	Nilsson	(Washington,	D.C.:	The	Central	Asia-Caucasus	Institute,	The	 Silk	 Road	 Studies	 Program,	 2008);	 Karbuz,	‘Review	of	the	EU	Strategy	on	Energy	towards	the	Black	and	Caspian	Sea	Basins’;	 Dieckhoner,	 ‘Simulating	Security	of	 Supply	Effects	 of	 the	Nabucco	 and	South	Stream	Projects	 for	 the	European	Natural	Gas	Market’;	Uwe	 Remme,	 Markus	 Blesl	 and	 Ulrich	 Fahl,	 ‘Future	 European	 Gas	 Supply	 in	 the	 Resource	 Triangle	 of	 the	Former	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	Middle	 East	 and	Northern	Africa’,	Energy	 Policy,	 36.5	 (2008),	 1622–41	 (p.	 1637);	Dimitrios	 Mavrakis,	 Fotios	 Thomaidis	 and	 Ioannis	 Ntroukas,	 ‘An	 Assessment	 of	 the	 Natural	 Gas	 Supply	Potential	of	the	South	Energy	Corridor	from	the	Caspian	Region	to	the	EU’,	Energy	Policy,	34.13	(2006),	1671–80.	93	 Baran,	 ‘EU	 Energy	 Security:	 Time	 to	 End	 Russian	 Leverage’;	 Zeyno	 Baran,	 ‘Developing	 a	 Cohesive	 EU	Approach	 to	 Energy	 Security’,	 in	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security:	 Gazprom’s	 Dominance	 and	 Caspian	 Supply	
Alternatives,	ed.	by	Svante	E	Cornell	and	Niklas	Nilsson	(Washington,	D.C.:	The	Central	Asia-Caucasus	Institute,	The	Silk	Road	Studies	Program,	2008),	pp.	155–66;	see	also,	Erdogdu,	‘Bypassing	Russia:	Nabucco	Project	and	Its	Implications	for	the	European	Gas	Security’.	
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EU	neighbourhood	and	contribute	to	the	independence	of	the	regional	states	from	Russian	influence.94	Shaffer	 takes	 this	 debate	 further	 in	 the	 geopolitical	 scale	 and	 argues	 that,	 international	focus	on	 the	Caspian	Basin	 largely	 stems	 from	 the	 region's	 geopolitical	 significance	 as	 a	strategic	junction	between	Europe	and	Asia.	Therefore,	the	control	over	the	"energy	export	
projects	 [from	 the	 region]	 provides	 significant	 influence	 over	 the	 security	 and	 political	
outcomes	and	policies	of	the	Caspian	states";	thus,	the	battle	over	the	regional	export	routes	is	 "more	about	determining	 the	geo-strategic	 orientation	of	 the	 region	 than	 control	 of	 the	
Caspian	 states’	modest	 volumes	 of	 oil	 and	gas”.95	 Shaffer	 concludes	 that,	 the	August	2008	war	between	Russia-Georgia,	which	was	the	result	of	Russia’s	aggressive	reaction	against	Western	meddling	in	its	near	abroad,	served	as	a	"major	watershed"	in	the	regional	energy	race,	 potentially	 rendering	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 "as	 highly	 risky"	 for	 commercial	investments.96	Additionally,	 against	 the	backdrop	of	 skyrocketing	economic	development	 in	East,	 South	and	 South-East	 Asian	 countries,	 experts	 also	 raise	 concerns	 about	 the	 increased	competition	among	the	major	“empires”	over	the	scarce	energy	sources	and	question	the	availability	 of	 energy	 resources	 in	 need.97	 Others	 warn	 against	 the	 volatile	 security	environment	along	the	expected	transit	corridor	that	will	bring	new	gas	supplies	from	the	Caspian	Basin.	 Crandall	 argues	 that	 increased	 terrorism	 in	Turkey	 is	 of	 huge	 concern	 in	this	 regard.	Although	 the	pipelines	 traversing	Turkish	 territory	are	buried,	 the	pumping	stations	 remain	 above	 the	 surface,	 which	 represents	 an	 easy	 target	 for	 PKK	 Kurdish	terrorists	 who	 aspire	 to	 destabilise	 the	 region	 and	 achieve	 secession	 from	 Turkey.	Additionally,	 there	 is	 less	 than	30	km	between	the	South	Caucasus	Pipeline	(a	Caucasian	part	of	the	SGC)	and	the	Nagorno	Karabakh	(NK)	conflict,	which	destabilises	the	region	as	a	 result	 of	 Armenian	 occupation	 of	 Azerbaijani	 territories.	 Crandall	 warns	 that,	 "if	 war	
resumes,	 shipments	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 interrupted,	 as	 Armenia	will	 seek	 to	 deny	 its	 enemy	 a	
                                                            94	Bilgin,	 ‘Geopolitics	of	European	Natural	Gas	Demand:	Supplies	 from	Russia,	Caspian	and	 the	Middle	East’;	Ariel	 Cohen,	 ‘Energy	 Security	 in	 the	 Caspian	 Basin’,	 in	 Energy	 Security	 Challenges	 for	 the	 21st	 Century:	 A	
Reference	Handbook,	ed.	by	Gal	Luft	and	Anne	Korin	(Santa	Barbara:	Praeger	Security	International,	2009),	pp.	109–27.	95	Brenda	Shaffer,	‘Caspian	Energy	Phase	II:	Beyond	2005’,	Energy	Policy,	38.11	(2010),	7209–15	(p.	7210).	96	Shaffer,	‘Caspian	Energy	Phase	II:	Beyond	2005’,	p.	7213.	97	 Kalichi	 and	 Goldwyn,	 ‘Introduction:	 The	 Need	 to	 Integrate	 Energy	 and	 Foreign	 Policy’;	 Gawdat	 Bahgat,	‘Europe’s	Energy	 Security:	 Challenges	 and	Opportunities’,	 International	Affairs,	 82.5	 (2006),	 961–75;	Mikkal	Herberg,	 ‘Fuelling	 the	Dragon:	 China’s	 Energy	 Prospects	 and	 International	 Implications’,	 in	Energy	 And	 The	
Transformation	 Of	 International	 Relations:	 Toward	 A	 New	 Producer-Consumer	 Framework,	 ed.	 by	 Andreas	Wenger,	Robert	W	Orttung,	and	Jeronim	Perovic	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	269–97;	Shaffer,	
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source	of	funds.	These	are	wild	cards,	but	cannot	be	ruled	out".98	Supported	by	these	factors,	Crandall	argues	that	from	the	security	point	of	view,	Southern	Gas	Corridor	is	not	suitable	for	 safe	 transportation,	 ultimately	 diminishing	 Caspian	 (and	 Middle	 Eastern)	 energy	source's	importance.	In	 sum,	 the	 EU’s	 increased	 political	 engagement	with	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 and	 the	Middle	East	 via	 the	 SGC	 is	 construed	 as	 a	 geopolitical	 storyline	 in	 the	 Union’s	 external	 energy	security	 strategy.	 However,	 literature	 in	 this	 group	 largely	 ignores	 the	 lack	 of	 state	attributes	and	capabilities;	 in	short,	 lack	of	actorness	of	 the	EU	 in	a	conventional	 foreign	policy	sense.	As	I	indicated	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	in	view	of	this	lack	of	classical	foreign	 (energy)	 policy	 capabilities,	 the	 EU’s	 external	 energy	 policy	 actions	 are	 rather	based	on	 the	engagement	with	 third	countries	 through	 the	extension	of	domestic	norms	and	practices.	Literature	in	this	group,	however,	does	not	engage	role	of	the	EU	rules	in	the	establishment	 and	 future	 operation	 of	 the	 SGC,	 which	 is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 analytical	attention	of	the	current	thesis.		
5.2.	SGC	in	the	‘markets	and	institutions’	debate	
In	the	second	group,	academic	research	has	taken	an	interdependence	approach	to	energy	security	and	draws	attention	to	the	role	of	 the	 increasingly	globalised	energy	markets	 in	reducing	political	 tensions	stemming	 from	access	 to	energy	supply.	Underpinned	mainly	by	the	liberal	paradigm,	proponents	of	this	approach	argue	against	ascribing	a	geopolitical	role	 to	 energy	 supply	 and	 posit	 that	 globalisation	 has	 increased	 the	 interdependence	between	 the	 energy	 producers	 and	 consumers.	 Therefore,	 energy	 security	 of	 the	producers	 cannot	 remain	 unscathed	 by	 the	 challenges	 to	 the	 energy	 security	 of	 the	consumers	and	vice-versa.		In	this	regard,	Jeronim	Perovic	points	out	to	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	Russian	natural	gas	 exports	 are	 destined	 for	 the	 European	 markets	 due	 to	 the	 fixed	 nature	 of	 gas	transportation	 infrastructure	 and	 therefore,	 is	 inflexible.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Russia's	 high	revenues	 from	 energy	 exports	 make	 it	 dependent	 on	 European	 energy	 demand,	 which	consequently	 renders	 the	 possibility	 of	 "energy	weapon"	 illogical	 illusion.99	 In	 a	 similar	
                                                            98	Maureen	S.	Crandall,	Energy,	Economics,	 and	Politics	 in	 the	Caspian	Region:	Dreams	and	Realities	 (Praeger	Publishers	Inc,	2006),	p.	68.	99	Jeronim	Perovic,	 ‘Changing	Markets,	Politics,	and	Perceptions:	Dealing	with	Energy	(Inter-)	Dependencies’,	in	Energy	And	The	Transformation	Of	 International	Relations:	Toward	A	New	Producer-Consumer	Framework,	ed.	by	Andreas	Wenger,	Robert	W	Orttung,	and	Jeronim	Perovic	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	26–59;	 Andreas	Wenger,	 ‘Toward	 A	More	 Sustainable	 Global	 Energy	 System:	 Integrating	 Demand-Side	 and	Supply-Side	Policies’,	 in	Energy	And	The	Transformation	Of	 International	Relations:	Toward	A	New	Producer-
Consumer	 Framework,	 ed.	 by	 Andreas	 Wenger,	 Robert	 W	 Orttung,	 and	 Jeronim	 Perovic	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	331–63;	Fattouh,	‘How	Secure	Are	Middle	East	Oil	Supplies?’	
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line,	Paul	Isbell	argues	that,	“[t]he	highly	interdependent	nature	of	the	world	energy	system	
goes	a	long	way	toward	eliminating	the	real	likelihood	that	premeditated	supply	cuts	will	be	
used	 to	 damage	 importing	 economies	 during	 peacetime.	 Commercial	 and	 state	 diplomacy	
can,	 and	always	 have,	 taken	 care	 of	 the	 relevant	 residual	 risk”.100	Furthermore,	 he	 argues	that,	“[c]onsumers	also	need	to	be	made	aware	of	the	real	issues	involved,	within	the	context	
of	emergency	planning	and	demand	management,	as	opposed	to	simply	being	led	to	believe	
there	is	a	foreign	demon	on	the	horizon”.101	Pierre	 Noel	 takes	 this	 (normative)	 liberal	 argument	 a	 step	 further	 and	 argues	 that	 the	concept	 of	 energy	 security	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 "myth",	 as	 energy	 supply	 is	 and	 should	 be	subject	 to	 free-market	 rules,	 while	 leaving	 political	 and	 hard	 power	 motivation	 aside.	Thus,	public	intervention	to	energy	supply	vis-à-vis	dependence	on	Russia	is	anything	but	counterproductive.102	In	 furthering	 this	 argument,	 other	 scholars	 argue	 that,	 in	 fact	 "energy	weapon"	 is	more	exercised	by	 consumers	 in	 the	 form	of	Western	patronised	 sanctions	 in	order	 to	 induce	behavioural	 change	 in	 producing	 countries	 (Libya,	 Iraq	 and	 Iran	 are	 cases	 in	 point).103	Thus,	instead	of	alluding	to	the	illusionary	usage	of	"energy	weapon"	consumers	should	be	more	 concerned	 about	 the	 underinvestment	 in	 upstream	 energy	 production	 and	 heavy	domestic	energy	subsidisation	due	to	domestic	political	reasons.104	In	this	regard,	liberals	indicate	the	rhetorical	function	of	alleged	"energy	weapon",	which	feeds	into	the	vicious	cycle	of	"energy	security	dilemma"	where	all	parties	try	to	diversify	away	 from	 each	 other	 because	 of	 the	 fear	 of	 being	 a	 subjects	 of	 energy	 weapon.	 As	 a	consequence,	it	results	in	reduced	confidence	in	the	market	and	aggressive	drive	towards	accessing	scarce	alternative	sources.	Therefore,	liberals	call	to	embrace	interdependence,	instead	of	independence	and	engage	in	constructive	dialogue	and	furthering	transparency	in	 consumer	 and	 producer	 energy	 relations.105	 In	 this	 vein,	 John	 Gault	 suggests	 that,	instead	 of	 alienating	 Russia,	 the	 EU	 has	 to	 push	 for	 more	 economic	 cooperation	 with	Moscow,	 as	 it	 will	 lock	 up	 both	 European	 consumers	 and	 the	 Kremlin	 in	 mutual	
                                                            100	Isbell,	‘Paul	Isbell	Revisits	the	Energy	Security	Debate’,	p.	3.	101	Isbell,	‘Paul	Isbell	Revisits	the	Energy	Security	Debate’,	p.	4.	102	 Pierre	 Noël,	 ‘Challenging	 the	 Myths	 of	 Energy	 Security’,	 Financial	 Times,	 10	 January	 2008	<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/40c2f8aa-bf93-11dc-8052-0000779fd2ac.html>	 [accessed	 31	 March	2012];	Pierre	Noël,	Beyond	Dependence:	How	to	Deal	with	Russian	Gas	(European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	2008).	103	Fattouh,	‘How	Secure	Are	Middle	East	Oil	Supplies?’,	p.	96.	104	John	Roberts,	‘Energy	Challenges	for	Europe’,	in	Energy	And	The	Transformation	Of	International	Relations:	
Toward	A	New	Producer-Consumer	Framework,	ed.	by	Andreas	Wenger,	Robert	W	Orttung,	and	Jeronim	Perovic	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	245–69	(p.	251).	105	 Wenger,	 ‘Toward	 A	 More	 Sustainable	 Global	 Energy	 System:	 Integrating	 Demand-Side	 and	 Supply-Side	Policies’.	
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interdependence	 and	 eliminate	 any	 possibility	 of	 pre-mediated	 supply	 cut-offs.	 In	 this	view,	 inviting	Russian	companies	to	 invest	 in	 the	EU	will	make	them	hostage	to	the	host	governments'	policies	and	eliminate	any	residual	risks.106	Finon	and	Locatelli,	additionally,	take	a	different	and	somewhat	dialectical	approach	to	the	economic	 and	 political	 challenges	 stemming	 from	 the	 EU’s	 dependence	 on	 Russia	 gas	supplies.	They	recognise	the	increasingly	realist	mood	that	Russia	has	been	engaging	with	its	European	partners	and	the	deliberate,	if	only	mistaken,	"politicisation	of	the	gas	issue	by	
the	 [Vladimir]	 Putin	 government	 as	 a	 way	 of	 affirming	 Russia's	 ambitions	 to	 recover	 its	
international	 influence".107	 However,	 in	 doing	 so,	 the	 scholars	 argue	 that	 political	 risks	stemming	 from	 the	 EU's	 dependence	 on	 Russia	must	 not	 be	 extrapolated	 to	 Gazprom's	business	activities	in	Europe,	which	they	argue	is	"determined	by	market	principles	and	the	
need	 of	 Russia	 for	 stable	 long-term	 contractual	 arrangements	 based	 on	 credible	
commitments"	and	challenge	the	"idea	that	Gazprom	is	not	a	reliable	supplier".108	Thus,	they	differentiate	energy	dependence	 from	energy	security,	 considering	 the	 former	a	political	issue,	while	the	latter	an	economic	matter.	 In	doing	so,	Finon	and	Locatelli	argue	against	the	widespread	notion	that	Gazprom	acts	in	a	monopolistic	or	oligopolistic	manner	when	engaging	with	European	gas	consumers.	They	posit	that,	even	if	Gazprom	did	act	in	such	a	way,	 high	 market	 gas	 prices,	 resulting	 from	 such	 a	 market	 behaviour	 would	 "attract	
projects	 from	competitors	outside	 the	oligopoly	of	 dominant	producers,	 even	 if	 it	 owns	 the	
major	resources	around	the	regional	market”.109		In	this	specific	context,	Finon	also	views	the	SGC	as	a	geopolitical	effort	by	the	EU,	despite	its	 intrinsically	 limited	hard	powers	 in	the	strategic	 foreign	(energy)	security	matters.	 In	analysing	the	failure	of	the	Nabucco	pipeline,	which	initially	was	used	synonymous	to	the	SGC,	 the	 author	 argues	 that	 Russian	 Gazprom	was	more	 capable	 of	 galvanising	 energy,	financial	and	political	 resources	around	 the	competing	pipeline	 (South	Stream)	and	pre-empt	the	target	markets.	Consequently,	this	made	Nabucco	(strategically)	less	competitive	vis-à-vis	 the	 Russian	 project	 and	 lead	 to	 its	 demise.110	 He	 concludes	 that,	 there	 are	 too	many	 "subjective	 premises"	 at	 the	 EU,	 "which	 distort	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 reality	
concerning	 gas	 dependence	 risk.	 […]	 [and]	 there	 might	 be	 regrets	 that	 diversification	 of	
                                                            106	John	Gault,	‘European	Security	and	Natural	Gas	Supplies’,	Oxford	Energy	Forum,	2007,	6–8.	107	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	441.	108	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	441.	109	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	432.	110	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’.	
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sources	do	not	occur	when	reaching	new	gas	sources	from	Caspian	and	Middle	East	with	the	
help	of	new	corridors".111	In	 contrast	 to	 the	 current	 research,	 however,	 Finon	 strategically	 separates	 the	 EU’s	political	 support	 to	 the	 SGC,	 dubbed	 EU’s	 "hard	 power"	 strategy	 from	 its	 "soft	 power"	efforts.	 In	 his	 terms,	 if	 the	 former	 purports	 to	 provide	 the	 EU	with	 tools	 of	 geopolitical	power	projection	 -	building	energy	pipelines	 in	order	 to	 reduce	political	dependence	on	Russia,	 the	 latter	 is	 busy	with	 liberalising	 the	 rules	 governing	 energy	 trade	 towards	 the	EU.112	Although	Finon's	analysis	regarding	the	failure	of	the	Nabucco	pipeline	is	outstanding,	his	delineation	 of	 the	 hard	 and	 soft	 power	 elements	within	 the	 SGC	 is	 less	 so.	 As	 it	will	 be	argued	 in	 this	 PhD,	 the	 policy	 of	 diversification	 and	 instilling	EU	 rules	 along	 the	 energy	corridor	 is	not	as	separate	as	Finon	portrays.	This	research	will	argue	that,	 they	are	two	different	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin	 (different	 dimensions	 of	 the	 same	 strategy),	 as	 rule	extension	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 diversification	 strategy.	 It	 is	 aimed	 by	 the	 EU	 to	 be	implemented	through	multilateral	and	bilateral	rule	extension	instruments,	but	also	to	be	embedded	 into	 the	 regulatory	 regimes	governing	 individual	projects	 along	 the	SGC.	As	 I	will	 investigate	 in	 Chapter	 II,	 Nabucco	 pipeline	 incorporated	 the	main	 principles	 of	 the	EU's	 energy	 acquis	 -	 its	 "soft	 power",	 which	 would	 help	 the	 EU	 to	 source	 Caspian	 and	Middle	Eastern	gas	based	on	the	EU	preferences	while	eliminating	transit	risks	along	the	route.	 Additionally,	 Finon	 equates	 the	 Nabucco	 pipeline	 to	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor.	Although	the	former	gave	birth	to	the	later,	the	later	is	broader	in	its	scope	than	a	single	pipeline.	The	EU	has	set	off	 its	diversification	strategy,	not	only	by	building	(supporting)	alternative	supply/transit	pipelines,	but	also	promoting	alternative	corridor	regulated	by	the	EU	rules,	thus	intrinsically	interlinking	the	two	elements	-	"hard	and	soft	power"	if	to	put	it	in	Finon's	terms.	In	this	context,	a	new	but	relatively	small	group	of	research	endeavours	have	concentrated	on	 conceptualising	 external	 Europeanisation,	 namely	 export	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 to	 third	countries,	 as	 a	 bridge,	 which	 marries	 and	 overcomes	 the	 dilemma	 between	 neo-liberal	markets	 and	 neo-realist	 geopolitics	 storylines	 in	 the	 EU’s	 (external)	 energy	 policy.113	 In	general,	although	some	experts	ascribe	the	EU	external	energy	governance	to	the	Union's	
                                                            111	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	p.	65.	112	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’;	Finon	and	Locatelli,	‘Russian	and	European	Gas	Interdependence:	Could	Contractual	Trade	Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	427.	113	Escribano	Francés,	‘Market	or	Geopolitics?	The	Europeanization	of	EU’s	Energy	Corridors’;	see	also,	Youngs,	
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free-markets	 preferences	 in	 external	 relations,114	 not	 all	 scholars	 view	 it	 from	 markets	perspective.	Giselle	Bosse	argues	that,	EU's	external	energy	strategy,	which	is	assumed	to	be	driven	by	the	necessity	to	address	energy	security	challenges,	is	not	the	result	of	hard	"geopolitical	 facts"	 and	 is	 rather	 established	 in	 a	 discursive	manner.	 She	 posits	 that,	 by	securitising	 and	 dramatising	 energy	 supply	 challenges	 and	 its	 disadvantageous	 energy	supply	 position,	 the	EU	 attempts	 to	 influence	policy	 developments	 in	 third	 countries	 by	establishing	a	neo-colonial	type	of	relationship.115	In	contrast,	Manoli	describes	the	EU's	rule	export	policy	(in	the	context	of	ENP/EaP)	as	the	EU's	 civilian	 power	 projection	 effort.	 However,	 according	 to	 her,	 these	 efforts	 are	perceived	by	the	regional	hegemon	(Russia)	as	a	geopolitical	power	projection	and	by	the	receiving	(EaP)	countries	as	an	instrument	to	counter	it.116	With	 the	 notable	 few	 exceptions,	 which	 I	 review	 below,	 however,	 none	 of	 the	 above	mentioned	 studies	 engage	 the	 first	 research	 question	 of	 this	 thesis:	 on	 the	 political	 and	economic	rationale	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	from	the	perspective	of	the	SGC	at	the	practical	level.	Especially	lacking	is	the	thorough	analysis	of	the	energy	related	rule	expansion	 and	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 under	 the	 latest	 contractual	 commitments	 in	relation	 to	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Georgia	 within	 the	 ENP/EaP	 framework.	 This	 is	 partly	conditioned	by	the	 fact	 that,	 the	 latter	policy	 instrument	 is	considerably	new	in	the	EU's	external	governance	repertoire	and	its	contractual	outcome	materialised	only	in	2014.	In	short,	 existing	 literature	 does	 not	 provide	 detailed	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 EU	energy	(natural	gas)	acquis	can	potentially	address	transit	risks	along	the	SGC.		In	 this	 regard,	 Gareth	 Winrow	 presents	 valuable	 empirical	 research,	 where	 he	 ties	Turkey's	role	 in	the	establishment	of	the	SGC	to	the	country's	EU	accession	negotiations.	He	articulates	that,	Turkey's	tough	stance	in	the	SGC	negotiations	are	directly	linked	to	its	need	 to	 ensure	 domestic	 energy	 security	 and	 use	 its	 energy	 transit	 position	 to	 leverage	progress	in	the	EU	accession	negotiations,	especially	vis-à-vis	the	opening	of	the	blocked	
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accession	chapters.117	Although	 the	study	 is	empirically	extensive,	 it	does	not	present	an	underlying	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 governs	 the	 logical	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 relevant	actors.	Additionally,	Winrow	concentrates	only	on	the	Turkish	section	of	the	SGC	and	does	not	extend	the	analysis	to	the	other	parts	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 deficiency	 of	 systematic	 academic	 research	 on	 the	 factors	 that	condition	the	success	and/or	failure	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	in	the	context	of	the	SGC,	which	is	the	main	focal	point	of	the	second	research	question	of	this	thesis.	The	notable	exceptions	are	the	research	endeavours	undertaken	by	Pardo	Sierra	and	Lussac.	Pardo	Sierra	utilises	external	governance	as	a	main	conceptual	framework	to	analyse	EU's	rules	export	policy	vis-à-vis	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	(but	excluding	Turkey).	 	 In	doing	so,	he	identifies	three	external	factors,	namely,	lack	of	institutional	policy	coherence	in	the	
EU,	regional	geopolitics	 and	domestic	 context	 linked	 to	 the	 regional-level	dynamics,	 as	 the	main	 factors	 that	 lead	 to	 the	 failure	of	 the	EU’s	external	energy	governance	vis-à-vis	 the	extended	Black	Sea	region	(which	also	incorporates	the	Caspian	Basin).	In	addition,	Pardo	Sierra	argues	 if	 the	SGC	 is	 to	be	a	 success	story,	 it	 can	only	be	possible	due	 to	 the	path-dependency	process	 (stemming	 from	regional	producers’	 already	existing	energy	supply	links	 with	 the	 EU)	 and	 interdependence	 (stemming	 from	 dense	 economic	 relations)	between	the	EU	and	the	SGC	countries.118	In	a	more	recent	work,119	Pardo	Sierra	largely	investigates	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	energy	sectors	in	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	and	ascribes	it	to	the	failure	of	the	resonance	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU	rules	in	the	South	Caucasus	and	the	inability	of	the	EU	to	engage	in	the	 region’s	 hard	 security	 challenges.120	 However,	 in	 his	 own	 acknowledgement,	 Pardo	Sierra	 does	 not	 analyse	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	EU	 rules	 in	 the	 SGC	 countries	per	 se.	Furthermore,	the	analysis	does	not	take	account	of	the	domestic	constraints	inhibiting	the	
                                                            117	Winrow,	‘Problems	and	Prospects	for	the	Fourth	Corridor:	The	Positions	and	Role	of	Turkey	in	Gas	Transit	to	 Europe’;	Winrow,	 ‘The	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 and	 Turkey’s	 Role	 as	 an	 Energy	 Transit	 State	 and	 Energy	Hub’;	Kardas,	 ‘Turkish–Azerbaijani	Energy	Cooperation	and	Nabucco:	Testing	 the	Limits	of	 the	New	Turkish	Foreign	Policy	Rhetoric’.	118	Pardo	Sierra,	 ‘A	Corridor	 through	Thorns:	EU	Energy	Security	and	 the	Southern	Energy	Corridor’;	Pardo	Sierra,	‘No	Man’s	Land?	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	the	EU	and	Russia’s	Influence	in	the	Southern	Caucasus’;	for	regional	geopolitics	as	an	 inhibiting	 factor	 for	external	governance,	 see	also,	Antoaneta	Dimitrova	and	Rilka	Dragneva,	 ‘Constraining	External	Governance:	Interdependence	with	Russia	and	the	CIS	as	Limits	to	the	EU’s	Rule	Transfer	in	the	Ukraine’,	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	16.6	(2009),	853–72.	119	 Pardo	 Sierra,	 ‘No	Man’s	 Land?	A	 Comparative	Analysis	 of	 the	 EU	 and	Russia’s	 Influence	 in	 the	 Southern	Caucasus’;	 Oscar	 Pardo	 Sierra,	 ‘Life	 Is	 a	 Dream:	 EU	 Governance	 in	 the	 Southern	 Caucasus’,	 Dynamiques	
Internationales,	2012.	120	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that,	 although	 Pardo	 Sierra	 also	 refers	 to	 domestic	 costs	 as	 one	 of	 the	 factors	(although	 not	 the	 primary	 factor)	 in	 general	 terms,	 he	 does	 not	 provide	 any	 in	 depth	 systematic	 analysis	thereof.	
 53 
Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	sectors	of	the	SGC	countries	and	its	wide	implications	on	future	gas	supplies	via	the	SGC.121	Similarly,	 but	 not	 identically,	 Samuel	 Lussac	 argues	 that,	 the	 lack	 of	 strategic	 coherence	among	 the	 views	 of	 the	 EU	 member	 states	 vis-à-vis	 the	 security	 of	 gas	 supplies	 from	Russia	 was	 the	 main	 reason	 behind	 the	 EU’s	 reluctance	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 the	 Caspian	Basin	pipeline	politics.	This	has	changed	in	the	wake	of	the	successive	EU-Russia	gas	crises	and	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 extensive	 EU	 involvement	 in	 the	 region	 through	 external	 energy	governance.122	Nevertheless,	 similar	 to	Pardo	Sierra,	 Lussac	does	not	provide	analysis	of	the	domestic	factors,	which	are	assumed	to	affect	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC.	Moreover,	 in	 analysing	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 rules	 by	 third	 countries	 (with	 a	reference	to	Georgia)	with	no	EU	membership	prospects,	Prange-Gstöhl	presents	“demand	
side”	 explanatory	 factors	 in	 the	 context	 of	 third-country	 membership	 in	 the	 Energy	Community	Treaty	(EnCT).	Prange-Gstöhl	argues	that,	since	the	adoption	of	the	EU	energy	
acquis	through	EnCT	is	not	linked	to	eventual	EU	membership	conditionality,	three	major	explanatory	factors	can	potentially	describe	the	willingness	of	third	countries	to	adopt	EU	rules:	1)	 identification	with	Europe	and	willingness	to	demonstrate	their	capacity	to	one	day	 become	 an	 EU	member,	 2)	 expectations	 to	 reduce	 their	 energy	 dependency	 on	 the	regional	hegemon,	i.e.	Russia,	3)	economic	gain,	as	common	rules	can	potentially	increase	their	 economic	 exchange	 with	 the	 European	 Union,	 thus	 resulting	 in	 national	development.123		However,	 among	 the	 non-EU	 SGC	 countries,	 only	 Georgia	 has	 applied	 for	 the	 EnCT	membership	with	not	much	of	a	progress	achieved	in	the	accession	process	yet.	Secondly,	even	in	that	case,	the	practical	outcome	of	Georgia’s	voluntary	EnCT	membership	will	only	duplicate	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 existing	 EU-Georgia	 AA/DCFTA,	 which	 is	 governed	 by	‘conditionality’	on	the	part	of	the	EU.	Finally,	Prange-Gstöhl	does	not	evaluate	the	practical	outcome	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 rules,	 thus,	 his	 broader	 conceptual	 position	 remains	empirically	invalidated.	In	conclusion,	there	is	abundance	of	academic	literature	on	the	SGC.	However,	systematic	empirical	 research	 is	 lacking	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 attempted	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	
                                                            121	Pardo	Sierra,	‘A	Corridor	through	Thorns:	EU	Energy	Security	and	the	Southern	Energy	Corridor’.	122	Lussac,	‘Ensuring	European	Energy	Security	in	Russian	“Near	Abroad”:	The	Case	of	the	South	Caucasus’;	for	a	more	recent,	but	non-peer	 reviewed	piece,	 see	also,	Edward	Hunter	Christie,	 Samuel	Lussac	and	Kataryna	Wolczuk,	The	EU	and	 Its	Eastern	Partners:	Energy	Needs	and	Future	Prospects	 (Brussels:	Directorate-General	For	External	 Policies	Of	The	Union,	 European	Parliament,	 2012);	 Lussac,	The	 State	 as	 a	 (Oil)	 Company?	The	
Political	Economy	of	Azerbaijan.	123	 Prange-Gstöhl,	 ‘Enlarging	 the	 EU’s	 Internal	 Energy	Market:	Why	Would	 Third	 Countries	 Accept	 EU	Rule	Export?’	
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institutional	 governance	 of	 the	 SGC;	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 practical	 political	 and	 economic	rationale,	the	role	of	domestic	constraints	in	the	target	countries	in	affecting	its	success,	as	well	 as	 its	 overall	 implications	 on	 the	 EU’s	 conception	 of	 energy	 security.	 This	 is	 the	specific	gap	in	the	academic	literature,	which	this	PhD	aims	to	address.	In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 identify	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 which	 underpins	 the	analyses	throughout	the	thesis.	
6.	Theoretical	framework:	Rational	Choice	Institutionalism	and	External	
Incentive	Model	
Defining	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 important,	 as	 it	 determines	 the	 vantage	 point	through	which	 I	analyse	 the	 logical	basis	of	actions	undertaken	by	different	actors	along	the	SGC.124	In	line	with	the	“domestic	analogy”	thesis125,	this	PhD	investigates	the	aims	and	the	consequences	of	the	attempted	Europeanisation	of	the	(natural	gas	policies	of	the)	SGC	countries	 based	 on	 the	 hierarchical	 and	 network	modes	 of	 the	 EU	 external	 governance.	Accordingly,	the	research	questions	inquire	both	the	rationale	of	the	external	deployment	of	the	EU	institutions	(acquis)	and	the	role	of	domestic	constraints,	which	condition	their	adoption/rejection	by	 the	 target	countries.	Hence,	an	appropriate	 theoretical	 framework	must	 be	 able	 to	 engage	 these	 questions	 and	 provide	 methodological	 solution	 for	investigations	in	the	case	studies.	In	 this	 regard,	 as	 I	 argue	 in	 this	PhD,	 through	 the	politics	 of	 inclusion126,	the	EU	external	governance	 aims	 at	 absorbing	 external	 disturbances	 (energy	 security	 risks)	 in	 to	 the	common	regulatory	 framework	and	addresses	 them	via	“internal”	 regulation.	This	 thesis	ushers	 in	 a	 rationalist	analytical	 framework,	 for	 instrumental	logic	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	main	 driver	 of	 the	 EU	 external	 governance	 on	 this	 particular	 instance.	 Admittedly,	rationalist	assumptions	usually	suffer	 from	a	post-hoc	 theorisation	of	 the	 interests	of	 the	actors	under	investigation.127	To	soften	this	theoretical	fallacy,	my	methodological	solution	is	to	inductively	investigate	the	goals	of	the	EU	vis-à-vis	the	SGC	as	declared	by	the	formal	EU	 policy	 instruments	 and	 the	 content	 of	 the	 relevant	 EU	 legislation	 to	 be	 exported	 as	much	as	realistically	possible.	As	I	argue	further	down	the	line,	given	the	EU	policy	goals	
                                                            124	Here,	I	am	only	interested	in	explanatory	purchase	of	the	theory,	which	is	deployed	to	explain	(rather	than	critique)	energy	security	in	the	EU	context.	125	 Frank	 Schimmelfennig,	 ‘Europeanization	 Beyond	 Europe’,	 Living	 Reviews	 in	 European	 Governance,	 4.3	(2009),	p.	10.	126	Smith,	‘The	European	Union	and	a	Changing	Europe:	Establishing	the	Boundaries	of	Order’,	p.	23.	127	See	e.g.	Mark	Pollack,	‘Rational	Choice	and	EU	Politics’,	in	Handbook	of	European	Union	Politics,	ed.	by	Knud	Erik	 Jorgensen,	Mark	 Pollack,	 and	 Ben	 J.	 Rosamond	 (London;	 Thousand	 Oaks,	 Calif:	 SAGE	 Publications	 Ltd,	2007),	pp.	31–56	(p.	33).	
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are	 intrinsically	 instrumental	 (aimed	at	ensuring	competitive	gas	supply	and	eliminating	external	transit	risks)	and	since	the	content	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	is	in	nature	problem-
solving,	 then	 a	 rationalist	approach	 becomes	 very	 appropriate	 for	 investigating	 the	 case	studies	in	this	PhD.		Furthermore,	 ascribing	 an	 independent	 role	 to	 domestic	 costs	 in	 the	 determination	 of	policy	 outcomes	 in	 the	 target	 SGC	 countries	 is	 also	 an	 inherently	 rationalist	 exercise.	
Domestic	 costs	signal	 to	 the	 constraining	 (as	 opposed	 to	 constitutive)	 role	 of	 the	 context	surrounding	the	actors	concerned.	Hence,	combined	with	the	assumption	that	 the	actors	are	 utility-maximisers,	 a	 constraining	context	 forces	 them	 to	 behave	 rationally	 in	 opting	for	the	most	beneficial	(or	the	least	costly)	policy	options	available.		Against	 this	 backdrop,	 Rational	 Choice	 Institutionalism	 (RCI)	 presents	 a	 valuable	theoretical	approach	for	engaging	the	(formal)	institutional	elements	of	the	SGC	strategy	in	a	 strategic	 context.	 However,	 as	a	 second	 order	 theory	 of	 the	 social128	 RCI	 is	 generally	concerned	 with	 ontological	 and	epistemological	questions	 related	 to	 the	 deployment	 of	formal	 institutions	 under	 the	 logic	 of	 rational-choice.	 It	 is	not	 specific	 to	 any	 particular	study	domain,	including	International	Relations	or	EU	Studies.	Therefore,	in	the	context	of	the	regulatory	dimension	the	SGC,	RCI	does	not	provide	domain	specific	explanatory	tools	in	order	to	account	for	the	factors	that	facilitate	and/or	inhibit	the	success	and/or	failure	of	the	EU’s	rule	extension	strategy.	Therefore,	 I	 use	 the	 first	 order	 adaption	 of	 RCI,	 External	 Incentive	 Model	 (EIM)	 as	 the	domain	 specific	 theoretical	 tool	 of	 this	 PhD	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 inter-relations	between	the	domestic	adoption	costs	(causes)	and	the	failure	of	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	(effect).	With	this	in	mind,	below,	I	first,	introduce	RCI	as	a	broader	theoretical	theme	of	 this	 PhD	 and	 analyse	 its	 main	 arguments	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	 EU's	 external	 energy	governance	vis-à-vis	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	Then,	 I	 go	on	 to	outline	 the	explanatory	arguments	 of	 the	 EIM	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 factors	 affecting	 rule	 adoption	 in	 the	 target	countries.	
6.1.	Rational-Choice	Institutionalism	
Since	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance	 envisions	 external	 policy	 action	 based	 on	domestic	 rules,	 New	 Institutionalism,	 especially	 its	 rational-choice	 version	 presents	 a	valuable	 analytical	 tool	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 EU	 policy	 of	
                                                            128	 For	 explanation	 of	 the	 second	 and	 first	 order	 theories,	 see	 e.g.	 Alexander	 Wendt,	 Social	 Theory	 of	
International	 Politics,	 Cambridge	 Studies	 in	 International	 Relations	 (Cambridge,	 UK;	 New	 York:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	1999).	
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Europeanisation	 towards	 the	 SGC,	 which	 I	 have	 dubbed	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 this	alternative	energy	corridor.	 In	general	 terms,	what	are	the	main	precepts	of	 the	RCI	and	how	does	it	explain	the	external	energy	governance	of	the	EU?		To	start	with,	by	taking	the	logic	of	calculus,	RCI	assumes	that	individuals	always	strive	to	maximise	 the	 achievement	 of	 their	 objectives;	 accordingly,	 act	 strategically.129	 That	 is	 to	say,	they	canvass	all	possible	options	of	action	that	can	help	them	to	attain	their	objectives	and	select	those	options	that	confer	the	maximum	amount	of	benefits.130	As	such,	RCI	is	a	methodologically	 individualist	 theory;	 in	 other	words,	 the	 basic	 units	 of	 analysis	 are	 the	individuals	themselves	and	it	seeks	to	explain	"both	individual	and	collective	behaviour	as	
the	aggregation	of	individual	choices".131	In	the	case	of	the	EU	external	governance,	we	are	interested	 in	 the	collective	behaviour	(external	policy	choices)	of	 the	EU	(its	 Institutions	and	member	 states)	 as	 constrained	by	 the	 existing	EU	 institutions,	 namely,	 Treaties	 and	relevant	secondary	legislation	(below).	Secondly,	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 analysis	 in	 RCI	 is	 not	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 basic	 units	(individuals	or	their	aggregations	at	the	state,	supra-state	or	non-state	actor	level),	but	the	
institutions	 themselves.	 Institutions	 are	 defined	 as	 the	 rules,	 norms	 and	 organisational	structures,	which	"are	robust	over	time,	and	lend	themselves	to	comparisons	across	settings,	
as	structured.	They	persist	in	roughly	the	same	form	from	year	to	year,	and	their	similarities	
to	and	divergences	from	objects	sharing	their	label	in	other	places	also	persist".132	Since	 the	 actors'	 behaviour	 is	 based	 on	 strategic	 calculus,	 "this	 calculus	 will	 be	 deeply	
affected	 by	 the	 actor’s	 expectations	 about	 how	 others	 are	 likely	 to	 behave	 as	 well".133	Institutions,	 in	 this	 regard,	 structure	 these	 interactions	 and	 strategic	 behaviour	 "by	
affecting	 the	 range	 and	 sequence	 of	 alternatives	 on	 the	 choice-agenda	 or	 by	 providing	
information	 and	 enforcement	 [e.g.	 penalties	 for	 defection]	 mechanisms	 that	 reduce	
uncertainty	about	the	corresponding	behaviour	of	others".134		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	preferences	and	interests	of	actors	do	not	matter.	It	is	rather	to	point	 out	 that,	 the	 preferences	 of	 actors	 are	 exogenous	 to	 institutional	 analysis,135	while	
                                                            129	Kenneth	A.	Shepsle,	‘Rational	Choice	Institutionalism’,	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Political	Institutions,	ed.	by	R.	A.	W.	Rhodes,	Sarah	A.	Binder,	and	Bert	A.	Rockman,	Oxford	Handbooks	of	Political	Science	(Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	pp.	23–39	(p.	30);	see	also,	Pollack,	‘Rational	Choice	and	EU	Politics’.	130	Peter	A.	Hall	 and	Rosemary	C.	R.	Taylor,	 ‘Political	 Science	and	 the	Three	New	 Institutionalisms’,	Political	
Studies,	44.5	(1996),	936–57	(p.	939);	see	also,	Duncan	Snidal,	‘Rational	Choice	and	International	Relations’,	in	
Handbook	 of	 International	 Relations,	 ed.	 by	Walter	 Carlnaes,	 Beth	 Simmons,	 and	 Thomas	 Risse	 (New	 York:	SAGE	Publications	Ltd,	2002),	pp.	73–94.	131	Pollack,	‘Rational	Choice	and	EU	Politics’,	p.	32.	132	Shepsle,	‘Rational	Choice	Institutionalism’,	p.	27.	133	Hall	and	Taylor,	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms’,	p.	945.	134	Hall	and	Taylor,	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms’,	p.	945.	135	Hall	and	Taylor,	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms’,	pp.	939,	951.	
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their	 behaviour	 and	 potential	 strategies	 are	 constrained	 and	 shaped	 by	 the	 institutions	they	 are	 bound	 with.	 Therefore,	 analysing	 the	 institutions	 is	 vital	 for	 predicting	 the	outcome	of	strategic	interaction	among	different	players.136	From	the	viewpoint	of	the	SGC,	RCI	presents	a	strategic	outlook	of	energy	relations.	This	is	rather	 because,	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 underpinned	 by	 the	 logic	 of	
calculus.	 It	 is	 geared	 towards	 addressing	 the	 external	 energy	 supply	 risks	 from	 and/or	through	third	countries	by	expanding	the	boundary	of	the	EU	institutions	(relevant	energy	
acquis)	 to	 absorb	 the	 SGC	 countries	 and	hence,	 take	 advantage	 of	 their	 problem-solving	properties.137	 Consequently,	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 EU	 institutions	 externally	(Europeanisation)	will	allow	the	Union	to	determine	the	parameters	(rules)	that	condition	(and	constrain)	the	capacity	of	third	countries	to	make	energy	related	strategic	decisions	along	the	SGC	and	tailor	them	to	the	EU	preferences.	In	this	regard,	RCI	presents	a	more	flexible	theoretical	tool;	it	does	not	directly	favour	free-
market	 or	 geopolitics	 approach	 in	 its	 conception	 of	 what	 constitutes	 a	 rational	 action.	Rational	action	is	considered	as	the	deployment	of	institutions	in	order	to	reduce	the	risks	stemming	 from	 the	behaviour	 of	 others	 by	narrowing	down	 the	 strategic	 policy	 options	available	for	them.	In	the	SGC	context,	this	logic	entails	strategic	implications,	for	it	is	set	to	 bind	 the	 strategic	 capacity	 of	 one	 group	 of	 actors	 with	 the	 preferences	 of	 another.	However,	 in	 doing	 so	 it	 does	 not	 contradict	 with	 the	 liberal	 precepts,	 for	 the	institutionalisation	of	external	energy	relations	based	on	domestic	norms	also	envisages	the	export	of	 the	EU's	 free-markets138	model	 in	 energy	 supply/transit	 to	other	 countries.	Hence,	 by	 accounting	 for	 the	 role	 of	 the	 formal	 institutions	 in	 a	 strategic	 context,	 RCI	engages	with	the	first	research	question	of	this	thesis	in	an	explanatory	manner.	However,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that,	RCI	is	not	a	theory	of	security,	Europeanisation	or	 even	 politics	 as	 such.	 It	 is	 rather	 a	 "second-order"	 social	 theory	 in	 A.	Wendt's	 terms,	concerned	with	epistemological	 and	ontological	questions,	 such	as	 “the	nature	of	 human	
agency	and	its	relationship	to	social	structures,	the	role	of	ideas	and	material	forces	in	social	
                                                            136	Here	the	constraining	 role	of	 the	 institutions	 take	place	at	 two	 levels:	a)	external	governance	deploys	EU	domestic	rules	externally	to	constrain	the	behavior	of	external	actors	and	b)	the	choice	and	the	availability	of	external	 governance	 itself	 as	 a	 tool	of	 external	 action	 is	 also	 shaped	and	 constrained	by	 the	existing	 formal	institutions,	such	as	the	EU	Treaties	and	the	division	of	relevant	competences	in	energy	between	the	member	states	and	the	EU	institutions.		137	Lavenex,	‘EU	External	Governance	in	“Wider	Europe”’,	p.	694.	138	It	is	also	important	to	clarify	that,	here	the	“free-markets”	model	does	not	necessarily	denote	“neo-classical	
liberal”	market	in	which	private	actors	operate	free	of	governmental	intervention.	Quite	the	opposite,	the	EU’s	
“free	market”	model	 is	 a	 heavily	 regulated	 space,	within	which	 certain	 segments	 (such	 as	 supply	 activities)	encourage	competitive/profit-seeking	behaviour,	while	others	(such	as	transmission	services	and	access	to	it)	are	subject	to	public	regulation.	
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life,	 the	 proper	 form	 of	 social	 explanations	 and	 so	 on”.139	 In	 order	 to	 translate	 this	 broad	umbrella	theory	 into	a	domain-specific	analytical	 tool	 in	the	SGC	context,	 there	 is	a	need	for	a	mid-range	 theory	 in	order	 to	account	 for	 the	 factors	 that	affect	 the	outcome	of	 the	Europeanisation	of	natural	gas	sectors	of	the	countries	along	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	In	the	Europeanisation	literature	several	mid-range	theories	have	been	prominent	in	the	past	 two	 decades	 in	 accounting	 for	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 third	 countries,	 including,	
External	 Incentive	 Model	 (EIM),	 Social	 Learning	 Model	 (SLM)	 and	 Lesson-Drawing	 Model	
(LDM).140	In	the	first	two	models,	the	principal	actor	in	inducing	the	adoption	of	rules	is	the	EU,	while	the	latter	investigates	the	underlying	rationale	of	rule	adoption	that	is	triggered	by	domestic	 incentives	of	 the	 rule-receiving	end.141	 Since	 the	adoption	of	 rules	 that	 I	 am	concerned	with	here	are	incentivised	and	driven	by	the	EU,	the	LDM	is	not	relevant	for	this	research.	 SLM,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 Sociological	 Institutionalism	
(SI)/Constructivism	 at	 the	 ontological	 level.	 As	 such,	 SI	 is	 underpinned	 by	 the	 logic	 of	
appropriateness	 and	 explains	 the	 choice	 of	 action	 by	 the	 actors’	 “internalised	 identities,	
values	and	norms”.142	Correspondingly,	in	contrast	with	the	instrumental	rationality	of	the	RCI	(logic	of	calculus),	SI	and	SLM	take	“the	legitimacy	of	rules	and	the	appropriateness	of	
behaviour"	 as	 the	main	 factors	 that	mark	 the	 process	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 rules	 and	 their	adoption	by	the	actors	at	the	receiving	end.143	In	general,	energy	relations	are	 intrinsically	rational	at	 the	empirical	 level,	 for	what	 is	at	stake	here	is	the	material	gains/losses	it	entails.	Energy	is	the	bedrock	of	every	economic,	military	and	social	activity	and	 is	 intrinsically	underpinned	by	the	 logic	of	efficiency	and	security.	As	such,	it	by	definition	involves	and	necessitates	the	analysis	of	costs	&	benefits	and	is	less	affected	by	the	ideational	factors	and	scripts	of	appropriate	behaviour	in	doing	so.	For	this	reason,	the	 logic	of	appropriateness	of	the	SLM	is	 less	relevant	to	analyse	the	factors	affecting	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC.	EIM,	on	the	other	hand,	draws	on	the	RCI	and	accounts	for	the	relations	between	the	rule	transfer	 and	 adoption	 based	 on	 the	 logic	 of	 calculus.	 As	 such,	 it	 explains	 the	 adoption	
                                                            139	Wendt,	Social	Theory	of	International	Politics,	p.	4;	Pollack,	‘Rational	Choice	and	EU	Politics’,	p.	32.	140	 These	 three	 models	 are	 by	 far	 not	 the	 only	 models	 in	 the	 Europeanisation	 literature.	 For	 a	 fantastic	literature	review	on	this	subject	see	e.g.	Schimmelfennig,	‘Europeanization	Beyond	Europe’.	141	 Frank	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 Ulrich	 Sedelmeier,	 ‘Introduction:	 Conceptualizing	 the	 Europeanization	 of	Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe’,	 in	 The	 Europeanization	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 ed.	 by	 Frank	Schimmelfennig	 and	Ulrich	 Sedelmeier,	 Cornell	 Studies	 in	 Political	 Economy	 (Ithaca,	 NY:	 Cornell	 University	Press,	2005),	pp.	1–28	(p.	8).	142	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	9;	for	a	meta-theoretical	basis,	see	e.g.	James	G.	March	and	Johan	P.	Olsen,	Rediscovering	Institutions:	
The	Organizational	Basis	of	Politics	(The	Free	Press,	1989),	pp.	160–162.	143	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	9.	
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and/or	rejection	of	EU	rules	by	the	costs-benefits	calculations	of	the	actors	at	the	receiving	end,	which	 in	our	case	are	 the	candidate	(Turkey)	and	partner	(Georgia	and	Azerbaijan)	countries.	 Since	 the	 explanatory	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	
domestic	constrains	in	affecting	the	rule	adoption	by	the	SGC	countries,	the	EIM	provides	a	more	relevant	mid-range	theoretical	tool	based	on	logic	of	calculus	(logic	of	consequences).	In	this	regard,	although	the	EU	policies	aimed	at	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	countries	also	 include	actions	 that	 target	 the	 socialisation	of	 the	 latter	 into	 the	 legitimacy	 and	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 in	 line	 with	 SLM,	 I	 concentrate	 only	 on	 the	 EIM	 for	explaining	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	EU	natural	 gas	acquis	 by	Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	Azerbaijan	due	to	time	and	space	constraints.		As	 indicated	 in	 section	 4	 of	 the	 current	 chapter,	 the	 EU	 external	 governance	 envisages	different	modes	and	corresponding	avenues	of	rule	expansion	vis-à-vis	third	countries.	In	view	of	this,	the	rationalist	(and	ideational)	explanations	of	rule	expansion/adoption	entail	different	 combinations	 of	 final	 rewards,	 actor	 interaction,	 rule	 selection,	 institutional	organisation	 and	 the	 end	 results	 within	 the	 rule	 expansion	 process.	 At	 the	 risk	 of	oversimplification	Table	1	attempts	to	summarise	these	into	a	single	chart	below.						
Table	1:	Modes	of	External	Governance	and	explanatory	Models	of	Europeanisation	 |	Compiled	by	 the	author	using	information	from	the	existing	literature	and	new	policy	developments.	
 
 
		 Hierarchy	Mode	Reward	 Actor	interaction	 Rule	selection		
(Legalisation)	 Institutional	org.			(Institutionalisation)	 Results	of	rule	expansion	Logic	of	Consequence	 Full	EU	membership	 Vertical	intergovernmental	leverage	–	wholesale	export	of	EU	acquis	
Hierarchically	‘imposed’	by	the	EU	-	legally	binding	 Accession	process	 Harmonisation	of	rules	and	institutions	
	Logic	of	appropriate-ness	 Full	EU	membership	 Top-down	and/or	bottom	up	socialisation	and	persuasion	of	the	target	governments	or	societal	actors	about	the	appropriateness	of	its	rules	
	 Accession	process	 Harmonisation	of	rules	and	institutions	
 60 
 
 That	being	said,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	analysis	that	I	carry	out	in	this	PhD	is	essentially	synchronic;	taking	a	snapshot	of	the	policy	timeline	and	then	looking	into	the	
rationalist	 explanations	 of	 the	 policy	 choices	 made	 by	 the	 actors	 involved.	 This	 is	conditioned	 by	 the	 specific	 analytical	 focus	 of	 this	 particular	 research	 endeavour.	Nonetheless,	if	the	analyses	were	to	be	extended	to	include	certain	ontological	discussions	about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 objects	 being	 analysed	 (e.g.	 the	 “real”ity	 of	 the	 external	 energy	supply	 risks	 and/or	 the	perceptions	 linked	 to	 the	policy	 choices	made	 to	 address	 them),	then	 constructivism	 as	 an	 ontological	 approach	 could	 actually	 enrich	 the	 investigations.	This	 would	 be	 especially	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 how	 the	 policy	 choices	 made	 by	 the	relevant	 actors	 were/could	 have	 been	 affected	 by	 the	 ideas	 that	 they	 held	 about	 their	context/environment.	It	is	often	the	case	that,	changes	in	the	policies	are	preceded	by	the	changes	in	the	perceptions/ideas	informing	the	policy.144	Therefore,	different	approaches	to	the	analysis	of	the	social/political	can	be	combined	at	different	levels	of	analyses	-	from	empirical	to	metaphysical.	
6.2.	External	Incentives	Model	(EIM)	
	EIM	was	one	of	 the	most	prominent	 explanatory	models	 that	have	been	widely	used	 to	analyse	 rule	 adoption	 by	 the	 Central	 and	 East	 European	 Countries	 (CEECs)	 during	 the	2004-2007	enlargement	rounds.	According	to	this	model,	the	adoption	of	EU	rules	is	set	as	a	condition,	that	the	candidate	countries	must	implement	in	order	to	receive	rewards	from	the	EU,	which	can	be	 in	 the	 form	of	assistance	(technical	and	 financial)	and	 institutional	
                                                            144	See	e.g.	Colin	Hay	and	Ben	Rosamond,	‘Globalization,	European	Integration	and	the	Discursive	Construction	of	Economic	Imperatives’,	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy,	9.2	(2002),	147–67.	
	 	 	 	 Network	Mode	Reward	 Actor	interaction	 Rule	selection	
(Legalisation)	 Institutional	org.			(Institutionalisation)	 Results	of	rule	expansion	Logic	of	Consequence	 Functional	membership	–	
participation	in	
the	EU’s	
functional	
institutions	
Horizontal	trans-governmental	‘governance’	–	sectoral	rule/practice	export	
Bilaterally	‘voluntarily’	defined	based	on	‘joint	ownership’	–	legally	
binding	
Association	Councils	and	Committees/	Partnership	&	Cooperation	Councils	and	Committees	
Adoption	of	bilaterally	defined	parts	of	sectoral	
acquis	(energy)	Multilaterally	‘hierarchically’	defined	–	legally	binding	 Energy	Community	Treaty,	Energy	Charter	Treaty	
Full	adoption	of	sectoral	
acquis	(energy)		Logic	of	appropriate-ness	 Functional	membership	–	participation	in	
the	EU’s	
functional	
institutions	
Horizontal	trans-governmental	‘linkage’	–
socialisation	and	sectoral	practice	sharing	
Multilaterally	defined	–	advisory	and	
consultative	 EaP	energy/3rd	platform,		EURONEST	energy	committee	
Structural	approximation	of	domestic	legislation	with	that	of	the	EU	
acquis	
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ties	(association,	cooperation	or	 full	membership).145	 In	this	view,	the	main	thesis	of	EIM	suggests	 that,	 "A	government	adopts	 the	EU	 rules	 if	 the	benefits	of	EU	 rewards	 exceed	 the	
domestic	adoption	costs."146	 In	specific	terms,	EIM	presumes	four	key	explanatory	factors,	which	determine	the	potential	outcomes	of	rule	adoption:	1. 	Determinacy	of	conditions/rules	-	It	is	expected	that	the	more	the	rules,	which	are	 set	 as	 a	 condition	 for	 the	 ultimate	 reward,	 are	 determinate,	 the	more	 likely	they	will	be	adopted	by	the	target	governments.	2. Size	and	speed	of	reward	-	It	is	assumed	that,	the	EU	rules	are	more	likely	to	be	adopted	if	the	reward	is	big	(e.g.	membership	vs.	association)	and	the	delivery	of	this	reward	is	not	too	far	in	the	future.	3. Credibility	 of	 conditional	 threats	 and	promises	 -	 This	 assumes	 that	 rules	 are	more	likely	to	be	adopted	when	the	conditional	threats	and	promises	are	big	and	vice-versa.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 it	 suggests	 that,	 if	 the	 EU	 is	 not	 able	 to	 withhold	 the	rewards	with	little	or	no	cost	to	itself,	or	is	more	interested	in	rewarding	the	target	government	than	punishing	them,	then	its	conditional	external	incentive	will	have	little	or	no	impact	in	bringing	about	change	in	the	latter.		4. The	role	of	veto	players	and	net	adoption	costs	-	This	assumes	that	EU	rules	are	less	likely	to	be	adopted	when	the	number	of	veto	players	(sub-state	actors),	which	incur	net	adoption	costs,	e.g.	opportunity	costs,	welfare	and	power	losses,	increase.	These	individual	explanatory	factors	provide	a	useful	analytical	tool	for	analysing	the	role	of	domestic	 costs	 in	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	 Azerbaijan	 in	 conditioning	 their	willingness	 to	adopt	 the	 EU	 rules	 in	 natural	 gas	 sector	 in	 a	 cause	 and	 effect	manner.	 Analysis	 of	 these	factors,	 consequently,	 will	 allow	 me	 to	 unearth	 different	 risks	 to	 competitive	 energy	supply	to	the	EU	via	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	the	roles	and	preferences	of	variety	of	(both	 state	 and	 non-state)	 actors	 therein.	 These	 investigations	 necessitate	 the	 use	 of	variety	of	research	methods,	which	I	present	in	the	following	section.	It	 is	also	 important	 to	note	 that,	arguably,	 the	authoritarian	nature	of	 the	regimes	 in	 the	case	study	countries	might	also	have	a	 role	 to	play	 in	 their	adoption/rejection	of	 the	EU	rules.	Considering	that	natural	gas	supply/transit	has	an	inherently	(geo)political	utility	to	it,	 then	 it	 seems	 all	 the	 more	 reasonable	 to	assume	 that	 wielding	 strong	 governmental	control	 over	 the	 energy	 sector	 (e.g.	 by	 rejecting	 EU	 rules)	 is	 also	 aimed	 at	 ensuring	
                                                            145	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	10.	146	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	12.	
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the	longevity	 of	 the	 ruling	 regimes.	 This	 is	 rather	 because,	 the	 latter	 could	 serve	 as	 a	leverage	 against	 the	 normative	 pressures	 stemming	 from	 the	 EU.	 Indeed,	 elite	 interests	could	well	be	presented	as	national	interests	in	order	to	justify	the	policy	choices	made	by	the	governments.	As	 such,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 very	 reasonable	 assumption	 as	 it	 (rightly)	 points	 to	 the	instrumental	 use	 of	 energy	 supply/transit	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	 political	 objectives	 (i.e.	regime	 survival)	 of	 the	 (group	 of)	 individuals.	 Nonetheless,	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	deployment	 of	 rationalist	 analytical	model,	 the	 analysis	 of	 this	 aspect	 of	 rule	adoption/rejection	 by	 the	 target	 SGC	 countries	 creates	 substantial	 unsolicited	problems.	The	problem	arises	when	one	ventures	 to	uncouple	 the	 interests	of	 the	ruling	elite	 from	 the	 real	 national	 interests	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 real	 national	 interests	 of	 the	countries	 in	questions	 are	 assumed	 to	be	 subverted	and	are	no	 longer	 considered	 to	be	those	 as	 declared	 through	 the	 formal	 avenues	 (e.g.,	 legislation,	 official	 policy	 strategies,	speeches,	 interviews,	 newspaper	 articles,	 etc.).	 They	 have	 to	 be	disentangled	 from	 the	"parasitic	invasion"	 of	 the	 personal	 interests	 of	 the	 ruling	 elite	 through	 the	
normative	judgement	of	the	researcher.	This	would	require	a	secondary	research	question	on	-	What	should	have	been	the	domestic	costs/benefits	that	would	push	the	governments	
to	adopt/reject	 the	EU	rules?	That,	however,	requires	a	critique,	as	opposed	to	(arguably)	dispassionate	 and	neutral	 analysis	of	 the	 rule	 adoption	 and/or	 rejection	 process.	Rationalist	 theoretical	 framework,	 in	 contrast,	 does	 not	 engage	 in	 the	 critique	 and	 is	 ill	equipped	to	deal	with	a	normative	terrain	in	the	analysis	of	the	political.		That	 being	 said,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 elite	 interests	 in	 the	rejection	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 is	 not	 compatible	with	 a	 rationalist	 explanation.	 It	 is	 rather	 to	point	 out	 that	 the	 rationalist	 explanatory	model	 is	 not	capable	 of	disentangling	 the	 elite	
interests	from	 the	 real	 national	 interests	in	 methodological	 terms.	 Hence,	 under	 such	 a	framework	one	could	only	suffice	with	referring	to	their	potential	negative	impacts	of	the	elite	 interests	 in	 the	 authoritarian	 political	 culture	 in	 the	 SGC	 countries	 on	 the	 rule	adoption	 process.	 However,	 their	delimitation	 from	 the	“real"	 national	 interest	 will	remain	beyond	the	capacity	of	this	research.		
7.	Research	design	and	methodology	
It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	methodology	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 elements	 of	 any	serious	 academic	 research	endeavour	 and	ultimately	 conditions	 the	outcome	of	 analysis	throughout	 the	 research.	 As	 I	 presented	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	 this	 thesis	
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presents	 a	 two-dimensional	 structure	 for	 analysis	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	different	 cross-cutting	 elements,	 namely,	 hardware	 and	 regulatory	 elements	 of	 this	alternative	energy	corridor.	Although	each	of	these	dimensions	is	part	of	the	same	strategy,	objectives	in	each	of	them	serve	as	an	additional	 layer	of	 safety	 for	gas	supply	via	 the	SGC.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 two-dimensional	 research	 framework	 is	designed	 in	order	 to	 (only)	analytically	separate	 the	actions	pursued	by	the	EU	in	order	to	safeguard	diverse	and	competitive	gas	supply	via	the	SGC.	Admittedly,	the	failure	in	one	of	these	policy	strands	will	ultimately	affect	the	other,	too.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 contribution	 of	 hardware	 and	 software	 elements	 of	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	 EU	 energy	 security	 will	 be	 different,	 although	complementary.	Where	the	physical	establishment	of	the	corridor	(hardware	dimension)	is	to	contribute	to	the	diversity	of	supplies	to	the	EU,	while	its	Europeanisation	(regulatory	dimension)	is	also	to	bring	about	competitiveness	of	supply	and	transit	via	the	SGC,	while	ensuring	its	affordability	and	reliability.	Indeed,	 the	analysis	of	 the	physical	establishment	of	 the	SGC	 is	 important	 for	presenting	the	complete	picture	of	the	development	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	Nonetheless,	it	 is	 the	regulatory	 issues	along	the	SGC	that	 is	at	 the	heart	of	 this	 thesis.	 In	general,	 the	
regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 EU's	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 strategy	 is	 concerned	with	 the	level	of	harmonisation	of	the	regulatory	regime	along	the	SGC	with	that	of	the	EU	and	thus,	the	potential	of	addressing	non-market	risks	therein.	This	strand	of	analysis	is	concerned	with	the	qualitative	compatibility	of	the	regulatory	regimes	of	the	SGC	countries	with	the	EU	domestic	gas	market	rules	and	the	factors	affecting	them.	Therefore,	the	analyses	I	will	pursue	in	this	dimension	will	be	qualitative,	too.		In	 general,	 the	 explanatory	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 embedded	 into	 a	 descriptive	comparative	context.	That	is	to	say,	the	effects	that	I	aim	to	explain,	the	failure	or	success	of	 rule	 adoption	 in	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	 Azerbaijan	 are	 not	 pre-given	 and	 need	 to	 be	revealed	 by	 the	 researcher	 before	 any	 causes	 bringing	 about	 these	 effects	 can	 be	identified.	To	put	it	simply,	I	need	to	first	comparatively	describe	whether	EU's	natural	gas	market	 rules	 have	 been	 adopted	 by	 the	 SGC	 countries	 or	 not,	 before	 investigating	 the	underlying	 reasons	 thereof.	 Such	 a	 complex	 research	 design	 requires	 two	 tier	methodological	analysis	on	each	of	the	countries,	which	are	the	subjects	of	the	case	study	of	this	PhD,	namely	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.		
I.	 In	the	first	tier,	the	analysis	focuses	on	whether	or	not	the	subject	countries	have	adopted	 EU	 natural	 gas	 legislation.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 I	 use	 descriptive	comparative	analysis	of	the	institutional	documents	as	my	main	method	of	data	collection	
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and	analysis.	Institutional	document	analysis,	in	this	regard,	is	the	most	reliable	source	for	data	collection	for	descriptive	comparative	analysis,	as	they	provide	formal,	credible	and	publicly	 available	 source	 of	 information.	 Nonetheless,	 given	 that	 the	 extent	 of	 EU	legislation	to	be	adopted	by	the	target	countries	is	overwhelming	(even	in	a	single	policy	sector	 like	natural	gas),	 any	 realistic	descriptive	 comparative	analysis	 can	only	afford	 to	concentrate	 on	 a	 handful	 number	 of	 benchmarks/milestones.	 Selection	 of	 the	 relevant	benchmarks,	 on	 the	other	hand,	will	 require	deep	 review	of	 the	 secondary	 literature,	 as	well	as	the	official	EU	materials.	This	is	especially	vital	for	the	success	of	the	research,	as	these	 benchmarks	 will	 carry	 out	 strategic	 objectives	 for	 the	 EU	 external	 natural	 gas	supply,	as	I	will	indicate	in	Chapter	III.147	Furthermore,	descriptive	comparison	raises	another	set	of	issues	as	regards	the	objects	of	description.	 The	 problem	 here	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 adoption	 of	 certain	normative	acts	(EU	rules)	domestically	does	not	necessarily	denote	their	implementation	in	 practice,	 which	 has	 been	 dubbed	 "Potemkin	 harmonisation"	 in	 the	 Europeanisation	literature.148	 In	order	to	avoid	this	problem,	 I	screen	both	the	relevant	 legislative	acts	on	both	 sides,	 as	 well	 as	 refer	 to	 the	 latest	 practical	 developments	 affecting	 the	implementation	 of	 these	 relevant	 legislative	 provisions	 in	 the	 target	 SGC	 countries.	 To	accomplish	 this,	 I	mostly	 rely	on	primary	sources	of	 information,	 such	as	 legislative	and	non-legislative	 acts,	 newspaper	 articles,	 organisational	 research	 reports	 and	 qualitative	elite-interviews.	It	 is	also	 important	 to	note	 that,	 rule	adoption	 is	a	continuous	process.	This	 is	especially	relevant	to	Georgia,	who	has	only	recently	signed	an	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU,	contracting	 to	 implement	 EU	 legislation	 domestically.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 speed	 and	 the	depth	of	implementation	are	just	as	important	as	the	signature	of	the	AA.	In	order	to	glean	the	 views	 of	 the	 relevant	 policy	 actors	 on	 the	willingness	 of	 rule	 implementation,	 I	 use	elite	 interviews	also	as	a	method	of	collecting	data	related	to	rule	adoption	(i.e.	expected	
effect).	
II.	 In	 the	 second	 tier	 the	main	 explanatory	 argument	 and	 theoretical	 framework	 of	this	PhD	will	 guide	 the	 investigations.	 In	 this	 regard,	External	 Incentive	Model	allows	 to	operationalise	 the	 logic	 of	 calculus	 in	 empirically	 observable	 independent	 factors.	 As	indicated	 in	the	previous	section,	EIM	predicts	that,	"A	government	adopts	the	EU	rules	 if	
                                                            147	In	order	to	improve	my	skills	in	understanding	the	EU	legislation,	I	have	undertaken	a	specialised	46	hours	training	course	on	the	"EU	gas	market	regulation",	organised	by	the	Florence	School	of	Regulation,	European	University	Institute,	2015.	148	Wade	Jacoby,	Priest	and	Penitent:	The	EU	as	a	Force	in	the	Domestic	Politics	of	Eastern	Europe	(NCEER,	The	National	Council	for	Eurasian	and	East	European	Research,	1999).	
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the	 benefits	 of	 EU	 rewards	 exceed	 the	 domestic	 adoption	 costs".149	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	model	identifies	the	following	3150	factors	as	its	main	independent	factors:	1. Size	and	speed	of	reward,	2. Credibility	of	conditional	threats	and	promises,	3. The	role	of	veto	players	and	net	adoption	costs.	When	applied	to	the	analysis	of	the	success	and/or	failure	of	the	rule	adoption	in	the	SGC	countries,	these	factors,	allow	me	to	support	the	explanatory	argument	of	this	thesis	in	a	"causes-of-effects"	relationship.	In	investigating	the	role	of	domestic	adoption	costs,	I	take	advantage	 of	 counterfactual	 discussions	 based	 on	 the	 rational-choice	 logic	 in	 the	 case-study	chapters;	against	 the	 failure	of	rule	adoption	(fact),	how	would	the	success	of	rule	adoption	 (counter-fact)	 affect	 the	 attainment	 of	 national	 interests	 of	 the	 SGC	 countries	concerned,	 assuming	 that	 they	 are	 rational	 utility-maximisers.	 Although,	 the	 similar	research	 designs	 envision	 structured	 and	 logically	 sequenced	 phases,	 which	 is	 (mostly)	pertinent	to	quantitative	research	methodology,151	research	techniques	that	I	use	for	data	collection	and	data	analysis	are	qualitative	and	do	not	require	any	quantitative	modelling.	This	is	conditioned	by	the	following	major	factors.	Firstly,	 quantitative	 data	 collection	 (e.g.	 questionnaires)	 or	 data	 analysis	 (e.g.	 statistical	regression,	 content	 analysis,	 etc.)	methods	would	 not	 be	 effective,	 as	 the	 policy	 domain	under	 investigation	 here	 is	 fairly	 elitist.	 In	 each	 of	 the	 case	 study	 countries	 (except	 in	Turkey),	only	few	public	officials	or	private	stakeholders	are	engaged	in	the	policy-making	related	 to	 the	 harmonisation	 of	 the	 domestic	 rules	 with	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 acquis.	Therefore,	 insufficient	number	of	 responses	would	not	 justify	 the	 results	of	quantitative	data	collection	and	analysis.	Quite	incidentally,	I	was	warned	about	this	problem,	albeit	in	a	 slightly	different	 context,	by	a	key	European	Commission/DG	Energy	official,	who	 told	me	 that	 there	 are	 very	 few	 officials	 in	 the	 Azerbaijani	 government	who	 understand	 the	nature	of	the	legal	arrangements	with	the	EU,	including	those	related	to	natural	gas.152	Secondly,	even	if	 the	number	of	participants	could	be	extended	to	 include	general	public	figures	 (including	 scholarly	 community),	 elitist	 nature	 of	 the	 subject	 matter	 would	 not	
                                                            149	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	12.	150	In	fact,	the	EIM	predicts	the	"determinacy	of	the	rules"	as	the	fourth	independent	factor.	However,	since	the	EU	rules	in	natural	gas	sector	are	very	determinate	and	formalised	in	legislative	documents,	this	factor	is	less	relevant	to	the	analysis	of	the	research,	thus,	will	not	be	utilised	in	this	PhD.	151	See	e.g.	Piergiorgio	Corbetta,	 ‘Quantitative	and	Qualitative	Research’,	 in	Social	Research :	Theory,	Methods	
and	Techniques,	ed.	by	Piergiorgio	Corbetta	(London;	Thousand	Oaks,	Calif:	SAGE	Publications,	2003),	pp.	30–56	(p.	38).	152	Interview	with	the	European	Commission/DG	Energy	official,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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allow	 to	 capture	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 sensitivities	 involved	 in	 the	 time	 and	depth	application	 of	 the	EU	 rules	 in	 the	 individual	 SGC	 countries.	 Additionally,	 since	 energy	 is	intrinsically	politically	 sensitive	 topic,	even	 those	 involved	 in	 the	relevant	policy-making	domain	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 be	 always	 frank	 in	 their	 answers	 to	 standardised	questionnaires	forms.	This,	consequently,	would	decrease	the	quality	of	the	collected	data	and	run	the	risk	of	rendering	the	entire	quantitative	analysis	distorted.	Last	but	not	 least,	highly	standardised	techniques	of	the	quantitative	methods	would	not	allow	capturing	the	locally	specific	aspects	of	the	factors	affecting	the	rule	adoption	during	both	data	collection,	as	well	as	analysis.		At	 this	 point,	 it	 is	 also	 very	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that,	 although	 the	 EIM	 envisages	deductive	research	plan,	 I	will	 leave	enough	flexibility	 in	my	data	collection	and	analysis	techniques	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 individual	 particularities	 in	 each	 empirical	 case	without	being	biased	by	the	theoretical	modelling.	This	is	also	commanded	by	the	fact	that,	a	great	deal	of	information	in	this	subject	area	is	not	public	and	therefore,	it	is	virtually	impossible	identify	 all	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 effects	 during	 the	 research	 design	 phase	 and	 test	 it	 in	 an	empirical	 manner.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 although	 the	 causal	 factors	 (determining	 the	adoption/rejection	of	the	EU	rules)	envisaged	by	the	EIM	will	guide	the	research	process	in	broad	strokes,	I	leave	enough	flexibility	in	order	to	complement	them	inductively	during	the	empirical	research.	In	terms	of	the	research	methods,	I	rely	on	the	"three	fundamental	actions	underlying	the	
techniques	of	qualitative	research",	namely,	"observing,	asking	and	reading".153	I	will	briefly	outline	these	methods	below,	however,	 their	detailed	description	will	be	provided	in	the	APPENDIX	I	of	the	thesis.	Firstly,	personal	observation	of	the	main	policy	developments	is	key	for	understanding	the	mechanisms	 of	 rule	 transfer	 from	 the	 EU	 to	 the	 SGC	 countries154	 and	 its	 general	effectiveness,	 which	 cannot	 necessarily	 be	 captured	 in	 the	 formal	 documents	 (such	 as	meeting	minutes,	reports,	etc.).	In	this	regard,	the	multilateral	track	of	rule	transfer	of	the	Eastern	 Partnership,	 especially,	 the	 Euronest	 parliamentary	 assembly	 provides	 an	accessible	 avenue	 for	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 discussions	 among	 the	 members	 of	 the	European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 EaP	 countries.155	 Furthermore,	 bilateral	 track	 of	 the	 EaP,	
                                                            153	Piergiorgio	Corbetta,	 ‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	 in	Social	Research:	Theory,	Methods	and	Techniques,	 ed.	 by	Piergiorgio	Corbetta	(London;	Thousand	Oaks,	Calif:	SAGE	Publications,	2003),	pp.	287–309	(p.	287).	154	Rule	transfer	to	Turkey	is	an	exception	in	this	case,	as	it	is	carried	out	in	a	bilateral	and	restricted	manner.	The	meetings	cannot	be	attended	by	the	member	of	the	general	public	or	academia.	155	 I	 have	 attended	 the	 sixth	 and	 seventh	meetings	 of	 the	 Energy	 Committee	 of	 the	 Euronest	 Parliamentary	Assembly	 on	 12/02/2014	 and	 04/11/2014	 respectively,	 which	 took	 place	 at	 the	 European	 Parliament	 in	
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which	 is	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 Partnership	 and	 Cooperation	 Agreement	 (PCA)	 committees	between	the	EU	and	the	EaP	countries,	provides	a	more	intimate	avenue	for	observation	and	collecting	data	on	the	discussions	related	to	rule	transfer	to	the	EaP	countries	and	the	individual	 positions	 of	 the	 receiving	 countries.	 I	 attended	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 PCA	 sub-committee	 on	 energy,	 transportation	 and	 environment	 on	 11/02/2014	 in	Brussels/Belgium,	which	allowed	me	to	glean	 the	views	of	 the	sides	and	understand	 the	nature	 of	 bilateral	 discussions	 on	 energy.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 since	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 policy	debates	 take	 place	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 in	Brussels/Belgium,	 I	 spent	 several	months	 in	Brussels	in	order	to	interact	with	the	relevant	public	officials	and	the	policy	discourse	they	carry	out.	In	doing	so,	I	conducted	a	passive	observation	in	order	not	to	affect	the	observed	social	phonemenon	and	took	on-the-spot	notes.	Secondly,	 I	 conducted	 elite-interviews	 with	 relevant	 official	 figures	 involved	 in	 the	negotiations	 of	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 SGC.	 In	 total,	 I	 carried	 out	 16	 semi-structured	interviews.156	The	questions	of	the	interviews	were	organised	around	the	factors	that	this	thesis	 seeks	 to	 attribute	 the	 institutional	 outcome,	 although	 the	 order	 of	 questions	 and	precise	 formulation	 varied	 from	 interview	 to	 interview.	 This	 was	 conditioned	 by	 the	different	 context	 in	 each	 empirical	 study	 and	 the	 specialised	 focus	 of	 each	 interviewee.	Most	 of	 the	 interviewees	 authorised	 me	 to	 record	 the	 interview,	 which	 were	 later	transcribed	 for	 use	 in	 this	 research.157	 Elite	 interviews	 served	 both	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 data	collection,	 as	 well	 as	 analysis,	 for	 the	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 a	 argumentative	manner.	Finally,	analysis	of	 formal	documents,	which	were	produced	by	 legislative	and	executive	institutions,	 non-governmental	 organisations,	 agencies	 and	 companies	 and	 other	institutions	were	 used	 for	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	 purposes.	 In	 addition,	 secondary	sources,	such	as	journal	articles	and	books	were	also	utilised.	Wherever	 possible,	 I	 have	 used	 different	 techniques	 in	 conjunction	 in	 order	 to	 cross-validate	 the	 issues	 discussed.	 In	 using	 these	 methods,	 the	 goal	 of	 my	 analysis	 was	
inference,	 guided	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 this	 research.	 It	 is	 also	important	note	that,	this	logic	of	consequences	-	calculus	rationality	of	the	actors	and	their	preferences	to	maximise	their	benefits,	is	not	the	only	logic	in	social	sciences	that	provide	predictive	 assumptions.	 As	 noted	 above,	 another	 pertinent	 model	 in	 Europeanisation	
                                                                                                                                                                              Brussels/Belgium.	 In	 addition,	 I	 observed	 the	 fourth	meeting	 of	 the	 same	 committee,	 which	 took	 place	 on	12/02/2013	via	live	public	broadcasting.	156	See	APPENDIX	II.	157	Each	and	every	interview	provided	me	with	an	interview	consent	form	in	order	to	comply	with	the	research	ethics	norms	of	the	Department.	
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literature	 -	 Social	 Learning	 Model	 (SLM)	 -	 assumes	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness	 and	postulates	that,	"A	government	adopts	EU	rules	 if	 it	 is	persuaded	of	 the	appropriateness	of	
EU	rules”.158	Although	the	use	of	elite	 interviews	helped	me	 identify	 the	validity	of	either	logic,	it	could	also	be	cross-validated	using	the	comparative	analysis.			For	 example,	 if	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 in	 natural	 gas	 sector	 is	 argued	 to	 be	conditioned	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness,	 as	 opposed	 to	 logic	 of	 consequences,	 then	arguably	 the	 same	 logic	 should	 also	 apply	 to	 rule	 adoption	 in	 other	 similar	 sectors,	 e.g.	renewable	energy	generation,	electricity	sector	or	legislation	related	to	energy	efficiency.	To	 put	 it	 in	 a	 perspective,	 if	 Turkey	 voluntarily	 adopts	 the	 EU	 rules	 in	 renewables	 or	energy	 efficiency	 despite	 the	 lack	 of	 progress	 in	 accession	 negotiations,	while	 the	 same	voluntary	progress	is	not	observed	in	natural	gas	sector,	then	the	logic	of	appropriateness	fails	to	explain	the	underlying	reasons	thereof.	This	 is	especially	valid	given	the	fact	that	EU	 rules	 both	 in	 gas	 and	 renewables/energy	 efficiency	 spheres	 are	made	 according	 the	same	 legislative	procedure	and	envision	market-based	production	and	supply	of	energy.	Therefore,	 I	 will	 use	 this	 comparative	 technique	 wherever	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 cross-validate	the	logic	of	calculus	underpinning	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	research.	
8.	Conclusion	
As	illustrated	above,	the	main	focus	of	this	thesis	is	to	investigate	the	regulatory	elements	of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 SGC,	 which	 can	 have	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 competitive	supply	 of	 natural	 gas	 to	 the	 EU.	 As	 such,	 the	 institutional	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	concerned	with	the	establishment	of	 the	(market)	rules	of	natural	gas	transportation	via	this	energy	corridor,	which	is	aimed	at	addressing	transit	and	supply	risks	in	natural	gas	provision.	This	 is	 especially	 relevant	with	 regard	 to	 the	SGC,	 as	 the	natural	 gas	volumes	that	the	EU	is	trying	to	reach	out	to	in	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	East,	will	have	to	traverse	multiple	jurisdictions	and	be	subject	to	multiple	regulatory	regimes	and	practices	before	reaching	the	EU	borders.	This	makes	natural	gas,	 to	be	supplied	via	 this	corridor,	vulnerable	 to	 numerous	 economic	 and	 political	 challenges	 during	 the	 transit	 and	 entail	geopolitical	and	energy	security	concerns.	Therefore,	this	chapter	argued	that,	in	line	with	the	 EU’s	 conception	 of	 energy	 security,	 which	 is	 the	 diversity	 of	 energy	 supplies	 under	
competitive	market	conditions	–	the	institutional	elements	of	the	EU’s	SGC	strategy	aims	at	liberalising	 and	 depoliticising	 future	 natural	 gas	 supply	 via	 this	 corridor	 and	 make	 it	subject	to	market	rules.	
                                                            158	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	18.	
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Against	 this	 backdrop,	 this	 chapter	 indicated	 that	 the	 policy	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 EU	 in	order	to	address	transit	challenges	envisages	EU	external	energy	governance	vis-à-vis	the	SGC,	which	aims	at	the	Europeanisation	of	the	regulatory	regime	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	The	rationale	of	these	policy	actions	is	better	captured	by	the	theory	of	RCI,	as	it	accounts	 for	 the	 role	 of	 formal	 institutions	based	on	 the	 logic	 of	 consequences	 (rational-choice).	 From	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 SGC,	 RCI	 presents	 a	 strategic	 outlook	 of	 energy	relations.	This	 is	 rather	because	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	of	 the	 SGC	 is	 underpinned	by	the	logic	of	calculus.	It	is	geared	towards	addressing	the	external	energy	supply	risks	from	and/or	through	third	countries	by	expanding	the	boundary	of	the	EU	institutions	(relevant	energy	acquis)	 to	absorb	 the	SGC	countries	and	hence,	 take	advantage	of	 their	problem-solving	properties.159	The	deployment	of	the	EU	institutions	externally	will	allow	the	Union	to	determine	the	parameters	(rules)	that	condition	the	capacity	of	third	countries	to	make	energy	related	strategic	decisions	along	the	SGC	and	tailor	them	to	the	EU	preferences	(i.e.	
free-markets).	The	EIM	as	the	first-order	adaption	of	RCI,	additionally,	provides	a	tailor-made	analytical	tool	to	explain	the	role	of	the	domestic	factors	in	affecting	the	adoption	of	EU	rules	by	the	target	countries	along	the	SGC,	namely,	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.	Indeed,	both	RCI	and	 EIM	 better	 engage	 with	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 help	 to	 assess	 the	 explanatory	argument	of	this	thesis,	which	posits	that	-	in	the	absence	of	the	EU	membership	prospects	
or	 the	 lack	 of	 membership	 aspirations,	 net	 domestic	 adoption	 costs	 in	 the	 target	 SGC	
countries	serve	as	the	inhibiting	factors	of	energy	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	countries.	This,	accordingly,	will	allow	me	to	link	the	energy	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	countries	to	their	(energy	and	non-energy	related)	domestic	constraints,	as	opposed	to	external	(regional)	factors	 and	 to	 the	legitimacy	concerns	 of	 the	 state	 actors	 along	 the	 SGC	 as	 currently	argued	by	the	existing	academic	literature.160	It	 is	also	 important	to	acknowledge	that,	 in	 itself	 this	PhD	is	not	an	attempt	to	study	the	Europeanisation	of	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	in	general	terms,	although	it	borrows	extensively	 from	this	subject	 field	and	empirically	contributes	 to	some	of	 the	 theoretical	and	 conceptual	 issues	 from	 energy	 security	 viewpoint.	 My	main	 purpose	 in	 doing	 so	 is	rather	 to	 utilise	 existing	 policy	 and	 theoretical	 tools	 in	 investigating	 the	 future	 EU	 gas	supplies	via	the	SGC	under	depoliticised	free-market	conditions.	In	 order	 to	 accomplish	my	 research	 goals,	 Chapter	 II	 presents	 the	 SGC	 in	 infrastructure	(hardware)	terms	and	provides	a	historical	overview	of	the	developments	that	have	taken	
                                                            159	Lavenex,	‘EU	External	Governance	in	“Wider	Europe”’,	p.	694.	160	Pardo	Sierra,	 ‘A	Corridor	 through	Thorns:	EU	Energy	Security	and	 the	Southern	Energy	Corridor’;	Pardo	Sierra,	‘No	Man’s	Land?	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	the	EU	and	Russia’s	Influence	in	the	Southern	Caucasus’.	
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place	also	during	the	writing	of	this	thesis.	Chapter	III	presents	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 and	 investigates	 the	major	 avenues	 and	 the	 EU	 policy	initiatives	that	are	designed	to	underpin	the	expansion	of	the	EU	acquis	to	non-EU	actors.	The	 chapter	will	 also	 analyse	 the	 specific	 elements	 in	 the	EU	energy	 legislation	 that	 are	most	 relevant	 to	eliminating	 transit	and	supply	risks	along	 the	SGC.	These	elements	will	serve	 as	benchmarks	 for	 comparatively	describing	 the	 success	 or	 the	 failure	of	 the	EU's	external	 energy	 governance	 in	Chapters	 IV,	V	 and	VI	 	 (in	 other	words,	whether	 the	 SGC	countries	and	natural	gas	infrastructure	projects	are	in	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis	or	not).	Accordingly,	 empirical	 chapters	 IV,	 V	 and	 VI	 comparatively	 analyse	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	EU's	external	energy	governance	 towards	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	 (main	non-EU	countries	 along	 the	 SGC),	with	 the	 aim	 to	 reveal	 the	 factors	 facilitating	 or	 inhibiting	 the	success	thereof.	In	doing	so,	each	of	these	chapters	investigate	the	transit	and	supply	risks	along	the	relevant	transit	country	and	analyse	it	in	the	context	of	the	competitive	natural	gas	 supplies	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 general	 success	 of	 this	 policy	 initiative.	 Finally,	 the	Conclusion	of	the	thesis	sums	up	the	core	findings.	
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CHAPTER	II:	THE	HARDWARE	DIMENSION	OF	THE	SGC	&	THE	DIVERSITY	OF	THE	EU	ENERGY	SUPPLIES	
1.	Introduction	
In	 the	previous	 chapter,	 I	 noted	 that	 the	hardware	dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 aimed	at	 the	development	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 EU	natural	 gas	 provision.	 As	 such,	 the	 practical	 role	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 physical	infrastructure	is	to	diversify	supply	sources	and	routes	towards	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	 East	 and	 accordingly,	 allow	 the	 EU	 to	 address	 the	 pre-existing	 gas	 supply	 risks	largely	stemming	from	a	high	dependence	on	Russian	gas	supplies.	Against	 this	backdrop,	 the	 latest	developments	put	 the	 initial	volumes	to	be	delivered	to	the	EU	 in	 2020	 via	 the	 SGC	 at	 only	 10	 bcm/a,	which	was	 highly	 praised	 by	 the	EU	 as	 a	"major	milestone	for	the	diversification".161	These	volumes	are	to	be	transported	to	the	EU	via	a	combination	of	SCPx,	TANAP,	TAP	and	IGB	pipelines.	This	is	less	than	the	third	of	the	volumes	 (31	BCM/year)	envisioned	 to	be	supply	 to	 the	EU	by	 the	original	design	of	 this	alternative	energy	corridor	(Nabucco	classic	pipeline)	and	roughly	2%	of	 the	current	EU	consumption.	This	has	raised	doubts	about	the	ability	of	this	fourth	gas	corridor	to	deliver	tangible	contribution	to	the	EU's	gas	supply	security.	Secondly,	unlike	the	original	vision,	which	 aimed	 at	 easing	 supply	 concentration	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 the	 current	contractual	 arrangements	along	 the	SGC	will	 see	most	of	 the	new	volumes	 flow	 into	 the	South	European	markets,	 raising	questions	about	 the	strategic	deviation	of	 the	SGC	 from	the	 original	 blueprint.	 Thirdly,	 the	 supply	 source	 diversification	 constituted	 the	 major	strategic	rationale	and	the	key	selling	point	of	the	original	fourth	gas	corridor	blueprint.	In	contrast,	 the	 latest	 contractual	 arrangements	 will	 see	 only	 Azerbaijani	 reserves	 to	 be	linked	up	with	the	SGC	up	until	2020.	This	raises	certain	concerns	about	the	deliverability	of	the	SGC	in	terms	of	supply	diversification.		Taking	stock	of	the	latest	developments,	which	took	place	during	the	writing	of	this	thesis,	this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 present	 historically	 up-to-date	 discussions	 on	 the	 physical	establishment	 of	 the	 SGC,	 which	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 systematically	 analysed	 by	 the	 academic	
                                                            161	 ‘EC,	 Gas	 from	 Azerbaijan:	 Commission	Welcomes	 Final	 Investment	 Decision	 to	 Extract	 Gas	 Pledged	 for	Europe,	Press	Release	-	IP/13/1271’,	2013.	
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literature.	As	such,	 this	 is	 relevant	not	only	 in	 terms	of	analysing	 the	 tangible	 (material)	contribution	of	the	SGC	to	reducing	the	pre-existing	vulnerability	of	the	EU	supplies,	which	I	accomplish	in	this	chapter.	This	will	also	allow	me	to	analyse,	in	the	following	chapters,	the	 interrelations	 between	 the	 EU	 rules	 (regulatory	 dimension)	 in	 the	 non-EU	 SGC	countries	and	the	physical	infrastructure	(hardware)	that	is	currently	being	built	as	part	of	the	SGC,	hence	ensuring	the	competitiveness	of	the	EU	natural	gas	supply	via	this	energy	corridor.		Indeed,	 in	 contrast	 to	 other	 fuel	 types,	 the	 transportation	 and	 the	 very	 existence	 of	
market(s)	in	natural	gas	is	heavily	dependent	on	fixed	infrastructure,	especially	pipelines.	This	affects	not	only	the	practical	flow	of	energy,	but	also	the	application,	implementation	and	 consequences	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	markets	 rules	 (institutions)	 in	 natural	 gas	sector,	 for	 the	 rules	 get	 practically	 expressed	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 relevant	infrastructure.	 Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 translate	 the	 broader	 abstract	 assumptions	 of	 the	institutional	 elements	 of	 the	 SGC	 into	 the	 practical	 implications	 later	 in	 this	 thesis,	separate	analysis	of	the	hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	vital.	In	 general,	 academic	 literature	 tends	 to	 reduce	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	 development	 of	 certain	standalone	 transit	 pipelines,	 such	 as	 Nabucco,	 Trans-Adriatic	 Pipeline	 (TAP),	 Trans-Anatolian	 Pipeline	 (TANAP)	 and	 South-Caucasus	 Pipeline	 (SCPx).	 However,	 the	 regional	integration	of	national	markets	has	long	been	promoted	by	the	EU	via	multiple	initiatives,	such	as,	 INOGATE	programme,	Baku	 Initiative	and	Eastern	Partnership.	These	 initiatives	have	 always	put	 the	 emphasis	 on	both	physical	 integration	of	 the	national	 transmission	networks,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 regulatory	 harmonisation	 of	 the	 rules	 operating	 them.	 If	implemented	 successfully,	 this	 would	 incorporate	 the	 national	 markets	 of	 the	 non-EU	countries	 with	 the	 single	 EU	 energy	 market	 and	 establish	 an	 intercontinental	 energy	network	operating	under	harmonised	rules	made	in	the	EU.	In	 fact,	currently	some	volumes	of	Caspian	gas	are	already	being	delivered	to	 the	EU	via	the	Turkish	national	transmission	network	and	its	 interconnection	to	the	Greek	network	via	 the	 Interconnector-Turkey-Greece	 (ITG).	Although	 arguably	 this	 will	 likely	 to	 play	relatively	modest	role	in	the	future	gas	deliveries	to	the	EU	from	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	 East,	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 national	markets	 along	 the	 SGC	will	 transform	 them	into	 integral	 parts	 of	 this	 alternative	 supply	 corridor.	Hence,	 in	 a	mid-to-long	 term,	 the	analysis	 of	 the	 SGC	 should	 concentrate	 on	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 national	 transmission	networks.	Nonetheless,	 since	 the	physical	 integration	of	 the	national	 transmission	networks	of	 the	non-EU	 countries	 along	 the	 SGC	 is	 at	 their	 early	 stage,	 I	will	mainly	 concentrate	 on	 the	
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standalone	 transit	 pipelines	 that	will	 delivery	Caspian	 gas	 to	 the	EU	 starting	 from	2020	and	onwards	(see	Fig.	2).		
Fig.	2:	Southern	Gas	Corridor	in	physical	infrastructure	terms		|	EC,	PCI	interactive	map,	2015	
	With	all	these	in	mind,	below	I	will	first	locate	the	SGC	within	the	context	of	the	current	EU	natural	 gas	 supply	 vulnerability,	 which	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 over-reliance	 on	 concentrated	natural	gas	supply	sources.	Then	I	will	move	on	to	investigate	the	development	of	the	SGC	in	several	stages,	before	empirically	analysing	its	prospective	contribution	to	reducing	EU	natural	gas	supply	vulnerability.	
2.	EU	natural	gas	supply	vulnerability	and	the	SGC	
The	 European	Union	 is	 a	 group	 of	 consumer	 countries	whose	 demand	 in	 natural	 gas	 is	largely	 and	 increasingly	 met	 by	 external	 supplies.	 Already	 highly	 dependent	 on	 energy	imports,	according	to	the	European	Commission,	the	EU	import	dependency	in	natural	gas	is	expected	to	increase	from	the	current	61%	to	86%	in	2035.162	In	 the	past,	 the	expectations	of	 the	growing	 import	dependency	was	associated	with	 the	EU	 natural	 gas	 demand	 growth	 forecasts,	 from	 508	 bcm/a	 in	 2009	 to	 629	 bcm/a	 in	2035.163	 Contrary	 to	 the	 International	Energy	Agency's	 (IEA)	 forecasts	of	 "Golden	Age	of	Gas",	however,	the	EU	gas	demand	in	2013	declined	by	70	bcm	to	438	bcm/a,	compared	to	the	 2009	 gross	 consumption.164	 In	 its	 revised	 2013	 World	 Energy	 Outlook,	 the	 IEA	concluded	 that,	 underpinned	 by	 sluggish	 economic	 development,	 cheaper	 coal	 and	
                                                            162	 ‘Energy	 Infrastructure	 Priorities	 for	 2020	 and	 Beyond	 -	 A	 Blueprint	 for	 an	 Integrated	 European	 Energy	Network,	COM(2010)	677’	(European	Commission,	2010),	p.	21.	163	World	Energy	Outlook	2011	(Paris:	IEA,	International	Energy	Agency,	2011),	p.	159.	164	‘BP	Statistical	Review		of	World	Energy	June	2014’	(BP,	2014).	
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increased	use	of	renewables,	gas	demand	in	Europe	will	struggle	to	return	to	2010	levels	by	2035.165		At	 first	glance,	declining	demand	 for	natural	gas	 should	 resolve	 the	 fears	of	high	energy	import	 dependency	 in	 the	 EU.	 However,	 although	 demand	 growth	 for	 energy	 has	stabilised,	the	indigenous	supply	of	natural	gas	has	been	experiencing	continuous	decline	in	 the	EU.	The	 IEA	 forecasts	 that	 the	EU	domestic	 gas	 production	will	 decline	 from	185	bcm/a	in	2011	to	135	bcm/a	in	2020	and	further	to	104	bcm/a	in	2035.	Norwegian	(non-EU	but	EEA)	supplies,	on	the	other	hand,	will	only	increase	from	101	bcm/a	in	2011	to	121	bcm/a	in	2020	and	back	down	to	111	bcm/a	in	2035.	Under	these	forecasts,	in	2020,	the	year	when	the	SGC	is	to	delivery	first	volumes	to	the	EU,	the	Union	would	experience	50	bcm/a	 indigenous	 production	 decline,	 while	 increased	 production	 from	Norway	will	 be	able	to	compensate	it	only	by	20	bcm/a.	Furthermore,	in	2035	this	gap	in	the	EU	demand	and	Norwegian	production	growth	will	only	increase	even	further.	(see	Fig.	3)	
Fig.	3:	Natural	gas	production	in	the	EU	and	Norway	|	IEA,	New	Policies	Scenario,	2013	(bcm/a)166	
	These	factors	indicate	geological	risks	that	the	EU	might	face	in	the	future	as	regards	to	its	domestic	 energy	 supply.	 As	 the	 EU's	 indigenous	 production	 (and	 obscure	 future	 of	unconventional	-	shale	gas	production167	and	further	nuclear	phase-out)	will	not	be	able	to	take	 up	 the	 strain,	 the	 demand	 in	 the	 EU	will	 have	 to	 be	 satisfied	 by	 swelling	 imports,	which	 suggests	 escalating	 import	 dependency	 that	 is	 to	 come	 about	 in	 the	 next	 few	
                                                            165	World	Energy	Outlook	2013	(Paris:	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA),	2013).	166	World	Energy	Outlook	2013,	pp.	108–109.	167	 EU	 will	 produce	 only	 around	 20	 bcm/a	 of	 shale	 gas	 in	 2035. ⁠	 However,	 even	 these	 modest	 hopes	 on	unconventional	gas	are	waning	fast	due	to	the	unfavourable	geological	conditions	in	Europe,	as	well	as	popular	opposition	 (to	 controversial	 fracturing	 techniques	 used	 in	 the	 production	 of	 unconventional	 gas)	 in	 the	 EU	member	states.	See,	World	Energy	Outlook	2013,	p.	118.	
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decades.	 Additionally,	 as	 the	 EC	 stresses,	 gas	 will	 gain	 further	 importance	 as	 the	 most	preferable	back-up	fuel	for	the	intermittent	renewable	electricity	generation.168	This	statistics,	however,	 is	not	an	 indication	of	shortage	of	global	gas	production.	To	say	the	 least,	Russia	 is	 expected	 to	 ramp	up	 its	 production	 from	673	bcm/a	 in	2011	 to	808	bcm/a	in	2035.169	This	increase	would	in	principle	be	sufficient	to	meet	Russia’s	growing	domestic	 demand,	 as	well	 as	 compensate	declining	EU	production.	However,	 this	would	also	 mean	 that	 the	 import	 dependency	 of	 the	 EU	 on	 Russian	 gas	 would	 only	 further	increase.	This	has	already	been	witnessed	in	the	past	couple	of	years,	owing	to	the	reduced	LNG	deliveries	(higher	prices	in	Asia	and	Latin	America	attracted	most	of	the	world	LNG	shipments),	declining	indigenous	production	and	reduced	imports	from	Algeria	and	Libya.	As	a	result,	in	2014,	Russian	gas	made	up	around	42%	of	the	EU	imports	(See	Fig.	4).		
Fig.	4:	EU	imports	of	natural	gas	by	source,	2009-2014	|	EC,	2015170	
	However,	what	is	invisible	in	Fig.	4	is	the	asymmetrically	high	dependence	of	the	Central	and	South-Eastern	EU	member	 states	on	a	 concentrated	 source	of	 supply,	 i.e.	Russia.	As	the	table	below	illustrates,	these	countries	receive	a	bigger	share	of	their	imports,	as	well	as	consumption	from	Russia	compared	to	the	Western	EU	countries.	This	is	largely	due	to	the	lack	of	immediate	alternative	natural	gas	supplies	to	the	region	and	special	historical	relations	 that	 these	 countries	 had	 shared	 with	 Russia	 (USSR)	 in	 the	 past.171	 The	combination	of	these	factors	has	eventually	lead	to	above	60-70%	import	dependency	on	Russian	gas	(see	Table	2).	
                                                            168	 ‘Energy	 Infrastructure	 Priorities	 for	 2020	 and	 Beyond	 -	 A	 Blueprint	 for	 an	 Integrated	 European	 Energy	Network,	COM(2010)	677’,	pp.	6–7.	169	World	Energy	Outlook	2013,	p.	109.	170	 Quarterly	 Report	 on	 European	 Gas	 Markets	 (Brussels:	 European	 Commission,	 Directorate-General	 for	Energy,	Market	Observatory	for	Energy,	2015),	p.	8.	171	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’,	p.	4.	
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Table	2:	Dependence	of	EU	member	states	on	Russian	natural	gas	imports	|	IEA,	Natural	Gas	Information,	2013	(compiled	by	author)	
EU	Member	
States	
Consumption	
(bcm/a)	
Total	
Imports	
(bcm/a)	
Total	
Exports	
(bcm/a)	
Imports	
from	
Russian	
Federation	
(bcm/a)	
Share	of	
Russian	
gas	in	total	
imports	
(%)	
Share	of	
Russian	gas	in	
total	
consumption	
(%)			
Austria	 9.038	 11.551	 3.751	 8.264	 72%	 91%	
Belgium	 17.937	 21.126	 4.446	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
Bulgaria	 2.742	 2.488	 0.000	 2.488	 100%	 91%	
Croatia	 3.023	 1.357	 0.150	 0.400	 29%	 13%	
Czech	Republic	 8.323	 7.471	 0.000	 7.468	 100%	 90%	
Denmark	 3.899	 0.255	 2.985	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
Estonia	 0.670	 0.670	 0.000	 0.670	 100%	 100%	
Finland	 3.671	 3.671	 0.000	 3.671	 100%	 100%	
France	 44.147	 45.218	 2.480	 7.102	 16%	 16%	
Germany	 87.201	 87.742	 18.127	 31.351	 36%	 36%	
Greece	 4.354	 4.510	 0.000	 2.700	 60%	 62%	
Hungary	 10.232	 8.173	 0.836	 3.576	 44%	 35%	
Ireland	 4.737	 4.362	 -	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
Italy	 74.915	 67.725	 0.139	 18.999	 28%	 25%	
Latvia	 1.508	 1.720	 0.212	 1.720	 100%	 114%	
Lithuania	 3.364	 3.322	 0.000	 3.322	 100%	 99%	
Luxembourg	 1.214	 1.210	 -	 0.290	 24%	 24%	
Netherlands	 45.988	 26.088	 60.409	 2.931	 11%	 6%	
Poland	 18.112	 12.246	 0.000	 9.773	 80%	 54%	
Portugal	 4.629	 4.594	 -	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
Romania	 13.560	 2.888	 0.000	 2.488	 86%	 18%	
Slovak	Republic	 5.289	 4.801	 0.000	 4.779	 100%	 90%	
Slovenia	 0.872	 0.870	 		 0.393	 45%	 45%	
Spain	 32.496	 35.062	 2.795	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
Sweden	 1.130	 1.130	 		 0.000	 0%	 0%	
UK	 78.083	 50.259	 13.111	 0.000	 0%	 0%	
	In	this	regard,	although	high	import	dependency	is	not	a	risk	for	energy	security	in	itself,	the	 lack	 of	 import	 alternatives	 incurs	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 vulnerability.	 Vulnerability	 here	refers	 to	 the	geographical	concentration	of	supply	sources	and	transit	routes	on	a	single	country	or	region.172	In	this	regard,	if	a	country	relies	on	a	concentrated	supply	source,	its	
                                                            172	Javier	García-Verdugo	and	Beatriz	Muñoz,	‘Energy	Dependence,	Vulnerability	and	the	Geopolitical	Context’,	in	Energy	Security	 for	 the	EU	 in	 the	21st	Century:	Markets,	Geopolitics	and	Corridors,	 ed.	by	 José	María	Marín	Quemada,	Javier	García-Verdugo,	and	Gonzalo	Escribano	(London;	New	York:	Routledge,	2012),	pp.	37–53	(p.	41).	
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energy	system	will	become	more	vulnerable,	as	it	is	more	difficult	to	compensate	e.g.	the	loss	of	a	source	that	accounts	for	40%	of	supplies	than	the	10%	one.	On	 the	one	hand,	 risks	 associated	with	energy	vulnerability	 can	be	geopolitical,	 for	high	dependence	 on	 a	 single	 source/transit	 route	 can	 make	 the	 consumer	 countries	vulnerability	 to	 the	 political	 blackmailing	 by	 the	 supplier(s),	 which	 has	 largely	 been	ascribed	to	the	behaviour	of	Russia	during	the	EU	gas	supply	cuts	 in	2006	and	2009.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 the	 energy	 vulnerability	 can	 entail	 other	 risks,	 not	 all	 of	 which	 are	conditioned	by	(geo)political	considerations,	such	as	geological	(exhaustion	of	indigenous	reserves),	 as	 well	 as	 technical	 (failure	 of	 supply	 systems,	 triggered	 by	 environmental	calamities	 and	 human	 error).173	 In	 a	 relatively	 recent	 example,	 several	 EU	 countries,	namely,	 Poland,	 Slovakia,	 Austria,	 Hungary,	 Bulgaria,	 Romania,	 Greece	 and	 Italy	experienced	 gas	 supply	 shortages	 from	 Russia	 due	 to	 the	 cold	 snap	 sweeping	 across	Europe	 during	 the	 winter	 of	 2012.	 Cold	 weather	 temperatures	 resulted	 in	 increased	domestic	consumption	in	Russia	while	leaving	the	country	with	less	export	capacity.174	In	another	example,	 in	1986	Britain	 lost	one	quarter	of	 its	 total	energy	supplies	 for	several	days	due	to	the	strike	of	Norwegian	offshore	workers.175	A	similar	strike	hit	Norwegian	oil	and	 gas	 industry	 during	 the	 summer	 2012,	 which	 caused	 considerable	 oil	 price	 hikes	around	 the	 world	 and	 threatened	 natural	 gas	 supplies	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	 itself	 Norway	 is	probably	 the	 most	 reliable	 natural	 gas	 supplier	 to	 the	 EU.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 mentioned	strike	 endangered	 supplies	 to	 the	 UK,	 Netherlands,	 France,	 Germany	 and	 several	 other	countries.176	Hence,	although	unexpected	supply	shortages	from	Russia	have	largely	been	attributed	to	the	political	motivations	in	the	Kremlin,	not	all	disturbances	in	gas	supply	are	of	geo-political	nature.		As	such,	non-existence	of	geopolitical	risks	on	the	supply	side	must	not	be	considered	as	a	benchmark	for	security	of	supply,	for	one	can	never	predict	the	potential	risks,	which	can	be	incurred	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	The	upshot	is	that,	whether	strategically	conditioned	or	unmeditated,	the	interruption	of	gas	supplies	has	security	of	supply	implications	for	the	
                                                            173	 See	 e.g.	 Arianna	 Checchi,	 Arno	 Behrens	 and	 Christian	 Egenhofer,	 Long-Term	 Energy	 Security	 Risks	 for	
Europe:	 A	 Sector-Specific	 Approach	 (CEPS,	 2009),	 p.	 3;	 Stern,	Security	 of	 European	Natural	 Gas	 Supplies:	 The	
Impact	of	 Import	Dependence	and	Liberalisation;	 Jonathan	Stern,	The	New	Security	Environment	 for	European	
Gas:	 Worsening	 Geopolitics	 and	 Increasing	 Global	 Competition	 for	 LNG	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 Institute	 for	 Energy	Studies,	 2006);	 Javier	 García-Verdugo	 and	 San-Martín	 Enrique,	 ‘Risk	 Theory	 Applied	 to	 Energy	 Security:	 A	Typology	of	Energy	Risks’,	in	Energy	Security	for	the	EU	in	the	21st	Century:	Markets,	Geopolitics	and	Corridors,	ed.	 by	 José	 María	 Marín	 Quemada,	 Javier	 García-Verdugo,	 and	 Gonzalo	 Escribano	 (London;	 New	 York:	Routledge,	2012),	pp.	111–43.	174	 ‘Europe	 Hit	 by	 Russia	 Gas	 Shortage’,	 BBC,	 4	 February	 2012,	 section	 Europe	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16883560>	[accessed	20	December	2012].	175	Stern,	Security	of	European	Natural	Gas	Supplies:	The	Impact	of	Import	Dependence	and	Liberalisation,	p.	16.	176	‘Norway	Government	Ends	Oil	Strike’,	BBC,	9	July	2012	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18767000>	[accessed	21	October	2012].	
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consumer	 countries,	 especially	 if	 it	 is	 experienced	 from	 the	 single	 biggest	 gas	 supply	source.	Supply	vulnerability,	on	the	other	hand,	is	reduced	by	diversifying	supply	sources	and	 transportation	 routes.	 The	more	 the	 number	 of	 suppliers	 and	 the	 less	 the	 share	 of	individual	supplies,	the	less	vulnerable	the	energy	system	will	be	to	supply	cut-offs.		In	 this	 regard,	 diversity	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 security.	 If	 the	 EU	member	states	 are	 well	 interconnected,	 diversity	 of	 supplies	 will	 ensure	 that	 if	 one	 or	 several	supply	 sources	 are	 gone	 offline	 -	 regardless	 of	 underlying	 reasons	 -	 the	 rest	 can	compensate	 the	 lost	 supplies	 by	 filling	 the	 gap.177	 Vis-à-vis	 geological	 risks	 to	 energy	supply,	on	the	other	hand,	diversification	will	ensure	that	declining	domestic	production	can	be	supplemented	by	new	sources,	without	 increasing	concentrated	imports	 from	the	existing	ones.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	establishment	of	the	fourth	gas	(pipeline)	corridor	has	topped	the	EU’s	energy	agenda	in	the	past	decade.	This,	so	called,	Southern	Gas	Corridor	is	to	link	gas	production	sites	in	the	Caspian	Basin	(Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan)	and	the	Middle	East	 (Iraq	 and	 Iran)	 with	 the	 European	 consumers.178	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	chapter	 that,	 the	 SGC	 strategy	 of	 the	 EU	 is	 rather	multidimensional,	 for	 it	 includes	 both	
hardware	and	regulatory	(software)	elements.		The	hardware	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	aimed	at	the	development	of	physical	infrastructure	in	order	to	physically	 link	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	East	with	the	EU	market(s).	Although	 the	 development	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 is	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 the	development	of	formal	rules	governing	them,	the	two	should	be	investigated	separately	in	order	to	unearth	their	contribution	to	different	objectives	of	the	EU's	conception	of	energy	
security	(which	includes	both	diversity	and	competitiveness	of	energy	supply).	With	these	in	mind,	I	look	into	the	physical	development	of	the	SGC	in	3	historical	stages:	a)	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	Nabucco	classic	pipeline;	b)	TANAP	and	the	access	to	the	Caspian;	3)	 TAP	 as	 the	 final	 home	 stretch	 (see	 Fig.	 2).	 Finally,	 I	 will	 quantitatively	 describe	 the	prospective	 role	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 reducing	 the	 supply	 vulnerability	 of	Bulgaria,	 Greece	 and	Italy	(the	future	buyers	of	the	initial	gas	volumes	from	Azerbaijan)	on	Russian	gas	imports.	
                                                            177	 Interview	 with	 the	 key	 official	 of	 the	 European	 Commission/DG	 Energy,	 03/05/2013,	 Brussels.	 For	 a	similar	 argument,	 see	 also,	 Buchan,	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change:	 Europe	 at	 the	 Crossroads,	 p.	 13;	 ‘The	Commission’s	Energy	Infrastructure	Package,	MEMO/11/710’	(European	Commission,	2011).	178	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’,	pp.	4–5.	
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3.	The	first	stage	of	SGC:	rise	and	fall	of	Nabucco	classic	
Initiated	as	early	as	2002,	no	pipeline	has	topped	the	EU's	political	agenda	so	continuously	and	vigorously	 in	the	past	decade	as	the	Nabucco	classic	pipeline.179	The	first	 talks	about	the	 pipeline	 started	 between	 Austrian	 energy	 company	 OMV	 and	 Turkish	 national	champion	 BOTAŞ	 back	 in	 2002.	 Soon	 joined	 by	 Hungarian	 MOL,	 Bulgarian	 Bulgargaz,	Romanian	Transgaz,	the	five	companies	concluded	a	protocol	in	June	2002	declaring	their	intention	to	construct	a	pipeline	between	Turkey	and	Austria.	The	Cooperation	Agreement	on	the	pipeline	was	signed	on	October	10,	2002	in	Vienna,	which	followed	by	the	partners	attending	 the	 Vienna	 State	 Opera	 to	 watch	 "The	 Nabucco"	 opera	 by	 Giuseppe	 Verdi,	 to	which	 the	 pipeline	 is	 beholden	 for	 its	 name.180	 Nabucco	 International	 GmbH	 was	established	on	June	24,	2004	and	was	seated	in	Vienna,	Austria,	although	it	took	another	5	years	-	 July	13,	2009	-	to	sign	the	Intergovernmental	Agreement	(IGA)	among	the	transit	countries.		At	the	early	stages	of	the	pipeline	planning	Nabucco	classic	saw	little	or	no	support	from	the	European	heavyweights	 like	Italy	and	Germany,	as	they	were	quite	comfortable	with	their	bilateral	deals	signed	with	Russian	Gazprom	and	had	access	to	other	supply	sources.	Therefore,	Germany	and	Italy	were	less	willing	to	antagonise	Moscow	by	getting	in	direct	deals	with	 former	Soviet	satellites	while	bypassing	Russia.181	Quite	 the	opposite,	German	centre-left	chancellor	Gerhard	Schröder	put	his	political	weight	behind	the	Russian	Nord-Stream	 pipeline	 that	 directly	 linked	 Russian	 Baltic	 coast	 with	 Germany,	 thus	 avoiding	transit	jurisdictions	of	third	countries.182	However,	with	80%	of	Russian	gas	exports	to	the	EU	 being	 transmitted	 via	 Ukrainian	 gas	 transmission	 system	 (GTS),	 the	 consecutive	Russian	gas	cut-offs	across	Ukraine	in	2006	and	2009	and	the	Russian	invasion	of	Georgia	in	 2008	 served	 as	 a	 wake-up-call	 to	 the	 Europeans	 about	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 supply	dependence	on	a	single	source	and	route.183	This	constituted	a	good	reminder	for	the	EU	
                                                            179	The	original	pipeline	was	called	only	Nabucco.	However,	since	it	saw	a	revision	in	its	architecture	at	a	later	stage,	 the	original	pipeline	 came	 to	be	known	as	Nabucco	Classic,	while	 the	new	version	was	 recognised	as	Nabucco	West.	180	Bülent	Aras	and	Emre	Iseri,	The	Nabucco	Natural	Gas	Pipeline:	From	Opera	to	Reality,	(SETA	Policy	Briefs)	(SETA	Foundation,	2009),	p.	4.	181	Erdogdu,	‘Bypassing	Russia:	Nabucco	Project	and	Its	Implications	for	the	European	Gas	Security’,	p.	2942;	Katinka	Barysch,	‘Should	the	Nabucco	Pipeline	Project	Be	Shelved?’	(Transatlantic	Academy,	2010),	p.	7.	182	Daniel	Freifeld,	‘The	Great	Pipeline	Opera’,	Foreign	Policy,	24	August	2009.	183	Freifeld,	‘The	Great	Pipeline	Opera’;	see	also,	Paul	Belkin,	Jim	Nichol	and	Steven	Woehrel,	Europe’s	Energy	
Security:	Options	and	Challenges	to	Natural	Gas	Supply	Diversification	(DC,	Washington:	Congressional	Research	Service,	20	August	2013),	p.	12.	
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countries	 that	 the	 diversification	 of	 energy	 supply	 was	 a	 matter	 of	 energy	 and	consequently,	economic	and	political	security.184	These	 events	 followed	by	 the	European	Commission	 identifying	Nabucco	 as	 a	project	 of	common	interest	in	its	Second	Strategic	Energy	Review.185	The	pipeline	saw	another	push	when	 the	 German	 RWE	 joined	 Nabucco	 and	 became	 an	 equal	 shareholder	 with	 16.7%,	while	 later	 in	2010	the	European	and	 International	 financial	 institutions	promised	up	to	4€	bln	 in	 loans	 to	 the	project	 conditional	 upon	Nabucco	meeting	 solid	project	 financing	requirements.186	
3.1.	Conceptual	architecture	of	Nabucco	classic:	what	did	it	offer?187	
To	be	built	by	the	buyers	and	the	transit	countries	-	intermediaries	-	Nabucco	Classic	was	the	"merchants'	pipeline",	 the	practice	widespread	 in	 the	USA	but	relatively	unknown	 in	Europe.	 The	 concept	 envisioned	 a	 degree	 of	 sophistication	 and	 well-planning	 by	 the	intermediaries	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 recover	 the	 costs	 of	 construction,	 as	 well	 as	 the	operation	 of	 the	 pipeline,	 while	 supported	 by	 tariffs	 that	 offer	 commercial	 terms	 that	attract	both	suppliers	and	consumers.188	Conceptually,	 the	project	was	expected	 to	work	under	a	one-stop-shop	principle	and	any	company	that	wanted	to	use	the	pipeline	only	had	to	deal	with	only	a	single	interlocutor	–	Nabucco	International	GmhB	–	in	order	to	supply	gas	from	Eastern	Turkey	to	the	Austrian	hub	in	the	EU	or	vice	versa.189	This	would	spare	the	prospective	shippers	of	all	the	political	and	 economic	 hassles	 incurred	 by	 different	 regulatory	 regimes	 in	 force	 in	 different	Nabucco	host	countries.	Access	regime	to	the	pipeline	was	to	be	based	on	the	"open	seasons	procedure"	with	fixed	tariff	methodology	and	consisted	of	two	stages.	In	the	first	stage,	the	pipeline	shareholders	had	the	right	to	reserve	the	50%	capacity	-	up	to	15BCM	for	their	own	use	(supported	by	the	 derogation	 from	 the	 EU	 third	 party	 access	 (TPA)	 requirement	 for	 25	 years).	 In	 the	
                                                            184	See	e.g.	Aleksandar	Kovacevic,	The	Impact	of	the	Russia-Ukraine	Gas	Crisis	in	South	Eastern	Europe	(Oxford:	Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies,	2009).	185	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’.	186	 Anthony	 Williams,	 ‘EBRD,	 EIB	 and	 IFC	 Start	 Appraisal	 of	 Nabucco	 Pipeline:	 Important	 Step	 Towards	Meeting	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security	 Demands’	 (EBRD,	 2010)	<http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2010/100906.shtml>	[accessed	21	April	2014].	187	 Although	 the	 IGA	 on	 Nabucco	was	 signed	with	 a	 period	 of	 50	 years,	 and	 did	 not	 include	 any	 clause	 of	termination	 if	 the	pipeline	 is	not	built,	 I	will	 still	use	past	 tense	 in	explaining	different	elements	of	Nabucco	pipeline.	188	 John	 Roberts,	 ‘The	 Southern	 Corridor:	 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan’s	 Gas	 Legacy’,	 Turkish	 Policy	 Quarterly,	September	2012,	77–85	(pp.	79–80).	189	 ‘President	Barroso	and	Commissioner	Piebalgs	Welcome	the	Signature	of	the	Nabucco	Intergovernmental	Agreement,	Press	Release,	-	IP/09/1114’.	
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second	step,	however,	the	remaining	capacity	of	the	pipeline	had	to	be	offered	to	all	other	market	 participants,	 including	 the	 shareholders,	 on	 equitable	 bases	 in	 order	 to	 create	equal	 opportunities	 for	 all	 (if	 the	 technically	 available	 capacity	 is	 not	 booked	 after	 the	second	stage,	 a	 third	 round	of	open-seasons	 could	be	held).190	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 second	stage	 of	 the	 "open	 seasons"	 presented	 an	unbundled	 transportation	 scheme,	 where	 the	pipeline	owners	"rent	the	transportation	capacities",	both	on	 long-	and	short-term	bases	to	the	interested	shippers.191	The	reserved	capacity,	on	the	other,	was	supposed	to	function	under	use-it-or-lose-it	(UIOLI)	principle,	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	scarce	capacity	is	used	by	those	who	need	it	most.192	The	regulatory	aspects	of	the	pipeline	were	probably	the	most	important	characteristics	of	Nabucco.	 Being	 an	 international	 pipeline	 Nabucco	 classic	 was	 expected	 to	 traverse	 the	territories	of	several	countries	with	different	regulatory	regimes.	Although	Turkey	at	the	time	was	and	still	is	a	candidate	country	to	the	EU	membership,	it	is	yet	to	align	its	energy	legislation	with	that	of	the	EU.	Therefore,	the	European	Commission,	who	negotiated	the	Nabucco	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 (IGA)193	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 EU	 member	 states,	ensured	that	the	IGA	was	fully	in	line	with	the	EU	acquis	despite	Turkey's	non-EU	member	status.	From	the	perspective	of	Turkey,	as	the	former	Turkish	ambassador	to	the	EU	Selim	Kuneralp	put	 it,	 through	 the	 signature	of	 the	Nabucco	 IGA,	Turkey's	 "alignment	with	 the	
acquis	[was]	coming	in	through	the	back	door".194	With	its	open	seasons	and	equitable	and	transparent	 access	 for	 the	 50%	 of	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 pipeline	 in	 open	 tender,	 the	regulatory	regime	of	Nabucco	promised	considerable	alignment	with	the	requirements	of	the	 EU	 energy	 acquis,	 which	 explains	 the	 strategic	 (albeit)	 insufficient	 support	 it	 had	received	form	the	Union.	The	 single	 interlocutor	 concept	 had	 a	 second	 major	 objective,	 too.	 With	 a	 "harmonised	
capacity	 management	 system	 along	 the	 whole	 length	 of	 the	 Nabucco	 project",	 it	 was	designed	in	a	way	that	only	the	owners	of	the	pipeline	(the	consortium	of	consumer	with	equal	 stakes)	 could	 control	 the	 access	 to	 and	 the	 off-take	 from	 the	 pipeline,	 without	
                                                            190	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	2009,	Article	3.	191	Matthias	Pickl	and	Franz	Wirl,	‘Enhancing	the	EU’s	Energy	Supply	Security—An	Evaluation	of	the	Nabucco	Project	and	an	Introduction	to	Its	Open	Season	Capacity	Allocation	Process’,	Zeitschrift	Für	Energiewirtschaft,	34.3	(2010),	153–61.	192	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Article	3.3.2	and	Annex	3;	see	also,	Pickl	and	Wirl,	‘Enhancing	the	EU’s	Energy	Supply	Security—An	Evaluation	of	the	Nabucco	Project	and	an	Introduction	to	Its	Open	Season	Capacity	Allocation	Process’,	p.	157.	193	 The	 Intergovernmental	Agreement	 is	 a	 government-to-government	 agreement	 that	 declares	 the	political	commitments	of	the	relevant	governments	to	facilitate	the	development,	construction	and	the	operation	of	the	pipeline	at	all	stages.	The	Project	Support	Agreement	(also	called	Host	Government	Agreement	-	HGA),	on	the	other	 hand,	 is	 a	 contract	 signed	 between	 each	 relevant	 government	 hosting	 the	 project	 and	 the	 project	promoter	and	sets	out	the	details	referred	to	in	the	IGA.	194	Interview	with	the	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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interference	 of	 the	 governments	 whose	 territories	 it	 was	 to	 traverse.195	 Such	 a	 strong	attention	 by	 the	 EU	 to	 the	 regulatory	 aspects	 of	Nabucco	was	 (and	 still	 is)	 based	 on	 an	
institutional	 approach	 that	 the	 Union	 pursues	 in	 its	 relationships	 with	 third	 countries,	which	 is	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 external	 risks	 by	 institutionalising	 its	 bilateral/multilateral	relations	with	third-countries	based	on	the	EU	legislation.		With	 three	 access	 points	 in	 Eastern	 Turkey,	 Nabucco	 classic	 was	 expected	 to	 bring	 31	bcm/a	gas	 from	the	Caspian	basin,	 Iran,	 Iraq	(see	Fig.	5)	and	possibly	 from	Egypt	 to	 the	European	 Union.196	 These	 huge	 volumes	 (albeit	 hypothetical)	 could	 not	 only	 make	additional	gas	available	during	the	supply	crisis,	but	also	force	dominant	suppliers	to	offer	more	 competitive	 prices,	 similar	 to	 that	when	 increased	 LNG	 supplies	 to	 Europe	 forced	Gazprom	to	offer	price	discounts	to	its	European	consumers.197		
Fig.	5:	Nabucco	classic	pipeline	|	Prepared	by	the	author	using	publically	available	information.	
		
3.2.	Nabucco	vs.	South	Stream	
Nonetheless,	Nabucco	was	not	alone	in	targeting	the	South-East	and	Central	European	gas	market,	 while	 trying	 to	 avoiding	 Ukrainian	 territory.	 From	 the	 moment	 of	 inception	 of	
                                                            195	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Articles	7,	8.	196	Vladimir	Socor,	 ‘Sourcing	the	Nabucco	Pipeline	to	Prevail	Against	South	Stream’,	Eurasia	Daily	Monitor,	8	February	 2008	<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33365&no_cache=1#.VYhtLxOqqko>	[accessed	18	April	2014].	197	 James	 Marson,	 ‘Gazprom	 Cuts	 Gas	 Price	 for	 Poland’,	 Wall	 Street	 Journal,	 6	 November	 2012	<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204349404578102230135329520>	 [accessed	 18	November	2014].	
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Nabucco,	 the	 Kremlin	 swiftly	 introduced	 South	 Stream	 pipeline.198	 Dubbed	 by	 some	experts	as	President	(Vladimir)	Putin's	political	project,	 it	was	to	carry	gas	from	Russian	Black	 Sea	 coast	 to	Baumgarten	 (following	 the	Nabucco	 route)	with	 an	overall	 62	bcm/a	capacity,	while	bypassing	troubled	Ukrainian	territory.	Russian	 pipeline	 offered	 twice	 the	 transportation	 capacity	 as	 the	 Nabucco	 classic.	However,	 these	 two	 pipelines	were	 quite	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	EU's	energy	diversification	strategy.	In	this	regard,	Nabucco	offered	diversification	of	both	supply	 source,	 as	well	 as	 the	 transit	 route.	 It	was	 to	bring	Europe	qualitatively	new	gas	volumes	 from	the	countries,	which	have	yet	 to	send	Europe	a	single	molecule	of	natural	gas.199	The	route	of	Nabucco	was	selected	in	a	way	to	avoid	Russian	territorial	jurisdiction	and	 hence,	 its	 political	 and	 economical	 influence	 and	 presented	 both	 source	 and	 route	diversification.	This	would	not	only	increase	the	security	of	European	gas	supply	but	also	strengthen	the	EU	buyers'	position	in	negotiating	gas	prices	with	Russia.200	South	Stream,	on	the	other	hand,	was	only	to	carry	Russian	gas,	albeit	through	a	different	route.	In	this	vein,	 from	 the	 EU's	 perspective	 South	 Stream	 would	 only	 offer	 a	 route	 diversification,	while	 keeping	 the	 supply	 source	 intact,	 hence,	 did	 not	 qualify	 as	 a	 project	 of	 European	interest.201	According	 to	 some	 studies,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 supply	 cut-offs	 across	 Ukraine,	 South	 Stream	would	be	able	to	better	mitigate	the	supply	disruption.	This	is	rather	because,	the	pipeline	was	 to	 re-route	Russia's	EU	gas	exports	 that	 currently	go	across	Ukraine.	Therefore,	 the	impact	 of	 potential	 Ukraine	 disruption	 would	 be	 minimised	 by	 the	 construction	 of	 the	South	Stream	(and	Nabucco).202	However,	 since	South	Stream	only	addressed	 the	 transit	dimension	of	the	EU's	natural	gas	supplies	and	did	not	take	into	account	the	supply	source	crisis,	 during	 the	 supply	 source	 cut-off	 scenarios	 it	 would	 have	 been	 less	 reliable	 than	Nabucco.	
                                                            198	South	Stream	pipeline	was	cancelled	by	Russia	in	December	2014.	199	This	is	not	strictly	correct,	as	some	of	Azeri	gas	exports	to	Turkey	are	being	re-exported	to	Greece.	On	the	other	 hand,	 Turkmen	 gas	 has	 also	 been	 re-sold	 to	 Ukraine	 and	 the	 EU	 by	 Russia.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	major	difference	 in	 the	case	of	Nabucco	 is	 that,	 it	will	provide	a	single	stand-alone	pipeline	allowing	producer	and	consumers	to	engage	in	direct	trade	without	the	interference	middlemen	like	Turkey	or	Russia.	See	e.g.	Ingilab	Ahmadov,	 ‘The	 Southern	 Corridor	 and	 Nabucco	 –	 A	 Promising	 Challenge	 for	 Caspian	 Countries’,	 in	Beyond	
Turkey:	The	EU’s	Energy	Policy	and	the	Southern	Corridor,	ed.	by	Kristin	Linke	and	Marcel	Vietor	(International	Policy	 Analysis,	 2010),	 pp.	 15–19	 (p.	 18);	 Kardas,	 ‘Turkish–Azerbaijani	 Energy	 Cooperation	 and	 Nabucco:	Testing	the	Limits	of	the	New	Turkish	Foreign	Policy	Rhetoric’,	p.	61.	200	Remme,	Blesl	and	Fahl,	‘Future	European	Gas	Supply	in	the	Resource	Triangle	of	the	Former	Soviet	Union,	the	Middle	East	and	Northern	Africa’,	p.	1637.	201	 ‘Oettinger	Says	South	Stream	Not	a	Project	of	Common	Interest’,	Natural	Gas	Europe,	22	September	2013	<http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/south-stream-eu-priority-project>	[accessed	21	April	2014].	202	 Dieckhoner,	 ‘Simulating	 Security	 of	 Supply	 Effects	 of	 the	 Nabucco	 and	 South	 Stream	 Projects	 for	 the	European	Natural	Gas	Market’,	p.	174.	
 84 
On	the	other	hand,	the	starting	point	of	South	Stream	was	more	than	3000	km	away	from	the	production	sites	in	Yamal	peninsula.	Gas	sold	via	South	Stream	would	not	only	include	the	high	costs	of	production	 in	Western	Siberia	 (due	 to	permafrost	 conditions),	but	also	the	 cost	 of	 construction	 of	 new	 domestic	 transmission	 systems	 towards	 the	 Black	 Sea	coast,	in	addition	to	the	cost	of	South	Stream	pipeline	itself.203	According	to	some	studies,	even	 if	 only	 the	 entry-to-exit-point	distance	 is	 considered,	 the	 costs	of	 transportation	of	(any)	1000/m3	of	gas	were	to	be	19%	cheaper	via	Nabucco,	as	opposed	to	South	Stream	(not	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 extra	 costs	 of	 production	 in	 Russian	 fields).204	 Therefore,	 it	would	have	been	much	cheaper	for	Russia	to	continue	using	Ukrainian	and	Polish	transit	routes,	as	opposed	 to	South	Stream,	 in	order	 to	export	 its	gas	 to	 the	EU	markets.	 In	 this	regard,	 despite	 certain	 benefits,	 the	 South	 Stream	was	 only	 a	 strategic,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	cost-efficient	pipeline	for	transporting	Russian	gas	to	Europe.205	
3.3.	Fall	of	Nabucco	Classic	
It	was	widely	expected	that	the	rising	cost	of	carbon	emissions	in	the	EU	would	drive	the	demand	for	gas	at	the	expense	of	dirty	coal	and	fuel	oil206	and	thus,	increase	the	economic	viability	of	great	capacity	pipelines	 like	Nabucco.	This,	however,	did	not	 transpire	 in	 the	years	following	the	signature	of	the	Nabucco	Intergovernmental	Agreement	(IGM)	in	2009	and	hence,	could	not	attract	the	necessary	financial	support	to	the	now-deceased	pipeline.	There	are	several	factors	that	made	the	failure	of	Nabucco	classic	inevitable.	
Lack	of	gas	supplies	&	transaction	costs	have	played	the	primary	role	in	the	demise	of	the	project.	Many	experts	considered	that	even	though	Nabucco	classic	could	remain	empty	at	the	beginning,	its	very	existence	would	incentivise	gas	exports	through	this	pipeline.207	In	addition,	 the	 consortium	 members	 anticipated	 that	 the	 wellhead-to-market	 cost	 of	 gas	exports	 via	 Nabucco	 to	 be	 15%	 to	 27%	 cheaper	 than	 the	 competing	 projects	 (South	Stream,	 ITGI	 and	 TAP).	 These	 calculations	 could	 well	 have	 been	 true,	 if	 the	 main	
                                                            203	 The	 IEA	 predicts	 the	 costs	 to	 be	 $3.47-$4.07/Mbtu	 from	 the	 Caspian	 basin	 to	 Austria	 across	 Turkey	 vs.	$5.68	-$6/Mbtu	from	Russian	fields	across	the	Black	Sea	seabed	to	the	same	destination.	World	Energy	Outlook	
2009	(Paris:	IEA,	International	Energy	Agency,	2009),	pp.	482–484.	204	Pickl	and	Wirl,	‘Enhancing	the	EU’s	Energy	Supply	Security—An	Evaluation	of	the	Nabucco	Project	and	an	Introduction	to	Its	Open	Season	Capacity	Allocation	Process’,	p.	159.	205	 Dieckhoner,	 ‘Simulating	 Security	 of	 Supply	 Effects	 of	 the	 Nabucco	 and	 South	 Stream	 Projects	 for	 the	European	Natural	Gas	Market’,	p.	158;	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	p.	64.	206	 See	 e.g.	 Fredrik	 Pettersson,	 Patrik	 Söderholm	 and	 Robert	 Lundmark,	 ‘Fuel	 Switching	 and	 Climate	 and	Energy	Policies	 in	 the	European	Power	Generation	Sector:	A	Generalized	Leontief	Model’,	Energy	Economics,	34.4	(2012),	1064–73.	207	 Susanne	 Nies,	Oil	 and	 Gas	 Delivery	 to	 Europe:	 An	 Overview	 of	 Existing	 and	 Planned	 Infrastructures,	 New	Edition	(Bruxelles:	Paris,	Les	Études,	2011),	p.	156.
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assumption	-	90%	the	utilisation	rate	-	were	to	be	held.208	This,	unfortunately,	was	not	the	case	given	the	lack	of	gas	supplies	available	to	fill	the	pipeline.	The	Shah-Deniz	consortium	could	 offer	 only	 10	 bcm/a	 gas	 to	 the	 31	 bcm	 capacity	 Nabucco	 classic.	 This	 raised	 an	important	 question	 about	 the	 empty	 capacity	 of	 the	 pipeline	 and	 the	 tariffs	 for	transportation.	 According	 to	 Nabucco	 IGA,	 transportation	 tariffs	 were	 to	 be	 calculated	based	 on	 the	 contracted	 capacity	 by	 the	 shipper,	 the	 load	 factor,209	 the	 transportation	distance,	 CAPEX	 and	OPEX	per	 capacity	 unit	 and	 volumes.210	 Taking	 the	 load	 factor	 into	account,	 if	 a	 31	 bcm	 capacity	 pipeline	works	 only	with	 10	 bcm	 annual	 output,	 then	 the	transportation	costs	of	the	entire	capacity	(31	bcm)	has	to	be	paid	by	the	shipper	of	the	10	bcm	 gas	 in	 order	 to	 recover	 the	 CAPEX	 and	 OPEX	 of	 the	 TSO	 -	 Nabucco	 International	GmbH,	which	was	the	opposite	of	the	economies	of	scale	principle.211	In	other	words,	since	the	pipeline	was	not	going	to	be	fully	utilised,	the	per	unit	cost	of	transportation	of	Azeri	gas	would	 have	 increased	 considerably.	 Azerbaijani	 SOCAR	 -	 the	marketing	 operator	 of	Shah-Deniz	 consortium	 -	 however,	 was	 unwilling	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 empty	 capacity	 of	 the	pipeline,	which	if	passed	onto	the	final	consumers	would	make	Azeri	gas	uncompetitive	in	the	 European	 markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 these	 costs	 were	 to	 be	 met	 by	 the	 SD	consortium,	 then	 the	whole	 project	would	 not	 be	 commercially	 profitable	 to	 start	with,	given	 the	massive	 amount	 of	 upfront	 investment	 it	 required.	 FID	 into	 the	 SD	 II,	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 would	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 the	 gas	 sales	 &	 purchase	 and	 transportation	agreements	 were	 concluded	 before	 the	 actual	 start	 of	 production	 of	 gas	 in	 SD	 II.212	Therefore,	without	additional	firm	gas	supplies	from	other	sources	Shah-Deniz	consortium	was	 unlikely	 to	 commit	 10	 bcm	 gas	 and	 pay	 for	 the	 empty	 capacity	 of	 the	 Nabucco	pipeline.213	 Such	 an	 arrangement	 would	 not	 only	 incur	 economic	 costs,	 but	 also	 dis-incentivise	Nabucco	consortium	to	find	additional	supplies,	because	they	would	already	be	getting	paid	for	the	entire	technical	capacity	of	the	pipeline.214	Obviously,	Azerbaijan	could,	in	 principle,	 commit	 additional	 10	 bcm	 (20	 bcm	 in	 total)	 gas	 flow,	 which	 would	 make	Nabucco	 economically	 feasible	 at	 the	 beginning.215	 This,	 nonetheless,	 contradicts	 with	
                                                            208	 RWE	 GmbH,	 ‘Nabucco:	 The	 Most	 Commercial	 Southern	 Corridor	 Gas	 Pipeline	 Project’,	 2009	<https://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/239932/rwe-supply-trading/press/press-release/?pmid=4004206>	[accessed	19	April	2014].	209	Ratio	between	the	capacity	utilised	by	a	shipper	and	the	maximum	available	capacity	of	the	pipeline.	210	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Annex	4.	211	The	economies	of	scale	principle	dictates	that,	the	greater	the	volume	of	gas/oil	transported,	the	lower	will	be	the	per-unit	fixed	costs	of	transportation,	since	the	costs	will	shared	over	a	larger	volume	of	oil	and	gas	that	is	being	transported.	212	This	was	highlighted	during	the	interview	with	a	senior	official	from	SOCAR,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	213	Without	firm	supply	contracts,	on	the	other	hand,	Nabucco	was	unable	to	security	necessary	financial	tools	from	financial	institutions.	214	Rudolf	 ten	Hoedt,	 ‘“We	Do	Not	Want	 to	Depend	on	Only	One	Pipeline”	 -	 Interview	with	Elshad	Nasirov’,	
European	Energy	Review,	2010.	215	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	p.	50.	
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Azeri	(or	any	other	supplier's)	policy	of	diversification	of	demand	-	why	put	all	your	eggs	in	
one	basket?216		In	this	backdrop,	several	other	prospective	supply	sources,	inter	alia,	Iraqi	reserves	came	to	be	touted	as	Nabucco	starter,	especially	following	German	RWE's	investment	deal	with	Kurdistan	Regional	 Government	 of	 Iraq.	However,	 as	 it	 became	 clear	 later,	 the	 gas	 field	that	 could	 realistically	 be	 hooked-up	 with	 Nabucco	 -	 Akkas	 field	 -	 was	 in	 the	 Baghdad	controlled	region	of	 Iraq,	 close	 to	 the	Syrian	border.	The	major	gas	 field	 in	volatile	 Iraqi	Kurdistan	 -	Mansuriyah,	on	 the	other	hand,	would	only	make	 sense	 if	 linked	only	 to	 the	local	network	in	order	to	meet	local	demand.217	This	meant	that	any	gas	exports	from	Iraq	required	 a	 permanent	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 constitutional	 division	 of	 powers	 and	revenue	 sharing	 arrangements	 between	 the	 central	 government	 and	 the	 government	 in	the	 Kurdish	 autonomous	 region,218	 which	 have	 yet	 to	 materialise	 even	 after	 all	 the	deadlines	put	 for	Nabucco	classic,	 i.e.	2014.	 In	addition,	any	prospects	of	 Iraqi	gas	being	channelled	 to	Nabucco	via	 the	extension	of	 the	Arab	Natural	Gas	Pipeline	 (running	 from	Egypt	 to	Syria)219	were	nipped	 in	 the	bud	by	 the	Syrian	civil	war	 that	has	engrossed	 the	country.	 The	 current	 security	 predicament	 in	 the	 entire	 region,	 exacerbated	 with	 the	invasion	of	 Iraq	and	Syria	by	 the	 terrorist	 organisation	 called	 ISIS,	 renders	 any	 regional	project	unviable	for	at	least	in	the	next	decade	or	so.		Last	but	not	least,	Iran	-	another	hopeful	of	the	Nabucco	classic	-	is	still	embroiled	in	soft	international	conflict	due	to	its	nuclear	programme.220	Thus,	any	gas	exports	from	Iran	to	the	 EU	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 an	 unlikely	 scenario.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 Shah-Deniz	consortium	was	less	willing	to	risk	with	its	economic	wellbeing,	while	the	determination	of	Nabucco	tariffs	and	the	overall	project	realisation	was	depended	on	unrealistic	Iraqi	gas	(and	just	as	uncertain	Turkmen	and	Iranian	gas).221		Hence,	 the	merchant's	model	 that	 Nabucco	was	 based	 on	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	upstream	 risks	 associated	 with	 construction	 without	 ex-ante	 supply	 commitments.	 As	
                                                            216	Ahmadov,	‘The	Southern	Corridor	and	Nabucco	–	A	Promising	Challenge	for	Caspian	Countries’,	p.	17.	217	RWE’s	Kurdish	Nabucco	Gas	Deal	 Spells	 Problems	 for	Upcoming	 Iraqi	Gas	 Licensing	Round	 -	 IHS	Economic	
Report,	 31	 August	 2010	 <http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?id=106593878>	[accessed	19	April	2014].	218	 ‘Iraq	 Says	 Kurd	 Gas	 Deal	 with	 Germany’s	 RWE	 Illegal’,	 Reuters,	 2010	<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/08/29/iraq-gas-rwe-idUKLDE67S05H20100829>	 [accessed	 19	 April	2014].	219	 Ömer	 Fatih	 Sayan,	 ‘Turkey’s	 Energy	 Policy	 between	 East	 and	West’,	 in	Beyond	 Turkey:	 The	 EU’s	 Energy	
Policy	 and	 the	 Southern	 Corridor,	 ed.	 by	 Kristin	 Linke	 and	 Marcel	 Viëtor	 (Berlin:	 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,	2010),	pp.	10–14	(p.	13);	Kardas,	‘Turkish–Azerbaijani	Energy	Cooperation	and	Nabucco:	Testing	the	Limits	of	the	New	Turkish	Foreign	Policy	Rhetoric’,	p.	63.	220	Mert	Bilgin,	 ‘The	Middle	East	–	A	Real	Gas	Option	for	the	Southern	Corridor?’,	 in	Beyond	Turkey:	The	EU’s	
Energy	Policy	and	the	Southern	Corridor,	ed.	by	Kristin	Linke	and	Marcel	Viëtor,	International	Policy	Analysis	(Berlin:	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,	2010),	pp.	20–24.	221	Hoedt,	‘“We	Do	Not	Want	to	Depend	on	Only	One	Pipeline”	-	Interview	with	Elshad	Nasirov’.	
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major	 pipelines	 were	 traditionally	 built	 by	 the	 producers	 themselves,	 the	 capital	expenditures	 incurred	 served	 as	 a	 "hostage"	 until	 the	 costs	 were	 recovered	 during	 the	operation	 of	 the	 pipelines.	 Therefore,	 suppliers	 (who	 were	 also	 the	 builders)	 were	incentivised	to	use	the	pipeline	in	order	to	recover	their	pipeline	investment.222	As	Finon	most	 eloquently	 put	 it,	 "partnership	 from	 wellhead	 to	 consumers	 introduces	 mutual	
commitment".223	 Nabucco,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 defied	 this	 logic	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 gas	supplies	could	not	secure	investment	from	international	financial	institutions	and	banks.	
Strategic	vs.	commercial	partnership	-	Some	also	argued	that,	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	SD	 consortium	 did	 not	 put	 its	weight	 behind	 the	 Nabucco	 Classic	was	 that	 the	 pipeline	consortium	did	not	represent	the	interests	of	the	producers.224	Indeed,	the	merchants'	pipe	concept	did	not	 fit	with	SOCAR's	global	expansion	vision.	Azerbaijan's	energy	strategy	 is	quite	different	from	that	of	Turkmenistan,	which	sells	gas	at	the	border	and	is	more	than	satisfied	with	 flowing	energy	rents.	Quite	 the	opposite,	SOCAR	 is	aspiring	 to	break	away	from	the	role	of	a	mere	upstream	player	and	step	up	its	involvement	in	other	segments	of	the	global	energy	trade.		Azeri	 oil	 and	 gas	 reserves	 are	 far	 inferior	 to	 those	 of	 Turkmenistan.225	 Therefore,	 the	government	 is	 already	 working	 on	 the	 blueprint	 of	 transforming	 SOCAR	 into	 a	 global	company.	To	that	end,	SOCAR	aims	to	get	stakes	not	only	in	upstream,	but	also	in	the	mid-	and	down-stream	markets226	 (gas	 transportation	and	distribution	 to	 the	 final	 consumers	with	 the	 likes	 of	 German	 RWE,	 French	 GDF	 or	 Total).	 This	 will	 allow	 the	 company	 to	continue	 its	 business	 in	 the	 world	 markets	 even	 after	 the	 oil	 and	 gas	 reserves	 in	Azerbaijan	run	dry,	which	as	a	matter	of	fact	is	not	a	distant	possibility.	To	this	end,	both,	the	shares	in	the	main	transportation	conduit,	as	well	as	the	rights	to	sell	gas	to	the	final	consumers	was	paramount	for	Azeri	energy	champion.227	The	decisions	made	then	would	affect	 the	 company's	 international	 standing	 in	 the	 next	 20-30	 years.	 In	 this	 vein,	 since	Nabucco	 Classic	 did	 not	 offer	 such	 possibilities,	 Azerbaijani	 SOCAR	 never	 rushed	 into	pledging	gas	supplies	Nabucco	consortium.	
Lack	of	'competitive'	demand	-	Last	but	not	least,	the	competitive	demand	in	the	markets	to	be	 supplied	 by	 Nabucco	 classic	 did	 not	 present	 an	 attractive	 option	 for	 the	 Shah-Deniz	
                                                            222	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	pp.	55–58.	223	Finon,	‘The	EU	Foreign	Gas	Policy	of	Transit	Corridors:	Autopsy	of	the	Stillborn	Nabucco	Project’,	p.	58.	224	Gulmira	Rzayeva	and	Theodoros	G.R.	Tsakiris,	Strategic	 Imperative:	Azerbaijani	Gas	Strategy	and	the	EU’s	
Southern	Corridor	(Baku:	SAM	Center	for	Strategic	Studies,	2012),	p.	16.	225	‘BP	Statistical	Review		of	World	Energy	June	2014’.	226	 Gulgiz	Dadashova,	 ‘SOCAR	Confirms	 Plans	 to	 Enter	 European	Gas	Distribution	Market’,	AzerNews,	 1	 July	2013	<http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/56121.html>	[accessed	19	November	2014].	227	Hoedt,	‘“We	Do	Not	Want	to	Depend	on	Only	One	Pipeline”	-	Interview	with	Elshad	Nasirov’.	
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producers.228	 In	gas	business,	 the	 fuel	must	be	sold	before	 it	 is	actually	produced.	 In	 this	vein,	as	was	elaborated	on	numerous	occasions,	Azerbaijan's	supply	of	gas	to	Nabucco	was	more	 dependent	 on	 the	 question:	Who	 pledges	 to	 buy	 10	 BCM	 at	 competitive	 prices,	 if	SOCAR	choses	to	supply	gas	through	Nabucco?229	The	ensuing	"defeat"	of	Nabucco	West	-	Nabucco	classic's	successor	(which	was	slated	to	start	with	an	initial	10	bcm	capacity	and	scaled	 up	 as	 the	 new	 supplies	 become	 available)	 also	 indicated	 that	 although	 the	 initial	lack	of	supplies	might	have	been	the	factor	killing	the	Nabucco	Classic,	it	was	by	far	not	the	only	reason.	Although	the	markets	along	 the	route	of	Nabucco	are	heavily	dependent	on	Russian	 supplies,	 they	 are	 not	 necessarily	 undersupplied.	 Hence,	 the	Nabucco	 route	 did	not	present	an	attractive	enough	commercial	option	for	the	suppliers	in	order	to	push	for	the	project	realisation.	No	contractual	commitments,	on	the	other	hand,	translate	into	no	project	financing	by	the	financial	institutions.	To	sum	it	all	up,	 the	problems	present	at	 the	birth	of	Nabucco	classic	had	never	actually	been	resolved	and	lead	to	the	demise	of	the	decade-old	international	project.	Regardless	of	its	massive	 capacity	 and	 favourable	 to	 the	 EU	 regulatory	 regime,	 the	 failure	 of	Nabucco	served	as	a	good	indication	that	economics	still	trumps	all	other	factors	when	it	comes	to	the	realisation	of	multi-billion	projects.	
4.	TANAP	and	access	to	the	Caspian	
Following	 the	 deadlock	 reached	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Nabucco	 Classic,	 a	 new	 project	surfaced	 along	 the	 SGC	 following	 the	 signature	 of	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	between	Azerbaijan	 and	Turkey	 on	December	 24,	 2011.	Owned	 by	Azeri	 SOCAR	 (58%),	Turkish	BOTAŞ	(30%)	and	BP	(12%)	and	stretching	from	the	East-to-Western	Turkey,	the	new	 pipeline	 is	 named	 after	 the	 peninsular	 that	 it	 traverses	 -	 Trans-Anatolian	 Pipeline	(TANAP)	(see	Fig.	2).	TANAP	is	to	replace	the	Turkish	section	of	the	Nabucco	Classic	and	carry	 Caspian	 (and	 prospectively	Middle	 Eastern)	 gas	 to	 the	 EU-Turkey	 border.	 On	 the	Eastern	side	TANAP	will	be	 fed	by	 the	expanded	version	of	 the	South	Caucasus	Pipeline	(SCPx),	which	will	connect	the	gas	production	sites	in	Azerbaijan	to	TANAP.	The	initial	capacity	of	TANAP	is	expected	to	be	half	of	the	size	of	Nabucco	Classic	-	16	BCM,	albeit	scalable	to	32	bcm/a	due	to	the	56"	pipeline	diameter.	Initially,	TANAP	is	expected	to	 transport	Azeri	 gas	 from	 the	 second	phase	of	 the	development	of	 the	 Shah-Deniz	 gas	
                                                            228	Although,	initial	survey	revealed	demand	for	Nabucco	to	be	between	140%-460%	capacity	of	the	pipeline.	See	Pickl	and	Wirl,	‘Enhancing	the	EU’s	Energy	Supply	Security—An	Evaluation	of	the	Nabucco	Project	and	an	Introduction	to	Its	Open	Season	Capacity	Allocation	Process’,	p.	157.	229	Hoedt,	‘“We	Do	Not	Want	to	Depend	on	Only	One	Pipeline”	-	Interview	with	Elshad	Nasirov’.	
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and	 condensate	 field.230	 However,	 according	 to	 SOCAR	 leadership,	 the	 Azerbaijani	government	will	peruse	other	 fields	 in	 the	offshore	Caspian,	such	as	"Absheron",	 "Umid"	and	 the	 deep-lying	 gas	 in	 the	 "Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli"	 (ACG)	 block	 and	 export	 any	produced	gas	to	the	EU	markets	through	TANAP,	in	addition	to	any	possible	volumes	from	the	Central	Asian	 countries.231	 ACG	alone	has	500	BCM	worth	deep-lying	 gas	 reserves,232	which	 is	almost	equal	 to	 the	aggregate	annual	consumption	of	 the	EU.	 In	 total,	Azeri	gas	export	 potential	 is	 expected	 to	 stand	 at	 around	 40-50	 BCM	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 next	decade	and	the	country's	leadership	expects	most	of	it	to	go	to	the	EU	market.233	
4.1.	Advantages	of	TANAP	
Due	 to	 its	 natural	 monopoly	 character,234	 pipeline	 gas	 transportation	 have	 different	implications	for	the	suppliers	and	the	consumers,	especially	if	third	-	transit	countries	are	involved	 in	 the	 process.	 Taking	 these	 aspects	 of	 pipeline	 transportation	 into	 account,	TANAP	offers	several	advantages	and	disadvantages	for	the	suppliers	and	the	consumers	alike.		
Supplier's	 perspective	 -	 TANAP	 is	 based	 on	 a	 dedicated	 pipeline	 concept,	 which	 is	physically	separate	 from	the	Turkish	national	grid	and	thus,	will	operate	 independent	of	the	 Turkish	 government's	 economic	 and	 political	 control.	 TANAP	 HGA	 grants	 TANAP	Project	 Entity	 the	 exclusive	 right	 to	 conduct	 the	 transit	 passage	 of	 natural	 gas	 via	 the	Trans-Anatolian	Pipeline.235	 In	 this	 vein,	 since	SOCAR	owns	 the	majority	of	 stakes	 in	 the	TANAP	 project	 entity,	 TANAP	 will	 allow	 Azerbaijan	 to	 exercise	 control	 over	 the	transportation	 of	 its	 gas	 up	 to	 the	EU	border	 and	 keep	 the	 interference	 of	 the	 principal	transit	state,	i.e.	Turkey,	to	the	minimum.	Without	TANAP	if	Turkey	reduces	the	transit	of	gas	to	the	EU	only	to	serve	its	domestic	consumers	during	the	harsh	climatic	conditions,236	this	would	undermine	the	reliability	of	SGC	as	such.	Therefore,	especially	in	the	absence	of	Europeanisation	of	Turkish	gas	market	(which	I	will	analyse	in	the	following	chapter)	the	independence	of	TANAP	from	Turkish	political	establishment	is	a	vital	contribution	to	the	
                                                            230	 Shah-Deniz	 II	 is	 expected	 to	 produce	16	BCM	of	 additional	 gas,	 6	 of	which	 is	 slated	 for	Turkish	market,	while	the	remaining	to	be	exported	further	into	the	EU.	231	 Emil	 Ismayilov,	 ‘SOCAR:	 TANAP	 to	 Allow	 Transporting	 Gas	 from	 Caspian	 Littoral	 Countries	 to	 Europe’,	
Trend,	16	November	2012	<http://en.trend.az/capital/energy/2088905.html>	[accessed	19	November	2012].	232	Ismayilov,	‘SOCAR:	TANAP	to	Allow	Transporting	Gas	from	Caspian	Littoral	Countries	to	Europe’.	233	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	SOCAR,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	234	Whoever	controls	the	pipeline,	can	in	principle	control	the	access	of	the	third	parties	to	the	pipeline,	thus	affecting	the	competitiveness	of	gas	supply.	235	Parviz	Babayev,	‘TANAP:	General	Project	Status’	(presented	at	the	stakeholder	consultation	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	Regional	Group	meeting	of	the	Projects	of	Common	Interest,	European	Commission,	2015).	236	See	e.g.	 ‘Turkey	Sends	Gas	to	Greece	as	EU	Slams	Gov’t	in	Athens’,	Hurriyet	Daily	News,	20	February	2012	<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-sends-gas-to-greece-as-eu-slams-govt-in-athens.aspx?pageID=238&nid=14137>	[accessed	15	August	2013].	
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reliability	of	the	SGC,	as	notwithstanding	any	assurances	by	the	Turkish	establishment,	the	authorities	in	Baku	would	always	be	weary	of	the	safe	transit	of	gas	from	Georgian	border	to	the	EU	without	Baku's	control	of	transit	across	Turkey.	Hence,	 both	 the	 dedicated-pipeline	 character,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 majority	 stakes	 owned	 by	SOCAR	 represent	 the	 biggest	 advantages	 of	 TANAP	 for	 the	 Azeri	 government	 (the	principle	 supplier	 of	 gas).	 Along	 with	 security	 in	 transportation,	 such	 a	 commercial	structure	will	allow	the	Shah-Deniz	consortium	and	SOCAR	to	streamline	the	development	of	 the	mega-project	 along	 the	 entire	 value	 chain	 and	 coordinate	different	 segments	 into	one	single	project.	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 since	 TANAP	 stops	 at	 the	 EU-Turkey	 border,	 it	 will	 allow	 Azeri	government	 to	 diversify	 its	 gas	 export	 portfolio	 to	 multiple	 markets	 within	 the	 EU	 -	Central,	 Southern	 and	 South-Eastern	 European	markets	 and	 ensure	 security	 of	 demand	through	multiple	consumer	base.	
Consumers'	perspective	 -	 TANAP	also	offers	 several	 advantages	 from	 the	viewpoint	 of	the	 EU	 gas	 supplies.	 It	 was	 no	 secret	 that	 Turkish	 government	 had	 tried	 to	 link	 the	construction	of	Nabucco	classic	to	the	progress	in	Turkey's	EU	membership	bid.237	Such	a	strategy	on	the	part	of	the	Turkish	government	could	potentially	undermine	the	credibility	of	 the	 entire	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 and	 question	 the	 security	 of	 gas	 supply	 across	 the	Turkish	 territory.	 However,	 since	 TANAP	 will	 be	 constructed	 and	 operated	 with	 the	majority	stakes	under	SOCAR's	ownership,	this	will	give	the	EU	a	comparative	advantage	vis-á-vis	Turkey	should	the	latter	decide	to	once	again	resort	to	soft	blackmailing	strategy.	Thus,	if	the	EU	consumers	start	buying	gas	directly	from	Azerbaijan,	instead	of	Turkish	re-exports,	it	will	shelter	them	from	Turkish	gas	cut-offs	for	whatever	reason	it	might	be	for.	
4.2.	Disadvantages	of	TANAP	
Supplier's	 perspective	 -	 The	 commercial	 viability	 of	 gas	 transportation	 via	 pipelines,	
inter	alia,	depends	on	the	technical	capacity	of	the	pipeline	and	the	volumes	transported.	The	bigger	the	volumes,	the	less	will	be	the	fixed	costs	of	transportation	per	unit	of	gas,	for	the	costs	will	be	shared	over	a	larger	volume	of	gas	that	is	being	transported.	In	this	vein,	although	TANAP	will	give	the	Azeri	government	(the	principle	supplier)	more	control	over	the	midstream	transportation	(unlike	Nabucco	classic),	it	nevertheless	had	not	solved	the	problem	of	 lack	 of	 gas	 supplies.	 Shah-Deniz	 consortium	 is	 still	 determined	 to	 export	 no	
                                                            237	 ‘Turkey	 Blackmailing	 EU	 Over	 Gas	 Pipeline,	 German	 Minister	 Says’,	 Deutsche	 Welle,	 2009	<http://www.dw.de/turkey-blackmailing-eu-over-gas-pipeline-german-minister-says/a-3962409>	 [accessed	1	August	2013].	
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more	 than	 10	 bcm	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 markets	 during	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 opening	 of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	10	bcm	alone,	on	the	other	hand,	would	not	make	gas	throughput	via	 TANAP	 economically	 competitive	 in	 the	 downstream	 markets	 due	 to	 higher	transportation	tariffs	per	unit	of	gas	(or	TANAP	could	incur	sunk	costs).	This	problem	was	partially	remedied	by	the	agreement	to	transport	Turkey's	share	of	gas	from	the	Shah-Deniz	II	-	i.e.	6	bcm	-	via	TANAP	to	Eskishehir	and	Istanbul	in	Turkey,	hence	increasing	the	total	throughput	from	10	to	16	bcm	(6	bcm	slated	for	Turkey	and	10	bcm	for	 the	EU).238	 Such	an	arrangement	will	 spread	 the	 cost	of	 transportation	across	 the	16	bcm,	although	only	10	bcm	of	it	will	continue	into	the	European	markets	during	the	initial	phase.	However,	the	gas	sales	deals	with	the	consumers	to	be	supplied	via	TANAP	envisage	larger	spot-pricing	 mechanism	 (80	 to	 100%),239	 which	 is	 more	 volatile	 than	 oil-indexation.	Therefore,	Azerbaijani	suppliers	will	have	to	increase	gas	transit	volumes	through	TANAP	in	 the	 future,	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 transportation	 costs	 component	 of	 the	 gas	 prices	offered	 to	 the	 final	 consumers	 and	 make	 the	 sales	 of	 Azeri	 gas	 in	 the	 EU	 markets	competitive.	
Consumers'	 perspective	 -	 Despite	 its	 enthusiastic	 acclaim	 by	 the	 EU	 (and	 the	 USA),	TANAP	 does	 not	 offer	 the	 kind	 of	 competitive	 pipeline	 access	 as	 the	 now	 deceased	Nabucco	classic.	Unlike	Nabucco,	which	guaranteed	50%	of	the	pipeline	capacity	to	third	party	shippers,	TANAP	does	not	envisage	such	a	liberal	pipeline	and	by	extension,	market	access	mechanism.240	As	Azeri	SOCAR	will	retain	58%	stakes	in	TANAP	in	the	longer	term,	it	 will	 likely	 to	 exercise	 a	 right	 of	 first	 call	 on	 the	 pipeline's	 capacity.	 This	 may,	theoretically,	 result	 in	 SOCAR	 prioritising	 Azeri	 gas,	 while	 impeding	 other	 potential	suppliers'	access	(e.g.	gas	from	Turkmen,	Iraq	and	Iran)	to	TANAP	and	the	markets	that	it	will	 subsequently	 supply.	 The	 absence	 of	 the	 guaranteed	 third	 party	 access	 to	transportation	capacity	across	Turkey,	on	the	other	hand,	will	 likely	 to	create	significant	transit	risks	for	the	prospective	trans-Caspian	gas	flows	from	Turkmenistan	to	the	EU	and	undermine	its	realisation.241		
                                                            238	 Interview	with	 a	 senior	 official	 from	 SOCAR,	 29/06/2015,	 Brussels.	 This	 was	 also	 indicated	 during	 the	TANAP	presentation	during	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	Regional	Group	meeting	as	part	of	 the	EU	projects	of	common	interest	(PCI)	stakeholder	consultation,	February	24,	2015,	Brussels.	239	 Oleg	 Vukmanovic	 and	 Stephen	 Jewkes,	 ‘Italian	 Gas	 Deals	 with	 Azerbaijan	 to	 Break	 Systemic	 Oil-Link’,	
Reuters,	 29	 April	 2014	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/italy-gas-azerbaijan-idUSL6N0N942A20140429>	[accessed	3	May	2014].	240	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	241	The	necessity	of	eliminating	transit	risks	across	Turkey	was	also	highlighted	by	the	EU	report	on	the	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline	project	in	order	to	make	the	latter	commercially	and	politically	feasible.	Caspian	Development	
Corporation	 -	 Final	 Implementation	 Report,	 2010	
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Nonetheless,	 taking	 into	 account	 Azerbaijan's	 long-term	 strategy	 to	 become	 a	 strategic	transit	corridor	for	Central	Asian	gas	exports,	it	can	be	expected	that	SOCAR	will	gradually	encourage	third	party	access	to	the	major	transportation	lines	under	its	control,	especially	once	the	gas	output	in	Azerbaijani	fields	start	to	decline.	However,	given	the	massive	gas	export	 contracts	already	 in	place	between	Turkmenistan	and	China,	 concerns	 rise	about	whether	the	window	of	opportunity	for	tapping	Central	Asian	gas	is	closing	too	fast.	This	is	especially	 a	worrying	 trend	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 global	 demand	 for	 natural	 gas	 is	 shifting	towards	emerging	Asian	economies.	Moreover,	guaranteed	access	to	the	major	transport	conduits	like	TANAP	could	incentivise	the	 resolution	 of	 constitutional	 disputes	 between	 Iraq	 and	 the	 Kurdistan	 Regional	government	over	the	share	of	energy	revenues	and	facilitate	 Iraqi	gas	exports	to	the	EU.	Cognisant	 the	 fact	 that	 additional	 gas	 flows	 through	 TANAP	 can	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	transport	 for	 Azeri	 gas	 too,	 SOCAR	must,	 in	 principle,	 be	 interested	 in	 facilitating	 third	party	 access	 to	 TANAP.	 This	 will	 dependent	 on	 the	 business	model	 of	 the	 operation	 of	TANAP	and	the	profits	 that	third	party	gas	can	generate	 for	the	owners	of	TANAP	in	the	case	 of	 the	 availability	 of	 the	 free	 capacity	 in	 the	 pipeline.242	 However,	 this	 can	 only	 be	realistically	expected	to	materialise	only	in	the	long-term	perspective,	as	gas	production	in	Iraq	 and	 Iran	 for	 that	 matter	 is	 less	 costly,	 thus	 more	 competitive	 vis-à-vis	 current	Azerbaijani	gas.	
5.	TAP	as	the	final	home	stretch	
With	TANAP	replacing	the	Turkish	section	of	the	Nabucco	classic	pipeline,	the	competition	for	 the	 final	 leg	of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	continued	between	Trans-Adriatic	Pipeline	(TAP)	and	Nabucco	West	(NW)	until	the	former	came	on	top	of	the	pipeline	race	on	June	28,	2013,	when	the	Shah-Deniz	consortium	declared	TAP243	as	 its	preferred	route	for	the	delivery	of	Azeri	gas	to	the	EU.244	This	followed	by	Shah-Deniz	consortium	announcing	its	final	investment	decision	(FID)	into	the	field	on	December	17,	2013,	that	is	to	produce	gas	slated	for	the	EU	market.	
                                                                                                                                                                              <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2010_12_report_cdc_final_implementation.pdf>	[accessed	5	February	2015].	242	 Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	 to	 the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	Similar	view	was	also	voiced	by	the	EC/DG	Energy	official	during	the	relevant	interview,	03/May/2013,	Brussels.	243	TAP’s	shareholding	 is	comprised	of	BP	(20%),	SOCAR	(20%),	Statoil	 (20%),	Fluxys	(19%),	Enagas	(16%)	and	Axpo	(5%).	The	pipeline	will	have	10	bcm/a	initial	capacity,	but	can	be	expanded	further	by	additional	10	bcm/a	up	to	total	20	bcm/a.	244	‘Press	Release:	Shah	Deniz	Targets	Italian	and	Southeastern	European	Gas	Markets	through	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline’	(BP,	28	June	2013).	
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With	the	route	length	of	867	km	and	traversing	the	territories	of	Greece,	Albania	and	Italy,	TAP	will	supply	combined	10	bcm	gas	to	Bulgarian,245	Greek	and	Italian	markets	starting	from	 2020.	 In	 contrast,	 Nabucco	West	 would	 follow	 the	 original	 Nabucco	 classic	 route	within	the	EU,	but	only	starting	from	the	EU-Turkey	border	(see,	Fig.	6).	
Fig.	 6:	 Trans-Adriatic	 and	 Nabucco	 West	 pipelines	 |	 Prepared	 by	 the	 author	 using	 publically	 available	information.	
		Although	 a	 late-comer	 to	 the	 pipeline	 race,	 TAP's	 victory	 over	 Nabucco	 West	 was	conditioned	by	several	fundamental	factors:	• Commercial	viability	-	Since	the	entire	SGC	envisioned	investment	worth	over	$45	bln,	gas	prices	in	the	final	supply	markets	was	a	key	economic	indicator	to	ensure	that	 the	 entire	 project	 is	 commercially	 viable	 and	 avoid	 sunk	 costs.	 Higher	 gas	prices	 in	 Greece	 and	 Italy,	 thus,	 ensured	 that	 TAP	 comes	 on	 top	 of	 the	 pipeline	race.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 national	 and	 regional	 markets	 to	 be	 supplied	 by	 Nabucco	West	 would	 incur	 negative	 netback	 for	 the	 Shah-Deniz	 consortium,	 hence,	undermining	 the	 economic	 rationale	 of	 pursuing	 the	 entire	 alternative	 energy	corridor	idea.246	
                                                            245	 Strictly	 speaking,	 gas	 to	Bulgaria	will	 be	 supplied	via	 Interconnect	Greece	Bulgaria	 (IGB)	and	not	Trans-Adriatic	Pipeline	(TAP).	246	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	SOCAR,	29/05/2015,	Brussels.	
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In	 general,	 the	 economics	 of	 pipeline	 transportation	 is	 seriously	 affected	 by	 the	distance	between	the	supply	and	demand	points	and	the	transportation	costs	per	unit	 of	 distance,	which	 includes	both	OPEX	and	CAPEX.	The	 shorter	 the	 route	 to	the	 final	 market,	 the	 lower	 will	 be	 the	 transportation	 costs	 element	 in	 the	 final	price	 offered	 to	 the	 end	 consumers.	 In	 this	 regard,	 due	 to	 459	 km	 shorter	transportation	 route	 compared	 to	 Nabucco	 West,	 TAP	 offered	 cheaper	 transit	tariffs	$3.85	(50	cents	cheaper	than	NW)	per	thousand	cubic	metre/	100	km	of	the	pipeline	length.247	In	real	terms,	this	would	mean	that	every	thousand	cubic	metre	gas	sold	in	Baumgarten	via	Nabucco	West	had	to	be	at	least	$19.96	more	expensive	than	 the	 same	 volume	 sold	 in	 Italy	 via	 TAP.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 alternative	 gas	supplies	 (even	 if	 limited),	 not	 all	 the	 costs	 can	 be	 transferred	 onto	 the	 final	consumers	 and	 will	 have	 to	 be	 compensated	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 producer	netback.	Thus,	in	the	backdrop	of	lower	CAPEX	of	TAP	vis-a-vis	NB	(€4.4	vs.	€6.6	bln)	the	decision	of	the	Shah-Deniz	consortium	was	as	commercial	as	it	gets.	• Strategic	 substance	 -	 Either	 pipeline	 offered	 shareholder	 stakes	 for	 Shah-Deniz	consortium	members,	including	Azeri	SOCAR,	which	was	one	of	the	key	conditions	of	 the	 country	 that	 owns	 the	 gas.248	 Furthermore,	 SOCAR	 acquired	 66%	 of	 the	Greek	 gas	 distribution	 company	 DESFA	 in	 2013,	 which	 will	 see	 Azeri	 national	champion	enter	the	EU	midstream	for	the	first	time.	Although	there	are	no	direct	links	 between	 the	 selection	 of	 TAP	 and	 the	 acquisition	 of	 DESFA,	 the	 move	promises	a	strategic	synergy	for	tapping	into	the	regional	markets	and	will	allow	SOCAR	 to	 continue	 its	 business	 in	 the	 mid-	 and	 downstream	 segments	 of	 gas	supply	chain	when	Azeri	gas	production	starts	declining	in	the	future.	• Demand	 for	 gas	 -	 In	 terms	 of	 supply	 volumes,	 Nabucco	 West	 expected	 to	 sell	around	 4-5	 bcm/a	 along	 the	 route	 to	 Bulgaria,	 Romania	 and	 Hungary.	 The	remaining	5-6	bcm/a	was	expected	to	be	transported	to	Baumgarten	in	Austria.249	In	addition	to	its	primary	markets,	Bulgaria,	Greece	and	Italy,	TAP	offers	prospects	of	 gas	 supply	 to	 the	 Western	 Balkan	 countries	 -	 Albania,	 Montenegro,	 FYROM,	Croatia	 and	 Bosnia–Herzegovina,	which	 currently	 have	 small	 or	 no	 gas	markets.	Individually,	 these	 countries	 may	 present	 small	 individual	 demand,	 but	 in	combination	 these	 markets	 can	 offer	 aggregated	 demand,	 which	 will	 be	 quite	important	for	ensuring	security	of	demand	for	the	Shah-Deniz	producers.			
                                                            247	 Shahin	 Abbasov,	 ‘Azerbaijan:	 When	 It	 Comes	 to	 Pipelines,	 It’s	 Not	 Personal,	 It’s	 Strictly	 Business’,	
EurasiaNet,	19	July	2013	<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67277>	[accessed	10	May	2014].	248	Roberts,	‘The	Southern	Corridor:	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan’s	Gas	Legacy’,	p.	84.	249	Rzayeva	and	Tsakiris,	Strategic	Imperative:	Azerbaijani	Gas	Strategy	and	the	EU’s	Southern	Corridor,	p.	28.	
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That	 said,	however,	 from	the	point	of	 the	European	Union,	 the	contest	was	not	between	Nabucco	West	 or	 TAP,	 for	 either	 pipeline	 would	 bring	 qualitatively	 new	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	market.	Therefore,	for	the	EU	it	was	not	an	"either	-	or",	but	rather	"which	one	comes	first"	contest.250	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 European	 Commissioner	 for	 Energy	 Günther	 Oettinger,	 who	witnessed	 the	decision-making	on	 the	SGC	 through	 to	 the	end,	noted	 that,	 “What	we	 see	
today	 is	 just	 the	 beginning.	 A	 decision	 to	 have	 TAP	 built	 first	 and	 to	 bring	more	 gas	 later	
means	that	the	route	to	Austria	–	currently	Nabucco	West	–	is	still	on	the	table.	The	question	
is	not	either	one	or	the	other,	 in	the	medium	term	both	are	needed.	This	 is	certain:	we	will	
need	more	gas	in	2020,	and	Caspian	gas	is	a	good	response	to	this	need.”251	With	 the	 FID	 in	 Shah-Deniz	 II	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 TAP	 as	 the	 main	 (if	 only	 the	 first)	pipeline	 to	 deliver	 10	 bcm/a	 Azeri	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 markets	 from	 2020,	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor	has	reached	 its	 implementation	phase.	Obviously,	10	bcm/a	does	not	stand	out	vis-à-vis	Russian	supply	volumes	to	the	EU,	which	stood	at	155	bcm	in	2013	and	made	up	30%	of	 the	EU	consumption.	 In	aggregated	 terms,	 it	 constitutes	only	2%	of	 the	 total	EU	demand.	Nonetheless,	this	argument	overlooks	the	regional	dimension	and	contribution	of	the	SGC.	The	first	volumes	from	Azerbaijan	are	not	expected	to	be	dispersed	across	the	entire	EU	market	 and	will	 be	 supplied	 to	 only	 a	 small	 number	of	 national	markets.	 Therefore,	 the	contribution	of	10	bcm	of	Azeri	 gas	 to	 lessening	 the	dependence	on	Russian	 supplies	 in	vulnerable	countries	 is	expected	 to	be	much	higher.	This	can	be	revealed	by	statistically	analysing	the	contribution	of	Shah-Deniz	II	gas	to	the	reduction	of	supply	dependence	on	Russian	 (supply	 source	 concentration)	 in	Bulgaria,	Greece	 and	 Italy	 -	 the	primary	 supply	markets	of	TAP.	This	is	captured	by	the	supply	vulnerability	index	of	Greece,	Bulgaria	and	Italy	with	 or	without	 the	 initial	 SGC	 volumes.	 The	 index	 demonstrates	 the	 geographical	concentration	 of	 domestic	 energy	 consumption	 in	 these	 countries	 and	 is	 calculated	 by	dividing	the	imports	share	of	the	single	biggest	supplier	(in	our	case	Russia)	by	the	overall	imports	and	converting	the	outcome	into	percentage	value252	(see	Fig.	7).	
	
	
                                                            250	Vladimir	Socor,	‘Old	and	New	Options	Considered	in	the	Post-Nabucco	Era’,	Eurasia	Daily	Monitor,	28	June	2013	<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41090&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=f249db3f8e6c17c9b39df2d6f65e8113>	[accessed	30	June	2013].	251	 Günther	 H.	 Oettinger,	 ‘Shah	 Deniz	 Decision:	 More	 Gas	 for	 Europe’,	 Natural	 Gas	 Europe,	 1	 July	 2013	<http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shah-deniz-decision-oettinger>	[accessed	2	July	2013].	252	 Chloé	 Le	 Coq	 and	 Elena	 Paltseva,	Common	 Energy	 Policy	 in	 the	 EU:	 The	Moral	 Hazard	 of	 the	 Security	 of	
External	 Supply	 (Stockholm:	 Swedish	 Institute	 for	 European	 Policy	 Studies	 (SIEPS),	 2008),	 p.	 29	<http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/67-20082.pdf>	[accessed	3	June	2014];	García-Verdugo	and	Muñoz,	‘Energy	Dependence,	Vulnerability	and	the	Geopolitical	Context’,	p.	41.	
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Fig.	7:	Supply	vulnerability	index	
	To	 that	 end,	 2	 different	 scenarios	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 comparative	 analysis:	 (See	
Table	3).	• Scenario	1:	SD	II	volumes	meet	the	equivalent	amount	of	additional	imports	over	2011	levels	(Russian	supplies	at	2011	level/2011	total	imports	+	SD	gas),	• Scenario	2:	SD	II	volumes	replace	the	equivalent	amount	of	Russian	supplies	with	imports	 at	 2011	 levels	 (Russian	 supplies	 at	 2011	 level	 –	 SD	 gas/2011	 total	imports),	The	 table	 indicates	 that,	 the	 gas	 supply	 situation	 varies	 across	 the	 Southern	 and	 South-Eastern	European	markets.	While	Italy	has	a	well-diversified	supply	portfolio,	Bulgaria	is	100%	 reliant	 on	 Russia	 for	 its	 total	 imports	 and	 the	 same	 figure	 for	 Greece	 stands	 at	59.87%.		According	to	existing	gas	sales	agreements,	Italy	will	receive	8	bcm/a,	while	Bulgaria	and	Greece	each	will	receive	1	bcm/a	from	the	second	phase	of	the	development	of	the	Shah-Deniz	 field.	 Although	 modest	 vis-à-vis	 Russian	 exports,	 the	 new	 gas	 supplies	 from	Azerbaijan	can	reduce	Bulgaria’s	dependence	on	Russian	gas	from	100%	by	up	to	35.41%	depending	 on	 2	 different	 scenarios	 demonstrated	 in	 Table	 1.	 In	 scenario	 1	 contracted	Shah-Deniz	volumes	meet	the	equivalent	amount	of	additional	imports	in	2020	over	2011	levels	-	1	bcm/a,	while	reducing	the	share	of	Russian	supplies	 in	Bulgarian	total	 imports	from	 100%	 down	 to	 73.85%.	 While	 scenario	 1	 presumes	 (1	 bcm/a)	 increase	 in	 total	imports,	 scenario	 2	 envisages	 the	 imports	 in	 2020	 to	 stay	 at	 2011	 levels,	 thus,	 leading	Shah-Deniz	 gas	 to	 replace	 1	 bcm	 of	 Russian	 supplies	 per	 annum	 and	 subsequently	decreasing	 the	 dependence	 on	Russia	 from	100%	down	 to	 64.59%.	The	 current	Russia-Bulgaria	gas	sales	&	purchase	contract	envisions	2.9	bcm/a	gas	supplies	to	Bulgaria	until	2022.253	 Considering	 that	 Shah-Deniz	 supplies	 will	 reach	 Bulgaria	 around	 2019-2020,	 it	will	 give	 Bulgarian	 government	 comfortable	 time	 to	 readjust	 its	 next	 gas	 purchase	contract	with	Russia	in	line	with	domestic	demand	and	alternative	supply	options.	
                                                            253	 ‘Russia,	 Bulgaria	 Sign	 Gas	 Supply	 Deal	 for	 Next	 Decade’,	 RIA	 Novosti,	 15	 November	 2012	<http://en.ria.ru/business/20121115/177493177.html>	[accessed	11	May	2014].	
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Table	3	-	South	East	Europe	natural	gas	supply	vulnerability	and	the	SGC	|	The	figures	are	compiled	and	calculated	by	the	author	using	IEA	and	EU	sources.254	
	
Gas	statistics	for	2011	in	mln	m3/a	(IEA)	 	
Reduction	of	supply	
vulnerability	vis-à-vis	Russia	in	
2019/2020	
	
Total	
consumption	
Domestic	
production	
Total	
Imports	
Imports	
from	Russia	
Current		
supply	
vulnerability	
index	
vis-à-vis	Russia	
	
SH	II	
contractual	
supplies	for	
2019-2020	
(mln	m3/a)	
Scenario		
I	
Scenario		
II	
Nabucco	
West	
Romania	 14,394	 10,964	 3,145	 3,045	 96.82%	
	
-	 -	 -	
Hungary	 11,557	 2,766	 8,019	 5,218	 65.07%	
	
-	 -	 -	
Austria	 9,475	 1,776	 14,631	 6,221	 42.52%	
	
-	 -	 -	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	
TAP	
Bulgaria	 3,300	 476	 2,824	 2,824	 100.00%	
	
1,000	 73.85%	 64.59%	
Greece	 4,737	 6	 4,510	 2,700	 59.87%	
	
1,000	 49.00%	 37.69%	
Italy	 77,919	 8,449	 70,369	 19,634	 27.90%	
	
8,000	 25.05%	 16.53%		Similarly,	with	new	volumes	from	SH	II,	Greece	and	Italy	can	reduce	their	dependence	on	Russian	 gas	 by	 up	 to	 22.17%	and	11.37%	 respectively	 depending	 on	 the	 2	 scenarios	 as	demonstrated	in	Table	3.	Thus,	although	the	initial	supplies	through	SGC	will	amount	to	an	insignificant	2%	of	the	overall	EU	demand,	the	contribution	of	these	(10	bcm/a)	volumes	will	be	far	more	significant	at	the	level	of	individual	member	states	that	have	contracted	it.	Reduction	of	dependence	on	Russian	supplies,	on	the	other	hand,	will	reduce	their	relative	vulnerability	against	supply	shocks	from	a	single	dominant	source.	The	bigger	the	current	supply	vulnerability,	the	more	substantial	will	be	the	contribution	from	the	SGC.	Nonetheless,	 the	 question	 still	 remains	 open	 regarding	 the	 access	 of	 other	 Nabucco	hopefuls	 to	 the	 alternative	 energy	 sources.	 As	 Table	 3	 indicates,	 although	 Russia	 sells	more	 gas	 to	 Italy,	 Greece	 and	 Bulgaria	 combined,	 Romania,	 Hungary	 and	 Austria	 are	 at	least	just	as	dependent	on	a	single	source	as	the	South	European	countries	-	the	question	TANAP/TAP	 design	 of	 the	 SGC	 did	 not	 address.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 next	 section	 will	indicate,	the	prospect	of	additional	Caspian	gas	reaching	Central	European	markets	is	not	as	dim	as	it	may	initially	seem	due	to	the	new	market	design	envisaged	by	the	EU	GTM.	
                                                            254	Natural	Gas	Information	2013	(Paris:	IEA,	International	Energy	Agency,	2013);	‘EU	Energy	Trends	to	2030:	Update	2009’	(European	Commission,	DG	Energy,	2010).	
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6.	EU	Natural	Gas	Target	Model	and	Southern	Gas	Corridor	
In	broad	terms,	EU	internal	gas	market	strategy	envisages	two	mutually	inclusive	strands	of	policy	at:	1. "Software	level"	-	establishment	of	the	rules	of	market,	and,	2. "Hardware	 level"	 -	 establishment	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 to	 enable	 the	functioning	of	the	market	rules.	The	first	strand	ushers	in	the	establishment	of	a	new	Gas	Target	Model	(GTM),255	which	is	envisioned	 by	 the	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 and	 currently	 being	 codified	 in	 the	 European	Network	Codes	for	gas.	As	 per	 the	 legal	 prescriptions	 of	 the	 EU	 Third	 Energy	 Package,	 the	 GTM	 envisages	 the	establishment	of	Entry-Exit	(E/E)	zones,	with	individual	virtual	trading	points	(VTP,	also	called	 hubs),	 where	 entry	 capacity	 into	 the	 system	 is	 booked	 separately	 from	 the	 exit	capacity	 from	 the	 system.256	Whether	 created	 (a)	 along	 the	 national	 borders	 of	 a	 single	member	 state,	 (b)	 several	 E/E	 systems	 within	 one	 member	 state	 or	 (c)	 one	 E/E	encompassing	 several	 member	 states,257	 an	 E/E	 system	 eliminates	 the	 notion	 of	contractual	paths	in	natural	gas	transportation	in	a	traditional	point-to-point	sense.	In	this	regard,	 once	 gas	 enters	 an	 E/E	 system	 through	 any	 of	 the	 entry	 points,	 it	 should	 be	deliverable	to	any	exit	point	 from	the	system,258	whether	to	the	end	consumers	or	to	the	adjacent	systems.		Establishment	of	 the	GTM	diminishes	 (if	 not	 eliminates)	 the	dependence	of	 gas	delivery	from	 specialised	 transit	 pipelines	 across	 national	 (E/E)	 systems.	 Such	 a	 scenario	 is	underpinned	 by	 two	 factors:	 (1)	 since	 the	 EU	 energy	 legislation	 eliminated	 differential	treatment	 of	 transit	 gas	 from	 the	 gas	 earmarked	 for	 domestic	 consumption,	 and,	 (2)	 so	long	as	the	price	of	gas	is	higher	in	the	adjacent	E/E	zones	than	the	gas	price	in	the	initial	E/E	 zone	 (both	 registered	 at	 their	 respective	 VTPs)	 plus	 the	 cost	 of	 capacity	 at	 the	interconnection	points	in	between	the	relevant	E/E	zones,	gas	will	always	flow	across	the	borders	supported	by	the	price	signals.	
                                                            255	CEER,	CEER	Vision	for	a	European	Gas	Target	Model	-	Conclusions	Paper	(CEER,	2011).	256	 This	 model	 is	 predicted	 by	 the	 EU	 Regulation	 715/2009	 on	 conditions	 for	 access	 to	 the	 natural	 gas	transmission	networks.	257	It	is	expected	that,	initially	the	E/E	systems	will	correspond	to	the	national	borders	of	individual	member	states,	then	expand	beyond	depending	on	the	market	liquidity.	See	e.g.	Yafimava,	The	EU	Third	Package	for	Gas	
and	the	Gas	Target	Model.	258	 See	 e.g.	 Study	 on	 Entry-Exit	 Regimes	 in	 Gas	 (Prepared	 by	 DNV	 KEMA;	 Commissioned	 by	 the	 EC,	 2013)	<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/studies/doc/gas/201307-entry-exit-regimes-in-gas-partb.pdf>	[accessed	22	November	2014].	
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Obviously,	 such	 a	 market	 design	 (software)	 necessitates	 the	 existence	 of	 necessary	
hardware	 -	 physical	 interconnection	 points	 (IPs)	 between	 the	 E/E	 systems	 in	 order	 to	enable	the	physical	flow	of	gas.	The	EU	policies	in	this	sphere	are	attuned	towards	market	integration:	 a)	 through	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 necessary	 interconnections	 among	 the	member	states,	and	b)	ensuring	 the	 flexibility	of	existing	 interconnection	points	 through	the	 availability	 of	 reverse	 flow	 capacities.	 	 Although	 moderate	 in	 terms	 of	 throughput	capacity,	 but	 much	 denser	 in	 the	 area	 of	 coverage,	 these	 networks	 connecting	 the	 E/E	systems	are	 to	 lift	 the	 isolated	member	states	 from	energy	vulnerability	and	ensure	that	gas	can	be	supplied	to	the	member	states	far	afield	the	initial	EU	entry	points.		In	 order	 to	 foster	 this	 goal,	 envisaged	 by	 the	 EU	 Directive/73/2009	 and	Regulation/715/2009,	national	TSOs	and	ENTSO-G	are	required	 to	prepare	national	and	regional	Ten	Year	Network	Development	Plans	(TYNDP)	every	year	and	every	two	years	respectively.	Among	 these	projects,	 a	 special	 list	 of	projects	 of	 common	 interest	 (PCIs)	 is	prepared	 by	 the	 EC	 every	 two	 years,	 which	 will	 have	 signification	 contribution	 to	 the	Unions	energy	policy	objectives,	namely	the	security	of	energy	supply,	sustainability	and	competition.		In	 October	 2013,	 supported	 by	 the	 TEN-E	 guidelines,259	 the	 European	 Commission	published	the	first	list	of	248	projects	of	common	interest	(PCIs).	While	eligible	for	Union	funding	 under	 the	 Connecting	 Europe	 Facility	 (€5.85	 bln	 between	 2014-20),	 these	projects	 are	 to	 foster	 market	 integration	 and	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 energy	 islands.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 potential	 EU	 funding,	 the	 PCIs	 are	 to	 benefit	 from	one-stop-shop	permit	granting	procedure	and	shorter	periods	of	project	authorisation	(3.5	years	+	9	months).		Furthermore,	underpinned	by	the	new	competences	under	the	Lisbon	treaty,260	the	EU	has	taken	other	 legislative	measures	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 security	 of	 gas	 supply	 to	 the	Union.	The	adopted	EU	Regulation	994/2010	requires	member	states	to	ensure	that	"in	the	event	
of	 a	 disruption	 of	 the	 single	 largest	 gas	 infrastructure,	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 remaining	
infrastructure,	determined	according	to	the	N	–	1	formula	[…]		is	able	[…]		to	satisfy	total	gas	
demand	of	the	calculated	area	during	a	day	of	exceptionally	high	gas	demand	occurring	with	
a	statistical	probability	of	once	in	20	years"	by	December	3,	2014.	This	is	to	be	ensured	in	
                                                            259	 ‘Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 347/2013	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 17	 April	 2013	 on	Guidelines	 for	 Trans-European	 Energy	 Infrastructure	 and	 Repealing	 Decision	 No	 1364/2006/EC	 and	Amending	Regulations	(EC)	No	713/2009,	(EC)	No	714/2009	and	(EC)	No	715/2009’,	2013.	260	 ‘Treaty	 of	 Lisbon:	 Amending	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Treaty	 Establishing	 the	 European	Community’,	Article	176	A.	
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addition	to	enabling	"permanent	bi-directional	capacity	on	all	cross-border	interconnections	
between	Member	States"	by	3	December	2013	at	the	latest.261		With	 the	 timely	establishment	of	 the	necessary	hardware	and	 full	 implementation	of	 the	relevant	software,	gas	sourced	via	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	can	eventually	reach	beyond	the	markets	to	be	initially	supplied	via	TANAP/TAP/IGB	pipelines,	in	particular	in	Central	and	Southeast	Europe.262	Under	the	current	architecture	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	Italy	is	well	 positioned	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 gateway	 into	 the	 Central	 European	 gas	markets.	 In	 line	with	the	EU	rules,	Snam	Rete	Gas,	the	Italian	TSO	and	operator	of	the	PSV	(Italian	virtual	trading	 point,	 i.e.	 hub)	 is	 currently	 in	 the	 process	 of	 implementing	 the	 "Support	 to	 the	
North	 West	 market	 and	 bidirectional	 cross-border	 flows”,	 a	 significant	 infrastructure	development	 project	 included	 into	 its	 TYNDP	 2014-2023.	 The	 project	 envisages	 the	expansion	of	the	Northern	Italian	transmission	capacity,	along	with	the	exports	points	at	the	Swiss	and	Austrian	borders.	With	the	FID	already	agreed	in	two	phases,	Italian	export	capacity	 to	 Switzerland	 at	Passo	Gries	 and	 to	Austria	 (the	 gas	hub	of	 Central	 Europe)	 at	
Tarvisio	will	be	22	mln	m3/d	and	18	mln	m3/d	respectively	by	2018.263	These	translate	into	8	 and	 6.5	 bcm	 annual	 export	 capacity	 to	 Switzerland	 and	Austria	 (and	beyond)	 and	 can	serve	as	vital	interconnection	points	in	case	Central	European	countries	see	sudden	drop	in	Russian	gas	supplies	or	would	like	to	further	reduce	their	dependence	thereof.264	Since	EU	GTM	eliminates	 the	 necessity	 of	 specialised	 transit	 pipelines,	 any	 additional	 Caspian	gas	to	be	supplied	to	the	Italian	E/E	system	through	an	entry	point	in	Southern	Italy	can	be,	 in	principle,	delivered	to	the	exit	point(s)	 in	the	North	via	the	domestic	 transmission	lines	(which	are	 in	 the	process	of	expansion	under	 the	TYNDP).	This,	on	the	other	hand,	will	 allow	 for	 future	 additional	 Caspian	 gas	 to	 be	 re-exported	 from	 Italy	 to	 Central	European	markets	via	the	interconnection	points	at	the	Swiss	and/or	Austrian	borders	on	temporary	 or	 permanent	 bases,	 thus	 improving	 security	 of	 supply	 in	 the	 Central	 and	Eastern	European	countries.		It	is	also	important	to	note	that,	TAP's	regulatory	regime	encourages	the	expansion	of	the	pipeline	and	is	amicable	to	the	potential	third-party	suppliers.	The	pipeline	has	received	a	third-party	access	(TPA)	exemption	from	the	EU	only	for	the	initial	10	bcm	capacity,	while	
                                                            261	 ‘Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 994/2010	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 20	 October	 2010	Concerning	Measures	to	Safeguard	Security	of	Gas	Supply	and	Repealing	Council	Directive	2004/67/EC’,	2010,	Article	6.	262	‘EC,	EU	Commission	Welcomes	Decision	on	Gas	Pipeline:	Door	Opener	for	Direct	Link	to	Caspian	Sea,	Press	Release	 -	 IP/13/623’,	 2013;	 ‘Press	 Release:	 Shah	 Deniz	 Targets	 Italian	 and	 Southeastern	 European	 Gas	Markets	through	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline’.	263	‘Ten-Year	Development	Plan	of	the	Natural	Gas	Transmission	Network	2014-2023’	(Snam	Rete	Gas,	2014),	p.	56.	264	Snam	is	expecting	to	create	similar	export	capacity	to	Slovenia	as	well.	See	‘Ten-Year	Development	Plan	of	the	Natural	Gas	Transmission	Network	2014-2023’,	p.	58.	
 101 
the	 expansion	 capacity	 (additional	 10	 bcm)	 must	 still	 be	 offered	 to	 other	 market	participants	on	an	equal	basis.	Exemption	decision	obliges	TAP	to	perform	market	tests	in	order	 to	 determine	 interest	 for	 the	 expansion	 capacity	 when	 it	 starts	 its	 commercial	operation	 and	 every	 subsequent	 two	 years	 and	 build	 the	 requested	 capacity	 if	 there	 is	sufficient	 market	 demand.265	 This	 requirement	 is	 not	 only	 legally	 binding,	 but	 is	 also	incentivised	by	TAP's	business	model	and	the	tariff	regime.		To	start	with,	TAP's	entire	expansion	capacity	(i.e.	additional	10	bcm/a)	will	incur	only	the	18%	 of	 the	 CAPEX	 of	 the	 initial	 10	 bcm/a	 capacity.266	 Furthermore,	 TAP's	 tariff	methodology	is	approved	as	such	that,	any	additional	capacity	built	on	top	of	the	initial	10	bcm/a	will	 lower	 tariffs,	 both	 for	 the	 initial	 and	 the	 expansion	 capacity	uniformly.	 Thus,	since	 the	 expansion	 capacity	 will	 be	 much	 cheaper	 to	 build,	 it	 will	 also	 lower	 the	
depreciation	per	unit	of	capacity,	resulting	in	lower	uniform	tariffs	(by	up	to	40%)	for,	both	initial	capacity	holders,	as	well	as	new	parties.267	In	this	vein,	the	regulatory	regime	of	TAP	will	only	encourage	the	access	of	new	(non-SH	II)	suppliers	to	the	pipeline,	which	can	then	be	 re-exported	 to	 the	 Central	 and	 Western	 European	 markets	 across	 the	 Italian	 E/E	system.		Secondly,	 additional	 Caspian	 gas	 can	 be	 supplied	 to	 Romania,	 Hungary	 and	 beyond	following	the	establishment	of	the	relevant	E/E	systems	in	Bulgaria	and	Romania	and	the	interconnection	thereof,	without	the	need	of	constructing	of	a	stand-alone	transit	pipeline	(like	Nabucco	West)	across	Bulgaria	and	Romania.	This	is	underpinned	by	the	logic	of	the	E/E	 system,	which	 eliminates	 traditional	 point-to-point	 gas	 transportation	 regime.	Once	E/E	market	 areas	 are	 established	 and	 interconnected,	 independent	 shippers	 (suppliers)	will	 be	 able	 to	 buy	 gas	 in	 Greek/Bulgarian/etc.	 hubs	 (once	 they	 are	 established)	 and	channel	them	to	Romania,	Hungary	and	other	adjacent	markets.	 In	doing	so,	they	will	be	required	 only	 to	 book	 entry	 and	 exit	 capacities	 at	 the	 relevant	 IPs	without	 the	 need	 to	engage	in	a	point-to-point	transportation	contract	with	a	stand-along	transit	pipeline.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that,	 the	EU	GTM	calls	 for	gas	to	be	delivered	from	at	 least	3	different	sources	for	the	establishment	of	liquid	trading	hubs.268	Thus,	the	realisation	of	the	SGC	will	
                                                            265	 ‘Final	 Joint	 Opinion	 of	 the	 Energy	 Regulators	 on	 TAP	 AG’s	 Exemption	 Application’	 (National	 Regulatory	Authorities	of	Italy,	Albania	and	Greece,	2013).	266	 2013	 EC	 (2013),	 ‘Commission	 Decision	 on	 the	 Exemption	 of	 the	 Trans	 Adriatic	 Pipeline	 from	 the	Requirements	on	Third	Party	Access,	Tariff	Regulation	and	Ownership	Unbundling	Laid	down	in	Articles	9,	32,	41(6),	41(8)	and	41(10)	of	Directive	2009/73/EC,	C(2013)	2949’	(European	Commission,	2013),	p.	5.	267	EC	(2013),	 ‘Commission	Decision	on	the	Exemption	of	the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline	from	the	Requirements	on	Third	Party	Access,	Tariff	Regulation	and	Ownership	Unbundling	Laid	down	in	Articles	9,	32,	41(6),	41(8)	and	41(10)	of	Directive	2009/73/EC,	C(2013)	2949’,	p.	31.	268	CEER,	CEER	Vision	for	a	European	Gas	Target	Model	-	Conclusions	Paper.	
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not	 only	 bring	 new	 alternative	 gas	 into	 the	 market,	 but	 will	 also	 facilitate	 the	establishment	of	liquid	trading	hubs	in	South	Eastern	Europe.	
Fig.	8:	TAP	and	the	supply	potential	to	South-East	Europe	|	TAP	webpage,	2015.	
	Last	but	not	least,	 in	addition	to	the	originally	envisaged	markets	in	Central,	Eastern	and	Southern	 EU	 markets,	 the	 selection	 of	 TAP	 presents	 a	 prospective	 security	 of	 supply	benefits	 to	 the	countries	of	 the	Western	Balkans.	Currently,	 Serbia	 relies	on	Russian	gas	for	 88%	 of	 its	 domestic	 demand,	 FYR	Macedonia	 100%,	 Bosnia	 and	Herzegovina	 100%	and	EU	member	state	Croatia	39%,	while	Albania,	Montenegro	and	Kosovo	lack	domestic	gas	 grids	 and	 are	 entirely	 reliant	 on	 fuel	 oil	 and	 dirty	 coal	 for	 their	 primary	 energy	consumption.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 prospective	 cooperation	 between	 TAP	 and	 the	 Ionic-Adriatic	 Pipeline	 (IAP)	 (see	Fig.	 8),	 running	 from	Albania	 to	 Croatia,	will	 allow	 Caspian	and	 potentially	Middle	 Eastern	 gas	 to	 reach	 the	 isolated	 Balkan	markets,	 or	 create	 new	ones.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that,	EU	energy	space	is	a	moving	target.	It	changes	and	evolves	almost	 every	 year	 and	 month	 affected	 by	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 factors	 that	 cannot	 be	envisaged	 in	 advance.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 during	 the	 accomplishement	 of	 this	 thesis	 the	prices	 for	oil	 ranged	 from	90$	 to	140$	and	 then	down	 to	as	 low	as	25$	per	barrel.	This	affected	 the	 economic	 feasibility	 of	 thousands	 of	 energy	 projects	 around	 the	 globe,	including	those	that	have	been	analysed	as	part	of	this	chapter.	The	SGC	is	almost	half	way	through	its	development	with	more	than	half	of	investment	already	in	place.	Nonetheless,	the	price	of	energy	commodities,	 including	coal,	which	directly	competes	against	natural	
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gas	 in	 the	market,	will	affect	 the	 functioning	and	 indeed,	 the	potential	 role	 that	SGC	will	play	for	the	EU	energy	security,	too.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	 South	 Eastern	 Europe	 has	 increased	following	 the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 South	 Stream	 pipeline	 by	 Russian	 President	 Vladimir	Putin	 in	 December	 2014.269	 This	 followed	 by	 Russian	 Gazprom	 together	 with	 its	 EU	partners	 announcing	 a	 new	 pipeline	 in	 November	 2015,	 dubbed	 Nord	 Stream	 2	 from	Russian	Baltic	coast	to	Germany	under	the	bed	of	the	Baltic	Sea.	Similar	to	South	Stream,	the	Nord	Stream	2	is	aimed	at	minimising	Russia’s	dependence	on	Ukrainian	transit	route	and	 double	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 existing	 direct	 link	 between	 Russia	 and	 its	 biggest	 EU	national	gas	market	–	Germany.270		If	 this	 project	 materialises,	 it	 will	 only	 increase	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 SGC.	 With	 Nord	Stream	2	in	place	and	the	Ukraine	transit	route	scrapped,	the	countries	in	South-Eastern	Europe	will	have	to	receive	their	Russian	natural	gas	supplies	through	the	entry	point	in	Germany.	This	will	increase	both	the	distance	that	Russian	gas	will	have	to	travel	to	reach	th	SEE	countries,	as	well	as	the	cost	of	transportation,	hence	increasing	the	prices	offered	to	the	EU	consumers	in	this	region.	Accordingly,	this	can	make	natural	gas	supplied	via	the	SGC	 more	 competitive	 vis-à-vis	 Russian	 supplies,	 while	 economically	 justifying	 its	expansion	in	the	long	term	as	illustrated	above.		
7.	Trans-Caspian	realities	
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 potential	 gas	 supplies	 from	 the	 Caspian	 is	 not	confined	 to	Azerbaijani	 reserves	 only	 and	might	potentially	 include	 the	 available	 export	capacity	from	Central	Asia	once	the	necessary	infrastructure	across	the	Caspian	Sea	is	 in	place.		Construction	 of	 the	 Trans-Caspian	 Pipeline	 (TCP),	 which	 is	 to	 carry	 Turkmen	 (and	potentially	Kazakh	and	Uzbek	gas)	to	Europe	has	long	been	touted	about	without	tangible	headway	on	the	ground	(see	Fig.2).	Four	factors	have	so	far	undermined	the	realisation	of	the	project:	
                                                            269	Jack	Farchy,	‘Putin	Loses	Face	with	Cancellation	of	“pharaonic”	South	Stream’,	Financial	Times,	2	December	2014	<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea6e69a8-7a43-11e4-8958-00144feabdc0.html#axzz445OjoXJR>	[accessed	27	March	2016].	270	‘Germany	Seeks	to	Overcome	Opposition	to	Nord	Stream	2’,	EurActiv.com,	1	February	2016	<http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/germany-seeks-to-overcome-opposition-to-nord-stream-2/>	[accessed	27	March	2016].	
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I. Unresolved	status	of	the	delimitation	of	the	Caspian	sea	borders	among	the	littoral	states.	In	this	regard,	the	maritime	borders	between	Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan	are	 yet	 to	 be	 determined,	 which	 hinders	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 sides.	Bilateral	 relations	 are	 further	 strained	 due	 to	 the	 disputed	 gas	 field	 -	Kapaz/Sardar,	which	situates	on	the	claimed	by	both	sides	sea	border.		II. Regional	 geopolitics	 presents	 the	 major	 stumbling	 block	 on	 the	 way	 of	 the	realisation	of	the	energy	projects	in	the	Caspian	basin.	Russia	and	Iran,	holders	of	the	 first	 and	 second	biggest	 gas	 reserves	 in	 the	world,	 have	 long	opposed	 to	 the	direct	 access	 of	 the	Western	 energy	 companies	 to	 the	 Caspian	 oil	&	 gas.271	 Since	Azerbaijan	plays	a	pivot	role272	in	the	access	to	the	Central	Asian	resources,	Russia	and	Iran	have	long	mounted	pressure	on	Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan	in	order	to	prevent	 the	 construction	 of	 any	 trans-Caspian	 link	 prior	 to	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	status	of	the	Caspian	Sea	and	due	to	the	environmental	concerns.273	I. Political-economic	 rationale	 has	 also	 played	 a	 part	 in	 putting	 the	 project	 on	 the	back	burner.	Both	Turkmenistan	and	Azerbaijan	are	gas	producer	countries	and	as	such	 will	 be	 competing	 for	 a	 share	 in	 the	 same	 gas	 markets	 should	 the	 TCP	 is	realised.	Furthermore,	Turkmenistan	is	not	interested	in	any	gas	exports	to	the	EU	in	 volumes	 less	 than	 30	 bcm	 -	 3	 times	 the	 volume	 that	 Azerbaijan	 is	 slated	 to	export	from	the	second	stage	of	Shah-Deniz.	In	addition	to	the	massive	investment	required	for	the	physical	upgrades	to	the	entire	technical	architecture	of	the	SGC,	such	export	volumes	will	create	additional	competition	for	the	limited	share	in	the	EU	 markets.	 Moreover,	 since	 Turkmenistan	 prefers	 selling	 its	 gas	 only	 at	 the	border	without	getting	 involved	into	the	 infrastructure	development	process	and	pipeline	 politics,274	 this	would	mean	 that	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 costs	 of	 SGC	pipelines	(including	the	TCP)	will	have	 to	be	borne	by	Azerbaijan	and	other	SHD	stakeholders.	This	would	not	be	cost-effective	in	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds,	let	alone	 the	 current	 geopolitical	 predicament	 that	 the	 regional	 actors	 find	themselves.	I	will	analyse	these	issue	from	the	regulatory	point	of	view	in	Chapter	VI	of	this	thesis.	I. Asian	competition	currently	presents	additional	challenge	for	the	European	energy	players	 in	 Central	 Asia.	 Unlike	 the	 EU,	 Chinese	 delegations	 to	 Turkmenistan	
                                                            271	Shaffer,	Energy	Politics,	p.	84.	272	 For	 a	 strategic	 analysis,	 see,	 e.g.	 Zbigniew	 Brzezinski,	The	 Grand	 Chessboard:	 American	 Primacy	 And	 Its	
Geostrategic	Imperatives	(New	York,	NY:	Basic	Books,	1998).	273	Rovshan	 Ibrahimov,	Nabucco	Project:	How	Far	 Is	 It	 From	Realisation?	 (Baku:	Center	 for	Strategic	Studies	(SAM),	2010),	pp.	68–69.	274	Barysch,	‘Should	the	Nabucco	Pipeline	Project	Be	Shelved?’,	p.	12.	
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usually	arrive	both	with	an	offer	and	an	authority	to	execute	it	on	the	spot.275	This	has	 allowed	 Chinese	 CNPC	 to	 conclude	 a	 35	 year-long	 "turnkey	 arrangement",	under	 which	 the	 CNPC	 builds	 the	 necessary	 facilities,	 starts	 the	 production	 in	onshore	 Turkmen	 fields,	 transports	 gas	 to	 China	 and	 then	 turns	 the	 operations	over	to	Turkmengaz.276	 In	overall,	this	contract	envisages	60bcm/a	gas	exports	to	China	in	the	next	three	and	a	half	decades,	which	is	likely	to	suck	up	much	of	the	Turkmen	production,	thus,	leaving	little	export	capacity	for	the	EU	market.	In	order	to	overcome	these	challenges,	the	EU	is	currently	pursuing	a	block	gas	purchasing	
strategy	 -	 Caspian	 Development	 Corporation	 -	 from	 Turkmenistan,	 which	 will	 allow	European	companies	to	buy	Turkmen	gas	in	a	single	aggregated	contract.277	The	CDC	is	to	incorporate	 major	 EU	 energy	 companies	 who	 are	 interested	 in	 gas	 purchases	 from	Turkmenistan,	while	not	 being	 able	 to	 offer	 sizeable	 gas	demand	 individually.	 This	 is	 to	meet	 three	 core	 conditions	 presented	 by	 the	 Turkmen	 government	 for	 its	 gas	 exports,	namely,	 1)	 sale	 of	 gas	 at	 the	 Turkmen	 border,	 2)	 conclusion	 of	 gas	 sales	 &	 purchase	agreement	with	a	single	big,	as	opposed	to	multiple	small	entities,	and	3)	ensuring	 long-term	 political	 framework	 under	 which	 short-term	 commercial	 adjustments	 can	 be	operated.278	 If	 realised,	 underpinned	 by	 the	 Council	 mandate,	 the	 CDC	 is	 to	 push	 the	European	Commission	beyond	 its	 competences	under	 the	EU	Treaty.	This	will	 allow	 the	legal	and	political	aspects	of	the	trans-Caspian	energy	corridor	to	be	negotiated	between	the	EU	and	the	regional	governments,	while	leaving	the	commercial	details	as	regards	the	gas	 prices	 and	 volumes	 "to	 Caspian	 and	European	 companies	 to	 settle.”279	 Obviously,	 this	will	not	turn	the	EU	into	a	downstream	gas	purchaser,	the	role	which	will	still	have	to	be	carried	out	by	private	and	state	energy	entities.	Nonetheless,	the	direct	involvement	of	the	EU,	 as	 a	 political	 actor,	 into	 the	 negotiations	will	 bring	 the	 kind	 of	one-person-in-charge	certainty	 that	 so	 far	 has	 been	 offered	 only	 by	 the	 Russian	 and	 the	 Chinese	 energy	champions.		With	this	 in	mind,	however,	 the	block	gas	purchasing	mechanism	creates	additional	new	challenges.	 Firstly,	 aggregated	 demand	mechanism	may	 represent	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 EU's	own	competition	rules.	As	gas	will	be	purchased	in	a	single	contract	under	unified	terms,	the	 costs	 	 of	 gas	 supply	 will	 then	 be	 transferred	 onto	 the	 final	 consumers	 in	 the	 EU	
                                                            275	Richard	G.	Lugar,	Energy	and	Security	from	the	Caspian	to	Europe	(Committee	on	Foreign	Relations	United	States	Senate,	12	December	2012),	p.	26.	276	Lugar,	Energy	and	Security	from	the	Caspian	to	Europe,	p.	23.	277	Nies,	Oil	and	Gas	Delivery	to	Europe:	An	Overview	of	Existing	and	Planned	Infrastructures,	p.	82.	278	Michael	Denison,	‘The	EU	and	Central	Asia:	Commercialising	the	Energy	Relationship’	(EUCAM,	2009),	p.	10.	279	 David	 Buchan,	 Expanding	 the	 European	 Dimension	 in	 Energy	 Policy:	 The	 Commission’s	 Latest	 Initiatives	(Oxford:	Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies,	2011),	p.	43.	
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markets,	thus	eliminating	the	incentive	for	the	suppliers	to	engage	into	competition	in	the	mid-	and	downstream	markets.	Therefore,	the	EU	views	the	CDC	as	an	ad	hoc	mechanism	in	order	to	overcome	the	relevant	market	difficulties	in	the	Caspian	basin	and	expects	it	to	be	dismantled	once	the	relations	start	to	mature.280	Secondly,	 since	 gas	would	 be	 purchased	 in	 a	monopsony	 fashion,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 suppress	competition	 in	 the	 upstream	 market	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 other	 suppliers,	 namely	Azerbaijan.	 Energy	 security	 for	 producers	 requires	 the	 availability	 of	 multiplicity	 of	demand.	Single	aggregated	demand,	on	the	other	hand,	will	change	the	balance	of	market	power	 in	 favour	of	 the	single	buyer	(made	of	European	companies),	who	can	dictate	 the	commercial	 terms	 of	 engagement,	 inter	 alia,	 gas	 prices	 and	 volumes.	 Thus,	 it	 can	reasonably	be	expected	that	Azerbaijan	will	drag	its	feet,	if	not	refuse	outright	to	provide	transit	guarantees	to	the	Turkmen	gas	purchased	via	CDC	mechanism,	as	long	as	its	own	gas	keeps	on	flowing.	Nevertheless,	the	prospects	of	channelling	the	Central	Asian	gas	to	the	European	markets	may	 not	 be	 so	 dim	 in	 a	 long-term	 perspective.	 As	 it	 was	 indicated	 above,	 Azerbaijan	aspires	to	position	itself	as	a	strategic	energy	corridor	on	the	way	to	the	EU.	This	allows	one	 to	 reasonably	 predict	 that,	 once	 production	 fields	 in	 Azerbaijan	 start	 steaming	 off,	official	Baku	will	likely	switch	its	role	from	an	upstream	actor	into	a	midstream	one.	Then	Azerbaijan	might	turn	its	lukewarm	attitude	towards	the	TCP	into	the	project	promoter.	By	buying	Turkmen	gas	at	 the	border	 in	 cheap	and	 then	reselling	 it	onto	 the	EU	and	world	markets	at	dearer,	Azerbaijan	might	effectively	become	a	gas	bridge	between	Europe	and	Asia.	
8.	Conclusion	and	implications	
With	the	necessary	agreements	in	place,	the	SGC	has	entered	the	final	home	stretch	with	modest	 but	 qualitatively	 new	 gas	 volumes	 slated	 for	 the	 EU	 markets	 in	 2020	 via	 the	combination	of	SCPx,	TANAP,	TAP	and	IGB	pipelines.	Under	the	current	supply	&	demand	projections,	 these	 volumes	 will	 help	 to	 ease	 the	 dependence	 of	 Southern	 and	 South-Eastern	 European	 countries	 on	 Russian	 gas	 to	 a	 varying	 degree,	 while	 increasing	 their	security	 of	 supply.	 The	 EU	 gas	market	 design,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 also	 transformed	since	 the	 first	 inception	of	 the	 idea	of	 the	SGC.	Underpinned	with	dense	 interconnection	capacity	among	the	member	states	(E/E	zones),	the	new	EU	gas	market	design	is	likely	to	eliminate	 the	need	 to	construct	additional	massive	capacity	stand-alone	pipelines	within	
                                                            280	Devlin	and	Heer,	‘The	Southern	Corridor	–	Strategic	Aspects	for	the	EU’,	p.	6.	
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the	 EU	 borders.	 This	 accompanied	 a	 subtle	 shift	 in	 the	 EU	 priority	 of	 ensuring	diversification	 of	 energy	 supplies.	 Previously,	 if	 the	 major	 emphasis	 was	 on	 the	construction	of	the	massive	capacity	pipelines	deep	into	the	EU	markets,	now	the	priorities	have	seemingly	shifted	in	favour	of	any	pipeline	 that	brings	qualitatively	new	volumes	to	the	 EU	 borders.	 The	 EU	 gas	 market	 design	 will	 then	 ensure	 that	 gas	 flows	 where	 it	 is	needed	most	under	commercial	conditions.	Even	the	failure	of	physically	linking	other	alternative	suppliers	(Turkmenistan,	Iran	and	Iraq)	 at	 this	 stage	 can	 be	 addressed	 in	 the	 mid-to-long	 term	 (in	 physical	 infrastructure	
terms),	 as	 more	 and	 more	 gas	 will	 be	 needed	 in	 the	 European	 markets	 if	 only	 to	compensate	the	dwindling	indigenous	production.	With	this	 in	mind,	the	development	of	the	SGC	is	to	be	viewed	in	two	stages:	1)	initiation	of	the	Fourth	Corridor	by	a	dominant	single	 supplier	 -	 Azerbaijan	 -	 which	 spearheads	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 necessary	infrastructure	 and	 provides	 the	 initial	 volumes,	 and	 2)	 expansion	 of	 the	 corridor	 and	change	 of	 roles,	 where	 previously	 an	 upstream	 company	 SOCAR	 becomes	 a	 mid-and	down-stream	player	 and	 facilitates	 the	access	of	other	 suppliers	 to	 the	pipeline	 systems	under	 its	 control.	 The	 latter	 scenario	 is	 in	 line	with	Azerbaijani	 general	 national	 energy	strategy	 to	 become	 an	 important	 energy	 corridor	 for	 the	 Central	 Asian	 energy	 supplies	towards	the	European	markets.	For	the	European	consumers,	these	two	stages	would	ideally	parallel,	as	opposed	to	follow	each	other.	However,	 in	 the	markets	where	new	suppliers	have	 to	compete	 for	a	 limited	share	under	uncertain	market	and	regional	geopolitical	conditions	and	where	consumers	cannot	 provide	 demand	 guarantees,	 merchants-led	 infrastructural	 projects	 are	 likely	 to	fail	 to	 live	up	to	expectations.	Gas	has	 to	be	sold	and	export	routes	determined	before	 it	can	 actually	 be	 produced,	 which	 therefore	 conditions	 the	 well-head-to-burner	coordination	of	the	owner	of	the	gas.	Thus,	the	shift	 in	the	balance	of	power	in	SGC	from	the	EU	merchants	to	the	Caspian	producers	was	a	logical	conclusion	in	the	development	of	the	decade-old	mega	project.	From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 current	 development	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 can	 be	argued	to	be	of	contribution	to	ensuring	the	EU	energy	security.	However,	the	definition	of	the	 EU	 energy	 security	 that	 this	 PhD	 upholds,	 is	 the	 diversity	 of	 energy	 supplies	 under	
competitive	market	 conditions,	 which	 ensures	 its	 affordability	 and	 reliability.	 In	 this	 vein,	even	 though	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 necessary	 infrastructure	 along	 the	 SGC	 is	 to	contribute	 to	 the	diversity	 of	pre-existing	energy	 supply	 to	 the	EU,	 further	measures	are	still	required	from	an	EU	perspective	to	ensure	that	these	new	energy	supplies	are	carried	out	under	depoliticised,	competitive	market	governance,	which	will	 in	practice	eliminate	
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the	transit	risks	along	the	SGC.	The	concerns	are	related	to	the	future	gas	supply	to	the	EU,	not	only	from	Azerbaijan,	but	also	from	Iraq,	Iran	and	Turkmenistan.	The	development	of	the	 necessary	 infrastructure	must	 not	 automatically	 be	 equated	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	the	equitable	market	conditions	for	access	to	them,	which	generates	further	transit	risks	along	the	supply	corridor.	Since	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	will	constitute	the	main	non-EU	transit	segment	of	the	 Southern	Gas	Corridor,	 elimination	of	 transit	 risks	 across	 these	 countries	 requires	 a	new	 dimension	 of	 policy	 actions	 that	 necessitates	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 EU-sourced	market	 rules	 along	 this	 energy	 supply	 corridor.	 The	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC,	which	 concentrates	 on	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 natural	 gas	 markets	 of	 the	 SGC	countries,	 hence,	 will	 analyse	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 successful	 in	eliminating	these	transit	risks	to	energy	supply	along	this	alternative	energy	corridor	by	exporting	its	domestic	gas	market	rules	into	the	SGC	countries.	With	this	in	mind,	the	next	chapter	 presents	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 and	investigates	the	major	avenues	and	the	EU	policy	initiatives	that	are	designed	to	underpin	the	expansion	of	the	EU	acquis	to	the	SGC	countries.		
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CHAPTER	III:	THE	REGULATORY	DIMENSION	OF	THE	SGC	
1.	Introduction	
The	main	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	present	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	regulatory	dimension	of	 the	SGC	 from	the	viewpoint	of	 the	EU	external	energy	governance	and	 investigate	 the	major	avenues	and	the	EU	policy	initiatives	that	are	designed	to	that	end.	In	doing	so,	this	chapter	 argues	 that,	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 aimed	 at	 depoliticising	 the	access	 to	 new	 gas	 sources	 and	 transit	 capacity	 along	 this	 very	 new	 energy	 corridor	 by	promoting	 regulated	 market	 governance	 therein.	 It	 includes	 measures	 geared	 towards	reducing	non-market	risks	by	shifting	energy	supply	from	bilateral	political	domain	onto	the	 multilateral	 market	 domain.	 If	 successful,	 this	 dimension	 will	 create	 institutional	milieu	through	which	the	EU	can	pursue	its	energy	interests	in	a	preferred	-	depoliticised	setting.	Having	set	this	broader	goal,	this	chapter	analyses	the	specific	elements	in	the	EU	energy	legislation	 that	 is	 most	 relevant	 to	 eliminating	 transit	 and	 supply	 risks	 along	 the	 SGC	(which	manifests	 itself	 in	the	form	of	restriction	of	access	to	transit	capacity	for	political	and/or	 commercial	 reasons,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 in	 price	 formulation	and/or	excessive	charges	for	transiting	gas).	These	elements	will	serve	as	benchmarks	for	comparatively	describing	the	success	or	the	failure	of	the	EU's	external	energy	governance	in	 Chapters	 IV,	 V	 and	 VI	 	 (in	 other	 words,	 whether	 the	 SGC	 countries	 and	 natural	 gas	infrastructure	projects	are	in	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis	or	not).	To	 that	 end,	 I	 identify	 the	 rules	 on	 unbundling,	 third	 party	 access	 (TPA)	 and	 equal	treatment	 of	 transiting	 gas	 as	 the	major	 elements	 of	 the	 EU's	 energy	 acquis,	 which	 the	Union	is	keen	on	extending	along	the	SGC.	Pertinent	to	pipeline	transportation	of	natural	gas,	these	specific	rules	target	the	elimination	of	economic	and	political	hurdles	to	access	to	 pipeline	 capacity.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 unbundling	 rules	 aim	 at	 eliminating	 (or	substantially	 reducing)	 the	 power	 of	 the	 pipeline	 owners	 in	 influencing	 the	 day-to-day	management	 of	 the	 pipelines;	 hence	 removing	 potential	 conflicts	 of	 (economic	 and	political)	interest	in	providing	equal	access	to	the	transmission/transit	networks.	The	TPA	rules,	 secondly,	 aim	 at	 ensuring	 equitable	 and	 guaranteed	 (regulated)	 access	 of	 all	interested	 parties	 to	 the	 pipeline	 capacity.	 Finally,	 "transiting”	 gas	 rules	 eliminate	differential	 treatment	 of	 transit	 gas	 from	 the	 gas	 volumes	 destined	 for	 the	 domestic	
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markets;	 thus,	 transforming	 neighbouring	 national	 markets	 into	 a	 single	 cross-national	market.	 Together,	 underpinned	 by	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 natural	 gas	 supply,	 these	 rules	establish	 market	 conditions	 where	 gas	 volumes	 follow	 the	 price	 signals	 without	 being	subject	 to	 non-market	 (political	 or	 economic)	 hurdles.	 In	 analysing	 these	 rules,	 I	 will	indicate	that,	if	successful,	they	will	transform	the	SGC	from	a	separate	corridor	leading	to	the	single	EU	natural	gas	market	to	an	integral	part	thereof.	Finally,	 this	 chapter	 presents	 and	 comprehensively	 analyses	 the	 major	 EU	 rule	 export	avenues.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 devote	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	(ENP)	and	its	Eastern	dimension	-	Eastern	Partnership	(EaP)	as	the	youngest	and	the	most	comprehensive	EU	external	energy	governance	tool,	which	has	yet	to	be	fully	investigated	by	 the	 existing	 academic	 literature.	 The	 purpose	 in	 doing	 so	 is	 to	 assess	 the	 internal	dynamics	of	 the	EaP,	which	will	 have	 considerable	 influence	on	 the	outcome	of	 the	 rule	extension	along	the	SGC.	
2.	SGC	and	ensuring	market	governance	for	gas	in	"transit"		
In	 terms	 of	 spatial	 characteristics,	 non-market	 risks	 to	 natural	 gas	 supply	 in	 import-dependent	countries	can	have	both	internal	and	external	elements.	While	the	former	can	be	 addressed	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 through	 relevant	 domestic	 regulatory	 measures,	 the	ability	to	tackle	the	latter	usually	remains	beyond	the	legal	sovereignty	of	the	consuming	countries	concerned.	These	external	risks	usually	appear	during	the	transit	of	gas	from	the	production	sites	to	consumer	markets	via	the	transit	countries	and	can	be	of	commercial	and	 political	 nature.281	 In	 the	 past,	 these	 transit	 risks	 happened	 between	 Russia	 and	Belarus	in	2004,	as	well	as	between	Russia	and	Ukraine	in	2006	and	2009282	The	 emergence	 of	 these	 transit	 risks	 related	 to	 Russian	 gas	 supplies	 in	 post-Cold	 War	period	were	one	of	the	primary	drivers	behind	the	urgency	of	establishing	alternative	gas	supply	 corridors,	 especially	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor.	 Although	 the	 role	 of	 the	 SGC	 in	addressing	the	supply	risks	incurred	by	high	dependence	on	Russian	gas	has	been	widely	investigated	 by	 the	 academic	 literature,	 the	 transit	 challenges	 related	 to	 the	 SGC	 itself	were	less	so.	Transit	and	market	access	risks	specific	to	gas	industry	can	be	in	the	form	of	
                                                            281	 Stern,	 Security	 of	 European	Natural	 Gas	 Supplies:	 The	 Impact	 of	 Import	 Dependence	 and	 Liberalisation;	A	
Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	Policy	COM(2015)	80,	p.	6.	282	Checchi,	Behrens	and	Egenhofer,	Long-Term	Energy	Security	Risks	for	Europe:	A	Sector-Specific	Approach,	p.	19;	Katja	Yafimava,	The	Transit	Dimension	of	EU	Energy	Security:	Russian	Gas	Transit	Across	Ukraine,	Belarus,	
and	Moldova	(Oxford:	Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies,	2011).	
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restriction	of	access	to	transit	capacity	for	political	and/or	commercial	reasons,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	transparency	in	price	formulation	and	excessive	charges	for	transiting	gas.283		In	the	context	of	the	SGC,	these	risks	have	emerged	almost	along	the	entire	 length	of	the	alternative	 energy	 corridor	 at	 different	 times.	 The	 policy	 of	 Turkey	 was	 especially	notorious	in	relation	to	its	demands	for	high	transit	and	domestic	supply	benefits.	 In	the	past,	this	has	hindered	the	negotiations	on	Nabucco	classic	pipeline,	as	well	as	the	transit	of	Azeri	gas	to	the	Western	markets.284	The	state	policies	of	another	important	actor	along	the	SGC,	Azerbaijan,	have	also	presented	the	SGC	with	transit	risks	in	the	past	2	decades.	In	general,	Azerbaijan	can	potentially	serve	not	only	as	the	gas	source	for	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	but	also	as	a	 transit	 corridor	on	 the	way	 to	Central	Asian	reserves	via	a	 trans-Caspian	 linkage,	 which	 was	 specifically	 highlighted	 by	 the	 Prague	 Declaration	 on	 the	SGC.285	 For	 this	 very	 reason	 ensuring	 favourable	 regulatory	 regime	 for	 natural	 gas	 in	transit	across	Azerbaijan	is	 just	as	 important	as	sourcing	gas	from	the	country	 itself.	For	example,	 the	 blueprint	 for	 the	 Caspian	 Development	 Corporation	 (CDC),	 a	 mechanism	proposed	 by	 the	 EC	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 joint	 -	 aggregated	 gas	 purchases	 from	Turkmenistan	(in	order	make	the	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline	(TCP)	project	commercially	and	politically	 viable),	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 addressing	 transit	 issues	 in	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	
Azerbaijan	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	 risks	 to	 be	 resolved	 before	 moving	 Central	 Asian	 gas	 to	Europe.286	 As	 such,	 transit	 risks	 to	 the	 transportation	 of	 Central	 Asian	 gas	 across	Azerbaijan	stem	from	the	fact	that	Azerbaijan	itself	is	a	producer	country.	Thus,	the	urge	of	the	 country	 to	 prioritise	 its	 own	 gas	 exports	 can	 create	 a	 barrier	 for	 Turkmenistan	 in	finding	access	 to	 transit	 capacity	 in	 the	SGC.	 In	 fact,	 the	 realisation	of	 the	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline	was	put	 off	 in	 1999	due	 to	Azerbaijan’s	 own	gas	 discoveries	 and	 its	 aggressive	play	 for	 the	Turkish	market.287	Furthermore,	even	 if	Azerbaijan	provides	 transit	 capacity	
                                                            283	 In	 addition,	 transit	 risks	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 market	 failure	 to	 incentivise	 adequate	 investment	 in	transportation/transit	 capacity,	 as	 well	 as	 security	 threats	 to	 transportation	 pipelines	 caused	 by	 wars,	terrorism,	as	well	 as	environmental	 calamities.	Although	 these	 risks	are	very	 relevant	 to	 the	SGC,	 too,	 I	will	concentrate	on	those	risks,	that	are	the	result	of	sovereign	intervention	in	natural	gas	in	transit.	Nonetheless,	it	is	also	pertinent	to	point	out	that,	EU's	regulatory	approach	to	eliminating	non-market	risks	is	also	relevant	to	dealing	with	market	risks,	i.e.	market	failure	to	adequate	investment.	Therefore,	although	I	will	not	investigate	the	role	of	 the	EU's	external	energy	governance	 in	addressing	 the	causes	of	market	 risks	 to	external	energy	supply,	the	practical	impact	of	the	former	on	the	latter	would	be	similar	as	on	the	non-market	risks.	284	 ‘Turkey	 Halts	 Azeri	 Natural	 Gas	 Exports	 to	 Greece’,	 Hürriyet	 Daily	 News,	 26	 April	 2011	<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-halts-azeri-natural-gas-exports-to-greece-2011-04-26>	[accessed	8	July	2013].		For	a	background	for	Turkey's	past	attempts	to	constrain	the	right	of	transit	and	charge	excessive	transit	fees,	see,	e.g.	Samuel	Lussac,	‘A	Deal	at	Last:	A	Bright	Future	for	Azerbaijani	Gas	in	Europe?’,	Central	Asia-Caucasus	
Institute	Analyst,	28	April	2010	<http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5317>	[accessed	4	December	2015].	285	 ‘‘Prague	Summit	Declarations:	Southern	Corridor’;	 ‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’,	p.	5.	286	Caspian	Development	Corporation	-	Final	Implementation	Report,	p.	8.	287	Alec	Rasizade,	‘The	Mythology	of	the	Munificent	Caspian	Bonanza	and	Its	Concomitant	Pipeline	Geopolitics’,	
Comparative	Studies	of	South	Asia,	Africa	and	the	Middle	East,	20.1	(2000),	138–47	(p.	142).	
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for	 Turkmen	 gas,	 the	 application	 of	 excessive	 transit	 tariffs	 can	 negatively	 affect	 the	commercial	viability	of	Turkmen	gas	in	the	EU	markets.	Therefore,	if	the	TCP	is	to	become	a	reality,	then	transit	capacity	and	tariffs	must	be	resolved	beforehand	all	across	the	SGC,	especially	 in	Azerbaijan,	Georgia	 and	Turkey.	While	 I	 analyse	 these	 risks	 in	detail	 in	 the	relevant	 empirical	 chapters,	 the	 current	 chapter	presents	 the	EU	policy	 tools,	which	 are	relevant	for	addressing	them	via	institutional	mechanisms.				In	general,	 the	underlying	 factor	 that	paves	way	 to	 the	emergence	of	 transit	 risks,	 is	 the	ability	 of	 the	 transit	 states	 to	 exercise	 sovereignty	 over	 their	 respective	 territories.	Underpinned	 by	 the	 territorial	 sovereignty,	 transit	 states	 gain	 the	 ability	 to	 control,	interfere	with	or	even	facilitate	the	flow	of	energy	resources	that	crosses	their	territories	in	 order	 to	 maximise	 national	 economic	 and/or	 (geo)political	 ends.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	territorial	sovereignty	is	widely	viewed	as	a	resource	to	be	exploited,	just	the	same	way	as	energy	suppliers	view	energy	as	a	resource.288	To	what	end	the	 transit	 role	 is	utilised	by	the	 transit	 countries	 varies	 from	 country	 to	 country,	 depending	 on	 their	 strategic	 and	economic	goals.	From	the	perspective	of	 the	consumer	countries,	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 minimise	 or	 even	 entirely	 eliminate	 these	 transit	 risks	 in	 order	 to	ensure	 free-flow	 of	 energy	 resources.	 The	 EC	 explicitly	 acknowledged	 the	 necessity	 of	addressing	 transit	 risks	 "if	 it	 is	 to	 have	 stable	 access	 to	 energy	 products	 it	 needs.	 This	 is	
especially	 true	 for	 gas,	 where	 the	 main	 risk	 lies	 in	 transit	 conditions	 and	 continuing	
diversification	of	transport	routes,	not	in	the	status	of	world	reserves."289	Against	 this	 backdrop,	 EU's	 approach	 to	 addressing	 (market	 and)	 non-market	 risks	 to	energy	 supply	 has	 revolved	 around	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 functioning	 EU-wide	 single	natural	 gas	 market	 by	 liberalisation	 and	 integration	 of	 the	 national	 markets	 of	 the	individual	member	states.	The	EC	Green	Paper	argued	that,	"[s]ustainable,	competitive	and	
secure	energy	will	not	be	achieved	without	open	and	competitive	energy	markets,	based	on	
competition	between	companies	looking	to	become	European-wide	competitors	rather	than	
dominant	national	players,	[which	eventually]	would	bring	down	prices".290	Truly	integrated	liberalised	natural	gas	market(s)	and	ensuing	competitiveness	is	seen	as	the	best	defence	against	potential	market	and	non-market	risks	 to	energy	supply.	Hence,	underpinned	by	the	 logic	 of	 calculus,	 the	 EU's	 approach	 to	 addressing	 non-market	 risks	 is	 based	 on	 the	deployment	 of	 formal	 institutions	 (market	 rules	 and	 organisational	 bodies),	 which	
                                                            288	 Yafimava,	The	 Transit	 Dimension	 of	 EU	 Energy	 Security:	 Russian	 Gas	 Transit	 Across	 Ukraine,	 Belarus,	 and	
Moldova,	p.	27.	289	 ‘Green	Paper	 -	Towards	a	European	Strategy	 for	 the	Security	of	Energy	Supply,	COM	(2000)	0769’,	p.	25	(emphasis	added);	A	Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	
Policy	COM(2015)	80,	pp.	4,	6.	290	Green	Paper:	A	European	Strategy	for	Sustainable,	Competitive	and	Secure	Energy,	COM	(2006)	105,	p.	5.	
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envisages	actions	at	two	levels:	1)	Europeanisation	of	the	EU	domestic	gas	markets	under	
regulated-market	 principles,	 and	 2)	 Export	 of	 the	 EU	 gas	 market	 model	 onto	 the	 main	transit	 corridors	 and	 take	 advantage	 of	 its	 problem-solving	 properties	 beyond	 its	sovereign	territory.	
2.1.	Europeanising	the	EU's	domestic	gas	market(s):	liberalisation	and	
regulation	
Traditionally,	 gas	 markets	 in	 Europe	 were	 segmented	 into	 national	 markets,	 where	individual	country's	supplies	were	provided	by	a	dominant	national	incumbent	company.	The	 latter	 used	 to	 control	 supply	 (production	 and/or	 import	 from	 abroad)	 and	transmission	 to	 the	 end	 consumers	 and	 ensured	 sufficient	 supply	 capacity	 for	 up	 to	 20	years	 ahead.291	 These	 national	 champions	 commanded	 enough	 bargaining	 power	 and	financial	capacity	vis-à-vis	external	suppliers	and	viewed	themselves	as	the	"guardians"	of	their	 national	 markets.292	 Although	 in	 itself,	 these	 conditions	 ensured	 adequate	infrastructure	 (capacity)	 for	 meeting	 rising	 demand,	 inefficiencies	 and	 market	concentration	 associated	 with	 them	 diminished	 competitiveness	 and	 resulted	 in	 higher	natural	 gas	 prices	 compared	 to	 liberalised	 markets	 (e.g.	 UK	 and	 US).	 This	 is	 rather	because,	 the	mid-stream	 industry	 (incumbents)	were	 entrusted	with	 exclusive	 rights	 to	supply	national	end-consumers,	while	downstream	(end	consumer)	competition	was	only	possible	 if	 the	latter	decided	to	switch	to	other	relevant	fuel	types.293	Furthermore,	these	national	markets	were	characterised	by	 limited	physical	external	sources	of	supply.	This	was	 the	 result	of	 the	control	of	 transportation	networks	by	dominant	external	 suppliers	(and	 domestic	 incumbents)	 and	 long-term	 contracts	 that	 they	 had	 tied	 the	 national	incumbents	 with,	 thereby	 obstructing	 competitive	 market	 forces.294	 In	 addition	 to	economic	consequences,	 it	also	carried	strategic	 implications	vis-à-vis	external	 suppliers	for	the	supply	of	energy	was	carried	out	by	the	states	through	external	inter-governmental	engagements.	Although	 natural	 gas	 market	 liberalisation	 in	 the	 EU	 was	 initiated	 in	 1998	 with	 the	adoption	 of	 the	 first	 EU	 gas	 Directive	 (98/30/EC),	 2007	 gas	 sector	 enquiry	 by	 the	 DG	
                                                            291	Stern,	Security	of	European	Natural	Gas	Supplies:	The	 Impact	of	 Import	Dependence	and	Liberalisation,	pp.	22–23.	292	 Finon	 and	 Locatelli,	 ‘Russian	 and	 European	 Gas	 Interdependence:	 Could	 Contractual	 Trade	 Channel	Geopolitics?’,	p.	427.	293	Correljé,	Groenleer	 and	Veldman,	Understanding	 Institutional	Change:	The	Development	of	 Institutions	 for	
the	Regulation	of	Natural	Gas	Transportation	Systems	in	the	US	and	the	EU,	p.	8;	Cameron,	Competition	in	Energy	
Markets:	Law	and	Regulation	in	the	European	Union,	p.	7.	294	 Youngs,	 Europe’s	 External	 Energy	 Policy:	 Between	 Geopolitics	 and	 the	 Market;	 Correljé,	 Groenleer	 and	Veldman,	Understanding	Institutional	Change:	The	Development	of	Institutions	for	the	Regulation	of	Natural	Gas	
Transportation	Systems	in	the	US	and	the	EU,	pp.	7–9.	
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Competition	of	the	EC	found	that,	competition	in	the	gas	market	were	limited	largely	due	to,	 inter	 alia,	 market	 concentration,	 vertical	 foreclosure	 stemming	 from	 inadequate	unbundling	 of	 network	 and	 supply,	 lack	 of	 cross-border	market	 integration	 and	 overall	transparency.295	Although,	 there	were	many	 factors,	which	obstructed	competition	 in	 the	wholesale	and	retail	markets,	here	I	am	more	concerned	with	the	risks	related	to	access	to	transportation	pipelines	and	cross-border	"transit"	of	gas	across	 the	EU;	 in	other	words,	"transit"	risks,	as	they	are	more	pertinent	to	natural	gas	transportation	via	the	SGC.	The	 Commission	 inquiry	 found	 that,	 new	 entrants	 to	 the	 European	 gas	 markets	 often	struggled	with	access	to	the	transmission	networks,	as	the	transmission	system	operators	in	the	EU	were	still	controlled	by	the	supply	companies	through	vertical	integration.	This	resulted	in	the	discriminatory	access	regime	to	the	main	pipelines	and	constituted	a	major	obstacle	for	the	competitiveness,	as	well	as	the	security	of	natural	gas	supply.296	It	created	a	barrier	not	only	with	regard	to	the	access	to	national	markets	of	the	individual	member	states	but	also	with	regard	to	securing	of	third	party	access	in	key	transit	routes/pipelines	across	 the	 EU.297	 In	 its	 ensuing	 legislative	 proposal	 the	 EC	 further	 argued	 that,	 “[t]he	
emergence	 of	 vertically	 integrated	 natural	 monopolies	 (up-	 and/or	 downstream)	
exacerbates	barriers	to	market	entry,	 thus	being	an	 important	obstacle	to	competition	and	
efficiency	gains.	These	vertically	integrated	companies	have	an	incentive	to	hinder	the	entry	
and	 expansion	 of	 rivals	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 their	market	 power	 and	 thus	 achieve	 higher	
profits”.298	Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 competitiveness	 and	 security	 of	 gas	 supply,	 it	 was	 ultimately	essential	 to	 ensure	 equal	 access	 of	 different	 suppliers	 to	 the	 emerging	 EU	 single	 gas	market.299	 This	was	 especially	 a	 stark	 issues	 in	 Central	 and	East	 European	 countries,	 as	high	 concentration	 of	 gas	 supplies	 in	 these	 region	 entailed	 security	 of	 supply	 risks,	 but	also	 enabled	monopolistic	 single	 supplier,	 i.e.	 Russian	 Gazprom,	 to	 set	 the	 price	 for	 the	imported	gas.300	
                                                            295	 DG	 Competition	 Report	 on	 Energy	 Sector	 Inquiry	 SEC(2006)	 1724	 (Brussels:	 European	 Parliament/DG	Competition,	10	January	2007),	p.	4.	296	DG	Competition	Report	on	Energy	Sector	Inquiry	SEC(2006)	1724,	p.	7.	297	DG	Competition	Report	on	Energy	Sector	Inquiry	SEC(2006)	1724,	p.	8.	298	 Commission	 SWD	 Accompanying	 the	 Legislative	 Package	 on	 the	 Internal	 Market	 for	 Electricity	 and	 Gas:	
Impact	Assessment,	SEC(2007)	1179	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	2007),	p.	14.	299	It	is	also	important	to	clarify	that,	here	the	“free-markets”	model	does	not	necessarily	denote	“neo-classical	
liberal”	market	in	which	private	actors	operate	free	of	governmental	intervention.	Quite	the	opposite,	the	EU’s	
“free	market”	model	 is	 a	 heavily	 regulated	 space,	within	which	 certain	 segments	 (such	 as	 supply	 activities)	encourage	competitive/profit-seeking	behaviour,	while	others	(such	as	transmission	services	and	access	to	it)	are	subject	to	public	regulation.	300	 Svante	 E.	 Cornell,	 ‘Trans-Caspian	 Pipelines	 and	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security’,	 in	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security:	
Gazprom’s	Dominance	and	Caspian	Supply	Alternatives,	ed.	by	Svante	E.	Cornell	and	Niklas	Nilsson	(Stockholm-Nacka:	Woodrow	Wilson	Centre	Press,	2008),	pp.	141–55.	
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As	a	remedy,	the	EU	adopted	the	Third	Energy	Package	(TEP)	in	2009,301	in	order	to	better	address	 risks	 and	 to	 secure	 a	 competitive	 gas	 supply	 in	 the	 EU.	 Although,	 the	 package	includes	 a	 variety	 of	 new	measures	with	 regard	 to	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	market(s),	 the	 following	 three	 elements	 in	 the	 legislative	 package	 were	 specifically	relevant	to	reducing	"transit"	risks:	(1) Unbundling	 -	 provisions	 are	 envisaged	 to	 de-couple	 the	 control	 over	 the	supply/production,	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 segments	 of	 natural	 gas	provision	within	the	EU.	This	essentially	means	that,	the	companies	who	produce	and/or	supply	gas	(e.g.	Gazprom,	BP,	Eni,	Statoil,	GdF,	SOCAR,	BOTAS,	etc.)	cannot	at	 the	same	time	own	and/or	wield	control	over	 the	 transmission	 lines.302	This	 is	conditioned	 by	 the	 fact	 that,	 transmission	 pipelines	 have	 a	 natural	 monopoly	character,	 for	 if	 an	existing	 supplier	 controls	 the	access	 to	 the	pipeline,	 it	 can	be	prohibitively	costly	for	new	entrants	to	build	a	new	pipeline	(or	use	other	routes)	in	order	to	reach	the	same	final	customers.303	Therefore,	 in	order	to	ensure	equal	and	 fair	 access	 to	 the	 consumers,	 guarantee	 necessary	 investment	 into	 the	transmission	 lines	 and	 foster	 competition	 by	 the	 new	market	 entrants	 all	 across	the	EU,	it	was	decided	that	suppliers	cannot	be	entrusted	with	control,	one	way	or	another,	 over	 the	 transmission	 pipelines	 (or	 their	 operators).	 This	 is	 rather	because	 there	 is	 an	 intrinsic	 conflict	 of	 interests	between	providing	equal	 access	for	other	suppliers	 to	 the	pipelines	owned	by,	e.g.	 the	company	A	and	the	 latter’s	own	 supply	 portfolio.304	 Thus,	 the	 EU	 opted	 for	 ownership	 unbundling	 (OU),	
Independent	 System	Operator	 (ISO)	 and	 Independent	Transmission	Operator	 (ITO)	models	 for	unbundling	supply	 from	transmission,	each	of	which	ensures	different,	but	still	acceptable	for	the	EU,	levels	of	separation.305	(2) Regulated	(mandatory)	third	party	access	(TPA)	 -	provisions	of	the	TEP	are	aimed	at	 ensuring	 that,	 regardless	 of	 who	 owns/controls/manages	 the	 transmission	pipelines,	access	to	them	are	provided	on	an	equitable	basis.	Regulated	TPA	sets	a	
                                                            301	In	essence,	the	Third	Energy	Package	consists	of:	Directive	(2009/72/EC)	concerning	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	 in	 electricity,	 Directive	 (2009/73/EC)	 concerning	 common	 rules	 for	 the	 internal	market	 in	natural	gas,	Regulation	(EC)	No.	713/2009	establishing	an	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators,	Regulation	(EC)	No.	714/2009	on	conditions	of	access	to	the	network	for	cross-border	exchanges	in	electricity,	Regulation	(EC)	No.	715/2009	on	conditions	for	access	to	the	natural	gas	transmission	networks.	302	‘Directive	2009/73/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Natural	Gas	and	Repealing	Directive	2003/55/EC’,	2009,	Article	9.	303	See	e.g.	Cameron,	Competition	in	Energy	Markets:	Law	and	Regulation	in	the	European	Union.	304	 Commission	 SWD	 Accompanying	 the	 Legislative	 Package	 on	 the	 Internal	 Market	 for	 Electricity	 and	 Gas:	
Impact	Assessment,	SEC(2007)	1179,	pp.	32–45.	305	Interpretative	Note	on	Directive	2009/72/EC	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Electricity	
and	Directive	2009/73/EC	Concerning	Common	Rules	 for	 the	 Internal	Market	 in	Natural	Gas	-	The	Unbundling	
Regime,	SWD	(European	Commission,	2010).	
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principle,	 where	 access	 to	 the	 pipelines	 are	 carried	 out	 based	 on	 pre-published	tariffs,	as	opposed	to	negotiated	tariffs	between	the	pipeline	operator	and	supplier	(now	called	shipper).306	The	allocation	of	 the	capacity,	on	the	other	hand,	 is	 to	be	ensured	though	auction	mechanism	by	default,307	which	enables	all	 the	 interested	shippers	of	gas	to	bid	for	the	scarce	capacity.	Such	a	system	allows	the	capacity	to	be	allocated	to	those	suppliers/shippers,	who	value	it	most,	for	the	level	of	scarcity	in	capacity	will	determine	the	final	pipeline	access	tariffs	underpinned	by	classical	supply	 and	 demand	 dynamics.	 Additionally,	 since	 auctions	 take	 place	 in	 a	transparent	 manner,	 the	 risk	 of	 pipeline	 operator/owner/manager	 creating	obstacles	to	the	new	market	entrants	(for	commercial	and/or	political	reasons)	is	eliminated	altogether.		(3) Equal	treatment	of	gas	in	"transit"308	-	last	but	not	least,	ensures	that	cross-border	("transit")	 gas	 is	 not	 treated	 differently	 (unfairly)	 compared	 to	 gas	 destined	 for	domestic	consumers.	By	prescribing	equal	treatment	of	all	shippers	in	the	access	to	the	 transmission	 pipelines,309	 TEP	 benchmarks	 the	 tariffs	 for	 transit	 gas	 to	 the	tariffs	 for	 domestic	 transportation	 of	 natural	 gas.310	 Therefore,	 to	 put	 it	 simply,	member	states	of	the	EU	can	no	longer	charge	extra	fees	to	gas	volumes	crossing	their	territory	to	be	delivered	to	customers	in	the	neighbouring	countries,	while	at	the	 same	 time	 cross-subsidising	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 domestic	 customers.311	 This	eventually	 allows	 gas	 to	 move	 freely	 within	 the	 integrated	 EU	 market	 without	being	subject	to	national	barriers.	
                                                            306	‘Directive	2009/73/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Natural	Gas	and	Repealing	Directive	2003/55/EC’,	Articles	32-35;	‘Regulation	(EC)	No	715/2009	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	on	Conditions	for	Access	to	the	Natural	Gas	Transmission	Networks	and	Repealing	Regulation	(EC)	No	1775/2005’,	2009,	Article	13.	307	 ‘Framework	Guidelines	on	Capacity	Allocation	Mechanisms	 for	 the	European	Gas	Transmission	Network’	(Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER),	2011);	‘Commission	Regulation	(EU)	No	984/2013	of	 14	 October	 2013	 Establishing	 a	 Network	 Code	 on	 Capacity	 Allocation	 Mechanisms	 in	 Gas	 Transmission	Systems	 and	 Supplementing	Regulation	 (EC)	No	 715/2009	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council’,	2013.	308	 In	 fact,	 the	 notion	 of	 "transit"	 was	 already	 abolished	 by	 the	 Second	 Energy	 Package	 in	 2003.	 See	 e.g.	Yafimava,	The	EU	Third	Package	for	Gas	and	the	Gas	Target	Model,	p.	3;	Andrey	Konoplyanik,	‘Third	EU	Energy	Package:	Regulatory	Changes	for	Internal	EU	Energy	Markets	in	Gas	and	Possible	Consequences	for	Suppliers	(Incl.	Non-EU	Suppliers)	and	Consumers’,	Oil,	Gas	&	Energy	Law	Journal	(OGEL),	9.3	(2011),	p.	20.	309	‘Directive	2009/73/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Natural	Gas	and	Repealing	Directive	2003/55/EC’,	Articles	32-35;	‘Regulation	(EC)	No	715/2009	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	on	Conditions	for	Access	to	the	Natural	Gas	Transmission	Networks	and	Repealing	Regulation	(EC)	No	1775/2005’,	Article	13.	310	 Gokce	 Mete,	 ‘Analysis	 of	 the	 Term	 ’transit’	 in	 Cross-Border	 Energy	 Transport:	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 of	Regulatory	 Frameworks	 in	 the	Eurasian	Context’,	Oil,	 Gas	&	Energy	 Law	 Journal	 (OGEL),	 12.2	 (2014),	 p.	 26;	
Transit	 Contracts	 in	EU	Member	 States:	 Final	Results	 of	ACER	 Inquiry	 (Agency	 for	 the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER),	2013),	pp.	15–25.	311	 Interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	See	also,	Transit	Contracts	in	EU	Member	States:	Final	Results	of	ACER	Inquiry,	pp.	15–25.	
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In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 prescribes	 regulatory	 measures	 designed	 to	eliminate	non-market	risks	to	gas	in	transit	and	ensure	equitable	and	transparent	access	to	the	main	gas	highways,	hence	fostering	competitiveness	in	the	markets.	Physical	market	integration	(facilitated	by	TEN-E	guidelines),312	additionally,	will	enable	the	new	sources	of	gas	 to	 reach	 the	 consumers	 far	 from	 the	 entry	 point	 at	 the	 EU	 border	 and	 drive	competition.313	 For	 example,	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Bacton-Zeebrugge	 interconnector	between	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Belgium	 forced	Norwegian,	 Russian,	 UK	 gas	 and	 LNG	into	competition	in	a	liberalised	market	context.314		To	sum	up,	all	these	energy	market	blueprints	are	ultimately	designed	to	ensure,	inter	alia,	the	 sourcing	 of	 natural	 gas	 from	 multiple	 origins,	 without	 being	 subject	 to	 sovereign	intervention,	 including	 during	 transit	 across	 different	 (member)	 states.	 Although	 the	establishment	of	the	SGC	is	expected	to	contribute	to	the	better	functioning	and	resilience	of	 the	 liberalised	EU	gas	market(s),	 the	EU's	regulatory	design	 in	 itself	does	not	address	the	 transit	 risks	beyond	 the	EU	borders.	 Indeed,	both	of	 the	oft-cited	supply	disruptions	from	 Russia	 occurred	 outside	 the	 EU's	 external	 borders	 in	 Ukraine	 in	 2006	 and	 2009.	Similarly,	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 envisages	 bringing	 gas	 volumes	 from	 different	sources	far	from	the	EU	borders,	i.e.	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	East	and	traverse	across	multiple	 transit	 jurisdictions,	 while	 potentially	 being	 subject	 to	 political	 and/or	commercial	 transit	risks.	Therefore,	addressing	these	risks	along	the	supply	corridor	are	just	as	 important	as	regulating	EU	markets.	 In	physical	 terms,	 the	SGC	 is	not	confined	to	separate	pipelines,	but	also	encompasses	the	transit	capacity	of	the	national	transmission	systems	of	the	transit	countries.315	Therefore,	the	policy	actions	undertaken	must	be	able	to	address	these	risks	at	the	system	level	and	not	only	with	regard	to	individual	pipelines	along	the	SGC.	
2.2.	External	spillover	of	energy	Europeanisation	
In	 the	 Second	 Strategic	 Energy	 Review,	 the	 European	 Commission	 argued	 that,	 “Europe	
should	 develop	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 'energy	 interdependence'	 provisions	 in	 broad-based	
agreements	 with	 producer	 countries	 outside	 Europe.	 […]	 Transit	 arrangements	 must	 be	
agreed	 to	 guarantee	 normal	 flows	 even	 in	 periods	 of	 political	 tension	 […	 and]	 should	 be	
                                                            312	 ‘Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 347/2013	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 17	 April	 2013	 on	Guidelines	 for	 Trans-European	 Energy	 Infrastructure	 and	 Repealing	 Decision	 No	 1364/2006/EC	 and	Amending	Regulations	(EC)	No	713/2009,	(EC)	No	714/2009	and	(EC)	No	715/2009’.	313	 ‘Energy	 Infrastructure	 Priorities	 for	 2020	 and	 Beyond	 -	 A	 Blueprint	 for	 an	 Integrated	 European	 Energy	Network,	COM(2010)	677’.	314	Nies,	Oil	and	Gas	Delivery	to	Europe:	An	Overview	of	Existing	and	Planned	Infrastructures,	p.	53.	315	For	example,	2011	intergovernmental	agreement	between	Azerbaijan	and	Turkey	envisaged	the	transit	of	Azeri	gas	to	Europe	via	a	new	standalone	pipeline	(TANAP)	or	Turkish	national	transmission	system.	
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based	on	the	EU's	energy	acquis	where	appropriate	and	the	principles	of	Energy	Charter	
Treaty.	 The	 provisions	 should	 contribute	 to	 a	 long	 term	 political	 framework,	 reducing	
political	 risks	 and	 encouraging	 commitments	 by	 private	 companies	 on	 supply	 and	
transit".316	 In	 that	 regard,	 the	 EC	 indicated	 that	 legally	 binding	 provisions	 on	 energy	interdependence	 should	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	 new	 agreements	 that	 will	 succeed	 the	Partnership	and	Cooperation	Agreements	currently	in	place	with	third	countries.317	In	 this	 context,	 the	 Prague	 Summit	 declared	 the	 SGC	 as	 a	 synergy	 of	 different	 policy	instruments,	 inter	 alia,	 EU-Azerbaijan,	 EU-Georgia	 Partnership	 and	 Cooperation	Agreements,	 Association	 Agreement	 with	 Turkey,	 European	 Neighbourhood	Policy/Eastern	Partnership,	EU-Azerbaijan	memorandum	of	understanding	on	energy	and	other	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 arrangements	 initiated	 and/or	 signed	 by	 the	 EU	 and	relevant	 third	 countries.318	 Such	 a	 broader	 conceptual	 approach	 to	 the	 SGC	 reveals	 two	important	elements	in	the	EU	strategy	to	addressing	external	challenges	to	its	gas	supply	security:	1)	external	energy	governance	 is	 the	preferred	(and	possibly	the	only	available)	tool	 in	 the	 EU's	 strategic	 energy	 toolbox,	 and	 2)	 external	 energy	 governance	 is	 so	important	 to	 the	 well-functioning	 and	 the	 freedom	 of	 transit	 through	 the	 SGC	 that	constitutes	its	integral	dimension.319	Although	 the	 EU	 dresses	 up	 its	 energy	 rule	 export	 policy	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 raise	 the	standards	of	international	partners,320	its	rational	implications	on	redistributing	the	power	relations	between	the	EU	consumer	and	non-EU	supplier/transit	country	lie	much	deeper.	In	this	vein,	being	more	than	a	mere	international	agreement,	the	interdependence	that	the	EU	 is	 envisioning	with	 third	 countries,	 including	with	 those	 along	 the	 SGC	 is	not	 that	 of	international	co-operation	between	the	two	independent	actors,	but	an	external	dimension	
of	the	EU	internal	energy	market	governance.	As	highlighted	in	Chapter	I,	the	mechanisms	for	the	export	of	the	EU's	energy	acquis	are	institutionalised	hierarchic	and	network	modes	of	external	governance,	where	the	EU	rules	are	directly	applied	to	third	countries	based	on	membership	 conditionality	 (e.g.	Turkey)	or	 the	 adoption	of	 the	EU	 rules	occurs	 through	"voluntary"	negotiations	and	commitments	(e.g.	EaP	countries	-	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan).	In	 both	 cases,	 nevertheless,	 existing	EU	 institutions	 (norms)	 serve	 as	 a	 template	 for	 the	organisation	 of	 the	 energy	 markets	 in	 third	 countries,	 while	 addressing	 the	 external	
                                                            316	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’,	p.	8	(emphasis	added).	317	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review:	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan,	COM(2008)	781’,	p.	8;	
Council	Conclusions	on	‘Second	Strategic	Energy	Review	-	An	EU	Energy	Security	and	Solidarity	Action	Plan’,	p.	3.	318	‘Prague	Summit	Declarations:	Southern	Corridor’,	p.	2.	319	Energy	2020:	A	Strategy	for	Competitive,	Sustainable	and	Secure	Energy,	COM(2010)	639,	pp.	18–19.	320	‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’,	p.	9.	
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energy	supply	risks	in	line	with	the	EU	preferences.	In	practical	terms,	the	export	of	the	EU	
acquis	 is	 operationalised	 via	 bilateral,	 multilateral,	 as	 well	 as	 project	 specific	 avenues.	 I	explore	each	of	these	avenues	and	corresponding	instruments	below.	
2.2.1.	Bilateral	institutionalisation	
Export	of	the	EU	acquis	through	bilateral	channels	is	prevalent	in	all	the	EU-third	country	relations,	 although	 the	Union	 favours	 synergies	with	multilateral	 frameworks,	 especially	with	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	(EnCT).321	The	most	specific	institutional	avenues	with	regard	to	the	SGC	countries	are	the	accession	process	for	Turkey	and	the	ENP/EaP.	In	the	framework	of	the	ENP/EaP	among	the	SGC	countries,	the	EU	is	leading	negotiations	on	the	Association	Agreement	(AA)	with	Azerbaijan	and	has	already	concluded	one	with	Georgia.		To	start	with,	Turkey's	institutional	relations	with	the	EU	are	rather	asymmetric	due	to	its	EU	candidate	status.	The	country	became	a	candidate	country	in	1999	and	started	its	EU	accession	 negotiations	 in	 December	 2014,	 after	 it	 managed	 to	 sufficiently	 meet	 the	minimum	political	conditionality	(dubbed	Copenhagen	Criteria),	which	was	set	at	the	1993	Copenhagen	meeting	of	European	Council.322	As	part	of	the	EU	accession	process	Turkey	has	to	transpose	all	of	the	35	chapters	of	the	EU	acquis	communautaire	into	its	domestic	legislation	and	harmonise	its	rules	and	policies	with	 that	 of	 the	EU,	where	 the	 community	 policy-making	 exists.	 Turkey's	 relations	with	the	EU,	thus,	follows	a	hierarchical	mode	of	the	latter's	external	governance,	for	the	entry	requirements	are	set	by	the	EU	and	any	country	willing	to	join	the	club	has	to	fully	comply	with	 them	 without	 having	 the	 flexibility	 to	 bring	 its	 own	 agenda	 or	 interests	 to	 the	negotiations	table.	This,	as	a	result,	entails	the	wholesale	export	of	the	EU	rules	to	Turkey,	while	the	latter	having	say	only	in	the	timing	as	opposed	to	the	depth	of	implementation	of	the	EU	rules.323	In	this	case,	the	rule	expansion	takes	place	in	a	vertical	-	top-down	manner,	which	gives	the	EU	the	leverage	to	ensure	the	success	of	its	external	governance.	For	these	reasons,	 as	 an	 EU	 candidate	 country	 Turkey	 is	 more	 asymmetrically	 exposed	 to	 the	influence	of	the	EU	rules	than	the	partner	countries	under	the	Eastern	Partnership	(which	I	will	analyse	in	the	following	section).	Since	the	ultimate	reward,	membership	in	the	EU,	depends	on	the	full	compliance	with	the	EU	rules,	the	monitoring	of	which	takes	place	at	
                                                            321	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’	(European	Commission,	2008),	p.	5;	‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’,	p.	7.	322	Frank	Schimmelfennig,	Stefan	Engert	and	Heiko	Knobel,	 ‘The	Impact	of	EU	Political	Conditionality’,	 in	The	
Europeanization	of	Central	 and	Eastern	Europe,	 ed.	by	Frank	Schimmelfennig	and	Ulrich	Sedelmeier,	Cornell	Studies	in	Political	Economy	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2005),	pp.	29–50	(p.	41).	323	Interview	with	an	EU	official	at	EC/	DG	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	
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the	 judicial	 level.	 Therefore,	 the	 enlargement	 process	 constitutes	 the	 most	 powerful	
external	tool	 for	addressing	external	risks	(to	energy	supply)	through	their	absorption	in	the	expanded	EU	regulatory	sphere.		For	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Georgia,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 export	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 is	 in	 a	
negotiated	mode,	 as	 they	 do	 not	 have	 EU	 candidate	 status	 and	 the	 former	 has	 not	 even	indicated	its	willingness	for	the	EU	membership	in	the	foreseeable	future.324	Nonetheless,	regardless	 of	 the	membership	 prospects,	 the	Association	Agreements	 attempt	 to	 ensure	the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 legislation	 in	 the	 partner	 countries,	 without	 providing	membership	 reward	 in	 return.	 Essentially,	 this	 is	 a	 process	 of	 external	 Europeanisation	under	the	membership	line.325		From	the	perspective	of	the	SGC	and	the	elimination	of	the	transit	risks	therein,	EaP	and	the	AAs	creates	a	legal	framework	for	the	application	of	the	Third	Energy	Package	in	the	non-member	 and	 non-candidate	 transit	 states	 of	 the	 SGC.	 This	 includes	 the	 above-mentioned	 regulatory	 benchmarks	 –	 unbundling,	 TPA	 and	 natural	 gas	 transit	 rules.	 It	provides	 a	 new	 institutionalised	 avenue	 where	 rule	 transfer	 can	 be	 enshrined	 in	formalised,	 structured	 and	 if	 successfully	 signed,	 legally	 binding	 agreements,	 i.e.	Association	 Agreements.326	 If	 fully	 implemented,	 unbundling,	 TPA	 and	 transit	 rules	 will	eliminate	or	minimise	non-market	transit	risks	to	energy	sourcing	from	the	Caspian	Basin	via	 the	 SGC,	 while	 effectively	 diminishing	 the	 transit	 governments'	 (i.e.	 Azerbaijan	 and	Georgia)	ability	to	tailor	energy	exports	to	their	strategic	and	commercial	interests.	Such	a	grand	 scheme	will	 ultimately	 affix	 the	 future	 single	EU	natural	 gas	market	with	 those	of	neighbouring	countries	up	to	the	source	of	energy	supply,	while	 leaving	 little,	 if	any	role	for	political	(or	quasi-state)	intervention	in	to	the	energy	haulage.327		Furthermore,	since	the	EU	legislation	prescribes	liberalised	market	governance	in	energy	supply,	the	AA	agreements	will	pave	the	way	for	the	commitment	by	the	Eastern	Partners	to	allow	market	pricing	prevail	for	both	domestic	and	transit	gas,	thus	leading	gas	volumes	to	follow	the	market	signals	along	the	value	chain.	Hence,	the	ENP/EaP	envisions	not	only	the	extension	of	intra-European	cooperation,	efficiency	and	environmentalism	beyond	the	borders,	 but	 also	 the	 elimination	 of	 external	 disturbances	 through	 absorption	 of	 the	players	 along	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 into	 a	 common	 institutionalised	 structure	through	 which	 the	 EU	 can	 pursue	 its	 energy	 interests	 in	 a	 preferred	 setting	 -	 binding	everyone	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 its	 own	 creation.	 In	 fact,	 according	 to	 some	 experts,	 energy	
                                                            324	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	325	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	326	Interview	with	a	senior	Georgian	diplomat	from	the	Georgian	Mission	to	the	EU,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	327	For	a	broad	conceptual	argument,	see	e.g.	Lavenex,	‘EU	External	Governance	in	“Wider	Europe”’,	p.	693.	
 121 
motivations	were	central	in	the	design	and	promotion	of	the	ENP/EaP	by	the	EU.328	Due	to	the	centrality	of	 the	EaP	to	 the	empirical	analysis	 in	 this	 thesis,	 I	will	 further	 investigate	the	 rule	 selection,	 institutional	 organisation	 and	 the	 compliance	mechanisms	within	 the	EaP	later	in	this	chapter.		
2.2.2.	Multilateral	institutionalisation	
The	EU	has	been	pursuing	different	multilateral	initiatives	since	the	mid-1990s	in	order	to	foster	 market	 integration	 and	 convergence	 in	 the	 broader	 Caspian	 region.	 The	 longest-running	instrument,	in	this	regard,	has	been	the	INOGATE	programme	(INterstate	Oil	and	
GAs	Transportation	to	Europe)	established	in	1995,	the	primary	objective	of	which	is	the	
"convergence	 of	 energy	 markets	 [in	 participating	 countries]	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 EU	
principles"	 through	bilateral	and	cross-border	technical	assistance.329	 In	addition,	the	EU	and	 the	 broader	 Caspian	 region	 states	 lunched	 the	 Baku	 Initiative	 in	 2004,	 in	 order	 to	streamline	 the	 regional	 market	 convergence	 “on	 the	 basis	 of	 EU	 internal	 energy	 market	
principles	taking	into	account	the	particularities	of	the	Partner	Countries".330	This	was	to	be	achieved,	inter	alia,	through	“[g]radual	opening	of	the	internal	electricity,	oil	&	gas	markets,	
establishing	 independent	 energy	 regulators	 [and]	 establishing	 common	 methodologies	 for	
tariff	 setting	 policy/role	 of	 regulators	 for	 gas	 &	 electricity	 markets,	 based	 on	 the	 EU	
principles”.331	 With	 these	 goals	 the	 EC	 was	 keen	 on	 exploiting	 these	 instruments	 in	widening	its	regulatory	space	to	include	the	neighbouring	regions.332	However,	most	of	the	policy	 objectives	 pursued	 under	 the	 Baku	 Process	 were	 absorbed	 by	 the	 EU	 Eastern	Partnership	policy,	while	the	technical	level	cooperation	was	transferred	to	the	INOGATE	Secretariat.333	Against	this	backdrop,	currently	the	major	instruments	at	the	EU's	disposal	in	establishing	institutional	milieu	 for	 external	 energy	 supply	 are	 the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	 (ECT)	 and	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	(EnCT).	Born	out	of	the	Energy	Charter	process	in	1994,	the	ECT	 Article	 7	 was	 the	 first	 attempt	 by	 the	 European	 Union	 to	 address	 transit	 risks	 to	
                                                            328	See	e.g.	Youngs,	Energy	Security:	Europe’s	New	Foreign	Policy	Challenge.	329	‘The	INOGATE	Programme	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan’,	2012	<http://www.inogate.org/>	[accessed	20	January	2013]	(emphasis	added);	for	a	good	historical	overview,	see	also,	Lussac,	‘Ensuring	European	Energy	Security	in	Russian	“Near	Abroad”:	The	Case	of	the	South	Caucasus’.	330	‘Ministerial	Declaration	on	Enhanced	Energy	Co-Operation	Between	the	EU,	the	Littoral	States	of	the	Black	and	 Caspian	 Seas	 and	 Their	 Neighbouring	 Countries’,	 2006,	 p.	 1	<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/doc/2006_11_30_astana_conclusions.pdf>	[accessed	4	July	2015].	331	‘Ministerial	Declaration	on	Enhanced	Energy	Co-Operation	Between	the	EU,	the	Littoral	States	of	the	Black	and	Caspian	Seas	and	Their	Neighbouring	Countries’,	p.	5.	332	‘The	EU	Energy	Policy:	Engaging	with	Partners	beyond	Our	Borders,	COM(2011)	539’,	p.	7.	333	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	EC/DG	Energy,	04/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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energy	supplies	from	the	former	Soviet	countries.	Since	the	ECT	and	the	first	EU	directive	on	 natural	 gas	 market	 were	 being	 prepared	 in	 parallel	 and	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 aimed	 at	implementing	 similar	 legal	 principles,	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 level	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 the	freedom	of	gas	transit	was	largely	the	same.	On	the	flip-side,	this	also	meant	that	as	the	EU	energy	acquis	 continued	to	evolve	 through	the	adoption	of	 the	Second	and	Third	Energy	Packages	and	currently	prescribes	more	 stringent	 rules	 for,	 e.g.	 access	 to	 transportation	capacity,	 the	 ECT	 essentially	 remained	 the	 same	 since	 it	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 1998.334	Unlike	the	current	EU	energy	acquis,	the	ECT	(nor	its	negotiated	but	never	adopted	Transit	Protocol)	 does	 not	 prescribe	 unbundling	 and	 regulated	 TPA	 rules	 for	 gas	 transmission	activity,	 nor	does	 it	 prohibit	 charging	 transit	 fees	 for	 gas	 in	 transit.335	 Thus,	 not	 only	 the	ECT	 1994	 fails	 to	 provide	 the	 same	 level	 of	 protection	 to	 gas	 in	 "transit",	 but	 also	 by	setting	 only	 the	minimum	 standards	 for	 its	members,	 it	 can	be	 argued	 that	 ECT	 actually	provides	a	safety	net	for	protecting	non-EU	actors	(whether	public	or	private)	against	the	"excessive"	liberalisation	of	the	current	EU	acquis.336		For	example,	during	the	negotiations	on	the	SGC,	Azerbaijani	authorities	were	confronted	on	 numerous	 occasions	 by	 the	 EU	 demands	 to	 apply	 EU	 rules	 domestically	 in	 order	 to	ensure	 the	 freedom	 of	 transit	 for	 Central	 Asian	 gas	 across	 its	 territory.	 In	 addition	 to	refusing	these	demands	on	various	grounds	related	to	the	potential	domestic	costs	(which	I	investigate	in	detail	in	the	empirical	Chapter	VI),	Azerbaijani	authorities	also	referred	to	the	 already	 existing	 transit	 obligations337	 of	 the	 country	 under	 the	 ECT	 and	 argued	 the	application	of	the	EU	acquis	for	the	purpose	of	ensuring	transit	freedom	unnecessary.338	In	other	 words,	 the	 pre-existing	 formalised	 institutional	 structure	 that	 Azerbaijan	 is	embedded	 into,	 serves	as	a	strategic	setting	 through	which	 the	 latter	can	"protect"	 itself	from	the	dynamic	external	energy	governance	of	the	EU,	which	envisages	balance	of	(soft)	power	re-alignments	by	binding	third	countries	to	the	EU	preferences	in	energy	supply.	As	such,	 some	 experts	 have	 argued	 that,	 as	 an	 institution	 the	 ECT	 bestows	 favourable	 bias	
                                                            334	 Konoplyanik,	 ‘A	 Common	 Russia-EU	 Energy	 Space	 (The	 New	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 Agreement,	 Acquis	Communautaire,	the	Energy	Charter	and	the	New	Russian	Initiative)’,	p.	284.	335	Mete,	‘Analysis	of	the	Term	’transit’	in	Cross-Border	Energy	Transport:	A	Comparative	Study	of	Regulatory	Frameworks	 in	 the	 Eurasian	 Context’,	 pp.	 23–26;	 Danae	 Azaria,	 ‘Energy	 Transit	 under	 the	 Energy	 Charter	Treaty	 and	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	 Trade’,	 Journal	 of	 Energy	 &	 Natural	 Resources	 Law,	 27.4	(2009),	p.	572.	336	 Konoplyanik,	 ‘A	 Common	 Russia-EU	 Energy	 Space	 (The	 New	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 Agreement,	 Acquis	Communautaire,	the	Energy	Charter	and	the	New	Russian	Initiative)’,	p.	284.	337	 As	 explained	 above,	 these	 transit	 obligations	 are	 not	 as	 stringent	 as	 the	 EU	acquis	 and	 do	 not	 envisage	general	 principles,	 like	mandatory	 TPA,	 or	 practical	mechanisms,	 like	 capacity	 auctions,	 in	 its	 definition	 of	freedom	of	transit.	338	These	discussions	 took	place	during	 the	Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly:	 Committee	 on	Energy	 Security	
(Fourth	 Meeting)	 (Baku,	 2013).	 Very	 limited	 minutes	 of	 the	 meeting	 can	 be	 found	 at	http://www.euronest.europarl.europa.eu/euronest/cms/cache/offonce/home/committees;jsessionid=C8C904E451009C26DC06E85AE5AAB938	[accessed	4	July	2015]	
 123 
upon	 the	 energy	 security	 and	 industrial	 interests	 of	 the	 EU,	 while	 leading	 to	 the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	of	the	producer	countries.339	However,	this	one	example	of	transit	is	a	practical	testimony	as	to	how	the	continuity	of	(existing)	formal	institutions	may	still	be	preferable	to	actors	bound	by	them,	even	if	they	incur	considerable	costs.340	The	Energy	Community	Treaty,	however,	 is	 a	more	strategic	and	dynamic	 instrument	 in	the	EU's	external	energy	governance	toolbox.	The	leitmotif	of	the	EnCT	is	the	extension	of	the	acquis	communautaire	in	to	the	contracting	parties	to	the	Treaty.341	As	such,	the	EnCT	carries	 the	 objective	 of	 fostering	 the	 development	 of	 regional	 energy	markets	 in	 the	EU	neighbourhood	 and	 their	 further	 integration	 into	 the	 EU	 internal	 energy	 markets.	 If	implemented	 successfully,	 these	 regional	 markets	 will	 become	 parts	 of	 the	 single	 EU	market	before	or	without	the	accession	of	the	contracting	parties	to	the	EU	membership.342	Established	 in	2005	on	 the	basis	of	 the	Second	Energy	Package	of	 the	EU,	 the	EnCT	also	envisages	 (but	 does	 not	 oblige)	 the	 updates	 and	 upgrades	 to	 the	 EU	 legislation	 to	 be	adopted	by	the	contracting	parties	as	they	are	adopted	by	the	EU	member	states.343	Thus,	in	contrast	to	the	ECT,	which	is	bound	and	limited	by	the	regulatory	precepts	of	a	certain	temporal	 point,	 the	 EnCT	 is	 designed	 as	 a	 strategic	 gateway	 for	 the	 continuous	marketisation	of	the	EU	rules	in	third-countries	as	they	become	available	in	the	EU.	In	addition,	although	the	EnCT	lacks	judicial	rule	enforcement	mechanism	comparable	to	the	European	Court	of	 Justice,	 its	highest	decision-making	bodies,	 the	Ministerial	Council	and	the	Permanent	High	Level	Group,	represent	the	EU	interests	at	a	"higher	rate"	than	the	contracting	parties	(third	countries),	who	are	the	targets	of	expansion	of	the	EU	acquis.	As	such,	the	EU	is	represented	at	these	bodies	with	2	members,	as	opposed	to	1	member	of	the	 contracting	 parties.344	 The	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 EnCT	 obligations	 (brought	
                                                            339	 See	 e.g.	The	 Energy	 Charter	 Treaty:	 An	 East-West	 Gateway	 for	 Investment	 and	 Trade,	 ed.	 by	 Thomas	W.	Wälde,	International	Energy	and	Resources	Law	and	Policy	Series	(London:	Kluwer	Law	International,	1996);	Rafael	Leal-Arcas	and	Andrew	Filis,	‘The	Energy	Community,	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	the	Promotion	of	EU	Energy	Security’,	Oil,	Gas	&	Energy	Law	Journal	(OGEL),	12.2	(2014),	p.	22.	340	For	theoretical	discussions,	see	e.g.	Hall	and	Taylor,	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms’,	p.	940.	341	 ‘Treaty	 Establishing	 the	 Energy	 Community’,	 2005	 <https://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/2796177/Pages_from_2178178.pdf>	 [accessed	 13	January	2014],	Titles	I-II.	342	See	e.g.	Rozeta	Karova,	Energy	Community	for	South	East	Europe:	Rationale	Behind	and	Implementation	to	
Date	(Florence:	European	University	Institute,	Robert	Schuman	Centre	for	Advanced	Studies,	Florence	School	of	Regulation,	2009).	343	 ‘Treaty	Establishing	the	Energy	Community’,	Article	25;	see	also,	Roman	Petrov,	 ‘Energy	Community	as	a	Promoter	of	the	European	Union’s	“Energy	Acquis”	to	Its	Neighbourhood’,	Legal	Issues	of	Economic	Integration,	38.3	(2012),	331–56	(pp.	7–10).	For	example,	the	EnCT	countries	agreed	to	the	adoption	of	the	Third	Energy	Package	 by	 the	 ‘D/2011/O2/MC-EnG:	 Decision	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	 Directive	 2009/72/EC,	 Directive	2009/73/EC,	Regulation	(EC)	No	714/2009	and	Regulation	(EC)	No	715/2009	and	Amending	Articles	11	and	59	of	the	Energy	Community	Treaty’,	2011.	344	Leal-Arcas	and	Filis,	 ‘The	Energy	Community,	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	the	Promotion	of	EU	Energy	Security’,	pp.	25–26.	
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forward	by	the	Secretariat,	Regulatory	Board	or	any	other	party),	on	the	other	hand,	are	reviewed	at	the	Ministerial	Council	level,	which	can	suspend	the	certain	rights	of	any	EnCT	party	in	the	case	of	serious	and	persistent	breaches	of	the	Treaty.345	From	 the	 broader	 external	 policy	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 external	 energy	 governance	 via	 the	EnCT	 enjoys	 certain	 practical	 advantages	 compared	 to	 the	 enlargement	 process.	 This	 is	underpinned	 by	 its	 flexibility	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 general	 political	 conditionality	 and	 the	
normative	 strings	 associated	 with	 the	 latter.	 As	 such,	 while	 the	 enlargement	 process	requires	 the	 candidate	 countries	 to	 comply	with	 the	minimum	 standards	 related	 to	 the	political	governance,	e.g.	human	rights,	democracy	and	rule	of	law	before	opening	up	the	discussions	 in	acquis	 extension,	 the	EnCT	places	 the	acquis	extension	at	 its	 raison	d'être	without	 defining	 the	 political	 conditionality	 as	 the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 external	Europeanisation.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 EnCT	 avoids	 the	 general	 problem	 of	 alienation	 of	 the	political	 and	 economic	 power-brokers	within	 the	 target	 countries	 by	 undermining	 their	power	base	via	the	conditions	of	political	and	social	reforms.346		In	 sum,	based	on	voluntary	multilateralism	 these	 rule	expansion	mechanisms,	especially	the	 EnCT,	 serves	 as	 a	 key	 instrument	 for	 promoting	 EU's	 energy	 interests	 in	 third	countries	and	addressing	the	energy	supply	risks	based	on	the	EU	template.		On	the	one	hand,	although	there	is	no	direct	formal	pre-accession	requirement,347	the	EnCT	also	 plays	 a	 role	 of	 a	 "preparatory	 school"	 for	 the	 eventual	 membership.348	 For	 other	countries,	 who	 do	 not	 have	 realistic	 EU	membership	 prospects,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	EnCT	provides	 a	 voluntary	multilateral	 tool	 to	Europeanise	non-EU	 countries	 below	 the	
membership	 threshold349	 and	 address	 the	 external	 risks	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	domestic	institutions	beyond	borders.	
2.2.3.	Project-specific	institutionalisation	
In	the	absence	of	the	fully	functional	regulatory	framework	fostering	market	principles	 in	the	 target	 countries,	 the	 EU's	 alternative	 tool	 is,	 what	 can	 be	 called,	 project-specific	external	governance.	With	regard	to	this,	the	most	discussed	natural	gas	pipeline,	Nabucco	
                                                            345	 ‘Treaty	Establishing	the	Energy	Community’,	p.	89;	see	also,	Petrov,	 ‘Energy	Community	as	a	Promoter	of	the	European	Union’s	“Energy	Acquis”	to	Its	Neighbourhood’,	pp.	5,	11.	346	Leal-Arcas	and	Filis,	 ‘The	Energy	Community,	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	the	Promotion	of	EU	Energy	Security’,	p.	26.	347	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	the	EEAS,	21/04/2015,	Brussels.	348	Energy	2020:	A	Strategy	for	Competitive,	Sustainable	and	Secure	Energy,	COM(2010)	639,	p.	17.	349	See	e.g.	Prange-Gstöhl,	‘Enlarging	the	EU’s	Internal	Energy	Market:	Why	Would	Third	Countries	Accept	EU	Rule	Export?’	
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classic350	 incorporated	 an	 element	of	 external	 governance.	Being	 a	 standalone,	 dedicated	pipeline	of	massive	capacity,	Nabucco	classic	was	based	on	a	stable	regulatory	framework	aligned	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis.	 Although	 one	 of	 the	 signatories	 of	 the	 Nabucco	intergovernmental	agreement	(IGA),	namely	Turkey	was	not	and	still	is	not	a	contracting	party	to	the	EnCT	or	a	member	of	the	EU,	Nabucco	classic	was	expected	to	provide	equal	and	transparent	rules	for	network	access	and	tariff	methodology	for	the	entire	route	of	the	pipeline.	As	 I	 have	described	 in	 specific	 details	 in	 the	 empirical	 Chapter	 II,	 by	being	 the	front-runner	 of	 the	 SGC,	 from	 the	 regulatory	 perspective,	 Nabucco	 was	 essentially	 an	extension	of	the	EU’s	domestic	gas	market	all	the	way	to	the	Turkey-Georgia	and	Turkey-Iran	borders.		Although	 the	 EU	 was	 not	 a	 party	 to	 the	 Nabucco	 IGA,	 the	 European	 Commission	 was	leading	the	negotiations	with	Turkey	on	behalf	of	the	member	states,	who	signed	the	IGA	and	were	 to	 act	 as	 a	 "transit"	 route	 for	 the	 Nabucco	 pipeline.	 The	 Commission's	 direct	involvement	 in	 the	negotiations	was	not	only	conditioned	by	 its	extensive	expertise,	but	also	by	the	motivation	to	ensure	that	EU	member	states,	who	were	to	sign	the	IGA,	would	not	 stray	 away	 from	 the	 EU	 legislation	 in	 their	 Nabucco	 commitments.	 From	 the	perspective	of	Turkey,	as	the	former	Turkish	ambassador	to	the	EU	Selim	Kuneralp	put	it,	with	 the	 signature	 of	 the	 Nabucco	 IGA	 "the	 alignment	 with	 the	 acquis	 [was]	 coming	 in	
through	the	back	door".351	Such	a	project-specific	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC	would	ensure	market-based	energy	transit	to	the	EU	based	on	an	international	treaty	(i.e.	Nabucco	IGA),	without	 requiring	 reforms	 in	 the	 domestic	 legislation,	 which	 would	 otherwise	 be	 too	costly	 for	 the	 transit	 countries	 to	 implement	 at	 the	 system	 level.	Nevertheless,	 although	such	 a	 mechanism	 of	 rule	 export	 provides	 a	 less-costly	 avenue	 for	 external	 energy	governance,	 it	 is	 limited	to	specific	and	single	projects,	which	also	crosses	the	borders	of	the	 EU.	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 Europeanise	 the	 infrastructure	 projects	 outside	 the	 EU	borders,	multilateral	and	bilateral	engagement	of	 the	EU	with	 third-countries	 is	deemed	necessary.		To	 sum	 up,	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 transit	 risks,	 while	boosting	 competitiveness	 (affordability)	 of	 gas	 supply	 along	 this	 alternative	 energy	corridor.	 Indeed,	 the	 establishment	 of	 (the	 EU-sourced)	 regulatory	 conditions	 along	 the	SGC	will	ensure	that,	the	flow/trade	of	energy	is	determined	by	the	free-market	principles,	
                                                            350	The	original	pipeline,	dubbed	here	as	Nabucco	classic,	was	planned	to	have	a	capacity	of	31bcm	and	stretch	from	Turkish-Georgian	and	Turkish-Iraqi	border	to	Baumgarten	gas	hub	in	Austria.	351	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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i.e.	 supply	 and	 demand	 signals,	 without	 non-market	 interference	 of	 the	 state	 actors	concerned.352		In	this	regard,	given	that	the	Eastern	Partnership	policy	of	EU	is	the	newest	and	the	most	comprehensive	 external	 governance	 tool	 (under	 membership	 line)	 in	 the	 EU's	 external	affairs	repertoire	and	which	has	been	pursued	 in	close	synergy	with	the	development	of	the	 regulatory	 institutions	along	 the	SGC,353	 the	next	 section	provides	 the	analysis	of	 the	EaP	in	the	context	of	the	SGC.	It	is	especially	relevant	given	that,	I	will	analyse	the	factors	affecting	the	adoption/rejection	of	the	EU	rules	by	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	in	the	context	of	the	intra-institutional	dynamics	within	the	EaP	in	Chapters	V	and	VI.	
3.	The	Eastern	Partnership	and	the	EU	external	energy	policy	
Since	 the	 latest	 enlargement	 in	2004	and	2007,	 the	EU’s	 external	borders	have	 changed	considerably	and	 the	Union	has	become	 to	neighbour	with	 regions	and	countries,	which	previously	 were	 considered	 as	 distant	 regions.	 Consequently,	 due	 to	 the	 enlarged	neighbourhood	 the	EU	has	 introduced	a	new	approach	 to	 its	 relationships	with	 the	new	sixteen	neighbours	via	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	 (ENP).354	 Following	 its	 inception	in	2004,	the	ENP	has	promoted	different	initiatives	to	construct	the	Union’s	relations	with	individual	 neighbours	 in	 a	 dense	 manner,	 virtually	 in	 every	 sector,	 however	 under	 the	membership	line.	In	2008	Poland	and	Sweden	 introduced	an	Eastern	dimension	 to	 the	ENP	called	Eastern	Partnership,	which	 encompasses	 neighbours	 to	 the	 East	 of	 the	Union,	 namely,	 Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Georgia,	Moldova	 and	Ukraine.	 In	 general	 terms,	 the	main	 rationale	and	 goal	 of	 the	 EaP	 is	 “to	 create	 the	 conditions	 to	accelerate	 political	 association	 and	
deepen	 economic	 integration	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Eastern	 European	 partner	
countries”,355	which,	 inter	alia,	 includes	 comprehensive	partnership	 in	 the	 field	of	energy	
security.			Officially	lunched	on	May	7,	2009	at	the	Prague	summit,	the	Eastern	Partnership	envisages	deepening	of	 association	of	 the	6	 above-mentioned	neighbouring	 countries	with	 the	EU,	while	stopping	short	of	offering	the	former	the	prospects	of	future	membership.	Officially	
                                                            352	This	was	especially	highlighted	during	the	interview	with	an	official	from	the	EC/DG	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	353	See	e.g.	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	pp.	7,	11.	354	The	European	Neighbourhood	includes	Algeria,	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	Belarus,	Egypt,	Georgia,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	 Libya,	 the	 Republic	 of	Moldova,	Morocco,	 the	 Occupied	 Palestinian	 Territories,	 Syria,	 Tunisia	 and	Ukraine.	355	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’,	p.	3.	
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speaking,	 the	 partner	 countries	 are	 free	 to	 choose	 the	 sectors	 that	 they	 would	 like	 to	cooperate	with	the	EU	after	"fulfilling"	the	fundamental	tenets	of	European	values,	namely,	democracy,	 human	 rights,	 rule	 of	 law	and	 the	 rights	 of	minorities.	 In	 general	 terms,	 the	EaP	focuses	on	the	3+1	issues	that	have	been	jointly	agreed	with	the	partners	based	on	the	"joint	ownership"	principle:356	• Political	association	and	economic	integration,	• Enhanced	mobility	of	citizens	in	a	secure	and	well	managed	environment,	• Strengthened	sector	cooperation	(including	energy).	The	 fourth	 element	 of	 the	 association	 is	 the	 Deep	 and	 Comprehensive	 Free	 Trade	Agreement	(DCFTA)	that	partner	countries	can	negotiate	with	the	EU	and	become	part	of	the	 European	 single	market.	DCFTA	 follows	 the	 logic	 that	 simple	market	 opening	 is	 not	enough,	as	technical	barriers	will	still	constitute	a	major	hurdle	in	boosting	external	trade.	Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 necessity	 to	 achieve	harmonisation	of	 rules	 and	practices	which	 govern	major	 aspects	 of	 production	 in	 target	 countries	 (EaP)	 and	 bring	 them	 closer	 to	 the	standards	 and	 regulatory	 practices	 of	 the	 market	 to	 be	 joined,	 namely,	 the	 EU	 single	market.357	While	 each	of	 the	above	mentioned	elements	 constitute	an	 important	 aspect	of	 the	EU's	external	governance,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	sectoral	cooperation	and	the	DCFTA	of	the	AA,	 where	 the	 EC	 envisions	 to	 include	 "energy	 interdependence"	 into	 the	 association	agreements	that	should	be	in	"coherence	with,	inter	alia,	EU	trade,	competition	and	energy	
policies".358	Here	it	is	important	to	point	out	that,	unlike	the	accession	negotiations	–	where	(ideally)	 the	 process	 steps	 are:	membership	 conditionality	→	wholesale	 export	 of	 the	 EU	
rules	 →	 rule	 adoption	 and	 compliance	 →	 accession	 to	 the	 EU	 –	 the	 EaP	 is	 less	straightforward	 in	 terms	 the	mechanics	 of	 the	partnership.	 In	order	 to	 shed	 light	on	 the	partnership	in	energy	sector	under	the	EaP,	below	I	assess	several	key	questions:	a)	What	
are	the	rules	to	be	exported	to	partner	countries?	b)	How	does	the	rule	expansion	take	place	
in	 organisational	 terms?	 c)	What	 is	 the	 reward	 for	 rule	 adoption	 and	 how	 is	 compliance	
ensured?	Addressing	 these	 questions	 is	 especially	 relevant	 for	 the	 explanatory	 purchase	 of	 the	External	 Incentive	 Model,	 which	 underpins	 the	 logic	 of	 actions	 of	 third	 countries	 in	adopting/rejecting	the	EU	rules,	 including	within	the	 framework	of	 the	EaP.	As	such,	 the	
                                                            356	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’,	p.	5.	357	Michael	Emerson,	Countdown	to	the	Vilnius	Summit:	The	EU’s	Trade	Relations	with	Moldova	and	the	South	
Caucasus	(European	Parliament/Directorate-General	for	External	Policies	of	the	Union,	January	2014),	p.	17.	358	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	7.	
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EIM	places	special	importance	on	the	relationships	between	the	expected	benefits	(in	the	form	of	reward)	of	adopting	the	EU	rules	and	the	costs	associated	with	it,	which	underpins	the	cost-benefit	analysis	by	the	relevant	actors	in	an	institutional	context.	For	this	reason,	in	order	to	analyse	this	very	relationship	between	the	expected	costs	and	the	benefits,	it	is	 vital	 to	 understand	what	 are	 the	costs	 and	 the	benefits	 in	 practical	 terms	 in	 the	 first	place,	which	is	the	main	goal	of	the	sub-sections	below.	
3.1.	Density	of	rule	exports	and	"conditionality	light"	under	the	EaP	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 (legalisation),	 network	 governance	 and	specifically	the	EaP,	in	principle,	envisages	voluntary	selection	and	implementation	of	the	EU	rules	by	the	partner	countries	based	on	the	"joint	ownership"	principle.	That	is	to	say,	it	is	up	to	the	receiving	party	to	decide	on	the	areas	it	wants	to	cooperate	with	the	EU	and	what	rules	it	has	to	adopt	to	that	end.	In	itself,	such	an	initial	conceptual	precondition	by	default	anticipates	the	export	of	EU	rules	to	the	partner	countries.359	In	 conceptualising	 these	 aspects	 of	 the	 ENP	 Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfennig	 note	 that,	 the	EU's	main	instrument	in	engaging	with	the	partner	countries	is	"soft	law"	or	conditionality	
light,	where	bilaterally	agreed	action	plans	aimed	at	approximation	of	 legal	standards,	as	opposed	 to	 legal	 homogeneity,	 constitutes	 the	 basis	 of	 interaction.360	 Of	 course,	 in	 the	absence	of	sizeable	reward	(like	membership	prospects)	it	would	be	naïve	on	the	part	of	the	EU	to	expect	that	partners	would	be	wholeheartedly	ready	to	voluntarily	embrace	the	EU	standards	and	practices.	Nevertheless,	this	does	not	preclude	the	EU	from	attempting	to	 induce	the	partners	 to	gradually	harmonise	 their	 legislation	with	that	of	 the	EU	while	employing	 at	 times	 patronising	 "this	 is	 good	 for	 you"	 rhetoric.361	 Although	 the	 EaP	countries	 officially	 retain	 their	 sovereignty	 in	 choosing	 among	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 EU	(energy)	acquis,	Brussels	 is	 still	 interested	 in	exporting	as	much	of	 its	 legislation	as	 it	 is	feasible	from	political	and	economical	viewpoint	outside	EU	structures.362	In	general,	since	the	introduction	of	the	EaP	in	2008,	the	European	Commission	explicitly	pointed	 out	 that,	 "legislative	 and	 regulatory	 convergence	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 partners’	
progress	 in	 coming	closer	 to	 the	EU".363	With	a	 similar	 language,	 the	Commission	and	 the	
                                                            359	As	is	the	case	with	the	accession	process,	Eastern	Partnership	also	entails	opening	and	closing	of	chapters	in	sectors	that	the	EU	and	individual	partner	countries	want	to	cooperate	on,	which	inevitably	includes	energy	sector	due	to	its	vitality	to	economic	development	and	political	independence.	360	 Lavenex,	 Lehmkuhl	 and	Wichmann,	 ‘Modes	of	External	Governance:	A	Cross-National	 and	Cross-Sectoral	Comparison’,	p.	820.	361	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	362	Youngs,	Europe’s	External	Energy	Policy:	Between	Geopolitics	and	the	Market,	p.	2.	363	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	pp.	9,	11.	
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European	 External	 Action	 Service	 (EEAS)	 later	 reiterated	 that,	 the	 work	 with	 the	 EaP	countries	should	be	focused	"on	enhancing	cooperation	to	integrate	competitive	energy	
markets	 with	 the	 EU	 market	 through	 comprehensive	 energy	 sector	 reforms	 (policies,	
legislation	 implementation	 and	 regulation).”364	 To	 put	 it	 into	 perspective,	 if	 the	 partner	countries	to	the	East	are	to	integrate	into	the	EU	energy	markets,	and	since	that	is	exactly	what	 is	 being	 offer	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EaP,365	 then	 they	 have	 to	 harmonise	 their	 domestic	legislation	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis.	 The	 binding	 commitment	 to	 adopt	 relevant	 EU	
acquis,	 accordingly,	 is	 legalised	 in	 the	 AAs	 signed	 between	 the	 individual	 EaP	 countries	and	the	EU	following	the	bilateral	negotiations.	Although	these	negotiations	with	the	EaP	countries	were	not	public,	the	finalised	and	signed	AAs	are	publically	accessible.366	Within	 the	 AAs,	 energy	 (specifically	 natural	 gas)	 is	 dealt	 under	 the	DCFTA	 and	 sectoral	
cooperation	 chapters.	 The	 former	 deals	 with	 the	 trade	 aspects	 of	 energy	 (natural	 gas)	provision	 and	 sets	 broader	 principles	 of	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 gas	 markets	 in	 the	individual	EaP	countries	and	the	principles	of	the	organisation	of	access	regime	to	energy	transportation	 facilities	 in	 their	 territories.367	 For	 analysing	 the	 density	 of	 rules	 to	 be	export	 via	 the	 EaP,	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	 use	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA/DCFTA	 as	 the	main	 point	 of	reference.	This	is	primarily	because,	Georgia	is	an	important	transit	country	along	the	SGC	and	its	Europeanisation	has	direct	implications	on	the	supply	of	natural	gas	to	the	EU	via	this	alternative	energy	corridor,	which	is	at	the	centre	of	analytical	attention	of	this	PhD.	Secondly,	although	another	transit/supply	country	along	the	SGC,	Azerbaijan,	never	signed	an	 AA	 with	 the	 EU,	 the	 kind	 of	 (Association)	 agreement	 it	 was	 offered	 by	 the	 EU	 was	similar	to	the	one	offered	to	Georgia	(,	Moldova	and	Ukraine).368	Hence,	the	EU-Georgia	AA	provides	a	good	point	of	reference,	which	can	be	sufficiently	attributed	to	the	rest	of	the	EaP	 in	 examining	 the	 density	 of	 rules	 to	 be	 exported	 (including	 the	 nature	 of	 rewards	offered	in	return).	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 chapter	 on	 the	 trade-related	 energy	 provisions	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	AA/DCFTA	 prescribes	 a	 guaranteed	 third	 party	 access	 to	 the	 transportation	 facilities	(defined	as	"high-pressure	natural	gas	transmission	pipelines")369	 in	Georgia.	Furthermore,	although	the	DCFTA	section	of	 the	EU-Georgia	AA	does	not	specifically	prescribe	auction	
                                                            364	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’,	p.	14	(emphasis	original).	365	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	11.	366	Out	of	6	EaP	countries,	only	Georgia,	Moldova	and	Ukraine	signed	AA	with	the	EU.	Among	these	countries,	only	Georgia	is	a	party	to	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	.	367	See	e.g.	‘Association	Agreement	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	and	Their	Member	 States,	 of	 the	One	Part,	 and	Georgia,	 of	 the	Other	 Part’	 (Official	 Journal	 of	 the	European	Union,	2014),	Chapter	XI.	368	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	369	 ‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	 European	Union	 and	 the	 European	Atomic	 Energy	 Community	 and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	Article	210.	
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mechanism	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	 the	 capacity	 in	 the	 transmission	 pipelines,	 per	 se,	 it	requires	such	capacity	to	be	allocated	through	"transparent	and	non-discriminatory	criteria	
and	 procedures".	 The	 tariffs	 for	 access	 to	 transport	 facilities,	 additionally,	 have	 to	 be	
"objective,	 reasonable,	 transparent	 and	 shall	 not	 discriminate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 origin,	
ownership	or	destination	of	the	energy	good".370	In	 line	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 latter	 prohibits	 a	 differentiated	(discriminatory)	 treatment	 of	 transit	 gas	 from	 domestic	 gas	 and	 forbids	 charging	 any	transit	 fees	 for	 gas	 transiting	 Georgian	 territory.	 This	 is	 rather	 because,	 in	 setting	 the	general	 principles	 of	 third-party	 access	 to	 transport	 facilities	 (e.g.	high-pressure	 natural	
gas	transmission	pipelines)	in	Georgian	territory,	the	Article	217	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	does	not	 differentiate	 between	 domestic	 and	 transit	 pipelines;	 it	 prescribes	 the	 same	 access	tariff	principles	across	the	board,	thus,	eliminating	the	notion	of	transit.	However,	 Article	 211	 of	 the	 same	 chapter	 also	 prescribes	 that,	 transit	 of	 gas	 through	Georgia	should	be	ensured	consistent	with	Georgia's	international	commitments	under	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty,	which	does	not	prescribe	mandatory	TPA	to	transit	pipelines,	nor	the	elimination	of	the	transit	fees	per	se.371	From	this	point	of	view,	the	implementation	of	the	DCFTA	in	Georgia	will	not	require	any	regulatory	changes	as	 far	as	the	transit	of	gas	across	Georgia	is	concerned.372	In	the	context	of	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC,	this	means	that,	DCFTA	section	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	as	such,	will	not	lead	to	the	harmonised	market	integration	and	gas	transportation	via	the	SGC	in	Georgia.	Nonetheless,	the	Article	218	of	same	chapter	also	indicates	that	upon	the	accession	of	Georgia	to	the	Energy	Community	Treaty,	the	provisions	of	the	latter	and/or	relevant	EU	energy	acquis	will	take	precedence	in	 case	 there	 is	 any	 conflict	between	 the	above-mentioned	provisions	of	 the	DCFTA	and	the	 EnCT	 (including	 third-party	 access	 rules	 and	 transportation	 terms),	 hence	necessitating	new	regulatory	reforms.373	In	this	vein,	although	detailed	legal	analysis	of	the	regulatory	regime	to	be	in	place	in	Georgia	following	the	country's	accession	to	the	EnCT	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	it	is	nevertheless	evident	that,	the	EU	acquis	is	envisaged	to	take	precedence	whenever	there	is	a	collision	with	the	pre-existing	regulatory	regime	in	place	in	the	EaP	countries.	
                                                            370	 ‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	 European	Union	 and	 the	 European	Atomic	 Energy	 Community	 and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	Article	217.	371	 See	 e.g.	Mete,	 ‘Analysis	 of	 the	 Term	 ’transit’	 in	 Cross-Border	 Energy	 Transport:	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 of	Regulatory	Frameworks	in	the	Eurasian	Context’,	pp.	23–26;	see	also	Azaria,	‘Energy	Transit	under	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade’,	p.	572.	372	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	373	 This	 was	 highlighted	 during	 the	 interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 Georgian	 Ministry	 of	 Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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In	 addition,	 the	 harmonisation	 of	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 with	 the	 EU	 legislation	 is	 also	prescribed	as	part	of	the	sectoral	cooperation	(Title	VI)	under	the	EU-Georgia	AA.	Article	298	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	states	that,	EU-Georgia	cooperation	in	energy	should	cover	"the	
development	 of	 competitive,	 transparent	 and	 efficient	 energy	 markets	 allowing	 third	
parties	non-discriminatory	access	to	networks	and	consumers	following	EU	standards,	
including	 the	 development	 of	 the	 relevant	 regulatory	 framework,	 as	 required".374	 In	addition,	 the	sectoral	part	of	 the	AA	binds	Georgia	to	adopt	the	 following	EU	natural	gas	directives	and	regulations	listed	in	the	ANNEX	XXV375	of	the	AA:	• Directive	 2009/73/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 13	 July	2009	concerning	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	in	natural	gas,	• Regulation	(EC)	No	715/2009	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	 2009	 on	 conditions	 of	 access	 to	 the	 natural	 gas	 transmission	 networks,	 as	amended	by	Commission	Decision	2010/685/EU	of	10	November	2010,	• Regulation	 No	 994/2010	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	concerning	measures	to	safeguard	security	of	gas	supply,	• Directive	 2008/92/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 22	October	2008	concerning	a	Community	procedure	to	improve	the	transparency	of	gas	and	electricity	prices	charged	to	industrial	end-users.	The	 former	 three	 legislative	 pieces	 can	 be	 argued	 to	 constitute	 the	 backbone	 of	 the	 EU	Third	 Energy	 Package	 and	 include	 all	 the	 detailed	 procedures	 and	 the	 benchmark	measures	outlined	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	chapter	(section	2.1.).	The	provisions	of	 these	legislative	acts	are	to	be	implemented	by	Georgia	in	accordance	with	the	timeline	agreed	by	the	latter	in	the	framework	of	Georgia's	accession	to	the	Energy	Community	Treaty.	The	AA	envisages	an	alternative	mechanism,	too,	for	if	Georgia's	EnCT	accession	is	not	effective	within	two	years	of	the	entry	into	force	of	the	AA,	then	the	timeline	of	implementation	of	the	 above-mentioned	 legislative	 acts	 is	 to	 be	 determined	 by	 the	 EU-Georgia	Association	Council	no	later	than	three	years	after	the	entry	into	force	of	the	AA.376	In	this	regard,	although	it	 is	yet	to	be	seen	as	to	what	extent	the	AA	will	be	successful	 in	aligning	 Georgia's	 natural	 gas	 legislation	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU,	 its	 general	 scope	 is	considerably	dense	and	provides	a	practical	measure	 for	analysing	 the	prospective	costs	
                                                            374	 ‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	 European	Union	 and	 the	 European	Atomic	 Energy	 Community	 and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	Article	298	(emphasis	added).	375	 ‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	 European	Union	 and	 the	 European	Atomic	 Energy	 Community	 and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	Article	300.	376	 ‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	 European	Union	 and	 the	 European	Atomic	 Energy	 Community	 and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	ANNEX	XXV.	
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associated	 with	 their	 adoption.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 nothing	 that,	 the	 bilateral	 track	 of	 the	Eastern	Partnership	and	its	contractual	outcome,	i.e.	the	Association	Agreement	is	the	only	legally	 binding	 document	 committing	 the	 Eastern	 partners	 to	 adopt	 the	 EU	 rules.	Nonetheless,	the	extension	of	the	EU	rules	to	the	EaP	countries	is	also	encouraged	through	the	mechanisms	 of	 institutional	 interaction	 in	 the	multilateral	 track	 of	 the	 EaP,	 as	well,	which	 attempts	 to	 promote	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU	 rules,	 as	 opposed	 to	 following	 the	principle	of	conditionality.	For	 example,	 the	 Euronest	 Parliamentary	 Assembly	 of	 the	 EaP	 (which	 plays	 a	 role	 of	legislative	oversight	over	the	EU-partner	country	relationships)	stressed	that,	"the	EU	and	
the	Eastern	European	partners	concerned	must	ensure	that	their	energy	sector	cooperation	
under	 future	 association	 agreements	 is	 in	 line	with	 EU	 internal	market	 rules",377	 which	 is	essential	 "to	 encourage	 competition	 and	 innovation,	 [and]	 mitigate	 the	 risk	 of	 abuse	 of	
dominant	 positions	 on	 the	 energy	 supply	 and	 distribution	 markets".378	 Although,	 as	 I	 will	explain	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 Euronest	 or	 other	multilateral	 fora	 of	 the	 EaP	 do	 not	 adopt	binding	decisions	 for	 the	EaP	countries,	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	rule	extension	 in	their	work	programme	 was	 aimed	 at	 socialising	 the	 Eastern	 partners	 about	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 EU	legislation.	Against	 this	 background,	 although	 the	 EU	 had	 offered	 an	 AA	 to	 all	 the	members	 of	 the	Eastern	Partnership,	unlike	Georgia,	Azerbaijan	has	chosen	not	to	commit	to	such	a	dense	and	 legally	 binding	 instrument.379	 Nevertheless,	 EU's	 external	 energy	 governance	 efforts	vis-à-vis	Azerbaijan	has	not	been	any	different	from	Georgia,	as	far	as	the	rule	extension	is	concerned.	Although	the	negotiations	with	partners	were	held	behind	the	closed-doors,	it	was	 confirmed	 during	 my	 interview	 with	 the	 lead	 negotiator	 from	 the	 Mission	 of	Azerbaijan	 Republic	 to	 the	 EU,	 that	 the	 chapter	 on	 energy	 in	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 AA	negotiations	 included	 every	 aspect	 of	 legislative	 reforms,	 for	 the	 EU	 was	 keen	 on	capitalising	on	its	domestic	experience	in	institutionally	restructuring	Azerbaijan’s	energy	sector.380	Therefore,	the	EU's	external	governance	vis-à-vis	all	the	members	of	the	EaP	has	been	similar	across	the	board.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	EU's	external	energy	governance	vis-à-vis	the	SGC	pre-dates	the	EaP	and	the	Association	Agreements	and	has	been	on	the	horizon	ever	since	the	
                                                            377	‘Resolution	On	Energy	Security	in	Connection	With	Energy	Market	and	Harmonisation	Between	the	Eastern	European	Partner	and	the	EU	Countries’	(Euronest,	2013),	p.	7.	378	‘Resolution	On	Energy	Security	in	Connection	With	Energy	Market	and	Harmonisation	Between	the	Eastern	European	Partner	and	the	EU	Countries’,	p.	6.	379	 Andrew	 Rettman,	 ‘Azerbaijan	 and	 EU	 Race	 to	 Agree	 “Modernisation”	 Pact’,	 27	 September	 2013	<http://euobserver.com/foreign/121592>	[accessed	29	December	2013].	380	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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start	 of	 gas	 exports	 from	 the	 Caspian	 region.	 For	 example,	 the	 memorandum	 of	understanding	(MoU)	in	energy	sphere	that	was	signed	between	the	EU	and	Azerbaijan	in	2006	maintained	that,	harmonisation	of	the	Azerbaijan's	energy	legislation	with	that	of	the	EU	acquis	will	be	a	significant	step	in	the	former's	"economic	integration	and	deepening	of	
political	cooperation	with	the	EU.”381	With	a	view	to	step	up	the	creation	of	an	open	energy	markets,	the	EU	advocated	the	strengthening	of	the	role	of	institutions	and	setting	up	"an	
Energy	Regulatory	Authority	independent	of	the	interests	of	the	electricity	and	gas	industry	
[and]	 electricity	 and	 gas	 transmission	 system	 operators;	 having	 the	 tasks	 referred	 to,	 and	
fulfilling	 the	criteria	 contained	 in	 the	 relevant	articles	of	 the	Electricity	and	Gas	Directives	
with	 respect	 to	 their	 independence	 from	 other	 activities	 not	 related	 to	 transmission”	 (i.e.	unbundling	 electricity	 and	gas	networks).382	 Therefore,	 the	AA	 is	not	 a	new	effort	 in	 the	EU's	external	energy	governance	repertoire	in	relation	to	Azerbaijan.		At	this	point,	it	is	necessary	to	pay	attention	to	an	interesting	and	equally	important	aspect	of	 the	 EU's	definition	 of	 the	 volunteerism	 and	 "more-for-more"	 principle	 that	 underpins	the	EaP.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 EU	 claims	 that,	 EU	 "does	 not	 seek	 to	 impose	 a	model	 or	 a	
ready-made	 recipe"383	 onto	 the	 partners.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 the	 partners	 are	expected	to	align	their	domestic	legislation	with	the	relevant	parts	of	the	EU	acquis	if	they	want	 to	 further	 their	 political	 association	 and	 economic	 integration	with	 the	EU.	 In	 this	regard,	it	can	be	argued	that,	volunteerism	in	EaP	becomes	reduced	to	timing	(of	adoption	of	EU	rules)	rather	than	a	benchmark	of	equality	and	independent	choice	in	partnership.	It	follows	a	similar	logic	to	Henry	Ford’s	famous	quote	about	the	Model-T:	“Any	customer	can	
have	a	 car	painted	any	colour	 that	he	wants	 so	 long	as	 it	 is	black”.384	Thus,	 from	the	EU's	perspective,	the	 legalisation	element	of	external	energy	governance,	i.e.	selection	of	rules	can	be	conceived	as	nothing	more	than	a	timeline	for	prioritising	convergence	of	norms	of	the	partner	countries	with	that	of	the	EU.	In	a	broader	picture,	EU's	rule	export	policy	can	be	argued	 to	be	a	neo-colonial	 strategy,	with	concealed	dominance	over	 the	partners	without	reciprocation	by	 the	EU,	especially	
                                                            381	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	2006,	p.	2.	382	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	p.	7;	see	also,	the	Twinning	programmes	initiated	between	Azerbaijan	and	the	EU	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	ENP	Walter	Sandtner,	Twinning	Project:	Legal	Approximation	and	Structural	
Reform	 in	 the	 Energy	 Sector	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 2009	 <http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details?p_new_id=2401>	 [accessed	 26	November	2012].	383	‘A	New	Response	to	a	Changing	Neighbourhood	COM(2011)	303’,	2011,	pp.	2,	3.	384	Henry	Ford,	My	Life	and	Work	(Doubleday,	Page,	1922),	p.	72.	
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as	 regards	 membership	 prospects.385	 However,	 acquis-based	 external	 engagement	 with	third-countries	 is	 conditioned	 by	 the	 very	 institutional	 constraints	 that	 the	 EU	 operates	under	 in	 constructing	 its	 external	 (energy)	 relations.	 Rational-Choice	 Institutionalism	describes	that,	although	the	preferences	of	actors	(i.e.	EU)	are	exogenous	to	 institutional	analysis,386	 their	 behaviour	 and	 potential	 strategies	 are	 restricted	 and	 shaped	 by	 the	institutions	they	are	bound	with.	Accordingly,	as	illustrated	in	section	3	of	Chapter	I,	these	institutional	constraints	are	also	practically	observed	with	regard	to	the	Treaty	provisions	limiting	the	external	aspects	of	the	EU	energy	competences.	In	this	regard,	if	in	the	context	of	 establishment	 of	 the	 SGC	 (one	of)	 the	 aim(s)	 of	 the	EU	 is	 to	 address	 the	 transit	 risks	along	this	alternative	energy	corridor,	then	the	institutional	tools	at	 its	disposal	are	very	limited.	Any	agreement	that	EU	signs	with	third	countries	must	be	compatible	with	the	EU	treaties	and	secondary	domestic	legislation.	Therefore,	the	use	of	EU	domestic	acquis	as	a	legal	 instrument	 to	 address	 external	 (energy)	 challenges,	 which	 will	 bind	 both	 third	countries	and	the	EU,	is	not	only	rational,	but	also	constraint-driven.		Given	that	 the	EU	 is	not	a	sovereign	nation-state	 in	a	 traditional	 foreign	policy	sense,	 its	external	policy	actions	in	natural	gas	sector	can	advance	only	up	to	the	level	as	to	reflect	the	 intra-EU	 integration	 achieved	 so	 far	 (although	 it	 entails	 re-alignment	 of	 power	relations	 vis-à-vis	 third	 countries).	 Hence,	 although	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance	can	 bear	 some	 similarities	 to	 the	 neo-colonial	policies	 pursued	 by	 some	 international	actors,	 I	 would	 argue	 that,	 it	 is	 conditioned	 by	 the	 domestic	 institutional	milieu	 that	 is	operating	under,	as	opposed	to	the	deliberate	neo-colonial	policy	preferences	per	se.		Furthermore,	 the	 relevant	 acquis	 was	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 address	 similar	 problems	within	 the	EU	 in	 the	 first	place.	As	one	EU	official	put	 it,	acquis	 is	 the	 “skeleton	and	 life-
blood”	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 therefore,	 offers	 a	 concrete	 model	 in	 dealing	 similar	 challenges	beyond	 the	 EU	 borders.387	 This,	 consequently,	 makes	 external	 energy	 governance	 a	rational	policy	choice	for	the	European	Union,	while	the	EU	acquis	constitutes	much	of	the	legal	skeleton	of	the	Association	Agreements	offered	to	the	EaP	countries.	
                                                            385	Horký-Hlucháň	and	Kratochvíl,	 ‘“Nothing	Is	Imposed	in	This	Policy!”	The	Construction	and	Constriction	of	the	 European	 Neighbourhood’;	 Korosteleva,	 ‘The	 Eastern	 Partnership	 Initiative:	 A	 New	 Opportunity	 for	Neighbours?’,	p.	7.	386	 Hall	 and	 Taylor,	 ‘Political	 Science	 and	 the	 Three	 New	 Institutionalisms’,	 pp.	 939,	 951;	 Pollack,	 ‘Rational	Choice	and	EU	Politics’,	p.	45.	387	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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3.2.	Institutional	organisation	of	rule	expansion:	bilateral	and	multilateral	
tracks	of	the	EaP	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 rule	 expansion,	 the	 EaP	 envisages	 both	bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 tracks	 of	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 partner	 country	relations.		
The	bilateral	track	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	provides	a	bilateral	avenue	of	cooperation	between	 the	EU	and	EaP	countries,	 in	order	 to	reach	 the	objectives	of	 the	EaP	 following	the	conclusion	of	the	individual	Association	Agreements	(which	will	define	the	depth	and	extent	 of	 individual	 partner	 countries'	 relations	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 entail	 legally	 binding	obligations	for	either	party	around	the	negotiations	table).388	Prior	 to	 the	signature	of	 the	AA,	EU-Georgia	(and	also	currently	EU-Azerbaijan)	bilateral	cooperation	 was	 (is)	 based	 on	 three-tier	 institutional	 cooperation	 mechanism:	 1)	Cooperation	 Council,	 2)	 Cooperation	 Committees	 and	 3)	 Cooperation	 Sub-committees.	These	 institutions	 were	 created	 following	 the	 signature	 of	 the	 Partnership	 and	Cooperation	Agreements	(PCAs)	between	the	EU	and	the	current	members	of	the	Eastern	partnership	in	the	late	1990s	and	provided	a	structured	avenue	for	bilateral	interaction	in	different	spheres	of	cooperation.	Following	the	signature	of	the	AA	on	August	30,	2014,	the	EU-Georgia	bilateral	institutions	were	 upgraded	 in	 order	 to	 reflect	 the	 depth	 and	 the	 width	 of	 the	 new	 contractual	arrangement	between	the	parties.	In	this	vein,	the	above-mentioned	PCA	institutions	were	replaced	by:	• The	 EU-Georgia	 Association	 Council	 –	 is	 held	 at	 the	ministerial	 level	 once	 a	 year.	There	 is	only	one	(single)	Association	Council,	which	encompasses	both	political,	DCFTA,	as	well	as	the	sectoral	cooperation	elements	contracted	under	the	AA.	• EU-Georgia	Cooperation	Council	–	is	held	at	the	deputy-ministerial	level	and	can	be	held	in	different	configurations,	including	trade.		• Association	Sub-committees	–	covers	the	sectoral	part	of	the	AA	and	takes	place	at	the	experts	level.	Unlike	the	Cooperation	sub-committee	under	the	former	PCA,	the	tasks	 of	 the	 Association	 sub-committee	 are	 bigger,	 because	 the	 AA	 covers	more	sectors	and	much	more	comprehensively	than	the	PCA.	Under	the	AA,	there	will	be	three	 types	 of	 sub-committees:	 a)	 A	 single	 sectoral	 sub-committee	 -	 will	 be	comprised	 of	 clusters	 encompassing	 different	 sectoral	 chapters	 of	 the	 AA,	
                                                            388	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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including	energy	chapter;	b)	four	DCFTA	sub-committees;	c)	the	rest	of	the	AA	will	have	their	own	sub-committees.389	These	 institutions	 will	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 AA	obligations,	 including	 the	 approximation	 process	 in	 energy	 sphere,	 by	 Georgia	 and	monitoring	thereof	by	the	European	Union.	As	it	was	indicated	in	the	previous	section,	the	timeline	 and	 the	 depth	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 by	 Georgia	 is	 not	prescribed	by	the	energy	chapter	of	the	EU-Georgia	Association	Agreement.	In	the	future,	these	 issues	will	have	to	be	discussed	at	 the	expert	 level	 in	 the	energy	cluster	under	the	Association	 Sub-committee	 and	 the	 outcome	 will	 be	 reinforced	 by	 the	 EU-Georgia	Association	Council	or	Committee.390	With	 regard	 to	 Azerbaijan,	 the	 institutional	 mechanism	 for	 bilateral	 interaction	 will	remain	 the	 same	 as	 provided	 for	 under	 the	 1996	 EU-Azerbaijan	 PCA,	 since	 Azerbaijani	government	 decided	 not	 to	 sign	 an	 AA	with	 the	 EU.	 Therefore,	 there	will	 be	 less	 dense	interaction	 at	 the	 expert	 level	 between	 Azerbaijan	 and	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 context	 of	approximation	of	the	former's	energy	legislation	with	the	EU	acquis.			
The	 multilateral	 track	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 is	 the	 first	 of	 its	 kind,	 which	assembles	 representatives	 of	 all	 the	 EU	 member	 states	 and	 6	 partner	 countries	 in	different	 arenas	 and	 at	 different	 levels.	 It	 is	 aimed	 at	 supporting	 the	 "progress	 in	
partners’	bilateral	relations	with	the	EU"	and	envisions	to:	• “provide	 a	 forum	 to	 share	 information	 and	 experience	 on	 partners’	 steps	 towards	
transition,	reform	and	modernisation”,	• “facilitate	the	development	of	common	positions	and	joint	activities”,	• “foster	links	among	the	partners	themselves”,	• “provide	the	setting	for	the	systematic	organisation	of	dedicated	sessions	[…]	devoted	
to	 the	 presentation	 and	 explanation	 of	 the	 EU	 legislation	 and	 standards	 [..	 and	
thereby	contribute]	to	initiating	a	structured	approximation	process.”391	In	 conceptual	 terms,	multilateral	 track	 does	 not	 entail	 any	 contractual	 obligations392	and	thereby,	is	of	consultative	nature.	With	a	multi-layered	and	participative	institutional	
                                                            389	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	390	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	391	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	pp.	8,	9.	392	Hrant	Kostanyan	and	Jan	Orbie,	‘The	EEAS’	Discretionary	Power	Within	the	Eastern	Partnership:	In	Search	of	the	Highest	Possible	Denominator’,	Southeast	European	and	Black	Sea	Studies,	13.1	(2013),	47–65	(p.	50).	
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framework,393	 it	 aims	at	 socialising	 the	6	partner	 countries	and	 persuading	 them	 about	the	appropriateness	of	the	EU	rules.			
Table	4	-	The	multilateral	track	of	partnership	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	|	Compiled	by	the	author	using	publically	available	EU	documents.	
	In	 institutional	 terms,	 multilateral	 track	 envisions	 fora	 at	 different	 levels	 of	representation,	 ranging	 from	biennial	 summits	of	 the	heads	of	 states	&	governments	to	ad	hoc	meetings	of	small	panels	dealing	with	individual	issues	(see	Table	4).	From	the	perspective	of	energy	security	and	Europeanisation	of	the	energy	sectors	of	the	SGC	 countries,	 the	 third	 thematic	 platform	 on	 energy	 security	 and	 Euronest	 Energy	
Committee	are	the	most	relevant	multilateral	fora	to	the	theme	of	this	chapter.	In	general,	it	seems	like	there	is	a	bit	of	confusion	between	the	EU	and	the	partner	countries	about	the	overall	 purpose	 of	 the	 thematic	 platforms.	 While	 the	 EU	 has	 put	 the	 emphasis	 on	approximation	 of	 the	 partner	 countries'	 energy	 legislation	with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	acquis,394	partner	 countries	 clearly	 prefer	 to	 regard	 the	 platforms	 as	 a	 launching	 pad	 for	 cross-border	 projects	 that	 involve	 participation	 of	 more	 than	 one	 country.395	 The	 European	Commission	has	been	especially	keen	on	encouraging	"structured	approximation	process"	
                                                            393	 Laure	 Delcour,	 ‘The	 Institutional	 Functioning	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership:	 An	 Early	 Assessment’,	Eastern	
Partnership	Review,	October	2011,	p.	4.	394	‘Eastern	Partnership	Platform	3	-	Energy	Security	-	Approved	Work	Programme	2012-2013’,	2012,	p.	2.	395	‘Resolution	On	Energy	Security	in	Connection	With	Energy	Market	and	Harmonisation	Between	the	Eastern	European	Partner	and	the	EU	Countries’,	p.	4.	
Biennial	Summits	of	the	EaP	Heads	of	State	&	Governments	
• Meetings	can	also	be	held	at	the	level	of	individual	ministers	in	other	policy	areas	Annual	Meetings	of	the	Ministers	of	Foreign	Affairs	
• PLATFORM	1:	Democracy,	good	governance	&	stability	• PLATFORM	2:	Econ.	integ.	&	convergence	with	EU	policies	• PLATFORM	3:	Energy	security	• PLATFORM	4:	Contacts	between	people	
4	Thematic	Platforms	Biannual	meetings	at	the	level	of	senior	oficials	
• Committee	1:	Political	affairs,	human	rights	and	democracy	• Committee	2:	Econ.	integ.,	legal	approximation	and	convergence	with	EU	policies	• Committee	3:	Energy	security	• Committee	4:	Social	affairs,	education,	culture	and	civil	society	EURONEST	Parliamentary	Assembly	
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of	 partner	 countries'	 national	 policies	 and	 legislation	with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 by	 organising	dedicated	sessions	involving	experts	from	both	sides.396		Third	 Thematic	 Platform	 on	 energy	 security,	 was	 established	 during	 the	 Prague	Summit	 of	 the	 inauguration	 of	 the	 EaP	 in	May	 2009,	while	 the	 first	meeting	 held	 in	June	of	the	same	year.	The	meetings	under	this	platform	take	place	biannually,	while	its	working	programme	is	set	for	the	period	of	two	years.	The	working	programme	for	each	year	 is	 agreed	by	 the	EU	and	 the	partner	 countries	 and	 take	 into	 account	 their	needs	and	interests.	The	working	programme	for	the	first	period	between	2009-2011	had	set	to	pursue	4	core	objectives:		1. Enhancing	framework	conditions	and	solidarity	among	partners,		2. Support	 for	 infrastructure	 development,	 interconnection	 and	 diversification	 of	supply,	3. Promotion	of	increased	energy	efficiency	and	use	of	renewable	resources,	4. Regulatory	framework	and	approximation	of	energy	policies.397	With	 a	 similar	 overall	 mission,	 the	 Euronest	 Parliamentary	 Assembly	 that	 involves	 60	parliamentarian	 from	 the	 EP	 and	 60	 from	 the	 partner	 states	 (50	 without	 Belarus)	 is	geared	 towards	 maintaining	 democratic	 control	 over	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 Eastern	Partnership.398	It	includes	a	special	Committee	on	Energy	Security	that	holds	consultations	and	prepares	reports,	recommendations	and	declarations	regarding	the	developments	 in	the	 subject	 specific	 area.399	 Euronest	 energy	 committee's	 goals	mirror	 those	declared	by	the	Thematic	Platform	3400	and	strives	to	achieve	them	through	sharing	of	legal	practices	at	a	legislative	level.	
3.3.	The	finalité	of	the	EaP	and	monitoring	the	compliance	
At	 the	 bilateral	 level,	 the	 EaP	 is	 based	 on	 differentiation	 and	more-for-more	 principles,	where	although	the	EU's	domestic	acquis	always	constitutes	a	point	of	departure	(as	was	discussed	in	the	previous	section),	each	partner	country,	in	principle,	is	expected	to	bring	its	own	interests	and	agenda	to	the	negotiations	table.	
                                                            396	This	was	also	personally	observed	by	the	author,	during	the	attendance	of	the	13th	meeting	of	the	Platform	3	on	Energy	Security,	June	19,	2015,	Brussels.	397	‘Eastern	Partnership:	Platform	3	-	Core	Objectives	and	Work	Programme	2009	-2011’,	2009,	pp.	1–3.	398	‘Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly:	Constituent	Act	of	the	Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly’,	2011.	399	‘Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly:	Rules	of	Procedures	of	the	EURONEST	Parliamentary	Assembly’,	2011,	p.	11.	400	 ‘Euronest	 Committee	 on	 Energy	 Security:	 Documentation	 File’	 (Euronest,	 2012),	 p.	 2	<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/nest/dv/eap_energy_security_documentation_/eap_energy_security_documentation_en.pdf>	[accessed	27	August	2013].	
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Traditionally,	Europeanisation	of	third-countries	under	the	external	 incentive	model	was	based	 on	 the	 membership	 reward	 for	 compliant	 (candidate)	 countries.	 However,	 the	reward	 for	 compliance	 for	 the	 EU	 conditionality,	 or	 as	 some	 call	 it,	 the	 finalité401	 of	 the	partnership	 under	 the	 EaP	 or	 its	 contractual	 pinnacle,	 is	 rather	 vague.	 The	 joint	declaration	of	the	Prague	Summit,	which	inaugurated	the	EaP,	stated	that	the	Partnership	
"will	 be	 developed	 without	 prejudice	 to	 individual	 partner	 countries'	 aspirations	 for	 their	
future	 relationship	 with	 the	 European	 Union".402	 The	 declaration	 adopted	 in	 the	 next	summit	in	Warsaw	in	2011	went	further	in	acknowledging	"the	European	aspirations	and	
the	European	choice	of	some	partners".403	However,	while	promoting	convergence	with	the	EU	rules	and	policies,	the	EU	has	so	far	successfully	avoided	offering	the	Eastern	Partners	a	membership	prospect.404	Some	even	speculated	that,	 the	wording	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	has	been	chosen	very	carefully	 in	order	 to	avoid	any	 future	rhetorical	entrapment	 in	 the	face	 of	 enlargement	 fatigue.405	 Thus,	 the	 question	 is:	 What	 will	 be	 Georgia’s	 (or	
Azerbaijan’s)	benefits	in	return	to	approximating	its	domestic	energy	legislation	with	
that	of	the	EU	acquis?	As	I	illustrated	above,	Georgia	is	to	conduct	energy	reforms	both	under	the	DCFTA	and	the	
sectoral	 parts	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	 Association	 Agreement.	 As	 a	 free	 trade	 agreement	 the	DCFTA	 section	 deals	with	 trade	 related	matters,	where	 the	 partner	 country	 commits	 to	approximate	 its	 domestic	 legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	single	EU	market.	As	the	name	suggests,	the	DCFTA	establishes	a	free	trade	area	between	the	contracting	parties,	which	will	allow	them	to	benefit	from	increased	bilateral	trade	and	the	economic	prosperity	it	ushers	in.		In	 this	 vein,	 although	 the	 natural	 gas	 related	 provisions	 of	 the	 trade-related	 energy	chapter	 of	 the	DCFTA	 is	 clear	 in	 outlining	 the	 reforms	Georgia	 is	 to	 carry	 out,	 its	 direct	benefits	to	Georgia’s	energy	(natural	gas)	trade	and	security	is	less	obvious.	This	is	rather	conditioned	 by	 the	 special	 and	 spatial	 characteristics	 of	 natural	 gas	 trade,	 which	 as	 I	described	 in	 Chapter	 I,	 is	 infrastructure	 and	 geology	 dependent.	 Georgia	 does	 not	 have	natural	 gas	 resources	 of	 its	 own	 and	 is	 dependent	 on	 gas	 imports	 from	Azerbaijan	 and	
                                                            401	Korosteleva,	‘The	Eastern	Partnership	Initiative:	A	New	Opportunity	for	Neighbours?’,	p.	2.	402	 ‘Joint	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Prague	 Eastern	 Partnership	 Summit	 in	 Prague’	 (The	 Council,	 2009),	 p.	 5	<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf>	[accessed	30	August	2013].	403	 ‘Joint	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 Summit,	 Warsaw,	 14983/11	 PRESSE	 341’	 (Council	 of	 the	European	 Union,	 2011),	 p.	 1	<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/warsaw_summit_declaration_en.pdf>	[accessed	18	January	2013].	404	Interview	with	a	senior	Georgian	diplomat,	who	was	part	of	the	negotiations	team	on	the	EU-Georgia	AA,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	405	 Andrew	 Rettman,	 ‘EU-Georgia	 Treaty	 Highlights	 Enlargement	 Fatigue’,	 EUObserver,	 8	 June	 2013	<http://euobserver.com/enlargement/120789>	[accessed	30	August	2013].	
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Russia.	 Additionally,	 the	 Georgian	 government	 or	 the	 private	 companies	 do	 not	 own	natural	gas	pipelines	 traversing	 its	 territory.	Thus,	 the	only	role	 that	Georgia	plays	 in	 its	interaction	 with	 the	 European	 Union	 as	 regards	 to	 natural	 gas	 trade	 is	 being	 a	 transit	country	on	the	way	of	Caspian	gas	exports	to	the	EU.	This	transit	role	is	also	unidirectional	and	Georgia	does	not	(and	is	not	expected	to)	receive	any	gas	volumes	from	the	European	Union,	as	the	latter	 itself	 is	 import	dependent.	 In	this	regard,	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	the	trade-related	 energy	 chapter	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA/DCFTA	 almost	 entirely	 concentrates	on	the	transit	provisions	of	gas	flow	through	Georgia,	as	opposed	to	gas	trade	with	Georgia.	Therefore,	unlike	trade	in	e.g.	industrial	or	agricultural	products,	where	Georgia	is	a	party	to	bilateral	interaction,	there	is	virtually	no	reward	for	Georgia’s	energy	reforms	as	far	as	trade-related	energy	chapter	of	the	DCFTA	is	concerned.	Azerbaijan,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	even	entitled	to	sign	a	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	 Agreement	 with	 the	 EU,	 for	 it	 is	 not	 a	 member	 of	 WTO,	 which	 was	 set	 as	 a	precondition	by	the	European	Union.406	Secondly,	since	reforms	in	Georgia’s	natural	gas	sector	is	also	envisioned	under	the	energy	chapter	 of	 the	 sectoral	 part	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	 Association	 Agreement,	 it	 is	 also	 worth	analysing	 potential	 reward	 that	 Georgia	 could	 benefit	 from	 in	 return	 to	 approximation	with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 through	 this	 avenue,	 too.	 The	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 envisions	 bilateral	cooperation	in	the	sphere	of	energy,	including	on	security	of	energy	supply,	scientific	and	technical	level,	promotion	of	energy	efficiency	and	nuclear	safety,	etc.407	Furthermore,	the	Eastern	Partnership	and	the	AAs	also	provide	for	the	participation	of	the	partner	countries	in	the	functional	EU	programmes	and	agencies.408	Energy	sector	specifically,	the	Eastern	Partnership	envisages	the	development	of	"mutual	
energy	support	and	security	mechanisms".409	 In	organisational	 terms,	major	emphasis	is	 put	 on	 integrating	 the	 Eastern	 neighbours	 into	 functional	 EU	 and	 EU	 supervised	agencies,	 such	 as	 Intelligent	 Energy	 Europe	 Programme	 (IEE).410	 The	 European	Commission	launched	the	IEE	programme	in	2003,	which	aims	at	supporting	and	creating	better	 conditions	 for	 organisations	 that	 are	 willing	 to	 invest	 in	 energy	 sustainability,	renewable	energy,	energy-efficient	buildings,	industry,	consumer	products	and	transport.	Similarly,	 at	 the	multilateral	 level,	 the	 Third	 Thematic	 Platform	 on	 energy	 security	 also	
                                                            406	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	4.	407	 ‘‘Association	Agreement	Between	 the	European	Union	and	 the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	and	Their	Member	States,	of	the	One	Part,	and	Georgia,	of	the	Other	Part’,	Article	298.	408	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’,	p.	4.	409	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	11	(emphasis	original).	410	 ‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	8;	 ‘Eastern	Partnership	Platform	3	-	Energy	Security	-	Approved	Work	Programme	2012-2013’,	p.	6.	
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aims	at	facilitating	access	of	the	partners	to	the	EU's	ManageEnergy	initiative,	which	has	similar	 objectives	 as	 the	 IEE.411	 To	 that	 end,	 the	 implementation	 of	 certain	 legislative	requirements	constitutes	a	pre-requisite	for	participation	in	these	programmes.	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 EU	 has	 also	 voiced	 the	 possibility	 of	 financing	 of	 cross-border	projects	 from	the	EU	and	affiliated	 funds	 in	order	 to	 incentivise	 the	partner	countries	 to	adopt	its	rules.	Thereby,	the	EC	expressed	that	the	cooperation	in	energy	sphere	can	also	look	 into	 the	 "possibilities	 for	 EIB	 financing	 for	 Southern	 [Gas]	 Corridor"412	 and	 further	logistical	and	financial	support	through	ENPI	funded	INOGATE	and	Energy	Community	in	legislative	convergence	and	market	integration.413	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 finalité	 of	 the	 sectoral	 partnership	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Eastern	neighbours	 seems	 to	 be	 more	 functional	 (related	 to	 issues	 of	 common	 interest)	 than	
institutional	(at	least	from	the	EU	perspective).	As	such,	this	functional	reward	under	the	network	mode	 of	 rule	 export	 of	 the	 EaP	 contrasts	with	 the	 hierarchy	mode	 of	 the	 EU's	external	 governance,	 which	 offers	 integration	 of	 the	 rule-adopters	 into	 the	 decision-making	institutions	of	the	EU	through	the	accession	process.	From	analytical	point	of	view,	this	means	that	the	rational-choice	to	be	made	by	the	relevant	actors	(in	our	case,	Georgia)	in	 adopting	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 legislation	 will	 have	 to	 measure	 the	 costs	 of	 extensive	reforms	against	the	limited	(and	potentially	irrelevant)	benefits	of	the	final	reward.	In	this	regard,	 as	 the	 level	 of	 integration	 into	 the	 EU	 terminates	 below	 the	 membership	 line	(which	has	been	the	primary	motivator	during	the	enlargement	process),	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	induce	the	partner	countries'	 legislative	approximation	to	a	high	standard	can	also	be	expected	to	be	inferior.414	
3.3.1.	Monitoring	the	compliance		
The	Eastern	Partnership	2013	roadmap	 indicated	that,	"Progress	 towards	reforms	will	be	
assessed	 according	 to	 specific	 criteria	 which	 reflect	 the	 commitments	 already	 undertaken	
                                                            411	‘Eastern	Partnership:	Platform	3	-	Core	Objectives	and	Work	Programme	2009	-2011’,	pp.	4,	5.	412	 ‘Eastern	 Partnership:	 A	 Roadmap	 to	 the	 Autumn	 2013	 Summit	 -	 Bilateral	 Dimension,	 SWD(2012)	 109’	(European	Commission,	High	Representative	of	the	EU	for	FASP,	2012),	p.	32.	413	 ‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	 to	 the	Autumn	2013	 Summit,	 JOIN(2012)	 13	 -	Multilateral	Dimension’	(European	Commission,	High	Representative	of	the	EU	for	FASP,	2012),	pp.	16,	17.	414	It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	although	the	AAs	with	the	EaP	countries	prescribe	much	denser	regulatory	harmonisation	than	the	Stabilisation	and	Association	Agreements	(SAAs)	that	the	EU	is	in	parallel	negotiating	with	 the	Western	Balkan	countries.	However,	unlike	 the	AAs	 the	SAAs	maintains	 the	membership	prospects	for	the	Western	Balkan	countries.	See	e.g.	Emerson,	Countdown	to	the	Vilnius	Summit:	The	EU’s	Trade	Relations	
with	Moldova	and	the	South	Caucasus,	p.	22.	
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through	 the	 existing	 agreements	 between	 the	 EU	 and	partner	 countries	 including	 those	 in	
ENP	Action	Plans/Association	Agendas".415	An	Association	Agenda	 is	a	 common	document	between	 the	EU	and	 the	partner	country	and	 lists	 the	priority	areas	of	 cooperation	 in	 the	next	3	years,	 following	 the	signature	of	the	AAs.	Although	 the	document	 is	 important	 for	 defining	 the	priorities,	 it	 is	 not	 legally	binding	and	does	not	 list	 legislative	acts	 that	 the	partner	county	 is	expected	 to	adopt	as	part	 of	 the	 approximation	with	 the	 EU	acquis.	 The	 list	 of	 legislative	 acts	 to	 be	 adopted,	which	were	agreed	as	part	of	the	AA,	is	rather	reflected	in	the	National	Action	Plan	of	the	partner	country,	which	serves	as	a	reference	document	for	them	on	what	needs	to	be	done	each	year.416	These	National	Action	Plans	will	not	be	monitored	by	the	EU,	which	will	produce	its	own	Progress	Reports	every	year	based	on	the	information	the	partner	country	submits	to	the	EU	 and	 the	 EU's	 own	 monitoring	 through	 the	 EU	 delegations	 in	 the	 relevant	 partner	countries.	 In	 this	 vein,	 although	 the	 partner	 country	 is	 not	 obliged	 to	 provide	 its	 own	progress	 report,	 it	 is	 nevertheless,	 obliged	 to	 provide	 any	 information	 (e.g.	 draft	 laws,	policy	 documents)	 that	 the	 EU	 might	 request.	 Although	 the	 AA	 does	 not	 specify	 the	technicalities	 of	 the	 monitoring	 process,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 relevant	 DGs	 from	 the	European	Commission	will	be	involved	in	the	relevant	policy	areas.417	Furthermore,	 although	 (in	 our	 case)	Georgia	 is	 obliged	 to	 fulfil	 the	 general	 principles	 of	the	energy	acquis	it	is	bound	to	under	the	EU-Georgia	AA,	it	is	unlikely	that	it	will	fulfil	all	the	 technicalities	 in	 the	reform	process.418	However,	 should	Georgia	decide	not	 to	 fulfil	
its	obligations	or	has	not	done	it	to	the	EU's	satisfaction,	what	are	the	mechanisms	of	
coercion	under	the	AA?		In	 case	 of	 non-compliance	 by	 Georgia,	 this	 will	 be	 flagged	 up	 in	 one	 of	 the	 institutions	described	in	the	previous	chapter.	However,	there	are	no	or	very	limited	tools	of	coercion	or	punishment	within	the	AA	framework.	As	regards	the	rule	adoption	in	energy	sector	is	concerned:	• DCFTA	 includes	 measures	 that	 can	 restrict	 the	 partner	 country's	 access	 to	 the	single	EU	market	in	case	of	non-compliance	in	the	agreed	timeframe	and/or	depth	of	 harmonisation	 until	 the	 remedies	 are	 provided.	 However,	 non-compliance	 in	once	 sector,	 e.g.	 natural	 gas,	will	 not	 limit	market	 access	 in	 all	 the	 areas	 of	 free-
                                                            415	‘Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	Autumn	2013	Summit,	JOIN(2012)	13’,	p.	4.	416	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	417	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	418	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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trade.	 In	 other	 words,	 as	 the	 Georgian	 diplomat	 put	 it,	 "if	 we	 [Georgia]	 do	 not	
comply	with	 energy	acquis,	we	 can	 still	 export	 apples	 to	 the	EU	market".419	Hence,	the	 DCFTA	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 a	 critical	 pressure	 on	 the	 partner	 countries	 to	force	 rule	 adoption	 across	 the	 board.	 In	 addition,	 since	 the	 energy	 (natural	 gas)	exported	 to	 the	EU	via	Georgia	does	not	belong	 to	 the	 latter,	 there	 is	no	political	and	 economic	 rationale	 for	 limiting	 the	market	 access	 to	 natural	 gas	 in	 order	 to	force	 Georgia	 into	 compliance.	 Indeed,	 the	 punishment	 of	 the	 non-compliant	partner	will	hurt	the	EU	more	than	the	partner	country.		• In	sectoral	part,	on	the	other	hand,	there	are	no	punishment	and/or	enforcement	mechanisms,	 as	 the	 partnership	 is	 based	 on	 the	 ‘good-will’	 of	 the	 partner	countries.	 Obviously,	 this	 can	 entail	 political	 pressure	 in	 the	 political	 dialogue	institutions	-	i.e.	Association	Council	and	Association	Committee.	However,	the	AA	does	not	envisage	anything	in	terms	of	sanctions.420	Thus,	 unlike	 rule	 adoption	 during	 the	 accession	 process,	 the	 EaP	 and	 its	 contractual	outcome	 -	Association	Agreement	do	not	envisage	 strict	 enforcement	mechanism,	which	can	be	applied	in	case	of	non-compliance.	To	sum	up,	although	in	broad	strokes	the	EaP	envisages	the	absorption	of	third	countries	into	the	EU's	regulatory	structure,	as	was	the	case	during	the	Eastern	enlargement,	it	stops	short	 of	 extending	 its	 institutional	 boundary	 to	 include	 the	 Eastern	 neighbours.	 In	 this	regard,	 any	 access	 granted	 to	 neighbours	 in	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 EU	 agencies	 and	programmes	 are	 of	 functional	 character,	 as	 it	 does	 not	 envisage	 any	 competence	 at	 a	decision-making	level.	From	the	viewpoint	of	the	External	Incentive	Model,	such	a	limited	reward	in	return	for	extensive	reforms	by	default	envisages	non-or-limited	compliance	by	the	targets	of	the	EU	rule	extension	policy	depending	on	the	nature	of	costs	to	them.	
4.	Energy	Union	and	Energy	Diplomacy	Action	Plan	as	a	“watershed”	
Close	 to	 finishing	 this	 research	 in	 2015,	 the	 European	 Commission	 published	 its	 new	
Energy	Union	policy	framework	and	the	Energy	Diplomacy	Action	Plan	was	adopted	by	the	Council	 of	 Ministers	 of	 the	 EU.	 This	 followed	 the	 general	 failure	 (as	 I	 thoroughly	investigate	in	the	case-study	chapters)	of	the	existing	EU	external	energy	policy	approach	and	the	heightened	EU	energy	supply	risks	following	Russia’s	military	intervention	in	the	Eastearn	Ukraine	and	the	annexation	of	Crimea	in	summer	2014.	
                                                            419	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	420	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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Some	experts	dubbed	Energy	Union	efforts	a	leap	forward	in	the	unified	energy	policy	of	the	 EU,	 with	 open	 calls	 for	 the	 necessity	 of	 establishing	 European	 energy	 diplomacy	 in	order	to	address	external	challenges	in	a	unified	manner.421	On	the	one	hand,	whether	the	Energy	 Union	 will	 become	 a	 watershed	 or	 not	 in	 the	 EU’s	 external	 energy	 policy	perspective,	it	 is	important	to	note	that	this	PhD	aims	to	investigate	only	the	governance	“phase”	 thereof.	Hence,	 its	 relevance	 to	 the	external	governance	 literature	 remains	valid	and	 indeed,	 provides	 substantive	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 the	 limits	 of	 external	 energy	governance	as	a	tool	for	addressing	energy	security	risks	in	and	through	third-countries.		On	the	other	hand,	however,	there	are	serious	reservations	as	to	extent	to	which	there	is	a	change/transition	to	a	more	foreign	policy	type	energy	policy	in	the	EU’s	engagement	with	third	 countries.	 As	 in	 previous	 policy	 documents,	 the	 Energy	 Union	 communication	reiterates	that,	“[e]nergy	policy	is	often	used	as	a	foreign	policy	tool,	 in	particular	in	major	
energy	producing	 and	 transit	 countries”.422	 Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 EU’s	 “ability	 to	
project	 its	 weight	 on	 global	 energy	markets”,	 the	 Union	 “will	 work	 towards	 an	 improved	
global	 governance	 system	 for	 energy,	 leading	 to	 more	 competitive	 and	 transparent	
global	energy	markets”.423	The	same	communication	goes	on	 to	specify	 that,	 “where	 the	
EU	 negotiates	 agreements	 with	 countries	 that	 are	 important	 from	 a	 security	 of	 supply	
perspective,	the	Commission	will	seek	as	a	priority	to	negotiate	energy	specific	provisions	
contributing	 to	 the	 energy	 security,	 notably	 access	 to	 resources”.424	 In	 terms	 of	 the	language,	 the	new	 approach	 to	 external	 energy	 supply	 does	 not	 necessarily	 differ	much	from	 the	 old	 approach,	 which	 places	 the	 key	 emphasis	 on	 reforming	 the	 governance	systems	in	third	countries	and	the	reliance	on	the	markets.	Admittedly,	 the	 Commission	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 “strategic	 energy	
partnerships	with	 increasingly	 important	producing	and	 transit	countries	or	regions	 such	
as	Algeria	and	Turkey;	Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan”425,	without	being	clear	as	to	what	it	means	 by	 strategic	 partnership.	 Although	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 Strategic	 Partnership	 on	energy	 with	 Ukraine,	 it	 places	 considerable	 emphasis	 on	 conducting	 necessary	 energy	market	reforms	in	the	country	similar	to	the	governance	thesis.		
                                                            421	Sami	Andoura	and	Jean-Arnold	Vinois,	From	the	European	Energy	Community	to	the	Energy	Union:	A	Policy	
Proposal	for	the	Short	and	the	Long	Term	(Notre	Europe	Jacques	Delors	Institute,	January	2015).	422	 A	 Framework	 Strategy	 for	 a	 Resilient	 Energy	 Union	 with	 a	 Forward-Looking	 Climate	 Change	 Policy	
COM(2015)	80,	p.	6.	423	 A	 Framework	 Strategy	 for	 a	 Resilient	 Energy	 Union	 with	 a	 Forward-Looking	 Climate	 Change	 Policy	
COM(2015)	80,	p.	6	(emphasis	added).	424	 A	 Framework	 Strategy	 for	 a	 Resilient	 Energy	 Union	 with	 a	 Forward-Looking	 Climate	 Change	 Policy	
COM(2015)	80,	p.	6	(emphasis	added).	425	 A	 Framework	 Strategy	 for	 a	 Resilient	 Energy	 Union	 with	 a	 Forward-Looking	 Climate	 Change	 Policy	
COM(2015)	80,	p.	7	(emphasis	added);	See	also	European	Council	Conclusions	(19	and	20	March),	2015,	p.	2.	
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Similarly,	 the	Energy	Diplomacy	Action	Plan	adopted	by	the	Council	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	 EU,	 puts	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 active	 use	 of	 “diplomacy”	 instruments	 in	 cooperating	with	third	countries.426	However,	it	is,	too,	unclear	as	to	what	should	constitute	the	content	of	 this	 external	 cooperation,	 whether	 with	 the	 SGC	 countries,	 Russia	 or	 other	 relevant	third	 countries.	 Similarly,	 the	 nature	 of	 linkage	 between	 EU	 energy	 and	 foreign	 policy	remains	at	best	unclear.427		The	review	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	in	late	2015	provided	some	clues	as	to	the	 EU’s	 own	 perception	 regarding	 the	 success	 and	 the	 limits	 of	 external	 policy	 action	based	 on	 EU	 norms	 and	 standards.	 It	 specifically	 highlighted	 that,	 “[d]ifferentiation	 and	
greater	mutual	 ownership	will	 be	 the	 hallmark	 of	 the	 new	ENP,	recognising	 that	not	all	
partners	 aspire	 to	 EU	 rules	 and	 standards,	 and	 reflecting	 the	 wishes	 of	 each	 country	
concerning	the	nature	and	focus	of	its	partnership	with	the	EU”.428		In	relation	to	partnership	in	energy,	the	review	highlighted	that,	“[t]he	EU	strongly	relies	on	
its	 neighbourhood	 for	 safe,	 secure	 and	 predictable	 generation	 and	 transportation	 of	
energy	 and	 therefore	 needs	 to	 strengthen	 its	 dialogue	 with	 partner	 countries	 on	 energy	
security	 and	 sustainable	 production.”429	 To	 that	 end,	 the	 EU	 will	 enhance	 “full	 energy	
market	integration”	with	the	EaP	countries	who	have	signed	AA/DCFTAs	with	the	Union,	including	 Georgia.	 With	 other	 partners,	 too,	 “[t[he	 EU	 should	 […]	 pursue	 regulatory	
approximation	 […]	 on	 sectors	 of	 mutual	 interest”.430	 Hence,	 although	 the	 call	 for	 more	“diplomatic”	and	“strategic”	approach	to	external	energy	policy	is	more	pronounced	in	the	latest	 EU	 policy	 documents,	 the	 content	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 “new	 approach”	 remain	undefined.	 This	 becomes	 all	 the	 more	 obvious	 since	 the	 Treaties	 and	 the	 underlying	division	of	competences	(on	energy,	as	well	as	the	foreign	affairs	and	the	security	policy)	remain	unchanged.	Hence,	 for	 the	purpose	of	 this	 thesis	 I	will	not	 investigate	 these	new	policy	developments	in	the	relevant	case	study	chapters.	
5.	Conclusion	
The	EU's	Southern	Gas	Corridor	strategy	has	more	implications	for	the	Caspian	and	Middle	Eastern	energy	players	 than	 it	 is	usually	presented	by	 the	extant	 literature.	The	EU	 is	 in	
                                                            426	Council	Conclusions	on	Energy	Diplomacy	(Brussels:	The	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2015).	427	Shahrazad	Far	and	Richard	Youngs,	Energy	Union	and	EU	Global	Strategy	(Stockholm:	Swedish	Institute	for	European	Policy	Studies).	428	 ‘Review	 of	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 JOIN(2015)	 50	 Final’	 (European	 Commission,	 High	Representative	of	the	EU	for	FASP,	2015),	p.	2	(emphasis	added).	429	‘Review	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	JOIN(2015)	50	Final’,	p.	11.	430	‘Review	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	JOIN(2015)	50	Final’,	p.	12.	
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need	of	alternative	gas	volumes	from	these	regions	in	order	to	ensure	its	energy	security	in	 light	 of	 the	 declining	 indigenous	 production	 and	 high	 dependence	 on	 concentrated	imports.	 However,	 this	 chapter	 argued	 that,	 the	 EU	 aims	 at	 diversifying	 natural	 gas	supplies	from	the	Caspian	Basin	and	Middle	East	under	competitive	market	conditions.	The	regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC,	 hence,	 is	 aimed	 to	 ensure	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 the	natural	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	this	alternative	energy	corridor,	by	making	energy	supply	subject	 to	 market	 dynamics,	 i.e.	 supply	 and	 demand	 signals,	 as	 opposed	 to	 political	bargaining	 among	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 involved.431	 This	would	 help	 the	 EU	 to	resolve	the	energy	supply	and	transit	challenges	along	the	SGC	through	the	deployment	of	the	EU	internal	market	rules	externally.	This,	consequently,	would	limit	the	strategic	and	commercial	uncertainty	 in	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 state	and	non-state	actors	 in	 influencing	the	energy	transit.	As	such,	the	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	cannot	be	called	foreign	energy	diplomacy	in	a	traditional	foreign	policy	sense.	The	EU	is	not	a	state	and	its	external	action	capacity	in	energy	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 integration	 of	 energy	 policy	 domestically.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 SGC	 is	 only	 the	 reflection	 of	 the	 internal	Europeanisation	 externally.	 This	 lack	 of	 EU	 competences	 in	 foreign	 energy	 policy,	however,	should	not	be	pre-judged	against	the	problem-solving	capacity	of	the	EU	external	energy	governance	vis-à-vis	third	parties.	As	I	have	demonstrated	throughout	this	chapter,	the	 density	 of	 the	 external	 Europeanisation	 is	 considerably	 high,	 both	 in	 relation	 to	 the	selection	 of	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 rules	 to	 be	 exported	 (legalisation),	 as	 well	 as	 the	institutional	organisational	of	rule	expansion	process.		Indeed,	 successful	 implementation	of	 the	EU	external	 energy	 governance,	 especially,	 the	rules	on	unbundling,	TPA	and	energy	 transit,	have	 the	potential	 to	alter	 the	 international	environment,	 that	 the	Union	 interacts	with,	 by	 affecting	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 potential	energy	strategies	of	the	non-EU	transit	and	supply	countries.	Hence,	in	the	absence	of	the	classical	actorness	of	the	EU	in	international	relations,	the	lack	of	conventional	capacity	for	
external	 action	 is	 being	 potentially	 compensated	 by	 absorbing	 the	 external	 into	 the	
internal	 (enlargement	 -	 Turkey)	 or	 extending	 the	 tenets	 of	 the	 internal	 beyond	 the	sovereign	 borders	 without	 merging	 the	 two	 (association	 -	 ENP/EaP	 -	 Azerbaijan	 and	Georgia).	In	both	cases	the	backbone	of	external	action	is	the	deployment	of	the	 in-house	
institutions,	which	presents	a	 rational	 choice	and	yields	 the	most	optimal	 results	 to	 feed	into	the	EU	preferences.	Therefore,	the	practical	external	actions	of	the	EU	with	regard	to	
                                                            431	This	was	especially	highlighted	during	the	interview	with	an	official	from	the	EC/DG	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	
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the	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	in	line	with	the	central	thesis	of	the	Rational-Choice	Institutionalism	theoretical	framework.	As	I	argued	above,	the	choice	of	external	energy	governance	as	a	foreign	energy	policy	to	deal	with	 the	external	 challenges	 is	 conditioned	by	 the	Treaty	constraints	 that	 the	EU	 is	bound	with,	as	opposed	to	neo-colonial	motivations.	Without	prejudice	 to	 this	argument,	this	chapter	contended	that,	EU’s	external	 institutional	strategy	bears	certain	geopolitical	implications	towards	the	target	countries.	These	geopolitical	 implications	differ	in	modus	
operandi	when	compared	to	the	strategies	of	other	international	actors;	especially	Russia,	who	has	been	using	energy	as	a	physical	tool	of	power	politics	in	a	classical	realpolitik.	In	contrast,	the	EU	has	been	successful	in	dressing	its	external	energy	policies,	as	one	expert	put	it	“in	the	finer	cloaks	of	rules-based	discourse".432		In	practice,	however,	through	the	spread	of	the	domestic	practices	and	policies	beyond	the	borders,	the	EU	external	governance	leads	to	the	emergence	of	a	regulatory	buffer	zone	in	the	 EU	 neighbourhood.	 This	 ensures	 the	 "domestic	 level"	 of	 safety	 in	 external	 energy	supply,	at	times	without	the	hassles	of	an	enlarged	membership	structure.	The	emergence	of	 this	 buffer	 zone	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 change	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 energy	 security	
asymmetrically	in	favour	of	the	EU	consumers.	This	would	be	underpinned	by	the	ability	of	the	 EU	 to	 influence	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 actors	 beyond	 its	 border	 by	 gaining	
institutionalised	 soft	 power,433	 for	 the	 rules	 they	will	 be	 bound	with	 are	made	 in	 the	 EU.	Ultimately,	the	latter	will	limit	the	capacity	of	third	countries	to	use	energy	supply/transit	as	 a	 tool	 of	 their	 strategic	 policy-making.	 This,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 will	 diminish	 their	relative	national	power	vis-à-vis	the	EU.	However,	one	should	not	equate	the	rational	policy	choice	by	one	actor	(EU)	towards	the	others	 (SGC	 countries)	with	 the	 rational	 policy	 response	by	 the	 latter.	 In	 this	 regard,	 as	Chapter	 I	 of	 this	 thesis	 argued,	 what	 actually	 conditions	 the	 success	 of	 the	 EU	 external	energy	 governance	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 SGC,	 is	 rather	 the	 inter-relations	 between	 the	expected	costs	and	benefits	of	 the	 target	 countries.	 I	 analyse	 these	 inter-relations	 in	 the	subsequent	three	empirical	chapters	on	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan,	the	territories	of	which	constitute	the	main	transit	segments	of	the	SGC.	
                                                            432	Youngs,	Europe’s	External	Energy	Policy:	Between	Geopolitics	and	the	Market,	p.	8;	Konoplyanik,	‘A	Common	Russia-EU	 Energy	 Space	 (The	 New	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 Agreement,	 Acquis	 Communautaire,	 the	 Energy	Charter	and	the	New	Russian	Initiative)’.	433	Here,	the	difference	between	institutionalised	soft	power	and	conventional	soft	power	is	that,	while	the	latter	is	underpinned	by	the	ideational	influence	over	the	third	counties	through	the	promulgation	of	one's	informal	ways-of-doing-things,	 the	 former	 uses	 formal	 rules	 to	 tie	 the	 preferences	 of	 third	 countries	 to	 the	 one's	domestic	preferences.	Essentially,	 difference	 is	between	 "getting	others	 to	want	what	 you	want"	 and	getting	
others	 contractually	 signed	 up	 to	 what	 you	 want	without	 resorting	 to	 material	 means	 of	 coercion,	 such	 as	economic	or	military	might.	For	soft	power	in	a	conventional	sense,	see	Nye,	The	Paradox	of	American	Power:	
Why	the	World’s	Only	Superpower	Can’t	Go	It	Alone,	pp.	8–12.	
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CHAPTER	IV:	EUROPEANISATION	OF	TURKEY's	NATURAL	GAS	SECTOR	&	SGC	
1.	Introduction	
The	core	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	analyse	the	degree	to	which	the	EU	has	been	successful	in	 Europeanising	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector	 of	 Turkey,	 which	 is	 a	 lynchpin	 actor	 along	 the	Southern	 Gas	 Corridor.	 Although	 the	 existence	 and	 the	 on-going	 construction	 of	 the	physical	 gas	 infrastructure	 across	 Turkey	 (will)	 constitute	 tangible	 progress	 in	 the	physical	development	of	the	SGC	and	its	contribution	to	the	EU	energy	security,	it	will	not	address	all	the	potential	risks	to	gas	supply	via	this	corridor.	As	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	III,	transit	risks	specific	to	the	gas	industry	can	be	in	the	form	of	restriction	of	access	to	transit	capacity	for	political	and/or	commercial	reasons,	as	well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 in	 price	 formulation	 and/or	 excessive	 charges	 for	transiting	gas.	Turkey	 is	a	vital	 transit	 country	between	 the	Caspian	and	Middle	Eastern	natural	gas	reserves	on	the	one	hand	and	the	EU	market(s)	on	the	other.	Hence,	policies	and	 (geo-)politics	 pursued	 by	 the	Turkish	 government	 in	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector	 has	 the	potential	 to	 render	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 energy	 resources	 to	 the	 EU	
uncompetitive,	in	other	words,	not	being	subject	to	the	free	market	principles.	As	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 Chapters	 I	 and	 III,	 since	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 energy	 supply	constitutes	 one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 tenets	 of	 the	 EU's	 conception	 of	 energy	 security,	 it	requires	institutional	level	EU	external	actions.	The	latter	manifests	itself	in	the	regulatory	
dimension	of	 the	SGC.	 In	relation	 to	 the	Turkish	segment	of	 the	SGC,	 the	regulatory	 level	external	action	on	the	part	of	the	EU	is	pursued	as	part	of	Turkey’s	EU	accession	process,	as	well	 as	 the	 its	potential	membership	 in	 the	Energy	Community	Treaty,	both	of	which	envisage	 the	harmonisation	of	 the	Turkish,	 inter	alia,	natural	gas	 legislation	with	 that	of	the	 EU.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 the	 institutional	convergence	between	Turkey	and	the	European	Union	in	natural	gas	sector,	as	well	as	the	determination	of	the	factors	conditioning	thereof	is	important	for	analysing	the	potential	transit	risks	for	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	the	SGC.	To	 that	end,	below	I	 first	analyse	 the	degree	 to	which	Turkey	has	aligned	 its	gas	market	legislation	with	the	EU	acquis	as	part	of	its	accession	process.	Then,	I	continue	to	identify	the	 factors	 that	 condition	 Turkey's	 choices	 (failure)	 to	 implement	 the	 relevant	
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institutional	 reforms.	 In	doing	so,	 I	 rely	on	 the	 rationalist	explanatory	model	of	external	Europeanisation	 based	 on	 external	 incentive	 and	 contend	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 uncertain	membership	prospects,	huge	net	domestic	 costs	 constitute	 the	major	 factors	 that	 inhibit	the	Europeanisation	of	Turkey's	natural	gas	sector.	Finally,	 I	 analyse	 the	 implication	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 regulatory	 convergence	 between	 Turkey	and	the	EU	on	the	current	and	future	functioning	of	the	SGC	under	competitive	principles.	
2.	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	sector	of	Turkey	
As	presented	in	Chapter	III,	the	export	of	the	EU	natural	gas	legislation	to	Turkey	is	being	pursued	 through	 the	 latter's	EU	accession	negotiations	and	 the	potential	membership	 in	the	Energy	Community	Treaty.	Both	of	these	avenues	of	EU	external	governance	envisage	the	adoption	by	Turkey	EU	Third	Energy	Package	and	are	of	research	interest	for	me	here.	Nonetheless,	I	will	 largely	concentrate	on	the	accession	process	in	this	chapter	due	to	its	centrality	to	the	Europeanisation	of	Turkey;	although	references	to	the	EnCT	will	also	be	made.	In	 general,	 the	 EU	 accession	 process	 envisages	 both	 political	 and	 acquis	 conditionality,	which	Turkey	has	to	fulfil	as	a	candidate	country	in	order	to	become	a	member.	Unlike	the	former,	 the	 acquis	 conditionality	 follows	 a	 relatively	 straightforward	 route	 in	 terms	identifying	 the	 nature	 of	 reforms	 that	 a	 candidate	 country	 needs	 to	 implement.	 In	 the	natural	gas	sector,	the	acquis	consists	of	all	the	(gas	related)	components	of	the	EU	Third	Energy	Package	 and	other	 legislative	 acts	pertaining	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector.	Due	 to	 time	and	 space	 constraints,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 screen	 the	 entire	 Turkish	 natural	 gas	 market	legislation	in	order	to	analyse	their	compatibility	with	the	EU	acquis.	Furthermore,	not	all	the	elements	of	the	EU’s	energy	acquis	are	relevant	for	ensuring	the	freedom	of	gas	transit	via	Turkey	(as	part	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor),	which	is	the	main	analytical	focus	of	this	PhD.	Therefore,	below	I	concentrate	on	the	three	regulatory	benchmarks	(unbundling,	TPA	and	the	transit	rules)	that	I	have	identified	in	Chapter	III	for	the	purpose	of	analysing	the	compatibility	of	Turkish	gas	market	rules	with	the	EU	acquis.	To	start	with,	the	most	fundamental	piece	of	legislation	that	regulates	the	Turkish	natural	gas	market	 is	 the	Natural	Gas	Market	 Law	 (NGML)	No.	 4646	 adopted	 in	April	 2001.	The	Law	initiated	the	liberalisation	of	the	Turkish	domestic	natural	gas	market,	terminated	the	
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legal	 monopoly	 rights	 of	 the	 state	 owned	 incumbent	 Petroleum	 Pipeline	 Company	(BOTAS)	and	enabled	the	private	entities	to	engage	in	natural	gas	supply	in	Turkey.434	The	 NGML	 introduced	 licensing	 requirements	 for	 each	 of	 the	 gas	 market	 activity	 (i.e.	
production,	 transmission,	 distribution,	 wholesale,	 importation,	 exportation,	 trading	 and	
storage)435	and	restructured	Turkey's	domestic	market	in	a	complex	manner.	The	relevant	stakeholders	in	the	Turkish	natural	gas	market	are:	• Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	 Resources	 -	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 state	 policy	 on	energy	 and	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 necessary	 draft	 laws	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 the	Turkish	parliament.	• BOTAS	-	is	a	vertically	integrated	undertaking,	which	owns	and	operates	national	transmission	lines,	as	well	as	supplies	78%	of	the	wholesale	gas	in	Turkey.	• Energy	 Market	 Regulation	 Authority	 (EMRA)	 (and	 its	 Board)	 -	 is	 the	 relevant	regulatory	authority	in	charge	of	providing	necessary	licenses	and	certificates	for	the	 gas	 market	 activities,	 approving	 tariffs	 for,	 inter	 alia,	 gas	 transmission	 and	preparing	necessary	network	codes.	In	the	market,	public	and	private	suppliers	(importers	and/or	domestic	producers)	supply	gas	to	the	wholesalers,	which	then	trade	and	re-sell	the	gas	volumes	to	the	distributors	by	using	 the	 national	 transmission	 networks	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 BOTAS.	 For	transmission	services	BOTAS	receives	transmission	fees.	Final	customers	(households),	on	the	other	hand,	buy	their	gas	from	the	distributors.436	NGML	 prescribes	 account	 and	 legal	 unbundling	 of	 the	 Turkish	 natural	 gas	 transmission	system	operator,	i.e.	BOTAS	until	2009.437	In	account	unbundling,	the	vertically	integrated	company	is	required	to	keep	separate	accounts	for	its	transmission	and	supply	activities,	while	 legal	 unbundling	 requires	 transmission	 and	 supply	 activities	 to	 be	 performed	 by	separate	legal	entities	(whether	under	the	same	parent	company	or	by	unrelated	entities).	Furthermore,	under	 the	NGML,	BOTAS	was	envisaged	to	undergo	ownership	unbundling	from	2009	onwards	and	perform	only	gas	 import	and	wholesale	activities	with	no	more	
                                                            434	Deloitte	Report:	Turkey’s	Natural	Gas	Market	Expectations	and	Developments	2012,	2012,	p.	10.	435	‘Natural	Gas	Market	Law,	No.	4646’	(Turkey,	2001),	Article	6.	436	 Gulmira	 Rzayeva,	 Natural	 Gas	 in	 the	 Turkish	 Domestic	 Energy	 Market:	 Policies	 and	 Challenges	 (Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies,	2014),	p.	49.	437	 ‘Natural	 Gas	Market	 Law,	 No.	 4646’,	 Provisional	 Article	 2;	Deloitte	 Report:	 Turkey’s	 Natural	 Gas	 Market	
Expectations	and	Developments	2012,	p.	11.	
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than	20%	market	share.	All	other	assets	of	BOTAS,	excluding	transmission	pipelines,	were	to	be	privatised.438		In	this	regard,	although	the	EU	acquis	prescribes	three	-	ownership,	ITO	and	ISO439	models	for	the	unbundling	of	 the	supply,	 transmission	and	distribution	activities,	 it	nevertheless	allows	 the	 member	 states	 to	 decide	 on	 which	 of	 these	 models	 to	 apply	 domestically440	Therefore,	 by	 prescribing	 ownership	 unbundling	 for	 the	 natural	 gas	 supply	 and	transmission	activities,	the	Turkish	NGML	formally	complies	with	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	EU	acquis	on	this	specific	benchmark.		Secondly,	the	NGML	provides	for	a	regulated	(mandatory)	third	party	access	rules	for	the	transmission	pipelines,	which	as	a	general	principle	is	enshrined	in	Article	4	of	the	Law.	In	addition	and	similar	to	the	EU	acquis,	NGML	prescribes	transmission	tariffs	to	be	approved	by	the	regulatory	authority	(EMRA)	and	TPA	to	take	place	based	on	these	approved	and	pre-published	 tariffs,441	 as	 opposed	 to	 negotiations	 between	 the	 third	 parties	 and	 the	transmission	 operator.442	 The	 detailed	 provisions	 of	 the	 TPA	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 the	network	 code	 called	 BOTAS	 Transmission	 Network	 Operation	 Principles	 or	 simply	 NOP.	Although	 NOP	 has	 made	 huge	 progress	 in	 providing	 equitable	 TPA	 regime	 to	 national	transmission	network	within	Turkey,	it	does	not	cover	the	access	regime	for	gas	transiting	the	Turkish	national	system.	This	 is	rather	due	to	the	fact	that	NGML	does	not	recognise	
transit	as	a	market	activity,	hence,	NOP	does	not	prescribe	any	regulatory	measures	to	that	end.443	 In	other	words,	although	NGML	provides	 for	a	 regulated	 (mandatory)	 third	party	access	 for	 domestic	 gas,	 it	 does	 not	 extend	 the	 same	 benefits	 for	 the	 gas	 transiting	(traversing)	Turkish	territory,	which	is	the	raison	d'être	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.444	Lastly,	 since	 transit	 of	 gas	 is	 not	 considered	 a	market	 activity	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 it	 is	 not	subject	to	regulation	under	the	current	gas	market	law	in	Turkey.	This	allows	for	the	state	to	 treat	 transit	 regime	 for	 gas	 under	 sovereign	 discretion	 and	 attune	 it	 to	 the	 country's	(geo)economic	 and	 (geo)political	 interests.	 In	 a	 bigger	 picture	 this	 means	 that,	liberalisation	of	 the	Turkish	gas	market	 is	(partially)	 taking	place	without	 its	 integration	
                                                            438	 ‘Natural	 Gas	Market	 Law,	 No.	 4646’,	 Provisional	 Article	 2;	Deloitte	 Report:	 Turkey’s	 Natural	 Gas	 Market	
Expectations	 and	Developments	 2012,	 p.	 11.;	 This	was	 also	 highlighted	 during	 the	 interview	with	 an	 official	from	the	EC/	DG	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	439	Independent	Transmission	Operator	and	Independent	System	Operator	440	See	e.g.	‘Commission	SWP:	Interpretative	Note	on	Directive	2009/72/EC	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Electricity	and	Directive	2009/73/EC	Concerning	Common	Rules	for	the	Internal	Market	in	Natural	Gas	-	The	Unbundling	Regime’,	2010.	441	‘Natural	Gas	Market	Law,	No.	4646’,	Article	11.	442	Deloitte	Report:	Turkey’s	Natural	Gas	Market	Expectations	and	Developments	2012,	p.	12.	443	This	was	also	highlighted	during	the	interview	with	an	official	from	the	EC/DG	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	444	 This	 was	 also	 pointed	 out	 during	 the	 interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Energy,	 04/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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into	 the	neighbouring,	 especially	 the	EU	 single	market.	Additionally,	when	analysing	 the	degree	 of	 rule	 adoption	 by	 Turkey,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 investigate	 the	 practical	implementation	thereof	 in	order	to	avoid	the	 impact	of	"Potemkin	harmonisation"	on	the	functioning	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.		In	 this	 regard,	 contrary	 to	 the	 regulatory	 prescription,	 BOTAS	 has	 not	 yet	 undergone	ownership	unbundling	and	remains	a	 firmly	vertically	 integrated	undertaking	almost	15	years	 after	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Turkish	 NGML.445	 Furthermore,	 the	market	 share	 of	 the	Turkish	gas	 incumbent	BOTAS	was	reduced	to	only	78%	by	2015	as	opposed	to	20%	as	prescribed	 by	 the	 NGML.	 BOTAS	 currently	 accounts	 for	 around	 35	 bcm/a	 of	 Turkish	domestic	 gas	 supply,	 in	 comparison	 to	 10	 bcm/a	 by	 the	 private	 actors.446	 Additionally,	through	 Board	 Decisions	 No.	 725/2006	 and	 No.	 1709/2008	 Turkish	 Energy	 Market	Regulatory	 Board	 has	 introduced	 a	 new	 requirement	 according	 to	 which,	 BOTAS's	comments	must	be	received	before	 the	approval	of	 the	new	gas	purchase	contracts,	 that	private	 companies	 conclude	 with	 external	 suppliers	 with	 whom	 BOTAS	 does	 not	 hold	import	 contracts.	 This	 decision	 is	 justified	 by	 "the	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 “take	 or	 pay”	
obligations	 under	 the	 purchase	 contracts	 of	 BOTAS	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 more-than-
necessary	import	connections,	and	thus	the	need	to	take	measures	to	prevent	public	losses."447	In	 other	 words,	 as	 a	 state-owned	 entity	 BOTAS	 is	 allowed	 to	 influence	 the	 commercial	decisions	 of	 the	 private	 gas	 suppliers,	 which	 were	 supposed	 to	 be	 operating	 in	 a	liberalised	market.		In	this	regard,	although	Turkey	has	achieved	some	progress	as	regards	the	liberalisation	of	its	domestic	natural	gas	market,	 the	progress	has	 largely	been	oriented	towards	 internal	gas	supply	and	avoided	providing	market-based	regulatory	regime	as	far	as	the	transit	gas	is	 concerned.	 This	 puts	 Turkish	 national	 gas	 market	 legislation	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 EU	
acquis,	which	envisages	the	establishment	of	an	 integrated	energy	market,	where	energy	flows	wherever	it	is	needed	most,	without	being	subject	to	national	barriers.448	In	this	vein,	as	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	III,	the	notion	of	gas	"transit"	under	the	EU	law	requires	gas	flow	to	be	determined	by	the	technical	capacity	and	commercial	considerations	related	to	the	transmission	lines,	rather	than	the	(geo)political	and	(geo)economic	considerations	of	the	transit	country.	This	principle	has	neither	been	prescribed	in	law,	nor	implemented	in	practice	 in	 Turkey,	 especially	 vis-à-vis	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 Caspian	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 via	 the	
                                                            445	 Interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	446	Rzayeva,	Natural	Gas	in	the	Turkish	Domestic	Energy	Market:	Policies	and	Challenges,	p.	29.	447	Deloitte	Report:	Turkey’s	Natural	Gas	Market	Expectations	and	Developments	2012,	p.	13.	448	A	Framework	Strategy	for	a	Resilient	Energy	Union	with	a	Forward-Looking	Climate	Change	Policy	
COM(2015)	80,	p.	2.	
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Turkish	national	transmission	system	(or	even	separate	transit	pipelines	as	I	will	indicate	below).		The	 necessity	 of	 ensuring	 regulated	 equitable	 third	 party	 access	 regime	 to	 the	 Turkish	pipelines	 is	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 Turkey	 does	 not	 cross-subsidise	 domestically	destined	gas	with	the	volumes	traversing	its	territory	en-route	to	the	EU	by	charging	the	latter	with	higher	transportation	tariffs	compared	to	the	former.449	This	may	not	only	dis-incentivise	the	supply	of	gas	across	the	SGC,	but	also	render	gas	volumes	exported	to	the	EU	 commercially	 uncompetitive	 due	 to	 the	 high	 costs	 stemming	 from	 the	transportation/transit.	Similarly,	 in	 its	 recent	 progress	 reports	 on	 Turkey's	 compliance	 with	 the	 EU	 rules,	 the	European	Commission	repeatedly	indicated	that	Turkey	has	made	no	progress	in	ensuring	
"fair	 and	 non-discriminatory	 rules	 for	 gas	 transit"450	 and	 BOTAS,	 which	 also	 controls	domestic	 natural	 gas	 transmission	 system,	 has	 not	 reduced	 its	 monopolistic	 domestic	market	 share	 as	 was	 previously	 expected.451	 Following	 the	 tangible	 progress	 on	 the	intergovernmental	 agreement	 with	 Azerbaijan	 on	 the	 Trans-Anatolian	 Pipeline,	 the	European	Commission	praised	Turkey	for	the	"progress	in	the	field	of	energy,	especially	on	
security	of	supply".	However,	it	stressed	that,	"further	work	is	required	on	natural	gas	[…]	
in	particular	on	alignment	with	the	relevant	EU	directives".452	In	the	past,	the	lack	of	transit	freedom	across	Turkey	has	created	a	number	of	setbacks	for	the	transportation	of	Caspian,	especially	Azeri	gas	to	the	EU.	Azerbaijan	started	production	in	 its	 giant	 Shah	Deniz	 gas	 field	 in	2006	and	 supplied	 its	 first	 gas	 volumes	 to	Turkey	 in	2007	 based	 on	 the	 supply	 contract	 signed	 in	 2001.453	 Under	 this	 contract,	 the	 Eastern	border	 of	Turkey	was	used	 for	 the	delivery	 and	 the	pricing	of	 gas	 volumes	destined	 for	Turkish	consumption.	Some	of	these	volumes	were	later	re-exported	to	the	EU	by	Turkey	at	much	higher	prices,	which	caused	dissatisfaction	by	the	Azerbaijani	side	as	regards	the	
unfair	gas	purchase	prices	it	was	receiving	from	Turkey.		Following	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 concept	 in	 2008,	 the	 transit-hampering	role	of	Turkey	became	all	 the	more	visible.	Turkish	government	was	keen	on	
                                                            449	 Interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	450	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	2012),	p.	61;	Turkey	2013	
Progress	Report,	SWD(2013)	417	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	2013),	p.	35.	The	lack	of	relevant	progress	was	 also	 highlighted	 by	 the	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels	451	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	61.	452	Turkey	 2014	 Progress	 Report,	 SWD(2014)	 307	 (Brussels:	 European	 Commission,	 2014),	 p.	 38	 (emphasis	added).	453	Lussac,	‘A	Deal	at	Last:	A	Bright	Future	for	Azerbaijani	Gas	in	Europe?’	
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acting	as	a	middleman	in	transferring	the	Caspian	gas,	by	purchasing	it	at	low	prices	on	its	Eastern	border	and	re-selling	it	at	higher	prices	to	the	EU	on	the	Western	border.454	Given	that	the	Azerbaijani	government	was	already	unhappy	with	the	gas	purchase	prices	it	was	receiving	 from	 Turkey,	 it	 firmly	 declared	 its	 intention	 to	 sell	 its	 gas	 directly	 to	 the	European	customers	by	using	Turkey	only	as	a	transit	country.455	It	took	Azerbaijan	three	years	to	negotiate	the	transit	terms	of	its	gas	exports	to	the	EU.	Both	on	this	issue,	as	well	as	 during	 the	 negotiations	 on	 the	 transit	 regime	 for	 the	 Interconnector	 Turkey-Greece-Italy	(ITGI)	and	Nabucco	pipeline	(which	were	to	source,	Azeri,	Iraqi	and	Iranian	gas	at	the	Eastern	 border	 of	 Turkey	 for	 the	 delivery	 to	 the	 EU),	 Ankara's	 transit	 hampering	 role	manifested	itself	on	two	specific	points:	• Transit	lift-offs	 -	Turkey	was	keen	on	receiving	15%	of	natural	gas	transiting	its	territory	 free	of	 charge	or	under	discounted	prices	as	a	 transit	 fee,	 in	 relation	 to	both	Nabucco456	and	ITGI.457	• Cheap	 gas	 purchase	 prices	 -	 The	 freedom	 of	 transit	 across	 Turkey	 was	 also	linked	to	the	(cheaper)	gas	purchasing	prices	for	Turkish	domestic	consumption.458	These	 demands	 by	 the	 Turkish	 government	 were	 not	 acceptable	 for	 the	 Caspian	producers,	because	any	additional	costs	incurred	during	the	transit	would	make	their	gas	uncompetitive	in	the	EU	market.	By	undermining	the	commercial	viability	of	the	Caspian	gas	exports	 to	 the	EU,	Turkey's	 relentless	 transit	 terms	also	delayed	 the	progress	of	 the	establishment	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	for	at	least	half	a	decade.		In	 this	 regard,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	 to	 pursue	 its	 above-mentioned	preferences	was	rendered	legally	and	politically	possible,	as	the	Turkish	government	has	not	 approximated	 domestic	 legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis,	 which	 would	 have	otherwise	 established	 a	 transit-friendly	 regulatory	 regime	 in	 Turkey.	 Neither	 Turkey's	membership	in	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	provides	strong	enough	regulatory	pressure;	for	the	 it	 does	 not	 prescribe	 regulated	 (mandatory)	 third	 party	 access	 regime	 to	 the	
                                                            454	Lussac,	‘A	Deal	at	Last:	A	Bright	Future	for	Azerbaijani	Gas	in	Europe?’	455	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	SOCAR,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	456	Vladimir	Socor,	‘Turkey’s	Stalling	on	Nabucco	Hurts	Europe,	Azerbaijan,	and	Itself:	Part	One’,	Eurasia	Daily	
Monitor,	 2009	<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34657&no_cache=1#.VUShbq2qqko>	[accessed	 5	 February	 2015];	 ‘Nabucco	 Gas	 Pipeline	 Project	 Crosses	 Key	 Threshold	 with	 Signing	 of	Intergovernmental	Agreement’,	IHS,	13	July	2009.	457	Vladimir	Socor,	‘Interconnector	and	Trans-Adriatic	Gas	Pipeline	Projects:	How	Competitive?’,	Eurasia	Daily	
Monitor,	 2011	<http://www.jamestown.org/regions/turkey/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=4&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37358&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=649&cHash=9cdb7e997cfef26dbe3ac1330f452c25#.VUSjNa2qqko>	[accessed	5	February	2015].	458	Interview	with	a	senior	official	from	SOCAR,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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transmission/transit	pipelines,	nor	it	prohibits	the	demands	for	transit	fees	by	the	transit	country.459	Lack	 of	 conformity	with	 the	EU	 energy	acquis	 can	 be	witnessed	not	 only	 in	 the	Turkish	domestic	 gas	 legislation,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 intergovernmental	 agreements	 that	 Turkey	 has	signed	as	part	of	the	specific	transit	projects	for	the	export	of	the	Caspian	gas	to	the	EU.	In	this	regard,	 the	Turkey-Azerbaijan	 intergovernmental	agreement	on	 the	Trans-Anatolian	Pipeline	 is	 very	 important,	 as	 it	will	 constitute	 an	 important	mid-stream	segment	of	 the	current	design	of	the	SGC.	The	IGA	and	the	Host	Government	Agreement	(HGA)	on	TANAP	were	signed	between	Turkey	and	Azerbaijan	on	June	26,	2012,	while	the	final	investment	decision	on	the	construction	of	this	pipeline	was	undertaken	on	March	17,	2015.	In	 contrast	with	 the	EU	energy	acquis,	TANAP	 IGA	does	not	envisage	any	unbundling	or	TSO	certification	provisions,	while	the	pipeline	is	owned	by	SOCAR	(58%),	BP	(12%)	and	BOTAS	(30%);	all	these	companies	are	engaged	in	the	production	and/or	supply	of	natural	gas.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 gas	 transit	 across	 Turkey,	 this	 is	 an	 especially	 relevant	concern.	This	is	rather	because,	freedom	of	transit	across	the	SGC	can	only	be	achieved	if	the	regulatory	regime	for	the	corridor	is	ensured	in	such	a	way	that	the	ownership	of	gas	volumes	 transported	 through	 the	 infrastructure(s)	 is	 irrelevant	 for	 the	 owners	 and	 the	operators	 of	 this	 very	 infrastructure(s).	 In	 this	 regard,	 since	 the	 owners	 of	 TANAP	 also	own	 the	 volumes	 transported	 through	 it,	 they	 have	 an	 in-built	 conflict	 of	 interest	 with	other	potential	 gas	producer/suppliers	 in	 the	 region,	who	might	be	 interested	 in	having	access	to	the	TANAP’s	capacity,	whether	to	supply	Turkish	or	the	EU	consumers.	Additionally,	TANAP	IGA	does	not	prescribe	regulated	(mandatory)	 third	party	access	 in	accordance	with	the	EU	acquis,	either,	although	negotiated	third	party	access	is	not	ruled	out.	The	latter	will	be	dependent	on	the	business	model	of	the	operation	of	TANAP	and	the	profits	that	third	party	gas	can	generate	for	the	owners	of	 the	pipeline	in	the	case	of	the	availability	of	the	free	capacity	in	the	pipeline.460		Moreover,	 TANAP	 HGA	 grants	 TANAP	 Project	 Entity	 the	 exclusive	 right	 to	 conduct	 the	transit	 passage	 of	 natural	 gas	 via	 the	 Trans-Anatolian	 Pipeline.461	 Under	 the	 HGA,	 the	Turkish	government	has	undertaken	the	obligation	not	to	obstruct	Azeri	gas	exports	to	the	EU.	 However,	 in	 return,	 any	 future	 available	 gas	 from	 Azerbaijan	 (in	 addition	 to	 SH	 II	volumes)	 will	 first	 have	 to	 be	 offered	 to	 the	 Turkish	 market	 and	 only	 then	 to	 the	 EU	
                                                            459	 See	 e.g.	Mete,	 ‘Analysis	 of	 the	 Term	 ’transit’	 in	 Cross-Border	 Energy	 Transport:	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 of	Regulatory	Frameworks	in	the	Eurasian	Context’.	460	 Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	 to	 the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	Similar	view	was	also	voiced	by	the	EC/DG	Energy	official	during	the	interview,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	461	Babayev,	‘TANAP:	General	Project	Status’.	
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consumers.462	 This	 is	 incompatible	 with	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 market	 principles,	 which	envisages	gas	to	follow	price	signals,	as	opposed	to	political	promises.	In	 this	 regard,	 although	TANAP	 IGA	and	HGA	provide	a	 certain	 level	of	 secure	 transit	of	Azeri	gas	through	Turkey,	it	is	not	in	compliance	with	the	EU	energy	acquis.	In	the	absence	of	regulated	third	party	access,	the	control	of	the	pipeline	by	a	limited	number	of	producer	companies	 will	 create	 a	 major	 conflict	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 future.	 This	 is	 rather	 because,	Turkey	and	specifically,	TANAP	can	also	serve	as	a	transit	route	for	the	export	of	Middle	Eastern	gas	volumes	(from,	e.g.	Iran,	Iraq	or	even	Turkmenistan	in	Central	Asia)	to	the	EU,	in	addition	 to	Azeri	gas.	Control	of	TANAP	by	 the	upstream	companies	producing	gas	 in	Azerbaijan,	however,	would	enable	them	to	exercise	the	right	of	first	call	for	the	access	to	the	pipeline	or	even	result	 in	excessive	access	charges	for	third	party	gas.	 In	this	regard,	the	 legislative	 framework	 behind	TANAP	does	 not	 provide	 for	 legal	 safeguards	 for	 non-discriminatory	and	equitable	access	rights	for	third	parties,	which	is	the	backbone	of	the	EU	energy	acquis.	Quite	interestingly,	by	signing	up	for	TANAP,	Turkey	has	conceded	and	shared	 some	 its	 sovereign	 transit	 prerogatives	 with	 Azerbaijan.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 argued	above,	 these	 prerogatives	 oblige	 Azerbaijan	 to	 offer	 future	 available	 gas	 volumes	 to	Turkey	 first	 and	 only	 after	 to	 the	 EU	 markets.	 Additionally,	 these	 prerogatives	 do	 not	extend	to	providing	freedom	of	transit	for	all	other	interested	parties,	including	Iran,	Iraq	and	Turkmenistan.	In	contrast	to	TANAP,	the	Nabucco	IGA	(described	in	Chapter	II)	provided	for	a	mandatory	third	party	access	to	50%	of	 the	capacity	of	 the	pipeline.	 In	doing	so,	 the	IGA	prescribed	
One-Stop-Shop	 Shipper	 access	 regime	 to	 the	 pipeline,463	 while	 eliminating	 any	 Nabucco	specific	 transit	 taxation	and	prohibiting	any	hurdles	 regarding	 the	geographical	delivery	point	of	gas464	or	the	"interruption	of	or	restriction	on	the	freedom	of	transportation	in	the	
Nabucco	Project".465	In	doing	so,	although	Turkey	was	(and	is)	not	a	member	of	the	EU,	it	was	(is)	bound	by	the	provisions	of	the	Nabucco	IGA,	which	was	in	compliance	with	the	EU	energy	acquis	at	the	time.466	However,	since	Nabucco	Classic	pipeline	is	off	the	table	now,	its	favourable	transit	regime	is	of	little	relevance	for	gas	transit	across	Turkey.	In	 the	 following	section	 I	 aim	 to	provide	a	 thick	description	of	 the	domestic	 factors	 that	have	so	far	conditioned	the	failure	of	rule	adoption	by	Turkey	and	its	implications	on	the	regulatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 Southern	Gas	 Corridor.	 I	will	 deploy	 the	 External	 Incentive	
                                                            462	Interview	with	the	official	from	SOCAR,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	463	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Article	3.3.3.	464	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Article	7.1	and	Article	11.1.	465	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Article	7.2.	466	‘Intergovernmental	Agreement	on	Nabucco’,	Article	3.3	and	Article	13.	
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Model	 (rooted	 in	 Rational-Choice	 Institutionalism)	 in	 order	 to	 reveal	 the	 underlying	factors	 affecting	 the	 failure	 of	 rule	 adoption.	 This	 model	 predicts	 that,	 "A	 government	
adopts	the	EU	rules	if	the	benefits	of	EU	rewards	exceed	the	domestic	adoption	costs".467	With	this	 in	mind,	 the	 following	sub-sections	will	analyse	 the	role	of	size	and	speed	of	reward,	
credibility	 of	 conditionality	 and	 the	 net	 domestic	 costs	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 EU-sourced	energy	reforms	 in	Turkey.	 Investigation	of	 these	 factors	will	not	only	help	me	to	explain	Turkey's	 choice	 not	 to	 implement	 EU	 rules	 domestically,	 but	 also	 set	 the	 institutional	context	 for	 the	 potential	 implications	 thereof	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor.	
2.1.	EU-Turkey	membership	negotiations:	the	size	and	the	speed	of	the	final	
reward	
Understanding	 Turkey's	 EU	 membership	 ambitions	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 thoroughly	appreciate	 its	 energy	 security	 strategy	 and	 its	 current	 and	 future	 impact	 on	 the	development	of	the	SGC.		To	 start	 with,	 Turkey's	 EU	 membership	 aspirations	 date	 back	 to	 almost	 30	 years	 ago,	when	 the	 government	 at	 the	 time	 formally	 applied	 for	 the	 EU	 membership	 in	 1987.	Although	the	EU	membership	prospects	were	already	mentioned	in	Article	28	of	the	1963	(Ankara)	 Association	 Agreement	 with	 the	 EU,	 Turkey	 received	 a	 candidate	 status	 only	more	 than	 30	 years	 later,	 at	 the	 Helsinki	 European	 Council	 in	 December	 1999.	 The	accession	 negotiations,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 were	 launched	 in	 December	 2004,	 after	 the	Turkish	 government	 progressed	 in	 implementing	 reforms	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 EU's	Copenhagen	(political)	criteria.468	Although	almost	10	years	have	passed	since	the	start	of	the	accession	negotiations,	Turkey	still	seems	to	be	a	long	way	off	fulfilling	the	EU's	acquis	conditionality.	Out	of	33	chapters	of	 the	EU	acquis	 communautaire,	which	Turkey	has	 to	align	its	domestic	legislation	with,	only	14	have	so	far	been	opened	and	only	1	chapter	(the	non-controversial	 science	 and	 research)	 has	 been	 provisionally	 closed.	 8	 chapters	were	blocked	by	 the	 	 EU	Council	 in	2006.	Additionally,	 5	 chapters	were	blocked	by	France	 in	2007	and	6	additional	chapters	(including	energy)	were	unilaterally	blocked	by	Cyprus	in	2009,	 because	 of	 Turkey's	 position	 on	 the	 conflict	 resolution	 in	 the	 island.	 France	unblocked	1	chapter	on	regional	policy	in	2013,	although	the	chapter	has	yet	to	be	opened	
                                                            467	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	12.	468	Schimmelfennig,	Engert	and	Knobel,	‘The	Impact	of	EU	Political	Conditionality’,	p.	41.	
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for	negotiations.469	 The	Council’s	 decision	 to	block	8	 chapters	was	 triggered	by	Turkey’s	failure	 to	 implement	 the	 Additional	 Protocol	 to	 the	 Association	 Agreement,	 which	 is	related	 to	 the	 obligation	 of	 Turkey	 to	 open	 its	 air	 and	 seaports	 to	 Cypriot	 planes	 and	shipping.470	 Energy	 chapter,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	was	 blocked	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus;	because	 the	 Turkish	 navy	 obstructed	 the	 Cypriot	 government	 from	 carrying	 out	 oil	 and	gas	 exploration	 in	 parts	 of	 the	 Mediterranean,	 which	 the	 latter	 considers	 its	 exclusive	economic	 zone	 (EEZ).	 For	 its	 part,	 Ankara	 insists	 that	 exploration	 of	 hydrocarbons	 can	only	 be	 allowed	 after	 the	 unification	 of	 the	 divided	 island	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 both	communities	(Greek	and	Turkish)	could	benefit	from	the	potential	offshore	drillings.471	In	light	of	these	developments,	despite	its	continuous	reiteration	about	the	commitment	to	the	 EU	membership	 (the	 policy	 course,	which	 the	 former	 Turkish	 foreign	 and	 currently	Prime	 minister	 Ahmet	 Davutoglu	 called	 "irreversible"),472	 the	 Turkish	 government	 has	regularly	 criticised	 the	 political	 stalemate	 in	 the	 EU	 accession	 negotiations,473	 which	indicates	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Brussels	 to	 fulfil	 its	"promises".474	Consequently,	some	of	 the	positive	accomplishments	achieved	by	the	 incumbent	Turkish	government	in	the	early	years	of	its	ascent	to	power	have	since	then	been	reversed,	put	on	hold	or	not	 fulfilled	to	the	full	extend.	Especially	the	 introduction	of	civilian	control	over	the	 military	 establishment,	 which	 was	 widely	 seen	 as	 the	 architect	 of	 the	 consecutive	military	 coup	 d'états	 in	 Turkey	 in	 1960,	 1971,	 1980	 and	 1997	 (in	 order	 to	 restore	
"democratic	rule")	and	the	culprit	of	systematic	violation	of	human	rights	via	the	military	courts,	was	one	of	the	several	factors	that	served	as	a	gateway	to	the	opening	of	accession	negotiations	in	the	early	2000's.475	However,	the	latest	progress	reports	by	the	EC	indicate	that,	there	are	persistent	concerns	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	trials	over	military	personal	arraigned	 for	 coup	 allegations,476	 other	 human	 rights	 violations	 and	 continuous	 drift	 of	
                                                            469	Interview	with	a	senior	officer	from	the	EEAS	in	charge	of	the	EU-Turkey	bilateral	relations,	21/04/2015,	Brussels.	470	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	5.	471	Winrow,	‘Problems	and	Prospects	for	the	Fourth	Corridor:	The	Positions	and	Role	of	Turkey	in	Gas	Transit	to	Europe’,	p.	7.	472	 Ahmet	 Davutoğlu,	 The	 Cairo	 Review	 Interview:	 Strategic	 Thinking,	 2011,	 p.	 11;	 ‘Davutoğlu:	 Turkey	 a	Crossroads	 of	 Global	 Energy	 Transportation’,	 TODAY’S	 ZAMAN,	 10	 August	 2009	<http://www.todayszaman.com//news-183531-davutoglu-turkey-a-crossroads-of-global-energy-transportation.html>	[accessed	14	August	2013].	473	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	10.	474	I	use	the	word	"promise"	in	quotation	marks,	for	it	is	my	contention	that	the	commitment	on	the	part	of	the	EU	to	grant	Turkey	membership	prospects	was	at	best	ambiguous.	475	Schimmelfennig,	Engert	and	Knobel,	 ‘The	Impact	of	EU	Political	Conditionality’,	pp.	41,	42;	see	also,	Owen	Parker,	 ‘“Cosmopolitan	Europe”	and	the	EU–Turkey	Question:	The	Politics	of	a	“common	Destiny”’,	Journal	of	
European	Public	Policy,	16.7	(2009),	1085–1101.	476	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	7.	
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otherwise	 secular	 state	 into	 a	 religious	 polity,	 leading	 to	 the	 apprehensions	 that	 the	
liberator	itself	started	behaving	in	an	authoritarian	fashion.		In	 a	 separate	 and	more	 recent	 development,	 Turkish	 police	 attacked	 the	 environmental	demonstrators	in	Istanbul's	Gezi	Park	with	an	unmatched	force.	Turkey's	then	EU	Minister	Egemen	 Baris	 called	 the	 subsequent	 Taksim	 protesters	 “terrorists”,477	 while	 further	complicating	the	EU-Turkey	accession	negotiations.478	Furthermore,	 the	 current	 Turkish	 government	 showed	 the	 same	 irreconcilable	 attitude	towards	 the	resolution	of	almost	half	a	century	old	Cyprus	problem	and	by	extension	 to	the	 territorial	 integrity	 of	 an	 EU	 member	 state,	 i.e.	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus.	 During	 the	Cyprus	Presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	EU	during	the	second	half	of	2012,	Turkey	froze	its	relations	with	this	institution.	The	European	Council	called	on	to	the	Turkish	government	to	 show	 "full	 respect	 for	 the	 role	 of	 the	Presidency	 of	 the	 Council,	which	 is	 a	 fundamental	
institutional	feature	of	the	EU	provided	for	in	the	Treaty”	and	expressed	its	concerns	about	the	antagonistic	statements	made	by	the	former.479	Considering	the	fact	that	accession	to	the	 EU	 requires	 unanimous	 endorsement	 by	 all	 the	 EU	 member	 states,	 such	 an	antagonistic	rhetoric	on	the	part	of	the	Turkish	government	is	highly	unlikely	to	brighten	Turkey's	membership	prospects	in	the	near	future.	Moreover,	 one	 also	 has	 to	 look	 into	 the	 essence	 of	 Turkey's	 EU	membership	 "promise"	when	analysing	the	progress	on	the	rule	adoption,	inter	alia,	in	natural	gas	sector.	To	start	with,	 EU-Turkey	 accession	 negotiations	 were	 initiated	 only	 following	 the	 European	Council	 decision	 in	 December	 2004,	 which	 some	 theorists	 attributed	 to	 the	 EU's	 own	
"rhetorical	 entrapment".480	 Some	 experts	 argue	 that,	 Turkey's	 consistent	 reforms,	 among	others,	 in	 broadening	 domestic	 political	 freedoms,	 abolishing	 death	 penalty,	 ensuring	
civilianisation	of	politics,	as	well	as	cultural	rights	for	Turkey's	Kurdish	minority,481	the	EU	was	 entrapped	 in	 its	 own	 "promise"	 previously	 made	 in	 return	 to	 these	 reforms.482	
                                                            477	 Marc	 Champion,	 ‘Germany’s	 EU	 Block	 Hurts	 Turkey’s	 Protesters’,	 Bloomberg,	 23	 June	 2013	<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/germany-s-eu-block-hurts-turkey-s-protesters.html>	[accessed	30	June	2013].	478	 Andrew	 Rettman,	 ‘Police	 Brutality	 Threatens	 Restart	 of	 EU-Turkey	 Talks’,	 EU	 Observer,	 7	 June	 2013	<http://euobserver.com/enlargement/120417>	[accessed	3	July	2013].	479	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	5.	480	Neill	Nugent,	 ‘The	EU’s	Response	 to	Turkey’s	Membership	Application:	Not	 Just	 a	Weighing	of	Costs	and	Benefits’,	 Journal	 of	 European	 Integration,	 29.4	 (2007),	 481–502;	 Alexander	 Burgin,	 ‘Cosmopolitan	Entrapment:	 The	 Failed	 Strategies	 to	 Reverse	 Turkey’s	 EU	 Membership	 Eligibility’,	 Perspectives:	 Review	 of	
International	 Affairs,	 18.2	 (2010),	 33–56;	 Frank	 Schimmelfennig,	 ‘The	 Community	 Trap:	 Liberal	 Norms,	Rhetorical	 Action,	 and	 the	 Eastern	 Enlargement	 of	 the	 European	 Union’,	 International	 Organization,	 55.01	(2001),	47–80.	481	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 review,	 see	 e.g.	 Ergun	Ozbudun,	 ‘Democratization	Reforms	 in	Turkey,	 1993–2004’,	
Turkish	Studies,	8.2	(2007),	179–96.	482	European	European	Council,	Copenhagen	European	Council,	Presidency	Conclusions	(Brussels,	2002),	p.	5.	
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Following	 the	 EC's	 positive	 political	 conditionality	 report	 on	 Turkey,483	 the	 European	Council	had	no	option	but	 to	open	accession	negotiations	with	Turkey	while	recognising	its	future	membership	status.		In	 light	 of	 this,	 however,	 others	 argued	 that,	 "rhetorical	 entrapment"	 of	 the	 EU	 did	 not	actually	 take	 place.	 In	 fact,	 although	 the	 2004	 European	 Council	 decision	 officially	 calls	
accession	 a	 common	objective	 for	both	 the	EU	and	Turkey,	 its	 language	 is	 so	ambiguous	that	it	leaves	a	leeway	for	short-of-full-membership	interpretations,	in	addition	to	a	special	membership	 criterion	 for	 Turkey,	 namely,	 the	 possibility	 of	 indefinite	 ban	 on	 free	movement	 of	 labour.484	 In	 itself,	 the	 occurrence	 or	 non-occurrence	 of	 "rhetorical	
entrapment"	with	regard	to	Turkey's	EU	accession	process	is	not	of	primary	interest	here.	What	 is	 important	 though,	 is	 the	 official	 recognition	 that	 accession	 "negotiations	 are	 an	
open-ended	 process,	 the	 outcome	 of	 which	 cannot	 be	 guaranteed	 beforehand",	 which	 is	codified	 into	 the	 2004	 European	 Council	 decision.485	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 although	 officially	speaking,	the	EU	has	"promised"	Turkey	membership	prospect	at	some	point	in	the	future,	recognition	 of	 open-ended	 negotiations	 encourages	 closed-doors	 politics	 (by	 certain	member	 states)	 towards	 Turkey.	 This	 feeds	 into	 the	 suspicions	 that,	 in	 itself	 even	 full	compliance	 with	 the	 EU's	 political	 and	 acquis	 conditionality	 may	 not	 guarantee	 the	ultimate	reward	-	membership.		In	 this	 regard,	although	 the	size	of	 the	 final	 reward	 is	 in	principle	substantial,	 the	open-endedness	 of	 the	 accession	 process	 undermines	 the	 speed	 of	 attainment	 thereof.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 stalled	accession	negotiations	 since	2012,	 in	his	 “Political	Guidelines”	 the	(then	 candidate	 and	 currently)	 president	 of	 the	 EU	 executive	 indicated	 that,	 no	 new	members	would	be	 joining	 the	EU	during	 the	mandate	of	 the	2014-2019	Commission.486	This	 later	 followed	 with	 the	 Commission	 downsizing	 its	 Directorate-General	 on	Enlargement	 and	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 even	 replacing	 “enlargement”	 with	
“enlargement	 negotiations”	 in	 the	DG’s	 name	 in	 order	 to	 comply	with	 Juncker’s	 Political	Guidelines	 mentioned-above.	 Against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 already	 reduced	 enthusiasm	 for	European	 aspirations	 in	 Turkey,	 such	 factors	 diminish	 the	 prospect	 of	 imminent	membership	and	with	it	the	incentives	for	Turkey	to	approximate	its	domestic	legislation	and	policies	with	that	of	the	EU	acquis	and	policy.	
                                                            483	Recommendation	of	the	European	Commission	on	Turkey’s	Progress	towards	Accession	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	2004).	484	Beken	Saatcioglu,	‘The	EU’s	“Rhetorical	Entrapment”	in	Enlargement	Reconsidered:	Why	Hasn’t	It	Worked	for	Turkey?’,	Insight	Turkey,	14.3	(2012),	159–76	(p.	166).	485	Brussels	European	Council,	Presidency	Conclusions	(Brussels,	2004),	p.	7.	486	 Jean-Claude	 Juncker,	 ‘A	 New	 Start	 for	 Europe:	 My	 Agenda	 for	 Jobs,	 Growth,	 Fairness	 and	 Democratic	Change,	Political	Guidelines	for	the	next	European	Commission’,	2014,	p.	20.	
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2.2.	Credibility	of	conditionality	
As	argued	above,	EU’s	commitment	to	the	eventual	Turkish	membership	is	at	best	shaky	as	evidenced	in	the	opposition	from	important	political	actors	in	EU	member	states.487	This	has	not	only	slowed	down	the	reforms	process	by	the	government,	but	also	undermined	the	 popular	 trust	 in	 the	 reliability	 of	 EU	 promises.	 Notably,	 popular	 support	 for	 EU	membership	 in	Turkey	has	 fallen	 from	over	70%	when	talks	began	 in	2005	to	as	 low	as	33%	in	2013.488		This	 cooling	 of	 relations	 since	 2005	 is	 reflected	 not	 only	 in	 the	 limited	 level	 of	harmonisation	 of	 Turkish	 legislation	 and	 policies	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 but	 also	 in	 the	rollback	of	the	institutional	capabilities	of	the	relevant	Turkish	state	institutions	to	foster	the	 harmonisation	 process.	 In	 its	 recent	 progress	 report,	 the	 European	 Commission	complained	 that,	 EU	 Harmonisation	 Committee	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Parliament	 "remains	 an	
auxiliary	 committee	 with	 a	 limited	 mandate	 and	 ability	 to	 scrutinise	 legislation.”489	 The	Committee	was	 set	 up	when	 the	 accession	 negotiations	were	 proceeding	 at	 a	 relatively	normal	speed.	Every	piece	of	legislation	that	was	submitted	to	the	Turkish	Parliament	had	to	go	 through	 this	committee	and	 its	 role	was	 to	analyse	whether	 there	was	anything	 in	each	 piece	 of	 legislation	 that	 might	 have	 impact	 on	 the	 accession	 process.	 The	compatibility	check	was	actually	a	primary	task	of	the	relevant	bureaucrats	at	the	Ministry	of	 the	EU	Affairs	and	 in	other	 line	ministries	 in	Turkey.	However,	 the	EU	Harmonisation	Committee	was	intended	to	provide	a	higher	profile	political	scrutiny	over	the	legislative	process	in	the	country	by	ringing	“the	alarm	bells”	 to	ensure	that	nothing	impinges	upon	the	 EU	 accession	 process.	 However,	 as	 the	 accession	 negotiations	 began	 to	 slacken	towards	 the	 end	of	 the	 first	decade	of	 the	 current	 century,	 there	was	 less	motivation	 to	carry	out	 this	high	profile	exercise	and	 the	 involvement	of	 the	mentioned	parliamentary	committee	to	the	legislative	process	in	Turkey	has	been	rolled	back.490	To	sum	it	up,	although	the	EU	membership	still	seems	to	be	a	priority	political	orientation	for	the	Turkish	government,	lack	of	overall	progress	in	accession	negotiations	was	at	best	insignificant	 during	 the	 past	 decade.	 Additionally,	 discrepancies	 of	 opinion	 in	 the	European	capitals	on	Turkey's	 cultural	and	geographical	 relevance	 to	 the	EU	has	 largely	discouraged	the	enactment	of	necessary	reforms	in	full	scale.		
                                                            487	 Ian	 Traynor,	 ‘In	 1683	 Turkey	 Was	 the	 Invader.	 In	 2004	 Much	 of	 Europe	 Still	 Sees	 It	 That	 Way’,	 The	
Guardian,	 22	 September	 2004	 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey>	 [accessed	 24	June	2013].	488	 ‘A	Tiny	Thaw?’,	The	Economist,	23	February	2013	<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21572244-many-turks-have-given-up-progress-towards-eu-inches-forward-tiny-thaw>	[accessed	14	August	2013].	489	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	p.	9.	490	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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In	this	regard,	although	the	threat	of	withholding	the	reward	from	Turkey	-	a	membership	
carrot	 -	 is	 great,	 the	 credibility	membership	 promises	 remains	 at	 best	 uncertain	 in	 the	foreseeable	 future,	 too.	 Therefore,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 speed	 of	 final	 reward,	 the	 lack	 of	credibility	 of	 future	 membership	 constitutes	 a	 major	 factor	 leading	 to	 the	 failure	 of	Europeanisation	of	Turkey	and	by	extension	its	energy	sector.		Nonetheless,	 in	 itself	 these	 factors	 cannot	 directly	 mediate	 between	 the	 Turkish	government’s	 preferences	 and	 political	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 adoption	 or	 rejection	 of	the	EU	acquis	 in	natural	gas	sector	 in	specific.	This	becomes	especially	evident	given	the	considerable	progress	that	Turkey	has	achieved	in	harmonising	its	electricity,	renewables,	security	 of	 energy	 supply	 (i.e.	 oil,	 coal	 and	 gas	 stocks)	 and	 energy	 efficiency	 legislation	with	the	relevant	EU	acquis.491	Following	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 accession	 negotiations,	 the	 Turkish	 Parliament	 passed	 the	
Law	 Concerning	 the	 Use	 of	 Renewable	 Energy	 Resources	 for	 the	 Generation	 of	 Electrical	
Energy	 No.	 5346,	which	 came	 into	 force	 18	 May	 2005.	 This	 law	 established	 the	 basic	framework	for	 the	promotion	and	use	of	renewable	energy	sources	(RES)	 in	Turkey	and	was	 modelled	 under	 the	 German	 Renewables	 Energy	 Act,	 aiming	 at	 expanding	 "the	
utilisation	 of	 renewable	 energy	 resources".492	 It	 served	 as	 a	 stepping-stone	 on	 the	way	 of	alignment	and	implementation	of	the	relevant	EU	legislation.	The	Energy	Efficiency	 law	No.	 5627,	which	 is	 envisaged	 to	 comply	with	 the	EU	Directive	2006/32/EC	and	Directive	2002/91/EC,	additionally,	was	adopted	in	2007	and	"covers	the	
principles	 and	 procedures	 for	 promoting	 energy	 efficiency	 so	 as	 to	 reduce	 the	 burden	 on	
energy	cost	on	the	economy	and	on	the	environment."493	In	addition	to	rule	adoption	at	the	formal	 level,	 official	 reports	 indicate	 palpable	 progress	 in	 terms	 of	 practical	implementation	 of	 these	 legislative	 acts.	 The	 Energy	 Community	 in	 its	 latest	 progress	report	 indicated	 that,	 Turkey's	 electricity	 sector	 is	 on	 the	 track	 to	 transitioning	 "from	 a	
largely	 state	 owned	 monopoly	 into	 a	 liberalised	 unbundled	 market	 with	 private	 sector	
participation."494	 Unlike	 the	 natural	 gas	 network	 owner	 and	 operator	 BOTAS,	 Turkish	Electricity	Transmission	Company	 (TEIAŞ)	has	been	ownership	unbundled	and	operates	the	relevant	transmission	lines	on	a	regulated	third	party	access	basis	in	line	with	the	EU	
acquis.		
                                                            491	 Interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	492	 Study	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	 the	 New	 EU	 Renewables	 Directive	 in	 the	 Energy	 Community	 (Energy	Community	Secretariat,	2010),	pp.	265–266.	493	Study	on	the	Implementation	of	the	New	EU	Renewables	Directive	in	the	Energy	Community,	p.	266.	494	Study	on	the	Implementation	of	the	New	EU	Renewables	Directive	in	the	Energy	Community,	p.	268.	
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Furthermore,	 following	 the	EU	practice,	both	 transmission	and	distribution	operators	are	
required	 to	 give	 priority	 to	 renewable	 power	 transmission.495	 Similar	 overall	 progress	 in	electricity	 sector	 and	 energy	 efficiency	 has	 also	 been	 consistently	 indicated	 in	 the	European	Commission’s	progress	report	on	Turkey.496	In	 accounting	 for	 this	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 progress	 in	 natural	 gas	 and	 electricity	(renewables,	efficiency,	etc.)	sectors,	I	will	below	argue	that,	in	the	absence	of	the	credible	reward	 in	the	 foreseeable	 future,	net	domestic	costs	are	the	direct	causes	behind	Turkish	government’s	political	decision	to	not	to	adopt	EU	acquis	in	natural	gas	sector.	
2.3.	Net	domestic	costs	and	ensuring	Turkey's	natural	gas	security	and	transit	
role	
Turkey	has	been	an	important	player	in	regional	energy	diplomacy	ever	since	the	start	of	pipeline	transportation	of	energy	(both	oil	and	gas)	from	the	Caspian	Basin	and	the	Middle	East	over	the	last	two	decades.	In	this	regard,	although	energy	entails	both	economic	and	political	 implications	 for	 Turkey's	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 the	 country	 has	 yet	 to	develop	 a	 uniform	 state	 energy	 security	 strategy.	 However,	 under	 its	 formal	 remits	 for	determining	the	state	energy	policy,	the	Turkish	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	has	 developed	 two	 successive	 Strategic	 Plans	 in	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 years,	 covering	 the	periods	of	2010-2014	and	2015-2019	(see	Fig.	9	and	Fig.	10).	These	plans	list	the	major	goals	and	objectives	in	ensuring	domestic	energy	security.	
Fig.	9:	Strategic	Plan	2010-2014	|	Turkish	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	of	Turkey,	2010	
	
                                                            495	Study	on	the	Implementation	of	the	New	EU	Renewables	Directive	in	the	Energy	Community,	p.	269.	496	Turkey	2012	Progress	Report,	SWD(2012)	336,	pp.	60–61;	Turkey	2013	Progress	Report,	SWD(2013)	417,	p.	35.	Furthermore,	the	stark	difference	in	progress	between	natural	gas	and	electricity,	renewables	and	energy	efficiency	 was	 also	 pointed	 out	 by	 the	 relevant	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Enlargement	 Negotiations	 and	Neighbourhood	Policy	during	one	of	the	elite	interviews,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	
Strategic	Theme	1:	Energy	Supply	Security	• 	Aim	1		-		Providing	Diversity	in	Resources	by	Giving	Priority	to	the	Domestic	Resources	• 	Aim	2		-		Increasing	the	share	of	the	renewable	energy	resources	within	the	energy	supply	• 	Aim	3		-		Increasing	Energy	Eficiency	• 	Aim	4		-		Making	the	free	market	conditions	operate	fully	and	providing	for	the	improvement	of	the	investment	environment	(especially	electricity)	• 	Aim	5		-		Providing	the	diversity	of	resources	in	the	are	of	oil	and	natural	gas	and	taking	the	measures	for	reducing	the	risks	due	to	importation	
Strategic	Theme	2:	Regional	&	global	inhluence	of	Turkey	in	the	area	of	energy	• 	Aim	6		-		Turning	Turkey	into	an	energy	hub	and	terminal	by	using	our	geo-strategic	position	effectively	within	the	framework	of	the	regional	cooperation	processes	
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Fig.	10:	Strategic	Plan	2015-2019	|	Turkish	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	of	Turkey,	2015497	
	
                                                            497	The	contents	of	both	Strategic	Plans	have	been	condensed	for	the	purpose	of	saving	space,	as	well	as	with	the	 intention	 of	 keeping	 the	 focus	 on	 natural	 gas	 sector	 in	 specific.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 order	 of	 prioritisation	provided	by	the	Ministry	was	kept	intact.	It	is	also	worth	mentioning	that,	both	plans	also	list	environmental	protection	and	technological	innovations	among	its	energy	security	priorities,	although	they	are	less	relevant	for	the	purpose	of	this	PhD.	
STRATEGIC	THEME	:	ENERGY	SUPPLY	SECURITY	
Goal	:	Strong	and	reliable	Energy	Infrastructure	• 	Ensuring	natural	gas	storage	capacity	to	be	able	to	meet	20%	of	the	annual	consumption	in	the	long-term	• 	Constructing	and	operating	electricity	and	natural	gas	transmission	systems	according	to	(n-1)	criteria,	with	no	regional	bottlenecks	
Goal	:	Optimum	Resource	Diversity	• 	Increased	electricity	generation	from	domestic	coal	• 	Inclusion	of	nuclear	energy	into	electricity	generation	portfolio	• 	Diversihication	of	import	countries	and	routes	by	adding	new	source	countries	
and	routes	into	natural	gas	import	portfolio	• 	Increased	domestic	oil	and	natural	gas	exploration	and	production	activities	• 	Reducing	the	share	of	natural	gas	in	total	electricity	generation	to	38%	• 	Expansion	of	LPG	and	dumped	LNG	use	in	the	regions	
Goal	:	Effective	demand	management	• 	Transition	to	liberal	market	in	the	natural	gas	and	the	price	shall	be	formed	within	a	supply-demand	balance	
STRATEGIC	THEME	–	REGIONAL	&	INTERNATIONAL	EFFECTIVENESS	
Goal	:	Turkey	integrated	with	regional	Energy	markets	• 	By	making	ENTSO-E	connection	permanent,	Turkey’s	integration	with	European	electricity	markets	• 	Increasing	international	electricity	interconnection	capacity	by	two-fold	until	the	end	of	2019	• 	Participation	in	the	regional	electricity	markets	through	market	coupling	and	undertaking	duties	in	the	organisations	regarding	the	functioning	of	regional	markets	• 	By	implementing	new	transit	pipeline	projects,	strengthening	the	role	of	Turkey	
as	a	natural	gas	corridor	
Goal	:	A	powerful	Actor	in	International	Arena	• 	Creating	new	international	oil,	gas,	coal	and	raw	materials	sources	by	partnering	
stong	national	companies	with	the	international	companies	having	foreign	
investments	for	exploration	• 	Enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	Turkey	in	international	energy	institutions	(e.g.	IEA,	IRENA)	• 	Establishment	of	representation	ofices	of	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	in	USA,	Russia,	Azerbaijan,	Iraq,	France,	in	order	to	engage	in	energy	diplomacy	
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Based	on	these	two	Strategic	Plans,	Turkey's	(officially	available)	energy	security	strategy	can	be	compiled	into	two	priorities:498	I. Ensuring	energy	(gas)	supply	security	for	the	domestic	market,	II. Achieving	 global/regional	 influence	 of	 Turkey	 in	 energy	 security	 by	 turning	 the	country	into	an	energy	hub.	In	this	context,	Turkey	is	in	need	of	supplying	domestic	market	with	enough	gas	volumes	in	order	to	avoid	shortages	in	energy	provision	to	households,	power	generation	plants,	as	well	as	industrial	complex,	especially	chemical	industry	which	uses	gas	(also)	as	feedstock.	In	 the	past	decade	Turkish	natural	 gas	demand	has	 risen	by	almost	230%	(see	Fig.	11),	both	due	to	the	positive	economic	growth	and	the	gasification	of	the	previously	secluded	provinces.499		
Fig.	11:	Turkish	natural	gas	consumption	and	underground	storage	capacity	|	MENR,	2014500	
	According	to	projections,	the	demand	for	gas	is	set	to	rise	to	70	bcm/a	by	2030	due	to	its	relative	price	competitiveness,	positive	economic	growth	and	increasing	share	of	natural	gas	 in	 electricity	 generation	 in	 Turkey.501	 Given	 that	 98.5%	 of	 Turkey’s	 gas	 demand	 is	procured	from	foreign	sources,	this	will	likely	increase	the	vulnerability	of	the	country	to	
                                                            498	 Both	 of	 these	 priorities	 were	 also	 highlighted	 during	 the	 interviews	 with	 the	 former	 Turkish	 EU	Ambassador	 Selim	Kuneralp	 and	 the	 current	 senior	Turkish	 diplomat	 at	 Turkey's	 EU	Mission,	 10/04/2015,	Brussels.	499	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019)	(Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey,	2015),	p.	28;	Deloitte	Report:	Turkey’s	Natural	Gas	Market	Expectations	and	Developments	2012,	p.	15.	500	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	p.	27.	501	Rzayeva,	Natural	Gas	in	the	Turkish	Domestic	Energy	Market:	Policies	and	Challenges,	pp.	7–10.	
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external	 supply	 shocks.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 although	 the	 Turkish	Ministry	 of	 Energy	intends	 to	 decrease	 the	 share	 of	 gas	 in	 electricity	 generation,	 the	 Turkish	 national	regulatory	authority	has	been	steadily	increasing	licenses	issued	to	the	gas-based	private	power	generation	companies.502	Hence,	 although	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 project	 the	 composition	 of	 Turkey’s	 energy	 mix	 in	 the	coming	decades,	 the	 share	of	natural	 gas	 is	 set	 to	 increase	both	 in	absolute	and	 relative	terms.	Given	that	virtually	all	of	this	gas	will	come	from	external	sources,	this	has	affected	and	will	 further	determine	 the	policy	 choices	undertaken	by	 the	Turkish	government	 in	natural	gas	sector.	Thus,	in	analysing	the	root-causes	of	the	failure	of	the	Europeanisation	of	 Turkey’s	 natural	 gas	 sector,	 I	 will	 below	 explore	 different	 factors,	 which	 are	 (also)	conditioned	by	the	above-mentioned	energy	security	priorities	of	the	Turkish	government.	
2.3.1.	Net	adoption	costs	
To	start	with,	Turkey's	gas	import	portfolio	is	fairly	diversified	(at	 least,	 in	contrast	with	the	 majority	 of	 the	 Eastern	 European	 countries)	 with	 gas	 being	 supplied	 by	 Russia,	Azerbaijan,	 Iran	 and	 spot	 LNG	 from	 Algeria.	 Despite	 this,	 the	 security	 of	 supply	 cannot	always	be	guaranteed	due	 to	 the	 steep	 seasonal	 gas	demand	and	 supply	 fluctuations,	 as	well	 as	 the	 technical	 and	 production	 problems	 faced	 by	 the	 supplier	 countries.	 For	example,	in	early	2012	Turkey's	gas	imports	from	Iran	and	Azerbaijan	experienced	sharp	decline	 following	 almost	 simultaneous	 technical	 difficulties	 by	 both	 counties.	 Facing	 the	domestic	 supply	 shortages	 due	 to	 the	 cold	 spell	 related	 domestic	 demand	 hike,	 Turkey	without	warning	stopped	its	gas	re-exports	to	Greece	via	the	cross-border	interconnection	capacity,	which	was	commissioned	in	2007.503	In	 the	 bigger	 picture,	 this	 gas	 cut-off	 to	 Greece	 was	 not	 driven	 by	 any	 (geo)political	considerations	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Turkey,	 but	 was	 rather	 conditioned	with	 the	 necessity	 of	ensuring	 domestic	 supply	 first.	 In	 a	 liberalised	 environment	 governed	 by	 the	 EU	 rules,	shortage	of	 energy	 supply	would	have	 triggered	price	hikes	and	equivalent	 reduction	of	consumer	demand	in	the	gas	market.	This	would	have	subsequently	lead	to	a	new	supply	and	demand	equilibrium.	Therefore,	from	the	EU	perspective	it	would	be	more	efficient	for	Turkey	 to	 allow	 the	market	 forces	 to	 determine	 the	 supply	 and	 demand	 balance	 in	 the	country.	However,	 from	a	Turkish	perspective	 this	balance	would	have	been	achieved	at	the	expense	of	the	energy	prices	offered	to	the	Turkish	domestic	consumers.	Therefore,	in	
                                                            502	Rzayeva,	Natural	Gas	in	the	Turkish	Domestic	Energy	Market:	Policies	and	Challenges,	p.	9.	503	 ‘Turkey	 Increases	 Gas	 Exports	 to	 Greece’,	 Turkish	 News,	 7	 February	 2012	<http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2012/02/07/turkey-increases-gas-exports-to-greece/>	[accessed	28	March	2012].	
 167 
line	with	 its	strategic	plan,	 the	Turkish	government	prioritised	domestic	supply	over	the	external	commitments	and	restarted	gas	exports	to	Greece	only	after	meeting	the	natural	gas	demand	of	the	Turkish	households	and	industry,	as	was	explained	by	the	then	Turkish	Energy	Minister	Taner	Yildiz.504	From	a	regulatory	point	of	view,	this	was	rendered	possible	due	to	the	state	control	over	the	domestic	transmission	lines,	as	well	as	gas	export/transit	activities.	In	fact,	under	the	Turkish	NGML,	public	and	private	companies	are	required	to	acquire	export	licenses	from	the	Turkish	Regulatory	Authority	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 engage	 in	 gas	 export	 activity	 in	Turkey.	Export	licenses,	on	the	other	hand,	are	granted	only	if	the	"export	process	will	not	
intervene	in	the	operation	of	the	system	or	the	satisfaction	of	the	natural	gas	demand	of	the	
country".505	Although	this	and	other	incidents	may	be	considered	as	isolated	or	emergency	cases	that	can	still	be	addressed	with	emergency	action	plans	under	the	free	market	principles,	 the	rationale	of	Turkey’s	preference	to	control	the	transit	and	gas	export	activities	becomes	all	the	 more	 evident	 under	 normal	 market	 conditions.	 To	 start	 with,	 due	 to	 its	 strategic	geographical	 location,	 Turkey	 is	 surrounded	with	 the	 largest	 gas	 reserves	 in	 the	world.	Accordingly,	 it	 acts	 as	 the	 transit	 bridge	between	 these	 reserves	 and	500	million	 strong	consumer	market	to	the	West.	Acknowledging	this	fact,	both	Strategic	Plans	of	the	Turkish	government	highlight	the	necessity	of	ensuring	the	diversity	of	supply	sources	and	routes	in	 order	 to	 ensure	 energy	 supply	 security	 of	 the	 Turkish	 consumers.506	 However,	 the	strategy	 pursued	 by	 Turkey	 was	 not	 only	 aimed	 at	 importing	 ample	 and	 diverse	 gas	volumes	 to	 meet	 surging	 domestic	 demand,	 but	 also	 getting	 the	 best	 price	 deals	 from	different	suppliers.	To	this	end,	the	Turkish	authorities	have	in	the	past	insisted	that,	due	to	its	vital	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	Turkey	must	be	entitled	to	 purchase	 domestic	 gas	 under	 discounted	 prices	 compared	 to	 the	 consumers	 in	Europe.507	Additionally,	Turkish	officials	have	been	arguing	for	the	right	to	lift-off	15%	of	the	gas	to	be	transported	across	its	territory	via	Nabucco	(or	any	other	line)	at	"reasonable	
prices"	as	transit	privilege.508	
                                                            504	‘Turkey	Sends	Gas	to	Greece	as	EU	Slams	Gov’t	in	Athens’.	505	‘Natural	Gas	Market	Law,	No.	4646’,	Article	4.	506	Strategic	Plan	(2010-2014)	(Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey,	2010),	pp.	12–13;	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	p.	36.	507	Interview	with	a	senior	SOCAR	official,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	508	Erdogdu,	‘Bypassing	Russia:	Nabucco	Project	and	Its	Implications	for	the	European	Gas	Security’,	p.	2942;	see	also,	Saltuk	Duzyol,	‘NABUCCO	Projesi	ve	Türkiye	(NABUCCO	Project	and	Turkey)’	(Presentation	by	BOTAS	General	 Manager	 at	 the	 Middle	 East	 Technical	 University,	 Turkey,	 2009)	<http://www.odtumd.org.tr/etkinlik/2009/03/NABUCCO_projesi/NABUCCO_Sunumu_ODTU_S_Duzyol_28_03_09.pdf>	[accessed	12	August	2013].	
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In	practice,	this	policy	line	can	be	argued	to	have	worked	well	for	the	Turkish	government.	For	example,	following	the	lengthy	negotiations	on	the	transit	passage	of	Azeri	gas	to	the	EU,	 the	 Turkish	 authorities	 managed	 to	 secure	 discounted	 gas	 purchase	 prices	 from	Azerbaijan,	which	is	constantly	pegged	to	the	85%	value	of	the	Russian	gas	sale	prices	to	Turkey.509	Additionally,	under	the	intergovernmental	agreement	on	the	standalone	TANAP	pipeline,	Turkey	managed	to	commit	Azeri	authorities	to	offer	any	future	available	export	volumes	 from	Azerbaijan	 (in	 addition	 to	 SH	 II	 volumes)	 to	 the	Turkish	market	 first	 and	only	after	to	the	EU	consumers.510		By	 using	 its	 transit	 status	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 Turkey	 has,	 thus,	 managed	 to	 secure	favourable	deals,	which	will	contribute	to	its	energy	security,	as	well	as	economic	growth.	In	 this	 regard,	 the	ability	of	Turkey	 to	exercise	sovereignty	over	 its	 territory	 in	order	 to	exact	benefits	from	(energy)	goods	transiting	its	territory	can	be	considered	as	a	resource	that	the	government	widely	relies	on	in	promoting	domestic	interests.	This	resource	would	have	 to	 be	 dispensed	 with	 if	 Turkey	 was	 to	 apply	 the	 EU	 law.	 Under	 EU	 legislation,	freedom	of	access	to	transmission/transit	pipelines	must	be	separate	from	the	gas	supply	activities	in	the	market.	This	is	to	be	achieved	by	regulating	the	access	to	pipeline	capacity	based	on	pre-published	tariffs	and	market-based	capacity	allocation	mechanisms,	such	as	
auctions.	 Shippers/suppliers	 who	 want	 to	 acquire	 pipeline	 capacity	 will	 have	 to	 do	 so	under	equal	conditions,	regardless	of	whether	their	gas	will	be	destined	for	the	domestic	Turkish	market	or	will	be	transiting	the	country	on	way	to	third-country	markets.	In	other	word,	 under	 EU	 law,	 the	 notion	 of	 gas	 transit	 itself	 disappears,	 as	 there	 is	 no	 more	difference	between	domestic	transportation	and	transit	activities	(which	is	why,	EU	acquis	refers	 to	 all	 gas	 transportation	 activities	 via	 high-pressure	 pipelines	 as	 transmission	regardless	of	destination,	origin	or	ownership).	Similarly,	 if	 Turkey	 was	 to	 apply	 EU	 law	 domestically,	 it	 would	 be	 formally	 obliged	 to	ensure	equal	 access	 to	 its	 transmission/transit	pipelines,	without	being	able	 to	 secure	a	certain	share	of	the	transit	gas	at	discounted	prices	for	the	domestic	consumption.511	This	would	create	considerable	domestic	costs	 for	the	government,	especially	considering	the	fact	 that,	Turkey	 is	 the	only	OECD	Europe	country,	which	will	 experience	significant	gas	demand	increases	in	the	coming	decades.	As	such,	access	to	ample	and	cheap	energy	will	have	a	direct	effect	on	the	continued	growth	of	the	national	economy,	which	unlike	the	EU	economy	 has	 been	 experiencing	 stable	 GDP	 growth	 -	 4.7%	 on	 average	 in	 the	 past	
                                                            509	Interview	with	a	senior	SOCAR	official,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	510	Interview	with	a	senior	SOCAR	official,	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	511	 This	 was	 highlighted	 during	 the	 interview	 with	 an	 official	 from	 the	 EC/DG	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26/05/2015,	Brussels.	For	a	similar	point	of	view,	see	also,	Winrow,	‘Problems	and	Prospects	for	the	Fourth	Corridor:	The	Positions	and	Role	of	Turkey	in	Gas	Transit	to	Europe’,	p.	20.	
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decade.512	 By	 being	 an	 important	 East-West	 energy	 bridge,	 Turkish	 government	 (and	BOTAS)	 is	 acting	 as	 a	 partially	 "monopsonic"	 entity	 to	 negotiate	 its	 gas	 deals	 with	 the	neighbouring	 producers.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 under	 limited	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 domestic	market,	 BOTAS	 remains	 the	 single	 biggest	 buyer	 and	 re-seller	 of	 natural	 gas	 in	 Turkey.	Dominant	 status	 in	 the	 domestic	 market	 allows	 BOTAS	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 state,	 to	negotiate	 the	 best	 gas	 import	 deals	 among	 the	 variety	 of	 external	 supply	 options,	consequently,	 driving	 down	 the	 prices	 of	 imported	 natural	 gas.	 Therefore,	 although	 the	market	 is	 nominally	 liberalised,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 negotiations	 on	 gas	 supply	 have	always	remained	high	in	the	agenda	of	the	Turkish	political	establishment	in	its	bilateral	and	multilateral	relations	with	the	relevant	supplier	countries.513	Secondly,	 certain	 energy	 projects	 in	 Turkey	 can	 be	 realised	 only	 if	 the	 interests	 of	 the	project	 promoters	 are	 taken	 into	 account.	 To	 put	 this	 into	 perspective,	 the	 Azerbaijani	government	has	repeatedly	declared	that	it	will	build	TANAP	in	Turkey,	which	will	initially	carry	16	bcm/a	gas,	6	bcm/a	of	which	will	be	destined	for	the	Turkish	domestic	market,	only	with	the	condition	that	SOCAR	(State	Oil	Company	of	Azerbaijan	Republic)	is	allowed	to	hold	the	majority	of	stakes	in	(hereby,	control	over)	the	pipeline.514	However,	the	very	design	of	EU	energy	acquis	 is	envisioned	to	curtail	the	suppliers'	(in	this	case	SOCAR	and	other	upstream	players')	control	over	 the	transmission	 lines,	so	 that	 the	 latter	could	not	discriminate	 against	 other	 suppliers	 from	 having	 equal	 and	 fair	 access	 to	 the	 same	pipelines.	 In	 this	 regard,	 if	 the	 EU	acquis	were	 to	 be	 fully	 applied	 in	Turkey	prohibiting	SOCAR	to	acquire	the	control	over	TANAP,	Azeri	company	would	be	dis-incentivised	from	building	 the	pipeline	 in	 the	 first	place.	Consequently,	 if	TANAP	were	not	 to	be	built,	 the	consortium	operating	 the	Shah-Deniz	gas	 field	 in	Azerbaijan	would	be	unlikely	 to	 invest	$22+	 bln	 in	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 giant	 gas	 field	 and	 hereby	 no	additional	volumes	of	gas	would	be	available	for	export	to	the	EU	and	Turkey.		Obviously,	EU	law	also	envisages	derogations	from	certain	provisions,	such	as	unbundling,	
third	 party	 access	 or	 regulated	 tariffs,	 which	 could	 be	 applied	 to	 TANAP,	 too.515	Nonetheless,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 legislation	 in	 Turkey	 would	 in	 itself	 create	high-risk	 environment	 for	 the	upstream	producers,	who	also	 own	and	operate	 the	 SCPx	and	TANAP.	The	payback	period	 in	 these	kinds	of	projects	 is	 long,	usually	around	25-30	years.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 regulatory	 risks	 in	 Turkey,	 which	 could	 fully	 or	
                                                            512	Economic	Outlook	No	96,	OECD	Annual	Projections,	November	2014.	513	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	514	 ‘SOCAR	 President:	 We	 Will	 Keep	 Operatorship	 of	 TANAP’,	 Natural	 Gas	 Europe,	 4	 April	 2012	<http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/socar-will-keep-tanap-operatorship-5729>	[accessed	7	April	2012].	515	 Interview	 with	 an	 EC/DG	 Energy	 official,	 as	 well	 as	 Rashad	 Novruz,	 Mission	 of	 Azerbaijan	 to	 the	 EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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partially	 impinge	 upon	 their	 ownership,	 control	 and	 operatorship	 of	 the	 high-cost	transmission/transit	pipelines,	the	SGC	stakeholders	would	be	unlikely	to	invest	in	TANAP	(and	 other	 parts	 of	 this	 “mega-project”).	 Consequently,	 by	 diminishing	 or	 delaying	 the	prospects	of	new	Azeri	gas	supplies	for	Turkey,	the	Europeanisation	of	the	Turkish	natural	gas	 sector	 could	 potentially	 entail	 security	 of	 supply	 implications	 for	 the	 country’s	domestic	 market.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 would	 undermine	 Turkey's	 attempts	 to	 decrease	 its	dependence	 on	 Russian	 gas,	which	makes	 up	 the	 bulk	 of	 its	 domestic	 consumption	 and	turn	it	into	Russia's	"energy	satellite".516	Thirdly,	in	addition	to	its	desire	to	exact	transit	benefits	from	gas	traversing	its	territory,	the	Turkish	Strategic	Plan	on	energy	envisages	turning	the	country	into	an	energy	hub.517	In	this	regard,	it	has	been	no	secret	for	some	time	that,	Turkey	wants	to	establish	itself	not	only	as	a	merely	transit	country,	but	also	as	a	natural	gas	hub	where	it	will	be	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	middleman	between	 the	Caspian	and	Middle	Eastern	gas	producers	and	 the	EU	consumers.518	In	this	vein,	natural	gas	hub	does	not	simply	imply	a	physical	intersection	of	different	pipelines	in	a	particular	territory	(although	it	is	a	vital	component	thereof).	As	the	 renowned	 expert	 in	 Caspian	 energy	politics,	 Vladimir	 Socor	 clarifies,	 “A	 hub	 country	
buys	 another	 country’s	 gas,	 stores	 it	 and	 re-sells	 it	 as	 its	 own	 gas	 to	 third	 countries	 at	 a	
higher	 price.	 A	 transit	 country,	 however,	 provides	 transit	 service	 through	 pipelines	 on	 its	
territory	 for	an	agreed	 (cost-based)	 fee,	 enabling	 the	producer	country	 to	enter	 into	direct	
commercial	relations	with	the	customers	for	its	gas”.519	In	this	regard,	if	Turkey	manages	to	buy	gas	in	cheap	at	its	Eastern	border	and	re-exports	it	to	the	EU	at	a	dearer	price,	then	it	will	bring	additional	economic	benefits	for	the	Turkish	state-controlled	energy	companies.	The	application	of	 the	EU	rules	 in	Turkey,	on	the	other	hand,	would	not	allow	Turkey	to	perform	the	role	of	a	single	middleman,	for	the	supply	and	trading	activities	will	have	to	be	 liberalised	 and	 carried	 out	 not	 only	 by	 BOTAS	 but	 also	 by	 private	 entities,	 hence	providing	limited	revenues	for	the	state.	
2.3.2.	Europeanisation	and	opportunity	costs	
Europeanisation	 of	 Turkey	 will	 likely	 entail	 potential	 costs	 not	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 the	energy	 and	 economic	 security	 of	 Turkey,	 but	 also	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 domestically	
                                                            516	Mert	Bilgin,	 ‘Energy	and	Turkey’s	Foreign	Policy:	State	Strategy,	Regional	Cooperation	and	Private	Sector	Involvement’,	Turkish	Policy	Quarterly,	2010,	81–92	(pp.	88,	91).	517	Strategic	Plan	(2010-2014),	pp.	29,	31;	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	pp.	23,	73.	518	See	e.g.	Shaffer,	‘Caspian	Energy	Phase	II:	Beyond	2005’,	p.	7214.	519	 Vladimir	 Socor,	 ‘Wikileaks	 Perturb	 US-Azerbaijan	 Relations	 (Part	 One)’,	 Euroasia	 Daily	 Monitor,	 7.217	(2010)	 <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37249>	 [accessed	 14	March	2012].	
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constrained	 capacity	 to	 pursue	 international	 (geo)political	 strategies.	 These	 potential	opportunity	 costs	 can	 be	 defined,	 firstly,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Turkey's	 EU	membership	 bid	and	secondly,	in	the	context	of	Turkey's	new	(geo)political	strategy	in	the	extended	Middle	East	region.	
EU-Turkey	Accession	negotiations	Implementation	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	by	Turkey	has	long	been	leveraged	by	the	latter	in	order	 accelerate	 overall	 progress	 in	 the	 EU-Turkey	 accession	 negotiations.	 Existence	 of	massive	 energy	 reserves	 and	 consumer	 markets	 in	 Turkey's	 neighbourhood	makes	 the	Turkish	 energy	 corridor	 a	powerful	 tool	 for	 the	 country's	EU	membership	 strategy.	The	sheer	statistical	difference	between	natural	gas	consumption	in	the	EU	(17%	of	the	global	overall)	 and	 the	 concentration	 47%	 of	 world's	 recoverable	 gas	 reserves	 in	 the	 Caspian	Basin	 and	 the	 Middle	 East	 is	 staggering.	 This	 allows	 one	 to	 reasonably	 expect	 that,	whatever	 the	 futures	holds	 for	 the	 realisation	of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	Turkey	will	always	 aspire	 to	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 it	 and	 take	 advantage	 of	 such	 a	 strategic	 position	 in	pursuing	 its	 national	 interests,	 for	 which	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 influence	 over	 the	pipelines	traversing	its	territory	is	paramount.		In	 this	 regard,	 as	 was	 already	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 energy	 chapter	 of	 the	 accession	negotiations	 is	 currently	 blocked	 by	 Cyprus	 due	 to	 a	 political	 dispute	 between	 the	 two	countries.	 Despite	 this,	 the	 EU	 has	 long	 been	 pushing	 Turkey	 to	 join	 the	 Energy	Community	Treaty,	the	leitmotif	of	which	is	rather	the	export	of	the	EU	energy	legislation	and	policies	 into	non-EU	countries.	 So	 far	Turkey	has	duly	 ignored	 the	call	 and	satisfied	itself	only	with	an	observer	status	in	the	EnCT.520	This	policy	choice	by	the	Turkish	government	 is	 in	 fact	very	rational.	Europeanisation	of	the	Turkish	energy	system	through	the	membership	in	the	EnCT	(or	on	a	voluntary	basis)	would	 ultimately	 adjust	 Turkey's	 energy	 policy	 choices	 under	 the	 EU	 preferences.	However,	 this	 would	 not	 result	 in	 any	 tangible	 progress	 in	 the	 EU	 accession	 process,	because	the	energy	chapter	remains	blocked	for	political	reasons.	Thus,	since	the	eventual	EU	membership	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 strategic	 goals	 of	 the	Turkish	 government,	 then	 the	strong	influence	of	the	Turkish	government	in	the	development	of	the	SGC	could	be	used	as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 to	 force	 the	 EU	 capitals	 to	 be	 more	 accommodating	 to	 Turkey's	European	 aspirations.	 In	 this	 context,	 although	 there	 were	 no	 formal	 links	 between	Turkey’s	 ratification	 of	 the	 Nabucco521	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 in	 2009	 and	 the	
                                                            520	 Interviews	with	 an	official	 from	 the	EEAS,	 21/04/2015,	Brussels	 and	with	 Selim	Kuneralp,	 10/04/2015,	Brussels.	521	Nabucco	was	intended	to	traverse	Turkish	territory	while	being	in	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis.	
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country's	 EU	 accession	 process,	 Ankara	 was	 eager	 to	 capitalise	 on	 its	 vital	 role	 in	 the	realisation	of	Nabucco	pipeline	and	force	the	EU	to	move	ahead	with	opening	of	the	energy	chapter.	 The	 former	Turkish	 ambassador	 to	 the	EU	Selim	Kuneralp	had	 argued	 that,	 EU	natural	gas	acquis	and	Nabucco's	legal	framework	were	based	on	common	principles	and	therefore	the	unblocking	and	opening	of	"energy	chapter	in	the	accession	negotiations	[…]	
would	 accelerate	 the	 adoption	 of	 EU	 legislation	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 [in	 Turkey]	 and	 thus	
Nabucco".522	Hence,	in	the	context	of	EU	accession	negotiations,	the	(non)application	of	the	EU	natural	gas	legislation	in	Turkey	remains	a	wild	card	in	Turkish	government's	foreign	policy	arsenal.	This	allows	the	latter	to	leverage	it	against	the	EU’s	energy	diversification	strategy	in	order	to	achieve	tangible	progress	 in	the	accession	process.	Therefore,	 it	was	no	 surprise	 that,	 similar	 to	 the	 European	 Commission,523	 the	 UK’s	 EU	 Minister	 David	Lidington	 called	 on	 for	 the	 “all	 blocks	 on	 chapters	 […	 to]	 be	 lifted	 in	 the	 shortest	 time	possible	and	the	path	for	Turkey’s	EU	membership	[…	to]	be	smoothed”,	while	recognising	Turkey’s	special	role	and	contribution	in	the	EU’s	energy	security.524	
Energy	–	geopolitics	nexus	In	analysing	the	adoption	of	the	EU's	energy	acquis	and	thereby	depoliticisation	of	Turkish	energy	 policy	 in	 general,	 one	 also	 has	 to	 take	 into	 account	 overall	 geopolitical	ramifications	 of	 these	 developments	 on	 the	 country's	 recently	 stepped-up	 regional	strategy.	 In	 this	 regard,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 Turkey's	 regional	 energy	 strategy	 can	 be	considered	as	an	end	in	itself	(ensuring	domestic	energy	security),	which	has	already	been	discussed	above.	On	the	other	hand,	it	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	geopolitical	instrument	-	as	a	means	to	a	separate	end.	In	 this	 vein,	 following	 the	 ascent	 of	 the	 ruling	 party	 (AKP)	 to	 power	 in	 2012,	 Ahmet	Davutoglu,	 the	 then	 foreign	 minister,	 currently	 prime	 minister	 and	 the	 architect	 of	Turkey's	 revamped	 foreign	policy	 strategy,	 has	 introduced	 a	 new	dimension	 -	 "strategic	
depth"525	to	the	country's	otherwise	Westward	political	orientation.	Davutoglu	posits	that,	Turkey's	 "multiple	 regional	 identities"	 enables	 it	 to	 pursue	 "an	 integrated	 and	
                                                            522	 Jacob	 Zirm,	 ‘Kuneralp:	 “Niemand	Kümmert	 Sich	Wirklich	Um	Nabucco‘	 (Kuneralp:	 "No	One	Really	 Cares	about	 Nabucco’)”’,	 DiePresse,	 2009	<http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/eastconomist/450163/Kuneralp_Niemand-kuemmert-sich-wirklich-um-Nabucco>	[accessed	1	August	2013].	523	 Arthur	 Neslen,	 ‘Oettinger	 Calls	 for	 “Europeanisation”	 of	 Energy	 Powers’,	 EurActiv,	 2012	<http://www.euractiv.com/energy/oettinger-calls-europeanisation-news-510497>	 [accessed	 2	 February	2012];	 ‘EU	 Should	 Open	 Energy	 Chapter	 With	 Turkey:	 Stefan	 Fule’,	 Scoop.it,	 2013	<http://www.scoop.it/t/turkish-agenda/p/4000116640/2013/04/17/eu-should-open-energy-chapter-with-turkey-stefan-fule>	[accessed	20	January	2014].	524	 ‘EU	 Urged	 to	 Open	 Energy	 Chapter’,	 Hurriyet	 Daily	 News,	 27	 February	 2014	<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-urged-to-open-energy-chapter.aspx?pageID=238&nID=62981&NewsCatID=351>	[accessed	28	February	2014].	525	Ahmet	Davutoglu,	Stratejik	Derinlik	(Küre	Yayinlari,	2001)	(original	in	Turkish).	
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multidimensional	 foreign	 policy",	 which	 also	 includes	 "a	 sense	 of	 responsibility"	 to	contribute	 to	 regional	 issues	arising	 from	a	common	history	and	geography.526	However,	the	role	he	(and	by	extension	the	incumbent	government)	envisions	for	Turkey	is	not	that	of	a	regional	power,	but	of	a	"central	power"	where	it	plays	a	central	role	in	several	regions	(the	Balkans,	 the	Middle	East,	Caucasus,	Central	Asia,	Mediterranean,	 the	Gulf	 and	Black	Sea)	simultaneously.527	With	this	in	mind,	in	terms	of	regional	geopolitics,	Turkey’s	energy	strategy	is	inseparably	linked	to	the	political	developments	in	post-invasion	Iraq,	where	the	fight	for	the	influence	over	the	country's	political	orientation	is	taking	place	both	at	domestic	and	international	levels.	After	the	electoral	victory	 in	2010,	 the	then	prime	minister	of	 Iraq,	Nuri	Al-Maliki	had	 settled	 for	 an	 “omnibalancing	 game”,528	 which	 entails	 complex	 balancing	 act	 on	 a	domestic	 (between	 different	 ethno-religious	 groups	 –	 Sunnis,	 Shiites	 and	 Kurds)	 and	international	 (between	 US,	 Turkey	 and	 Iran)	 levels.529	 At	 the	 domestic	 level,	 Kurds	 and	Sunnis	were	marginalised,	while	Shiite-Arabs	were	promoted	under	the	Al-Maliki’s	Arab-centric	government.530	At	international	level,	on	the	other	hand,	such	a	Shiite	dominance	of	Iraq	had	pleased	Iran,	while	at	the	same	time	ensuring	a	friendly	environment	for	the	US	business	and	allowing	limited	military	presence	on	Iraqi	soil,	while	sustaining	a	relatively	independent	 international	 political	 orientation.	 With	 the	 Sunni	 elite	 dominating	 the	government	 in	 Ankara,	 however,	 such	 an	 “omnibalancing	 game”	 had	 significant	implications	on	Turkey’s	Iraq	policy.		In	 this	 regard,	 Turkey	 had	 not	 only	 expressed	 its	 annoyance	 with	 the	 Al-Maliki	government,	which	it	accused	of	side-lining	Iraqi	Sunnis	and	fanning	sectarian	strife	in	the	country	 by	 promoting	 Shiites,	 but	 also	 refused	 to	 hand	 back	 Iraq's	 fugitive	 Sunni	 Vice-President	Tariq	Al-Hashemi	 even	 after	 the	 issuing	of	 global	 alert	 by	 the	 Interpol.531	 This	cooling	in	the	Ankara-Baghdad	relations	was	reflected	in	the	decision	by	the	Iraqi	cabinet	
                                                            526	Ahmet	Davutoglu,	‘Turkish	Foreign	Policy	and	the	EU	in	2010’,	Turkish	Policy	Quarterly,	2009,	p.	12.	527	 loannis	 N.	 Grigoriadis,	 The	 Davutoğlu	 Doctrine	 and	 Turkish	 Foreign	 Policy	 (Hellenic	 Foundation	 for	European	and	Foreign	Policy,	2010),	p.	4.	528	For	a	conceptual	explanation	of	 the	term,	see	e.g.	 Jason	E.	Strakes,	 ‘The	“Omnibalancing”	Proposition	and	Baghdad’s	Foreign	Policy:	Reinterpreting	Contemporary	Iraq-Iran-US	Relations’,	Mediterranean	Quarterly,	22.3	(2011),	95–108	(pp.	95–108).	529	Emre	Iseri	and	Oguz	Dilek,	‘The	Nexus	Of	Turkey’s	Energy	And	Foreign	Policy	With	Iraqi	Kurdish	Oil:	The	Iranian	Connection’,	Ortadoğu	Analiz,	February	2013,	25–32	(p.	27).	530	Iseri	and	Oguz	Dilek,	‘The	Nexus	Of	Turkey’s	Energy	And	Foreign	Policy	With	Iraqi	Kurdish	Oil:	The	Iranian	Connection’,	p.	27;	Michael	M.	Gunter,	‘Arab–Kurdish	Relations	and	the	Future	of	Iraq’,	Third	World	Quarterly,	32.9	(2011),	1623–35.	531	 ‘Turkey	 Rejects	 Iraqi	 VP	 Handover’,	 BBC,	 9	 May	 2012,	 section	 Middle	 East	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18009408>	[accessed	11	August	2013].	
 174 
to	 expel	 the	 Turkish	 State	 Petrol	 company	 (TPAO)	 from	 Block	 9	 (oilfield	 in	 Baghdad	controlled	territory),	where	the	latter	held	a	30	per	cent	stake.532	All	this	took	place	against	the	backdrop	of	Turkey's	new	reconciliatory	strategy	toward	the	Northern	 Iraqi	 Kurdish	 Regional	 Government	 (KRG)	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 friendly	relationships.	This	friendly	relationship,	first	of	all,	was	exemplified	with	the	involvement	of	Turkish	state	energy	companies	 in	 the	development	of	KGR's	energy	reserves.	To	 this	end,	after	TPAO's	eviction	 from	Block	9	 in	Southern	 Iraq,	Turkish	government	has	 taken	proactive	 steps	 in	 order	 to	 boost	 the	 state-controlled	 energy	 companies'	 presence	 in	Northern	 Iraq.	 Following	 the	 cabinet	 decision	 of	 January	 2013,	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 state	Turkish	 Petroleum	 International	 Company	 (TPIC)	 was	 increased	 from	 $150	 million	 to	$500	 million	 and	 its	 ownership	 was	 transferred	 under	 the	 Turkish	 Pipeline	Transportation	 Company	 (BOTAS).	 These	 steps	 were	 specifically	 tailored	 to	 increase	BOTAS's	presence	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan.533	This	indicates	a	major	shift	in	Turkey's	traditional	Baghdad-centric	 Iraqi	 policy,	 which	 was	 previously	 geared	 towards	 suppressing	 the	political	 secessionism	 of	 Iraqi	 Kurdish	 population,	 in	 favour	 of	 Erbil	 (the	 capital	 city	 of	KGR).534	Some	 attributed	 this	 shift	 to	 Turkey's	 overall	 geopolitical	 strategy	 in	 the	 Middle	 East.	According	 to	 the	vice-president	of	CHP,	Turkey's	main	opposition	party,	Faruk	Lagoglu	 -	the	confrontations	with	Baghdad	were	the	"result	of	Erdogan's	efforts	to	establish	a	Sunni	
influence	 zone	 to	 counter	 Tehran's	 influence	 on	 Shi'ite	 populations	 in	 the	 region".535	 Thus,	one	could	interpret	Turkey's	new	fraternity	with	the	KGR	as	a	counter-balancing	strategy	against	 Baghdad's	 Shiite-centric	 government.	 In	 this	 context,	 Turkish	 national	 energy	champions	play	a	role	of	a	proxy	in	Ankara's	political	engagement	with	the	regional	actors,	which	is	mainly	driven	by	Davutoglu's	new	foreign	policy	strategy.	Others	argue	that	the	dynamics	of	Turkey's	changing	regional	strategy	has	a	lot	to	do	with	its	 energy	 security,	 as	much	as	 its	 cultural-religious	 identity.	 In	 this	 regard,	one	Turkish	expert	argued	that	given	the	country's	energy	supply	flaws,	Ankara	will	incur	"opportunity	
costs	 […]	 if	 it	 does	 not	 develop	 relations	 as	 much	 as	 it	 could	 with	 partners	 such	 Russia,	
                                                            532	Ahmed	Rasheed,	‘Iraq	Says	Exxon	to	Quit	Oilfield,	Ends	Turkey	TPAO	Deal’,	Reuters	(Baghdad,	7	November	2012)	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-iraq-exxon-idUSBRE8A60Y420121107>	 [accessed	11	August	2013].	533	Orhan	Coskun,	‘Newly	BOTAS-Owned	Turkey	Oil	Firm	Seen	Boosting	Foreign	Presence’,	Reuters,	22	January	2013	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/turkey-energy-idUSL6N0AR2KI20130122>	 [accessed	11	August	2013].	534	Iseri	and	Oguz	Dilek,	‘The	Nexus	Of	Turkey’s	Energy	And	Foreign	Policy	With	Iraqi	Kurdish	Oil:	The	Iranian	Connection’,	pp.	27–28.	535	Ayhan	Simsek,	‘Turkey-Iraq	Row	Escalates’,	Deutsche	Welle,	14	May	2012	<http://www.dw.de/turkey-iraq-row-escalates/a-15947701>	[accessed	8	August	2013].	
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Azerbaijan,	 Iran	 and	 Iraq".536	 In	 a	 similar	manner,	 Turkey's	 then	 energy	minister	 Taner	Yildiz	had	protested	that,	"it	is	unreasonable	for	Turkey	to	remain	aloof	from	a	region	on	its	
border	while	 it	 looks	as	 far	as	Venezuela	 to	meet	 its	 energy	needs.	Genel	Energy,	 a	British	
Turkish	 energy	 company	 […]	 already	 has	 extensive	 oil	 and	 gas	 interests	 in	 the	 region	 but	
Turkish	 state	 institutions	 do	 not".537	 Similarly,	 the	 Turkish	 Strategic	 Plan	 for	 Energy	identifies	 BOTAS	 and	 the	 relevant	 departments	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	Resources	as	the	responsible	bodies	for	the	"[d]iversification	of	import	countries	and	routes	
[…]	by	adding	new	source	countries	and	routes	to	natural	gas	import	portfolio".538	Hence,	whether	Turkey's	 regional	 energy	 strategy	 is	 attuned	 to	 yield	 political	 dividends	from	 regional	 actors	 (a	means	 to	 a	 separate	 end)	 or	 geared	 towards	 contributing	 to	 the	country's	soaring	energy	demand	(an	end	in	itself)	or,	as	is	perhaps	most	likely,	both,	the	existence	of	strong	national	energy	champions	seems	to	be	an	essential	part	of	 it.	 In	this	context,	 the	premature	application	of	the	EU's	energy	acquis	 in	Turkey	would	 likely	 limit	Ankara's	 influence	 over	 regional	 geopolitics,	 as	 the	 unbundling	 and	 full	 market	liberalisation	 in	 Turkey	 in	 line	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 would	 financially	 and	 technically	weaken	 the	 national	 energy	 champion	 -	 BOTAS	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 oversees	initiatives.	 In	 line	with	 such	reasoning,	 the	Strategic	Plan	2015-2019	 in	 fact	 calls	 for	 the	development	 of	 strong	 and	 experienced	 national	 companies,	 which	 can	 be	 involved	 in	projects	in	the	international	arena.539	Of	 course,	 this	 Eastward	 engagement	 does	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 compromise	 in	 Ankara's	Western	political	aspirations.	It	would	in	many	respects	render	Turkey	a	more	attractive	partner	for	the	EU	and	the	USA	by	transforming	it	into	a	major	power	in	the	world's	most	energy	rich	basins.540	This	 follows	Davutoglu's	bow	and	arrow	analogy	 in	foreign	politics.	The	analogy	follows	that,	supported	by	 its	 ideational	and	strategic	geographical	 location,	Turkey	is	"an	archer	and	the	more	it	draws	the	back	of	the	bow	through	the	East,	the	farther	
the	 arrow	 flies	West".541	 In	 discussing	 this	 central	 aspect	 of	 the	 incumbent	 government's	foreign	strategy	a	Turkish	expert	recaps	that,	"[…]	Turkey’s	regional	activism	in	the	East	is	
viewed	 as	 an	 independent	 variable	 as	 a	means	 to	 reach	 the	 ultimate	 goal,	 which	 is	 to	 be	
                                                            536	Mert	Bilgin,	 ‘Energy	and	Turkey’s	Foreign	Policy:	State	Strategy,	Regional	Cooperation	and	Private	Sector	Involvement’,	pp.	85–86.	537	 Daniel	 Dombey	 and	 Guy	 Chazan,	 ‘Turkey	 and	 Iraq	 Kurds	 close	 to	 Energy	 Deal’,	 Financial	 Times,	 12	December	 2012	 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8a5bbc8-446f-11e2-932a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2apfRq4sT>	[accessed	2	August	2013].	538	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	p.	39.	539	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	p.	73.	540	Dimitrios	Triantaphyllou	and	Eleni	Fotiou,	‘The	EU	and	Turkey	in	Energy	Diplomacy’,	Insight	Turkey,	2010,	55–62	(p.	56).	541	 Burak	 Bilgehan	 Ozpek	 and	 Yelda	 Demirag,	 ‘The	 Davutoğlu	 Effect	 in	 Turkish	 Foreign	 Policy:	What	 If	 the	Bowstring	Is	Broken?’,	Iran	and	the	Caucasus,	16.1	(2012),	117–28	(p.	118).	
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strongly	 located	 in	 the	West.	 Therefore,	 Turkey	 prioritises	 its	 relations	with	 the	West	 and	
sees	the	activism	in	the	East	as	leverage	to	meet	this	goal.”542	Thus,	 restructuring	 Turkey's	 energy	 system	under	 the	 EU	 template	 by	 delinking	 energy	from	 high	 politics	 would	 inevitably	 curtail	 Turkey's	 leverage	 over	 the	 political	developments	in	its	neighbourhood	and	leave	the	country	with	fewer	political	instruments	than	the	advantageous	geopolitical	location	would	otherwise	offer.	
2.3.3.	Europeanisation	and	domestic	veto	players	
Major	 actors	 in	 Turkey's	 energy	 policy-making	 are	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	 Natural	Resources,	 Petroleum	 Pipeline	 Corporation	 (BOTAS),	 Turkish	 Petroleum	 Corporation	(TPAO)	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs;	 the	 latter	 being	 especially	 influential	 in	 the	foreign	policy	aspects	of	energy	security.	Among	these	actors,	BOTAS	has	the	most	to	lose	from	 the	 full	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 law	 in	 Turkey,	 as	 it	 will	 cut	 back	 BOTAS's	 (already	slowly)	 diminishing	 monopoly	 in	 domestic	 market	 access.	 On	 this	 subject,	 BOTAS	 has	argued	that	the	company	must	retain	its	key	position	in	domestic	gas	market	and	act	"as	a	
'locomotive'	behind	which	private	companies	could	follow."543	The	former	General	Manager	of	the	company	Saltuk	Duzyol	had	stressed	that	it	was	crucial	for	BOTAS	to	remain	a	key	player	 in	 Turkish	 natural	 gas	market	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 extract	 the	 best	 deals	 from	other	energy	companies	in	the	matters	of	energy	transit	through	Turkish	territory.544	In	this	vein,	BOTAS	defined	energy	security	strategy	for	Turkey	as	a	pyramid	of	priorities,	which	includes	supply	security,	low-cost	gas	imports	and	transit	&	trade	revenues	(see	Fig.	
12).	 In	principle,	BOTAS's	priorities	are	 incompatible	with	 the	EU	acquis,	 for	 they	 imply	both	 supply	 and	 transmission	activities	being	 carried	out	within	 the	 same	company	 (i.e.	BOTAS),	as	well	as	envisages	transit	benefits	for	Turkey	in	the	form	of	low-cost	natural	gas	imports	 from	 transiting	 gas.	 In	 this	 regard,	 during	 the	 initial	 years	 of	 the	 gas	 market	liberalisation	and	unbundling	process	in	Turkey,	as	the	former	Turkish	Ambassador	to	the	EU	 put	 it,	 BOTAS	was	 fighting	 the	 "real	 Gods'	 game"	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 its	monopoly	position	 and	 hold	 on	 to	 its	 transmission	 assets.545	 BOTAS's	 active	 opposition	 to	 the	 EU	legislation	 was	 especially	 salient	 during	 the	 negotiations	 on	 the	 Nabucco	intergovernmental	agreement,	for	the	company	was	arguing	for	an	entitlement	for	transit	
                                                            542	Ozpek	and	Demirag,	‘The	Davutoğlu	Effect	in	Turkish	Foreign	Policy:	What	If	the	Bowstring	Is	Broken?’,	p.	118.	543	Cited	in	Winrow,	‘Problems	and	Prospects	for	the	Fourth	Corridor:	The	Positions	and	Role	of	Turkey	in	Gas	Transit	to	Europe’,	p.	13.	This	was	also	indicated	during	author's	interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	544	Duzyol,	‘NABUCCO	Projesi	ve	Türkiye	(NABUCCO	Project	and	Turkey)’.	545	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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benefits	in	terms	of	access	to	15%	of	gas	volumes	to	be	supplied	via	Nabucco,	which	is	in	direct	contradiction	with	the	EU	law.	
Fig.	12:	BOTAS's	priority	pyramid	for	Turkish	gas	sector546	
Nonetheless,	although	the	company	has	considerable	influence	over	the	transit	regime	for	gas	 transportation	across	 the	country,	which	was	evident	during	 the	negotiations	on	the	transit	of	Azeri	gas	through	Turkey,	BOTAS	is	not	granted	with	formal	veto	powers	as	far	as	the	rule	adoption	in	Turkey	is	concerned.	In	fact,	during	the	Nabucco	IGA	negotiations,	BOTAS's	position	was	overruled	by	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Turkey.	The	former	Turkish	ambassador	 to	 the	EU	explained	that,	"if	 the	price	of	accession	 to	 the	EU	was	 the	
demise	of	BOTAS	as	it	stands	at	the	moment,	BOTAS	would	have	to	go".547	Secondly,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	Mineral	 Resources	 (MENR)	 holds	 the	main	 formal	powers	 in	determining	 the	course	of	 reforms	 in	Turkey's	energy	sector.	 In	 this	 capacity,	the	MENR	seems	to	share	similar	sentiments	with	BOTAS	and	is	interested	in	maintaining	the	 role	 of	 state	 enterprises	 in	 energy	 supply	 and	 strengthening	 their	 involvement	 in	international	 energy	 projects.	 In	 improving	 the	 country's	 energy	 performance,	 the	Turkey's	 Strategic	 Plan	 for	 energy	 argues	 that,	 MENR	 will	 take	 actions	 to	 ensure	 “full	
harmonisation	 [of	 the	 domestic	 legislation]	 with	 the	 EU	 Energy	 Efficiency	 acquis	 and	
especially	with	 the	 cogeneration	 regulations	will	 be	 provided."548	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	 latest	2015-2019	 Strategic	 Plan	 for	 Energy,	 MENR	 illustrates	 the	 importance	 of	 further	liberalisation	 of	 Turkey's	 electricity	 sector,	 the	 necessity	 of	 "the	 creation	 of	 more	
                                                            546	Duzyol,	‘NABUCCO	Projesi	ve	Türkiye	(NABUCCO	Project	and	Turkey)’.	547	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	548	Strategic	Plan	(2010-2014),	p.	21.	
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transparent	 and	 liquid	 markets	 and	 for	 obtaining	 electricity	 from	 cost-advantageous	
markets"	and	its	permanent	integration	with	the	European	electricity	market.549	However,	neither	plan	mentioned,	even	 in	passing,	 the	same	EU	harmonisation	vision	 in	natural	gas	sector.	This	also	signifies	the	dominant	view	that,	the	Ministry	is	interested	in	keeping	 governmental	 control	 over	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector.	 Quite	 the	 opposite,	 MENR	stressed	that	Turkey	must	capitalise	on	its	advantageous	geographical	position	in	securing	domestic	 energy	 supply	 and	 "leading	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 rich	
hydrocarbon	resources	to	the	growing	markets	and	especially	the	EU	market.”550	In	 support	 of	 this	 view,	 it	 is	 also	worth	mentioning	 that,	 according	 to	 Turkish	NGML	 of	2001,	BOTAS	was	banned	from	concluding	any	new	import	contracts	until	its	shares	drops	under	 20%	 in	 domestic	 market.	 However,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 has	 very	 recently	directly	 violated	 this	 legal	 prescription.	 According	 to	 the	 agreement	 signed	 with	 Shah	Deniz	 consortium	 in	 2012,	 BOTAS	will	 purchase	 6BCM	of	 gas	 from	 the	 second	 phase	 of	Shah-Deniz	 two	 for	domestic	supply	 (without	destination	clause),	as	well	as	hold	30	per	cent	shares	in	the	new	to	be	built	Trans-Anatolian	Pipeline	(TANAP).	These	developments	have	been	ratified	both	by	Azerbaijani	and	Turkish	parliaments,	although	in	principle	they	are	 incompatible	 with	 the	 Turkish	 NGML	 (as	 well	 as	 the	 EU	 acquis	 for	 unbundling	reasons).	Thirdly,	 Turkish	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 EU	 accession	aspects	 of	 domestic	 energy	 policy-making.	 In	 fact,	 the	 MFA	 played	 a	 leading	 and	conciliatory	 role	 during	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	 European	 Commission	 over	 the	Intergovernmental	Agreement	 (IGA)	 for	 the	NABUCCO	pipeline.551	Furthermore,	as	 it	has	already	 been	 mentioned	 above,	 Turkish	 diplomats	 have	 in	 the	 past	 linked	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 EU's	 energy	 acquis	 in	 Turkey	 to	 the	 progress	 in	 country's	 EU	accession	negotiations	and	have	questioned	the	expediency	of	the	application	of	the	EU's	energy	legislation	domestically	if	Brussels	is	unwilling	to	open	the	energy	chapter	due	to	a	political	veto.	 In	 this	regard,	although	 in	 the	past	Turkish	MFA	had	played	a	conciliatory	role	to	ensure	the	compliance	of	the	Nabucco	IGA	with	the	EU	acquis,	it	has	less	interest	to	foster	 the	 same	 process	 with	 regard	 to	 Turkey's	 domestic	 legislation,	 for	 it	 does	 not	contribute	to	the	EU	accession	process.552	Last	but	not	least,	there	is	also	an	indirect	link	between	the	domestic	political	dynamics	in	
                                                            549	Strategic	Plan	(2015-2019),	p.	74.	550	Strategic	Plan	(2010-2014),	p.	28.	551	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	552	Interview	with	Ambassador	Selim	Kuneralp,	10/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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Turkey	and	the	failure	of	depoliticisation	of	the	natural	gas	market	in	the	country.	This	is	especially	 relevant	 in	relation	 to	 the	 freedom	 of	transit	across	 Turkey	 in	 light	 of	 the	increasing	authoritarianism553	of	the	ruling	party.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	adoption	of	the	EU	rules	is	contingent	upon	the	level	of	democracy	in	a	candidate/partner	country.	The	voluntary	adoption	of	 the	EU	electricity	market	 rules,	which	are	based	on	 the	 same	principles	as	the	EU	natural	gas	acquis,	by	the	very	authoritarian	Turkish	government	is	a	testimony	 to	 the	 contrary.	 It	 is	 rather	 to	 argue	 that	there	 is	 a	 political	 utility	 for	 strong	government	 control	 over	 the	 transit	 of	 energy	 resources	 across	 Turkey.	 The	 latter	provides	a	 leverage	for	the	regime	against	the	political	pressures	from	the	EU	in	relation	to	 its	 poor	 governance	 records.	 As	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 third	 energy	 package	would	deprive	 the	 Turkish	 government	 of	 this	 political	 instrument,	 thus,	 its	 rejection	 can	 be	explained	also	in	relation	to	the	internal	political	dynamics	in	the	country.		Nonetheless,	this	is	not	to	posit	that	democratisation	of	Turkey	would	automatically	lead	to	the	adoption	of	the	EU	natural	gas	market	rules.	EU	rules	present	but	one	of	the	many	models	 available	 for	 organising	 natural	 gas	 markets;	 hence,	 they	 are	 not	 linked	 to	 the	process	 of	 democratisation	 or	 the	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 democratic	society.	Indeed,	so	long	as	there	are	no	credible	progress	in	the	EU	accession	negotiations,	any	 democratically	 accountable	 government	 in	 Turkey	 would	 find	 it	 economically	 and	strategically	 costly	 (as	 argued	 above)	 and	 potentially,	 unpopular	 to	 implement	 the	 EU	rules	in	natural	gas	sector.		Without	tangible	economic	and	political	benefits,	the	voluntary	implementation	of	the	EU	natural	gas	 rules	would	also	make	 the	ruling	conservative	government	 seem	weak.	Ever	since	 the	 ascend	 to	 power	 in	 2001,	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 islamist	 AKP	 government	 in	Ankara	has	largely	been	based	on	the	strong	economic	growth	that	the	country	has	been	experiencing.	 This	 has	 helped	 to	 raise	 the	 living	 standards	 in	 the	 country,	 while	 the	islamist	 “neo-populism”	 preached	 by	 the	 AKP	 government	 resonated	 with	 the	 broad	conservative	 strata	 of	 the	 Turkish	 society.554	 As	 note	 above,	 strong	 economic	 growth	 in	Turkey	 also	 spurred	 strong	 demand	 for	 cheap	 energy,	 which	 has	 largely	 been	 satisfied	with	 imports	 from	the	neighbouring	producing	regions.	Due	 to	 its	strategic	geographical	location	Turkey	was	successful	 in	negotiating	favourable	deals	in	its	natural	gas	imports,	in	 addition	 to	 receiving	 sizeable	 transit	 benefits.	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 third	 energy	package	 threatens	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 AKP	 government	 to	 continue	 doing	 so.	 The	 energy	
                                                            553	World	Report	2016	(USA:	Human	Rights	Watch,	2016),	pp.	578–585;	Amnesty	International	Report	2015/16:	
The	State	of	the	World’s	Human	Rights	(London:	Amnesty	International,	2016),	pp.	369–373.	554	See	e.g.	Ziya	Öniş,	‘The	Triumph	of	Conservative	Globalism:	The	Political	Economy	of	the	AKP	Era’,	Turkish	
Studies,	13.2	(2012),	135–52.	
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policy	 of	 the	 current	 Turkish	 government	 would	 (likely)	 have	 reverberations	 on	 the	economic	growth.	In	order	to	avoid	this	and	accordingly,	the	popularity	of	the	ruling	party,	it	 is	 seems	 all	 the	 more	 rational	 for	 the	 AKP	 government	 to	 not	 adopt	 the	 natural	 gas	
acquis.		
3.	Main	findings	and	implications	on	the	SGC	
This	 chapter	 argued	 that,	 although	 Turkey	 is	 an	 EU	 candidate,	 transposition	 and	application	of	the	EU's	energy	acquis	in	the	country	has	not	been	easy	and	successful	ever	since	 the	start	of	 the	accession	negotiations.	As	was	 investigated	 in	detail	above,	 several	factors	 play	 inhibitive	 role	 in	 the	 way	 of	 Europeanisation	 of	 Turkey's	 energy	 sector.	Despite	Turkey's	a	quarter	of	a	century	old	membership	application,	 the	achievement	of	the	 final	 reward	 is	 still	 uncertain	 if	 not	 impossible.	Nevertheless,	 this	 uncertainty	 in	eventual	membership	can	only	partially	explain	the	overall	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis,	as	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 to	 Turkey	 is	 not	 non-existent,	 but	 is	 rather	selective.		That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 is	 keen	 on	 capitalising	 on	 the	 EU	 experience	 in	certain	sectors	of	the	energy	system	(renewables,	electricity	sector	and	in	terms	of	energy	efficiency),	 but	 reluctant	 in	 others	 (natural	 gas).	 To	 this	 end,	 I	 have	 argued	 above	 that,	such	 a	 selective	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 net	 domestic	costs	 that	Turkey	will	 incur	 in	 adopting	 the	EU	natural	 gas	 legislation	without	 ensuring	credible	and	foreseeable	membership	prospects.		In	 this	vein,	we	can	observe	 that	 there	are	 two	opposite	 trends	 taking	place	 in	Turkey's	energy	policy	with	regard	to	renewables	and	electricity	sector	on	the	one	hand	and	natural	gas	sectors	on	the	other.	To	start	with,	Turkish	government	seems	to	be	keen	on	tapping	into	the	domestic	renewable	energy	sources	and	liberalising	domestic	electricity	sector.	In	doing	 so,	 it	 is	willing	 to	 capitalise	 on	 the	EU	practice	 and	 ensuring	market	 convergence	and	integration	with	the	neighbouring	countries,	including	the	EU.		However,	when	it	comes	to	the	national	gas	market,	the	Turkish	government	seems	to	be	paying	 only	 lip	 service	 to	 harmonising	 its	 domestic	 policies	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU	 and	ensuring	freedom	of	gas	transit	across	its	territory.	In	reality,	the	government	is	keen	on	holding	onto	its	formal	capacity	to	exert	control	over	the	transit	of	gas	across	its	sovereign	territory	and	hereby,	influencing	regional	(continental)	energy	trade	and	geopolitics.		
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In	this	context,	the	preferences	of	the	Turkish	government	is	exogenous	to	the	process	of	institutional	 reforms	 that	 it	 has	 enacted	 or	 refrained	 from	 enacting,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 to	institutional	 outcome.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 institutions	 that	 it	 is	 confronted	 with	 (EU	energy	acquis)	 do	 not	 serve	 as	 a	 basis/template	 of	 good	 or	 bad	 behaviour/action.	 They	rather	 present	 options	 for	 policy	 choice,	 the	 selection	 or	 non-selection	 of	 which	 is	determined	by	the	costs	incurred	or	benefits	accrued.	What	constitutes	a	cost	or	benefit	is	determined	by	the	preferences	of	the	Turkish	government,	which	are	or	can	be	affected	by	the	acceptance	or	non-acceptance	of	the	EU	acquis	(formal	institutions);	however,	they	are	not	 conditioned	 (affected)	 by	 them	 as	 scripts	 of	 appropriate	 behaviour.	 In	 other	words,	
preferences	are	determined	outside	the	process	of	decision-making	on	whether	to	adopt	or	reject	the	EU	rules.		In	practice,	these	preferences	are	related	to	Turkey's	role	in	energy	relations.	Turkey	is	a	growing	consumer,	as	well	as	a	key	transit	country	on	the	way	towards	the	EU	markets.	Therefore,	 the	 power	 to	 affect	 energy	 transit/trade	 across	 its	 territory	 feeds	 into	 the	political	 and	 economic	 muscles	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	 and	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	Turkey's	 (geo)economic	 and	 (geo)political	 strategy.	 Thus,	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 RCI,	 the	interaction	of	Turkey	with	the	EU-sourced	formal	 institutions	(in	our	case,	their	adoption	or	 rejection)	 is	 juxtaposed	 against	 its	 preferences	 (related	 to	 energy	 security)	 in	 a	strategic	 setting,	 the	 outcome	 of	 which	 is	 determined	 by	 a	 rational	 action,	 namely,	measuring	expected	costs	against	benefits.	As	this	chapter	argued,	structurally,	it	appears	that	institutionalisation	of	Turkish	natural	gas	sector	under	the	EU	template,	without	tangible	progress	in	EU	accession	negotiations	is	 likely	 to	 confer	 upon	 Turkey	 heavy	 net	 domestic	 costs.	 Therefore,	 in	 line	 with	 the	predictions	 of	 the	 EIM,	 the	 Turkish	 government's	 choice	 to	 not	 to	 apply	 EU	 legislation	domestically	 is	only	rational	 for	 it	will	allow	Turkey	 to	hold	on	 to	 its	national	control	of	energy	transit	across	its	territory	and	keep	on	taking	advantage	of	its	material	benefits.	From	the	view	point	of	the	central	thesis	of	this	PhD,	this	outcome	will	likely	entail	transit	implication	 on	 the	 EU	 supply	 of	 natural	 gas	 via	 the	 SGC	 across	 Turkey.	 This	 is	 rather	because,	freedom	of	transit	across	the	SGC	could	only	be	achieved	if	the	regulatory	regime	for	 the	 corridor	 were	 ensured	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 ownership	 of	 gas	 volumes	transported	via	the	major	infrastructure(s)	were	less	relevant	(immaterial)	for	the	owners	and	the	operators	of	this	very	infrastructure(s).	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	separation	of	the	gas	supply	 and	transportation	 activities	 of	 BOTAS	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 regulated	TPA	regime	 within	 Turkey,	 would	 have	 allowed	 third	 countries	 to	 engage	 in	 direct	 energy	relations	 with	 the	 EU	 without	 being	 hindered	 by	 Turkish	 government's	 or	 BOTAS’s	
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commercial	 and	political	 interests.	Hence,	 as	BOTAS	 (or	 any	 other	 company	owning	 the	transmission	 lines)	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 discriminate	 among	 domestically	 destined	 or	transiting	gas	in	terms	accessing	Turkish	domestic	transmission	(or	transit)	lines,	energy	export	 to	 the	EU	or	 any	other	 consumer	markets	 via	Turkey	would	 then	be	determined	solely	based	on	market	 fundamentals.	As	 I	have	 investigated	 in	 the	current	chapter,	 this	has	not	been	the	case	in	the	Turkish	section	of	the	SGC.	Despite	 the	 progress	 achieved	 with	 regard	 to	 TANAP,	 the	 necessity	 of	 establishing	 EU-sourced	 regulatory	 regime	 in	 Turkey	 remains	 all	 the	 more	 relevant.	 The	 maximum	transportation	capacity	of	TANAP	is	only	31	bcm/a,	16	bcm/a	of	which	has	already	been	contracted	 for	 25	 years	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 SH	 II	 volumes	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 Turkish	markets.	The	remaining	available	capacity	of	TANAP	can	easily	be	 filled	with	volumes	to	be	 produced	 from	 other	 fields	 in	 Azerbaijan,	 such	 as	 Umid,	 Absheron,	 Babek,	 etc.	 As	TANAP	does	not	envision	regulated	(mandatory)	TPA	regime,	it	will	not	guarantee	transit	capacity	 for,	 for	 example,	 Iranian,	 Iraqi	 or	 Turkmen	 gas	when/if	 they	 become	 available.	This	 will	 likely	 require	 the	 usage	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	 transmission	 system	 for	 the	transportation	of	these	Middle	East	and	Central	Asian	gas	volumes	to	the	EU.	This,	on	the	other	 hand,	 will	 still	 necessitate	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 favourable	 to	 transit	 regulatory	regime	in	Turkey,	whether	through	Europeanisation	of	the	Turkish	domestic	legislation	or	based	on	intergovernmental	agreement	that	provides	equal	pipeline	access	opportunities	for	 all	 the	 relevant	 third-party	 gas.	 Therefore,	 without	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 proper	transit	regime	in	Turkey,	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	risks	being	limited	to	current	export	capacity	 (10	 bcm/a),	which	will	 provide	 only	 limited	 contribution	 to	 the	 improving	 the	resilience	of	the	EU	energy	security.	Consequently,	 this	means	 that	under	current	circumstances,	 supply	of	natural	gas	 to	 the	EU	 via	 the	 Turkish	 segment	 of	 the	 SGC	 will	 not	 conform	 to	 the	 former's	 conception	 of	energy	 security,	which	 includes	both	 the	diversity,	 as	well	 as	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	supplied	 energy.	 Since	 competitiveness	 criterion	 requires	 the	 elimination	 of	 non-market	interference	 to	 energy	 supply/transit,	 in	 the	 case	of	Turkey,	 it	 can	be	 concluded	 to	be	 a	failed	effort.	
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CHAPTER	V:	EUROPEANISATION	OF	GEORGIA's	NATURAL	GAS	SECTOR	&	SGC	
1.	Introduction	
East	of	Turkey	the	territory	of	Georgia	constitutes	an	important	segment	of	the	SGC.	The	country's	 strategic	geographical	 location	between	 the	Caspian	energy	producers	and	 the	European	 consumer	 regions	makes	 it	 an	 indispensable	 transit	 country	 for	 the	 export	 of	these	 energy	 resources	 to	 the	 European	 consumers.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 strategic	position	allows	Georgia	to	ensure	its	own	energy	security.	From	the	EU	perspective,	on	the	other	 hand,	 Georgia's	 transit	 location	 can	 present	 economic	 and	 political	 risks	 for	 the	transfer	 of	 Caspian	 energy	 riches	 to	 the	 European	 market,	 regardless	 of	 the	 country's	West-friendly	political	orientation.	Although	modest	compared	to	Turkey,	these	risks	stem	from	Georgia’s	national	interests	to	exact	favourable	terms	from	the	Caspian	producers	in	purchasing	 natural	 gas	 for	 domestic	 supply,	 as	 well	 as	 receive	 additional	 benefits	 in	allowing	freedom	of	transit	across	its	territory.	Therefore,	Georgia	has	come	to	be	part	of	the	 EU’s	 SGC	 strategy	 not	 only	 in	 physical/hardware	 terms,	 but	 also	 from	 the	institutional/regulatory	point	of	view.	While	 the	 EU’s	 vision	 for	 designing	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 of	 this	 alternative	 energy	corridor	 is	 the	 same	across	all	 the	 countries	 -	 through	 the	extension	of	 the	EU	domestic	energy	 governance	 norms	 over	 the	 SGC	 countries	 -	 the	 nature/mode	 of	 the	 individual	bilateral	relations	between	these	countries	and	the	EU	is	considerably	different.	That	is	to	say,	due	to	its	candidate	status,	Turkey	is	by	default	required	to	transpose	the	whole	body	of	 the	EU	 law	 into	 its	domestic	 legislation	before	 it	 can	be	 let	 in.	Thus,	 the	nature	of	 the	relations	between	Ankara	and	Brussels	is	hierarchical,	which	I	have	investigated	at	length	in	the	previous	chapter.	However,	 as	 I	 have	 presented	 in	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 III,	 with	 the	 SGC	 states	 of	 Eastern	Partnership,	 the	 EU’s	 relationship	 is	 under	 the	 membership	 line.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 neither	Georgia,	nor	Azerbaijan	has	been	granted	a	 candidate	 status	and	 the	 latter	has	not	even	expressed	its	desire	to	become	a	member	of	the	EU	anytime	soon.	Therefore,	the	nature	of	relations	between	Georgia	 (and	Azerbaijan)	on	 the	one	hand	and	 the	EU	on	 the	other	 is	less	asymmetrical	 than	 the	one	between	the	EU	and	Turkey.	 In	 this	regard,	what	we	see	here	is	a	two	tier	power	relationships	between	the	EU	and	the	individual	countries	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	
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These	differentiated	power	relations	are	underpinned	by	the	different	levels	of	incentives	offered	 by	 the	 EU	 to	 the	 EaP	 countries	 in	 return	 to	 their	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis,	including	the	EU	legislation	in	natural	gas	sector.	As	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	III,	despite	the	 inferior	 incentives	 offered	 vis-à-vis	 the	 accession	 process	 (association	 vs.	membership),	the	EaP	envisages	similar	level	of	reforms	to	be	carried	out	by	the	partner	countries,	including	Georgia.	Hence,	assuming	that	as	a	vital	transit	and	energy	consumer	country,	 Georgia	 shares	 similar	 (although	 not	 identical)	 energy	 security	 interests	 with	Turkey	(which	I	analyse	inductively	below	in	this	chapter),	then	costs	associated	with	the	adoption	and	implementation	of	 the	EU	acquis	by	Georgia	can	be	expected	to	be	high,	as	well.	Thus,	under	the	rationalist	logic	of	the	External	Incentive	Model	it	can	be	anticipated	that,	Georgian	government	will	find	it	difficult	to	implement	the	EU	Third	Energy	Package	domestically	given	 the	high	adoption	costs	associated	with	 it.	With	 these	 in	mind,	 in	 the	current	 chapter	 I	 analyse	 the	domestic	energy-related	constraints	 in	Georgia	 in	order	 to	unearth	the	factors,	which	affect	the	Europeanisation	of	its	natural	gas	sector.	By	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 conceptual	 and	 theoretical	 tools	 from	 Europeanisation	literature,	 I	 aim	 to	 unearth	 and	 analyse	 the	 factors	 that	 will	 potentially	 affect	 the	functioning	of	 the	SGC	as	an	alternative	energy	supply	corridor	 to	 the	EU.	Consequently,	this	will	 enable	me	 to	 investigate	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	 EU's	 conception	 of	energy	security,	which	includes	both	the	diversity	and	competitiveness	of	energy	supply.		With	 this	 in	 mind,	 first,	 this	 chapter	 investigates	 the	 level	 of	 legislative	 approximation	between	Georgia	and	the	EU	in	natural	gas	sector.	Then,	it	provides	a	thick	analysis	of	the	domestic	 factors	 in	 Georgia	 that	 brought	 about	 the	 current	 state	 of	 outcome	 in	 rule	adoption	 process.	 Finally,	 it	 assesses	 these	 findings	 in	 the	 context	 of	 natural	 gas	 supply	across	the	Georgian	segment	of	the	SGC	and	its	potential	implications	on	the	competitive	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	this	corridor.	
2.	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	sector	of	Georgia	
As	part	of	the	Eastern	Partnership,	the	EU	signed	an	Association	Agreement	with	Georgia	on	 Jun	 27,	 2014.	 As	 described	 in	 Chapter	 III,	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 envisages	 contractual	obligation	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Georgia	 to	 apply	 both	 the	 main	 principles,	 as	 well	 as	 specific	provisions	of	 the	EU	natural	gas	acquis	as	part	of	 the	DCFTA	and	sectoral	 sections	of	 the	mentioned	 agreement.	 In	 addition,	 Georgia	 will	 have	 to	 apply	 the	 principles	 and	 the	specific	provisions	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	when	and	if	its	accession	process	to	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	is	successful.	However,	as	it	was	underlined	by	the	interviewees	at	the	
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European	Commission	and	the	EEAS,	it	leaves	a	lot	of	doubt	and	questions	as	to	how	deep	and	successfully	EU	 legislation	can	be	 implemented	 in	Georgia.555	 In	order	to	understand	this,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 a	 comprehensive	 picture	 of	 Georgia's	 domestic	 energy	landscape.	
The	Ministry	of	Energy	-	has	the	primary	responsibility	over	the	state	policy	in	the	energy	sector.	 It	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 drafting	 the	 national	 energy	 policy	 and	 submitting	 it	 to	 the	Parliament	 for	 approval	 and	 for	 developing	 and	 implementing	 short-medium-	 and	 long-term	strategies	and	priorities	for	the	energy	sector	of	the	country.	
Georgian	 National	 Energy	 and	 Water	 Supply	 Regulatory	 Commission	 (GNEWRC)	 -	 is	 the	relevant	 national	 autonomous	 regulatory	 body,	 which	 (also)	 establishes	 and	 regulates	tariffs	 for	 natural	 gas	 transportation	 and	 distribution	 activities.	 GNEWRC	 is	 responsible	for	drafting	and	approving	the	tariff	methodology	and	licensing	rules.	Natural	gas	supply	activities	 are	 deregulated,	 thus,	 no	 licence	 is	 required	 for	 these	 activities.	 The	 2005	amendments	 to	 the	 Law	 on	 Electricity	 and	 Natural	 Gas	 have	 stripped	 some	 regulatory	rule-making	powers	from	the	regulatory	authority	and	transferred	these	to	the	Ministry	of	Energy	 in	gas	&	electricity	 sectors.	The	amended	 law	gives	 the	Ministry	 the	authority	 to	approve	the	natural	gas	balance	and	the	natural	gas	market	rules.	
Georgian	Oil	and	Gas	Corporation	(GOGC)	-	 is	a	 joint	stock	company	and	100%	owned	by	the	Ministry	of	Energy	with	management	rights.	GOGC	administers	state’s	share	of	natural	gas	 (and	 oil)	 obtained	 under	 the	 relevant	 production	 sharing	 agreements	 (PSA)	and	manages	its	storage,	transportation	and	sale	operations	and	controls	the	import	of	gas	to	the	Georgian	wholesale	market,	although	gas	sector	is	liberalised	in	nominal	terms.	
Georgian	Gas	Transportation	Company	(GGTC)	–	is	the	operator	(TSO)	of	the	transmission	lines	owned	by	the	GOGC.	GGTC	itself	is	100%	owned	by	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy.	In	 this	 regard,	 GGTC	 is	 legally	 unbundled	 from	 GOGC.556	 GGTC	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 the	transmission	 level	 network	 activities,	 including	 commissioning,	 rehabilitating	 and	replacing	existing	oil	&	gas	pipelines	and	constructing	new	ones	in	the	territory	of	Georgia.	Under	 the	 current	 Georgian	 legislation,	 third-party	 access	 to	 the	 transmission	 system	 is	regulated557	and	any	party	that	seeks	access	to	the	transmission	system	for	the	purpose	of	receiving	natural	gas	must	submit	a	special	request	to	GGTC	(TSO).	GGTC	may	decline	the	request	 only	 in	 case	 if	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 parties	 (a	 licensee	 or	 direct	 customer)	 to	
                                                            555	Interview	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels,	as	well	as	with	the	EC	official	directly	involved	in	the	SGC	negotiations,	07/05/2013,	Brussels.	556	INOGATE	Programme:	Status	Report	2011	(Kiev:	INOGATE	Technical	Secretariat,	October	2012),	p.	12.	557	INOGATE	Programme:	Status	Report	2011,	p.	12.	
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natural	 gas	 transmission	 system	may	have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 system	 as	 a	whole.	Access	tariffs	to	the	transmission	lines	is	established	and	regulated	by	the	GNEWRC.	
Domestic	 distribution	 networks	 -	 are	 privatised.	 KazTransGaz	 Tbilisi	 and	 SOCAR	Georgia	Gas	 (SGG)	 control	 the	 distribution	 segments	 of	 gas	 transportation.	 Access	 to	 the	distribution	networks	is	carried	out	by	tariffs,	which	are	established	and	regulated	by	the	GNEWRC.		Georgia	imports	gas	for	domestic	consumption	from	Azerbaijan,	as	well	as	from	Russia	in	the	form	of	(transit)	payment	for	Russian	gas	transit	to	Armenia.	In	addition,	since	Georgia	also	 acts	 as	 a	 transit	 corridor	 for	 Azeri	 gas	 exports	 to	 Turkey	 and	 Europe,	 it	 receives	 a	share	of	transported	volumes	as	a	transit	fee,	which	amounts	to	5%	of	the	transiting	gas.558	In	this	regard,	although	Georgia	has	gone	a	long	way	in	applying	international	practices	in	domestic	energy	market,	 it	does	not	entirely	comply	with	the	broad	principles	enshrined	in	 the	EU	acquis	 (and	 the	EU-Georgia	AA).	Firstly,	 although	 (legal)	unbundling	 is	applied	vis-à-vis	the	Georgian	domestic	transmission	system,	the	South	Caucasus	Pipeline	(SCPx),	which	constitutes	the	first	leg	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	crosses	Georgian	territory	in	transit,	does	not	apply	this	regulatory	requirement.	The	SCPx	is	owned	and	operated	by	the	 supply	 (upstream)	 companies,	 which	 contradicts	 the	 EU	 legislation.	 Thus,	 in	 the	context	of	the	Europeanisation	of	the	SGC,	Georgia	has	yet	to	comply	this	benchmark	of	the	EU’s	external	energy	governance.	Secondly,	similar	to	unbundling	requirements,	TPA	in	Georgia	is	applied	only	vis-à-vis	the	domestic	 transmission	 lines,	 hence,	 leaving	 the	 SCPx	 outside	 this	 legal	 requirement.	Thirdly,	 the	broad	“transit”	principle	under	 the	EU	 legislation	(as	well	as	 the	EU-Georgia	AA),	 which	 eliminates	 the	 transit	 fees	 by	 the	 transit	 countries	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 applied	 by	Georgia,	as	the	country	still	receives	transit	fees	from	the	Caspian	gas	exporters	in	the	form	of	free	gas	off-takes.559	Although	it	may	initially	seem	insignificant,	these	(5%)	transit	off-takes	can	have	substantial	influence	on	the	economic	viability	of	natural	gas	supply	via	the	SGC.	 For	 example,	 under	 the	 Shah-Deniz	 phase	 II,	 16	 bcm/a	 of	 gas	 is	 contracted	 for	Turkish	 and	 EU	markets.	 This	means	 that	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 transit	 rights	 of	 these	volumes	across	Georgia,	Shah-Deniz	consortium	has	to	provide	up	to	800	mcm/a	of	gas	to	Georgia	free	of	charge.	If	to	consider	an	average	price	of	€300	for	every	1000	cubic	metres	
                                                            558	 The	 information	 on	 Georgia's	 domestic	 energy	 landscape	 was	 acquired	 during	 the	 in-depth	 phone	interview	with	the	relevant	official	from	SOCAR,	21/04/2015.	In	addition,	reports	from	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(EBRD)	and	INOGATE	programme	were	used.	See	e.g.	‘Strategy	for	Georgia’	(The	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development,	2013);	INOGATE	Programme:	Status	Report	2011.	559	 See	 e.g.	 ‘Инфраструктура	 для	 реализации	 проекта	 “Энергетический	 мост	 Азербайджан-Грузия-Турция”	 практически	 готова	 (The	 Infrastructure	 for	 Realisation	 of	 Project	 "Energy	 Bridge	 Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey)	 Is	 Practically	 Ready)’,	 OilCapital.ru,	 12	 September	 2014	<http://www.oilcapital.ru/industry/252148.html>	[accessed	24	October	2015].	
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of	 gas	 sold	 in	 the	 EU,	 Georgian	 off-takes	will	 cost	 the	 Shah-Deniz	 consortium	€240	mln	annually	or	€6	bln	during	the	25	years,	which	is	the	length	of	the	gas	supply	contracts	to	the	EU	consumers	signed	as	part	of	the	SD	II.	Whether	compensated	at	the	expense	of	the	gas	 suppliers,	 or	 passed	 on	 to	 the	 EU	 consumers	 in	 the	 final	 price	 of	 natural	 gas,	 these	figures	 prove	 that	 the	 economic	 impact	 of	 the	 freedom	 of	 transit	 across	 Georgia	 is	considerable.	This	 is	 especially	 true	given	 the	 fact	 that,	 the	netback	value	of	 every	1000	cubic	metre	of	natural	gas	sold	in	the	EU	is	usually	around	€50.	If	to	consider	the	transit	of	Central	Asian	gas	across	Georgia	(at	some	point	in	the	future),	then	transit	risks	in	Georgia	rises	exponentially.		Against	this	backdrop,	as	I	will	 illustrate	below,	although	Georgia	 is	 legally	bound	by	the	relevant	provisions	under	the	EU-Georgia	AA	and	in	the	future	by	the	EnCT	membership,	the	 government	 is	 very	 reluctant	 to	 implement	 EU-sourced	 reforms	 in	 the	 foreseeable	future,	for	they	will	incur	considerable	domestic	costs.		In	the	following	sub-sections,	based	on	the	rational-choice	analytical	 framework,	I	utilise	External	Incentive	Model	 in	order	to	reveal	the	underlying	factors	affecting	the	failure	of	rule	adoption	in	Georgia.	This	model	predicts	that,	"A	government	adopts	the	EU	rules	if	the	
benefits	 of	 EU	 rewards	 exceed	 the	 domestic	 adoption	 costs".560	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 the	following	 sub-sections	 will	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 size	 and	 speed	 of	 reward,	 credibility	 of	
conditionality	 and	 the	 net	 domestic	 costs	&	 veto	 holders	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 EU-sourced	energy	reforms	in	Georgia.	
2.1.	Size	and	speed	of	final	reward	
As	I	indicated	above,	the	finalité	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	is	under	the	membership	line.	Thus,	even	 though	 Georgia	 has	 clearly	 voiced	 its	 EU	 membership	 aspirations,	 the	 current	contractual	 arrangement	 does	 not	 even	 hypothetically	 guarantee	 this	 prospect.	Additionally,	although	the	DCFTA	part	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	enables	Georgia	to	access	EU	single	market	without	customs	barriers,	its	relevance	to	trade	in	natural	gas	is	irrelevant,	for	Georgia	does	not	own	natural	 gas	 resources	of	 its	own	and	plays	only	 a	 transit	 role,	while	satisfying	with	transit	benefits	received	from	major	Caspian	gas	exporters.	In	other	words,	 neither	 the	 AA	 nor	 its	 DCFTA	 promise	 sizeable	 rewards	 for	 Georgia	 as	 far	 the	natural	gas	sector	is	concerned.	In	 this	 context,	 Georgia's	 EnCT	 membership	 application	 can	 be	 analysed	 as	 a	 policy	strategy	in	order	to	enhance	its	EU	membership	prospects.	Since	Georgia	is	not	physically	
                                                            560	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	12.	
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linked	 to	 EU	 market,	 EnCT	 membership	 will	 not	 provide	 Georgia	 with	 tangible	 energy	security	 benefits,	 in	 terms	 of	 solidarity	 in	 times	 of	 energy	 shortages	 or	 energy	diversification	options	via	reverse	gas	flows.	Thus,	EnCT	membership	seems	to	be	only	a	symbolic	 gesture,	which	 an	 EC	 official	 interpreted	 as	 strategy	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Georgia	 to	
legitimise	 its	 EU	 membership	 prospects	 under	 the	 preamble	 of	 the	 Energy	 Community	Treaty.	The	preamble	in	principle	provides	EU	membership	prospects	for	the	contracting	parties.561	Despite	these	efforts,	the	prospect	of	the	big	reward	-	EU	membership	-	is	far	from	being	promised	 by	 the	 EU.	 Each	 successive	 Eastern	 Partnership	 summits	 presented	 even	 less	optimism	 than	 the	prior	 ones.	Hence,	 since	under	 the	 current	 contractual	 arrangements	the	 final	 reward	 for	 rule	 approximation	 envisages	 only	 association	 without	 tangible	material	benefits,	Georgia	 is	not	keen	on	rushing	to	 implement,	 inter	alia,	EU	natural	gas	
acquis	in	the	foreseeable	future.562		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 Georgia's	 efforts	 to	 legitimise	 its	 EU	 membership	prospects	 does	 not	 necessarily	 stem	 from	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 or	 the	understanding	thereof	as	such	by	Georgia.	Quite	the	opposite,	Georgia	seems	to	use	it	out	of	strategic	logic	in	order	to	further	its	ultimate	aim,	which	is	the	EU	membership.	Hence,	one	should	not	confuse	the	logic	of	legitimacy	(appropriateness)	with	the	logic	of	strategic	(rational)	choice	governing	the	behaviour	of	Georgian	authorities.		Nonetheless,	it	is	my	position	that,	in	itself	the	size	and	the	speed	of	final	reward	does	not	necessarily	explain	underlying	reasons	why	Georgia	is	so	reluctant	to	adopt	EU	natural	gas	
acquis,	 whether	 under	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA,	 EnCT	 membership	 or	 any	 other	 bilateral	 or	multilateral	 instruments,	 such	 as	 Twinning	 or	 INOGATE	 programmes.	 This	 requires	further	analyses	in	order	to	unearth	additional	factors,	which	condition	the	reluctance	on	the	part	of	the	Georgian	authorities	when	it	comes	to	approximation	in	natural	gas	sector.	To	 that	end,	 I	below	analyse	 the	 credibility	of	 conditionality	as	an	additional	underlying	factor	in	this	process.	
2.2.	Credibility	of	conditionality	
As	I	illustrated	above,	DCFTA	and	sectoral	parts	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA	envisages	access	to	the	EU	single	market	and	the	right	to	participate	in	the	functional	Union	programmes	and	
                                                            561	Interview	with	EC/DG	Energy	official,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	The	same	logic	was	also	reluctantly	admitted	by	a	senior	Georgian	diplomat	during	a	separate	interview,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	562	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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agencies	 in	 return	 to	 the	 approximation	 of	 domestic	 rules	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis.	Nevertheless,	this	conditionality	based	on	more-for-more	principle	is	not	aggregated	as	far	as	the	final	reward	for	compliance	is	concerned.	That	is	to	say:	• DCFTA	 includes	 measures	 that	 can	 restrict	 the	 partner	 country's	 access	 to	 the	single	EU	market	in	case	of	non-compliance	in	the	agreed	timeframe	and/or	depth	of	 harmonisation	 until	 Georgia	 provides	 the	 necessary	 remedies.	 However,	 non-compliance	 in	once	sector,	 e.g.	natural	gas,	will	not	 limit	market	access	 in	all	 the	areas	 of	 free	 trade	 between	Georgia	 and	 the	EU.	 In	 other	words,	 as	 the	 relevant	Georgian	diplomat	put	it,	"if	we	[Georgia]	do	not	comply	with	energy	acquis,	we	can	
still	export	apples	to	the	EU	market".563	• In	 sectoral	 part,	 additionally,	 there	 are	 no	 punishment	 and/or	 enforcement	mechanisms,	 as	 the	 partnership	 is	 based	 on	 the	 “good-will”	 of	 the	 partner	countries.	 Obviously,	 this	 can	 entail	 political	 pressure	 in	 the	 political	 dialogue	institutions	 -	 Association	 Council	 and	 Association	 Committee.	 However,	 the	 AA	does	not	envisage	anything	in	terms	of	sanctions.564	In	this	regard,	the	credibility	of	conditionality,	especially	enforcement	mechanisms	are	not	so	 stringent	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 EU	 accession	 process,	 nor	 they	 are	 interlinked	 among	different	 sectors	 of	 bilateral	 partnership.	This,	 consequently,	will	 allow	Georgia	 to	 tailor	the	depth	and	timeline	of	the	implementation	of	the	EU	acquis	to	its	domestic	preferences.		Nonetheless,	although	the	lack	of	credible	enforcement	mechanisms	in	the	EU-Georgia	AA	can	 explain	 Georgia’s	 current	 inclination	 not	 to	 rush	with	 the	 approximation	 process	 in	natural	gas	sector,	it	nevertheless	does	not	provide	a	credible	answer	to	the	question:	How	
does	Georgian	government	decide	which	rules	to	adopt	and	which	not?	In	other	words,	what	 are	 the	 factors	 that	 directly	 mediate	 between	 the	 preferences	 of	 Georgia	 and	 the	adoption	of	the	EU	rules	in	natural	gas	sector?	This	is	especially	a	germane	question	given	the	 fact	 that,	 Georgia	 is	 keen	 on	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 EU	model	 in	 electricity	 sector	organisation	and	integrating	into	the	regional	electricity	markets.565	As	such,	if	the	lack	of	credibility	 of	 conditionality	 was	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 or	 propensity	 for	 rule	adoption,	 then	 it	 should	 have	 been	 observed	 across	 the	 board	 in	 the	 energy	 sector.	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	analyse	the	role	of	domestic	net	adoption	costs	and	domestic	veto	holders,	as	they	directly	mediate	between	the	preferences	of	the	government	and	the	outcome	of	the	rule	adoption	process.	They	are	especially	relevant	for	the	role	of	Georgia	
                                                            563	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels	564	Interview	with	Salome	Salukvadze,	Mission	of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24/04/2015,	Brussels	565	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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as	 a	 key	 transit	 country	 along	 the	 SGC,	 for	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 potential	 impact	 of	 the	Georgian	 national	 interests	 on	 the	 freedom	 of	 transit	 across	 this	 country,	 hence,	competitiveness	 of	 EU	 gas	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC.	 I	 analyse	 these	 factors	 in	 the	 following	section.	
2.3.	Net	adoption	costs	and	veto	holders	
2.3.1.	Net	adoption	costs	
The	biggest	point	of	apprehension	for	Georgia	stemming	from	the	approximation	towards	the	EU	acquis	 is	 the	 transit	benefits	 that	country	currently	receives	 from	the	natural	gas	pipelines	traversing	its	territory	from	the	East	to	West,	as	well	as	from	the	North	to	South.	The	 former	 is	 related	 to	 the	 transit	of	Caspian	(currently	only	Azeri)	gas	volumes	 to	 the	Turkish	and	 in	 the	 future	 to	 the	European	markets	via	 the	South	Caucasus	Pipeline	 (the	first	 leg	 of	 the	 SGC),	while	 crossing	 the	 sovereign	 territory	 of	 Georgia.	 In	 return	 to	 this	transit	right,	Georgia	currently	receives	transit	fees	in	the	form	of	free	gas	volumes	under	the	 Host	 Government	 Agreement	 (HGA)	 with	 the	 South	 Caucasus	 Pipeline	 Company	(SCPC).	The	Georgian	Oil	and	Gas	Corporation	later	uses	these	free	gas	volumes	to	lower	the	wholesale	gas	prices	for	the	domestic	consumers.566	Furthermore,	 due	 to	 its	 strategic	 location	between	 the	 gas	production	 and	 consumption	regions	 and	 currently	 being	 the	 only	 viable	 Western	 transit	 route	 for	 the	 Caspian	 gas,	Georgia	 is	 able	 to	 exact	 favourable	 gas	 import	 prices	 from	 Azerbaijan	 for	 its	 domestic	consumption.	In	this	regard,	if	Georgia	implemented	the	EU	acquis,	then	it	would	have	to	let	go	of	the	transit	and	domestic	benefits	it	currently	receives.	This	is	rather	because,	as	I	indicated	in	Chapter	III,	EU	energy	acquis	prohibits	transit	fees	to	be	charged	for	transiting	gas.	 In	 addition,	 since	 under	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA/DCFTA	 Georgia	 must	 not	 hinder	 the	transit	 gas	 across	 its	 territory,	 then	 the	 government	 would	 be	 in	 a	 worse	 negotiating	position	in	exacting	cheaper	gas	prices	from	Azerbaijan	for	its	domestic	consumption.	Indeed,	this	would	be	beneficial	for	the	EU,	for	any	reduction	of	costs	of	EU-destined	gas	in	
transit	 might	 be	 passed	 on	 to	 the	 final	 EU	 consumers	 or	 make	 currently	 commercially	unfeasible	 upstream	 projects	 viable	 or	 simply	 increase	 the	 gas	 producer’s	 netback.	 In	contrast,	 the	application	of	 the	EU	acquis	would	not	generate	any	benefits	 for	Georgia	 in	order	to	offset	these	potential	costs.		
                                                            566	Interview	with	the	relevant	official	from	SOCAR,	21/04/2015.	
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These	concerns	would	apply	not	only	with	regard	to	the	transit	of	Azerbaijani	gas,	but	also	Russian	gas	exports	to	Armenia	while	crossing	Georgia	along	the	North-South	axis.	Unlike	the	 former,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 Georgian	 government	 owns	 the	 North-South	 transmission	line,	which	connects	Russia	with	Armenia	across	Georgia.	In	this	case	too,	Georgia	receives	transit	benefits	in	the	form	of	free	gas,	which	covers	around	10%	of	the	country's	domestic	demand.567	In	this	case	too,	the	application	of	the	EU	acquis	in	Georgia	would	deprive	the	country	 of	 these	 transit	 benefits,	 for	 the	 EU	 acquis	would	 have	 to	 be	 applied	 uniformly	without	 discriminating	 among	 different	 stakeholders.	 For	 this	 very	 reason,	 despite	 the	legal	 commitment	 under	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 to	 carry	 out	 reforms	 in	 approximating	domestic	 legislation	 to	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 Georgian	 government	 is	 keen	 on	 to	 continue	receiving	 transit	 benefits	 for	 a	 considerable	 period	 of	 time;	 thus,	 it	 will	 take	 a	 strong	negotiations	position	when	determining	the	timeline	and	depth	of	implementation,	which	is	not	prescribed	by	the	EU-Georgia	Association	Agreement.568		In	itself,	it	is	difficult	to	predict	any	comparable	costs	or	benefits	for	Georgia	regarding	the	application	of	unbundling	and	guaranteed	TPA	provisions,	which	are	also	envisioned	in	the	EU	acquis	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	 transit	 fees.	 For	 the	 owners	 of	 the	 SCPx,	which	would	have	to	be	unbundled,	however,	this	would	incur	extensive	commercial	and	strategic	risks,	as	they	would	not	be	able	to	exercise	control	over	the	access	regime	of	their	own	 pipeline.	 In	 theory,	 unbundling	 and	 guaranteed	 (regulated)	 TPA	 regimes	 could	 be	applied	 before/without	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	 transit	 fees,	 hence,	 giving	 the	 Georgian	government	a	leeway	to	continue	benefiting	from	the	latter	for	a	sometime.	However,	this	would	 likely	 to	unleash	 a	 chain	of	 reactions	 from	 the	pipeline	owners,	 as	 their	 rights	 to	pipeline	 ownership	 and	 operatorship	 is	 guaranteed	 under	 the	 bilateral	 inter-governmental	 and	 host	 government	 agreements.569	 Violation	 of	 the	 terms	 of	 this	agreement	would	 likely	 have	 a	 knock-on	 effect	 on	 the	 above-mentioned	 transit	 benefits	and	cheap	gas	imports,	for	the	Georgian	governmental	would	no	longer	be	able	to	leverage	its	geographical	location	to	that	end.	In	 other	 words,	 if	 the	 gas	 producers	 in	 Azerbaijan,	 who	 control	 the	 major	 gas	 transit	pipeline	 across	Georgia	were	 to	 be	 deprived	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 own	 and	operate	 thereof	(due	 to	 the	EU	unbundling	 and	TPA	 rules),	 then	 they	would	be	 left	with	no	 incentives	 to	provide	Georgian	consumers	with	discounted	gas	prices	in	return.	Hence,	if	Georgia	were	
                                                            567	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	568	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	569	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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to	fully	approximate	its	energy	legislation	with	that	of	the	EU,	then	it	would	have	to	let	go	of	both	cheap	gas	and	transit	benefits.		The	 government	 in	 Tbilisi	 is	 aware	 of	 these	 economic	 and	 ensuing	 political	 risks,	 for	 it	could	 also	 affect	 Georgia's	 political	 sovereignty.	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Georgia	 have	 been	enjoying	 friendly	political	and	business	relationships	since	regaining	 their	 independence	following	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union.	This	includes,	among	others,	close	cooperation	in	the	sphere	of	energy	security.570	Azerbaijani	gas	supplies	to	Georgia	came	very	handy	in	2006	when	Russian	Gazprom	declared	 its	 intention	 to	 up	 the	 gas	 sale	 prices	 to	Georgia	from	then	110	USD	to	new	230	USD	after	the	West-friendly	Rose	Revolution	in	Georgia.571	Russian	 request	 followed	 a	 blackmail	 strategy,	 as	 it	 made	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 old	prices	 to	 Georgia's	 selling	 off	 the	 North-South	 gas	 pipeline	 to	 the	 Russian	 gas	 giant	Gazprom.	The	latter	delivers	gas	from	Russia	to	Georgia	and	Armenia	(currently	mainly	to	Armenia)	 across	 the	 Georgian	 territory.572	 In	 order	 to	 close	 the	 circle	 around	 Georgia,	Russia	 even	 invited	 Azerbaijani	 president	 Ilham	 Aliyev	 to	 join	 the	 "anti-Georgia	Alliance",573	 which	 the	 latter	 (diplomatically)	 refused.	 Mindful	 of	 these	 risks,	 therefore,	Georgia	is	interested	in	such	a	timeline	and	depth	of	approximation	that	would	allow	it	to	continue	 benefiting	 from	 the	 above-mentioned	 benefits	 for	 a	 considerable	 period	 of	time.574		Furthermore,	 it	 is	 also	worth	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 EU	acquis	on	 the	 distribution	level	 of	 gas	 supply	 to	 the	 Georgian	 domestic	 consumers.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	this	would	not	affect	the	export	of	Caspian	gas	to	the	EU	markets.	Nonetheless,	 it	 would	 incur	 additional	 costs	 for	 the	 domestic	 Georgian	 gas	 market	 and	individual	consumers.			Since	 2012,	 State	 Oil	 Company	 of	 Azerbaijan	 Republic	 has	 bought	 most	 of	 the	 regional	distribution	 assets	 and	 started	 carrying	 out	 extensive	 gasification	 programme	 into	 the	remote	areas	in	Georgia.575	The	gasification	portfolio	is	aimed	at	providing	isolated	parts	of	the	 Georgian	 population	 with	 secure	 gas;	 hence,	 it	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 integral	element	of	Georgia’s	energy	security.	Under	the	agreement	with	the	Georgian	government,	
                                                            570	Zaur	Shiriyev	and	Kornely	Kakachia,	 ‘Azerbaijani-Georgian	Relations:	The	Foundations	and	Challenges	of	the	Strategic	Alliance’,	SAM	Review,	7-8	(2013).	571	 ‘Saakashvili:	 Georgia	 Will	 Not	 Pay	 “Political	 Price”	 for	 Gas’,	 Civil	 Georgia,	 14	 November	 2006	<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14085>	[accessed	2	March	2014].	572	 ‘Gazprom	 Wants	 “Georgian	 Assets”	 in	 Exchange	 for	 Cheap	 Gas’,	 Civil	 Georgia,	 7	 November	 2006	<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14032>	[accessed	2	March	2014].	573	 ‘Reports:	 Putin	 to	 Urge	 Aliyev	 to	 Join	 “Anti-Georgian	 Alliance”’,	 Civil	 Georgia,	 9	 November	 2006	<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14042>	[accessed	2	March	2014].	574	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	575	Interview	with	an	official	from	SOCAR	Georgia	Gas,	21/04/2015.	
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SOCAR	 is	 envisaged	 to	 provide	 gas	 to	 at	 least	 150	 000	 new	 (potential)	 customers	 and	invest	 at	 least	 $40	 million	 into	 the	 gasification	 programme	 of	 Georgia.	 However,	 it	 is	expected	that	investments	in	Georgia	will	significantly	surpass	this	amount.576	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 would	 require	 SOCAR	 Georgia	 Gas	 (a	subsidiary	 of	 SOCAR)	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 unbundling	 provisions,	 too,	 for	 under	 the	 EU	legislation,	 unbundling	 covers	 both	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 networks.	 SOCAR	currently	owns	both	 the	distribution	network	assets,	 as	well	 as	acts	as	a	 supplier	of	 the	final	customers	in	Georgia.	In	this	regard,	although	Azerbaijan	has	officially	 indicated	that	 it	would	not	object	to	the	application	 of	 the	 EU's	 third	 energy	 package	 in	 Georgia,577	 the	 latter	 would	 directly	undermine	SOCAR's	business	 in	 the	country.	This	 is	rather	because,	under	the	EU	acquis	SOCAR	 would	 have	 to	 undergo	 functional,	 legal	 and	 account	 unbundling	 of	 its	 gas	distribution	 services	 in	 Georgia	 and	 ensure	 mandatory	 third	 party	 access	 to	 its	distribution	 networks.	 Since	 there	 is	 a	 commercial	 link	 between	 SOCAR’s	 gasification	programme	and	the	control	and	operatorship	over	the	distribution	networks,	unbundling	regime	would	run	the	risk	of	making	SOCAR’s	gasification	business	commercially	unviable.	This,	 on	 the	other	hand,	would	 likely	 result	 in	 the	disruption	of	 the	 gasification	process	and	undermine	the	energy	security	of	isolated	Georgian	citizens.		In	light	of	this,	the	absence	of	realistic	alternatives	to	Azerbaijani	gas	supplies	in	the	region	is	likely	to	create	prohibitively	high	domestic	costs	for	Georgia	to	Europeanise	its	natural	gas	 sector,	 while	 (also)	 undermining	 the	 interests	 of	 Azeri	 SOCAR.	 Obviously,	 there	 are	other	 potential	 gas	 producers	 in	 the	 region,	which	 if	 delivered	 to	 Georgia	 following	 the	application	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 could	 provide	 diversification	 and	 competitiveness	 in	 the	Georgian	natural	gas	market.	These	were	highly	speculated	following	the	ascend	to	power	of	 the	 Georgian	Dream	 coalition	 in	 2012.578	 However,	 the	 vicinity	 to	 production	 regions	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	secure	gas	supplies.	The	restart	of	Russian	gas	supply	to	Georgia	is	a	highly	unlikely	scenario	in	the	foreseeable	future.	 Georgia	 stopped	 buying	 gas	 from	 Russia	 following	 the	 2006-2007	 “pricing	dispute”.579	 Trade	 and	 political	 relations,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 were	 entirely	 severed	
                                                            576	Interview	with	an	official	from	SOCAR	Georgia	Gas,	21/04/2015.	577	 ‘Azerbaijan	 Not	 to	 Raise	 Questions	 Regarding	 Georgia’s	 Entry	 into	 EU	 Energy	 Community’,	 ABC.az,	 27	November	2013	<http://abc.az/eng/news_27_11_2013_77685.html>	[accessed	16	February	2014].	578	 ‘Kakha	 Kaladze:	 Georgia	 May	 Resume	 Gas	 Purchases	 from	 Russia’,	 APA.az,	 7	 May	 2013	<http://en.apa.az/news_kakha_kaladze__georgia_may_resume_gas_pu_192420.html>	[accessed	20	May	2015].	579	In	fact,	it	was	more	of	a	political	reaction	on	the	part	of	Kremlin	to	Georgia’s	Western	aspirations	following	the	 “Rose	Revolution”.	 See	 e.g.	 Svante	E.	 Cornell,	Georgia	after	 the	Rose	Revolution:	Geopolitical	Predicament	
and	 Implications	 for	 U.S.	 Policy,	 The	 U.S.	 and	 Russia :	 Regional	 Security	 Issues	 and	 Interests	 (Carlisle,	 PA:	Strategic	Studies	Institute,	U.S.	Army	War	College,	2007);	Niklas	Nilsson,	‘Georgia’s	Rose	Revolution:	The	Break	
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following	the	Russian	invasion	of	Georgia	in	2008,580	which	has	not	improved	ever	since.	In	addition,	one	has	to	also	scrutinise	the	relative	competitive	advantage	of	Azeri	gas	exports	to	Georgia	vis-á-vis	Russia,	which	stands	at	 just	over	$200	per	thousand	cubic	metres.581	Russian	gas	export	prices	to	Armenia,	the	Kremlin's	most	loyal	ally	in	the	South	Caucasus,	constituted	 $270	per	 thousand	 cubic	metres	 before	 the	 country	 announced	 its	 desire	 to	join	Russian	lead	Customs	Union.	Only	after	Armenia's	decision	to	join	the	Customs	Union	and	sell	of	 the	rest	of	 shares	 in	 the	Armenian	gas	distribution	company	 to	Gazprom,	 the	latter	 lowered	gas	sales	prices	to	$189	thousand	cubic	metres.582	In	this	vein,	 it	does	not	take	much	to	come	to	the	conclusion	that	Georgia	is	unlikely	to	get	lower	gas	prices	from	Russia	 unless	 it	 follows	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	 Armenia	 and	 choses	 Customs	 Unions	 at	 the	expense	of	a	 free	trade	agreement	with	the	EU.	Furthermore,	Russian	gas	sales	prices	 to	Georgia	 would	 likely	 be	 higher	 than	 Azeri	 gas,	 due	 to	 the	 high	 production	 and	transportation	 costs	 from	 Russian	 gas	 extraction	 fields	 situated	 far	 afield	 the	 Georgian	borders.	Quite	 the	opposite,	 the	Georgian	government	 could	not	only	 realistically	expect	cheaper	gas	prices	from	Russia,	but	it	 is	also	mindful	of	the	political/strategic	dangers	of	further	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 domestic	 gas	 market	 (which	 is	 also	 envisioned	 by	 the	 EU-Georgia	AA	and	under	the	EnCT),	because	of	the	possibility	of	Russian	company	entering	Georgian	market.583		Kazakh	 gas	 supply	 to	 Georgia	 is	 also	 an	 unlikely	 scenario.	 Most	 of	 the	 country’s	 gas	production	 is	 whether	 injected	 back	 into	 the	 production	 fields	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 oil	output	 or	 used	 for	 domestic	 consumption.	 Furthermore,	 although	 supplies	 from	Kazakhstan	could,	in	principle,	constitute	a	source	diversification,	Kazakh	gas	would	have	to	traverse	Russian	territory	in	order	to	reach	Georgia.	This,	on	the	other	hand,	would	not	address	 the	transit	dimension	of	security	of	gas	supply	and	would	bring	Georgia	back	to	the	 table	of	Russia-Georgia	bilateral	political	 relationships.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 security	of	supply	concerns,	Kazakh	gas	supplies	 to	Georgia	would	also	 include	Russian	transit	 fees,	which	would	make	new	supplies	even	more	expensive	than	Azeri	gas,	hence	defeating	the	efforts	for	competitive	gas	pricing.	
                                                                                                                                                                              with	the	Past’,	 in	The	Guns	of	August	2008:	Russia’s	War	 in	Georgia,	ed.	by	Svante	E.	Cornell	and	S.	Frederick	Starr	(M.E.	Sharpe,	2009),	pp.	85–103.	580	The	 Guns	 of	 August	 2008:	 Russia’s	War	 in	 Georgia,	 ed.	 by	 Svante	 E.	 Cornell	 and	 S.	 Frederick	 Starr	 (M.E.	Sharpe,	2009).	581	 Alex	 Jackson,	 ‘Georgia	 Looks	 Longingly	 for	 New	 Gas	 Suppliers’,	 Natural	 Gas	 Europe,	 3	 June	 2013	<http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/georgia-natural-gas-suppliers>	[accessed	3	August	2014].	582	Tigran	Gevorgyan,	‘Russian	Energy	Giant	Captures	Armenian	Market’,	Institute	for	War	and	Peace	Reporting,	24	 January	 2014	 <http://iwpr.net/report-news/russian-energy-giant-captures-armenian-market>	 [accessed	3	August	2014].	583	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	
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Another	alternative,	Turkmen	gas	would	have	to	traverse	Azerbaijani	territory	in	order	to	reach	 Georgia,	 as	 well	 (or	 be	 transported	 via	 Caspian-Coastal	 Pipeline	 and	 Russian	territory,	 which	 would	 be	 only	 self-defeating	 from	 political	 viewpoint).	 Without	 a	negotiated	access	to	the	main	highways	across	Azerbaijan	and	the	physical	construction	of	a	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline,	third	energy	package	would	do	little	to	help	Georgia	to	diversify	its	gas	supplies.	Another	potential	supplier,	Iran	is	having	a	difficult	time	of	its	own,	in	terms	of	meeting	its	own	 domestic	 demand	 due	 to	 the	 Western	 sanctions.	 Iran	 currently	 supplies	 gas	 to	Armenia	and	gas	exports	to	Georgia	across	Armenia	is	a	theoretical	possibility.	However,	it	would	 have	 to	 address	 the	 reverse	 flow	 capacity	 first	 between	 Georgia	 and	 Armenia	 or	construct	entirely	a	new	pipeline.	Additionally,	Russian	Gazprom	controls	gas	import	and	transportation	pipelines	from	Iran	across	Armenia.584	In	the	absence	of	friendly	or	neutral	diplomatic	 relations	 between	 Tbilisi	 and	 Moscow,	 it	 would	 not	 unreasonable	 to	 expect	Gazprom's	disinterest	in	facilitating	gas	Iranian	gas	sales	to	Georgia.	Such	 a	 situation	 effectively	 leaves	 Georgia	 at	 the	 goodwill	 of	 the	 regional	 states,	 which	were	to	serve	as	transit	countries	for	supplies	volumes	other	than	from	Azerbaijan.	Quite	ironically,	 although	 surrounded	 by	 the	 regions	 producing	 three	 quarters	 of	 global	 gas	production,	Georgia	seems	to	be	bound	to	continue	“friendly”	partnership	with	Azerbaijan	and	 take	 into	 account	 its	 interests	 when	 progressing	 in	 its	 EU	 integration.	 It	 is	 highly	unlikely	that	Azerbaijan	could	afford	or	would	resort	to	extraordinary	measures	to	enforce	its	 interests	in	Georgia.	Nonetheless,	 friendly	cooperation	between	the	two	countries	has	stood	at	the	core	of	Georgia's	energy	security	throughout	the	 last	decade.	Therefore,	any	actions	 undermining	 these	 relationships	 could	 produce	 prohibitively	 high	 costs	 for	 the	Georgian	authorities.	Last	 but	 not	 least,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 these	 potential	 net	adoption	 costs	 could	 affect	 not	 only	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 natural	 gas	 specific	provisions	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	 Association	 Agreement,	 but	 also	 Georgia's	 future	membership	 in	 the	 EnCT.	 As	 I	 argued	 above,	 Georgia	 does	 not	 have	 any	 direct	 physical	links	with	the	EU	territory	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	the	market	access	benefits	of	the	EnCT	 membership.	 Nonetheless,	 EnCT	 also	 provides	 the	 possibility	 of	 regional	 market	creation	and	integration,	without	its	direct	physical	connection	with	the	EU	single	market.	That	is	to	say,	the	legislative	framework	of	EnCT	could	be	used	to	foster	the	establishment	of	 a	 regional	 market	 between,	 e.g.	 Georgia,	 Azerbaijan,	 Armenia	 and	 even	 Turkey.	According	 to	 Georgian	 officials,	 this	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	 motivations	 of	 Georgia	 in	
                                                            584	Gevorgyan,	‘Russian	Energy	Giant	Captures	Armenian	Market’.	
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applying	 for	 the	EnCT	membership.	However,	 since	none	of	 the	 regional	 states	 followed	suit	 in	 EnCT	 membership	 aspirations,	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 looming	 acquis	 approximation	costs	has	so	far	slowed	the	EnCT	accession	process	of	Georgia.585		
2.3.2.	Veto	holders	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 veto	 holders	 in	 Georgia’s	 domestic	 policy-making,	 several	 actors	 can	 be	identified.	Georgian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	has	been	a	champion	of	closer	cooperation	with	the	EU	in	energy	sphere	and	is	a	strong	supporter	of	Georgia’s	current	accession	bid	to	the	Energy	Community	Treaty,	as	well	as	the	closer	integration	into	the	EU	markets.	The	MFA	 sees	 the	 EnCT	 accession	 bid	 as	 a	 powerful	 political	 commitment	 to	 Georgia’s	 EU	integration	 objectives.	 However,	 the	 MFA	 is	 also	 mindful	 of	 the	 transit	 benefits	 that	Georgia	will	 have	 to	 let	 go	of	 if	 it	 implements	 the	EU	acquis	and	 is	 not	 a	 veto	holder	 as	regards	 the	 final	 decision	 in	 the	EnCT	membership	 or	 the	 current	 and	 future	 legislative	approximation	process.586	Secondly,	 the	 Economic	 Council	 of	 Georgia,	 which	 encompasses	 all	 the	 relevant	 state	institutions	that	are	involved	in	the	state's	economic	policy-making,	including	the	Ministry	of	 Energy,	 has	 a	 different	 take	 on	 the	 legislative	 approximation	 process	 and	 Georgia's	EnCT	membership	bid.	They	want	to	maintain	more	control	over	the	economic	aspects	of	the	 state’s	energy	policy,	 especially	vis-à-vis	 the	 tariffs	and	 transit	benefits	 linked	 to	 the	transit	 of	 Azerbaijani	 gas	 across	 Georgia.587	 Since	 the	 value	 of	 total	 transit	 benefits	 is	 a	commercial	 secret,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 estimate	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	 daily	 economy	 of	Georgia	 and	 economic	 costs	 vis-à-vis	 the	 potential	 benefits.	 However,	 one	 point	 can	 be	safely	 argued	 that,	 the	 elimination	 of	 transit	 benefits	 (natural	 gas	 free	 of	 charge)	would	likely	result	in	higher	wholesale	gas	prices	in	Georgia,	for	the	country	would	no	longer	be	able	 to	 acquire	 a	 certain	 share	 of	 its	 gas	 basket	 free	 of	 charge.	 This	 would	 likely	 be	unpopular	among	Georgians,	who	have	voted	for	a	government	promising	the	reduction	of	household	 utility	 bills.588	 Natural	 gas	 provides	 considerable	 share	 of	 total	 energy	consumption	 in	urban	Georgia.	Any	 increase	 in	natural	 gas	prices	would	directly	 impact	the	 household	 well-being	 and	 hence,	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 ‘Georgian	 Dream’	 coalition	among	the	mobile	urban	electorate.		
                                                            585	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	586	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	587	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	588	 ‘Promise	#	5:	Price	of	Natural	Gas	Will	Be	Reduced	by	2/3’,	2015	<http://dreammeter.ge/en/dapireba-5-gazis-safasuri-shemcirdeba-samjer/#sthash.GG8oSDup.dpuf>	[accessed	5	December	2015].	
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Thirdly,	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy	has	the	primary	responsibility	over	state	policy	in	the	energy	sector	and	is	in	charge	of	drafting	the	national	energy	policy	and	legislation	and	submitting	 it	 to	 the	 national	 Parliament	 for	 approval.	 Although	 some	 individuals	within	the	Ministry	are	 in	 favour	of	 closer	 integration	with	 the	EU	and	quicker	EnCT	accession	process,	 the	 Ministry	 is	 not	 yet	 decisive	 on	 the	 approximation	 process	 mindful	 of	 the	economic	costs	it	would	bring	to	the	country’s	natural	gas	sector.589	Quite	the	opposite,	by	using	the	isolated	market	status	(not	directly	connected	to	the	EU	market),	the	Ministry	is	planning	 to	 negotiate	 exemptions	 from	 the	 EU	 third	 energy	 package	 as	 part	 of	 the	implementation	of	the	sectoral	provisions	of	the	EU-Georgia	AA/DCFTA.590	Furthermore,	 both	of	 the	Georgian	 state-owned	natural	 gas	 companies,	GOGC	and	GGTC	are	 important	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 internal	 governmental	 debate	 on	 the	 approximation	process	or	the	EnCT	membership	bid	and	their	interests	and	visions	are	taken	on	board.591	However,	since	both	companies	are	100%	owned	by	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	their	interests	could	be	assumed	to	be	aligned	or	at	least	internalised	by	the	decisions	taken	by	the	Ministry.		Moreover,	multi-national	and	third-country	national	energy	companies	active	in	Georgian	gas	sector	are	 important	stakeholders,	 too.	Among	these,	Azeri	SOCAR	would	be	affected	by	 the	 distribution	 level	 reforms,	 while	 the	 South	 Caucasus	 Pipeline	 Company592	 by	 the	transmission/transit	 level	 reforms	 in	Georgia's	natural	 gas	 sector.	Nevertheless,	 none	of	these	stakeholders	have	formal	veto-powers	with	regard	to	the	legislative	approximation	process	 in	 Georgia593	 and	 have	 not	 even	 been	 part	 of	 the	 internal	 debate	 process.594	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 some	 of	 these	 companies	 (especially	 SOCAR)	 are	state-owned	 and	 their	 operation	 in	 Georgia	 are	 guaranteed	 at	 the	 bilateral	intergovernmental	level.595		Indeed,	following	the	announcement	by	the	Georgian	government	of	its	desire	to	join	the	Energy	Community	Treaty,	 the	Azerbaijani	 Foreign	Ministry	 indicated	 that,	 it	would	not	raise	issues	relating	to	this	membership.	However,	it	hinted	its	expectation	that,	"it’s	very	
unlikely	that	the	third	energy	package	of	[the]	EU	in	its	most	strict	form	would	be	applied	to	
                                                            589	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	590	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Georgian	Ministry	of	Energy,	03/06/2015,	Brussels.	591	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	592	The	SCPC	is	the	owner	and	the	operator	of	the	SCPx	(the	first	leg	of	the	SGC)	and	its	shareholders	are:	BP,	operator	(28.8%),	SOCAR	(16.7%),	Petronas	(15.5%),	Lukoil	(10%),	NICO	(10%)	and	TPAO	(19%).	593	 Interview	 with	 a	 senior	 Georgian	 diplomat,	 who	 was	 a	 party	 to	 the	 EU-Georgia	 AA	 negotiations,	16/04/2015,	Brussels.	594	Interview	with	an	official	from	SOCAR	Georgia	Gas,	21/04/2015,	Tbilisi.	595	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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the	 pipelines	 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan,	 Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum	 (SCP)	 or	 future	 TANAP."596	Otherwise,	Azerbaijan,	or	rather	the	consortium	operating	the	SCPx,	would	be	required	to	reserve	up	to	50%	of	the	capacity	of	the	pipeline	"for	some	mythical	oil	and	gas	of	the	third	
parties",597	in	order	to	comply	with	third-party	access	rules	prescribed	under	the	EU	rules.	This,	consequently,	would	mean	that	Azerbaijan	(or	rather	 the	consortium	operating	the	SCPx)	 would	 have	 to	 facilitate	 the	 access	 of	 its	 competitors	 (e.g.	 Turkmenistan)	 to	 the	pipelines	under	its	control.	Therefore,	 it	can	be	expected	that,	although	they	do	not	yield	formal	 veto	 powers,	 they	 would	 nevertheless	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	Georgian	 government	 when	 and	 if	 the	 latter	 takes	 a	 decision	 to	 go	 ahead	 with	 the	legislative	approximation.598	
3.	Main	findings	and	implications	on	the	SGC	
As	I	argued	above,	the	export	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	to	the	partner	countries	is	one	of	the	core	aims	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	established	in	2009,599	which	the	EU	pursues	in	tight	synergy	with	its	Southern	Gas	Corridor	strategy.	In	doing	so,	the	bilateral	track	of	the	EaP	uses	 the	more-for-more	 principle	as	an	external	 incentive	 to	 foster	approximation	of	 the	partner	counties’,	in	our	case	Georgia's	energy	legislation	with	the	EU	acquis.	If	successful	this	would	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 eliminate	 transit	 risks	 to	 energy	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC	by	absorbing	Georgia	into	the	regulatory	sphere	of	the	EU	single	market.	Nonetheless,	as	this	chapter	 analysed	 in	 detail,	 Georgia	 as	 a	 vital	 transit	 country	 along	 the	 SGC,	 has	 not	implemented	the	EU	natural	gas	legislation	domestically	and	has	little	incentive	to	do	so	in	the	foreseeable	future.	As	such,	this	has	implications	on	both,	the	EaP	as	a	tool	of	external	(energy)	policy	action	of	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	competitiveness	of	natural	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	the	SGC.	
3.1.	EaP	and	Europeanisation	of	Georgia’s	natural	gas	sector	
Despite	Georgia's	EU	membership	aspirations	 and	 its	 contractual	 (legal)	 commitment	 to	approximate	 domestic	 energy	 legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	Association	 Agreement,	 rule	 adoption	 in	 the	 country	 is	 currently	 hindered	 by	 the	expectations	of	 the	 certain	domestic	 costs.	Georgian	government	 is	 concerned	about	 the	
                                                            596	‘Azerbaijan	Not	to	Raise	Questions	Regarding	Georgia’s	Entry	into	EU	Energy	Community’.	597	‘Azerbaijan	Not	to	Raise	Questions	Regarding	Georgia’s	Entry	into	EU	Energy	Community’.	598	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	599	 Michael	 Ratner	 and	 others,	 Europe’s	 Energy	 Security:	 Options	 and	 Challenges	 to	 Natural	 Gas	 Supply	
Diversification	(Congressional	Research	Service,	2012),	p.	3.	
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impact	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 on	 the	 transit	 benefits	 and	 cheap	 domestic	 gas	 that	 the	government	 currently	 enjoys	without	bringing	 about	 comparable	benefits	 in	natural	 gas	sector	in	specific	or	in	attainment	of	the	EU	candidate	status	in	general.	Therefore,	in	order	to	 minimise	 the	 economic	 and	 energy	 security	 costs	 of	 rule	 adoption,	 the	 government	intends	to	tailor	the	depth	and	timeline	of	the	implementation	process	to	the	necessity	of	receiving	these	benefits	for	a	considerable	period	of	time.	Hence,	in	line	with	the	rationalist	analysis,	domestic	constraints	(net	adoption	costs)	serve	as	 a	pivotal	 factor	underpinning	 the	decision	of	Georgia	 in	 rejecting	 the	EU	 rules.	These	costs	 come	 about	 when	 the	 material	 preferences	 of	 the	 target	 country	 are	 being	confronted	with	 the	 new	 institutional	milieu,	 which	 entails	more	 costs	 than	 benefits	 in	return.	This,	consequently,	leads	to	an	outcome	where	the	adoption	or	the	implementation	of	the	formal	institutions	by	the	target	countries	is	deemed	prohibitively	costly	and	hence,	irrational,	as	predicted	by	the	External	Incentive	Model.	Nonetheless,	the	impact	of	the	net	adoption	costs	in	rule	adoption	must	be	viewed	in	the	context	of	the	promised	reward,	 for	the	role	of	the	reward	is	not	 ideational	but	material.	The	promised	reward	 in	return	 for	rule	adoption	carries	out	 the	 function	of	augmenting	the	 benefits	 against	 the	 costs.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 although	 the	 costs	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 pre-given,	 as	 they	 are	 underpinned	 by	 the	 exogenous	 preference	 formation	 of	 the	 actor	(Georgia)	 in	 question	 (to	 be	 able	 to	 benefit	 from	 energy	 transit	 and	 purchase	 benefits),	their	weight	can	be	rendered	smaller	vis-à-vis	the	prospective	benefits.	In	practical	terms,	this	would	 require	 the	EU	 to	offer	 the	EaP	countries	a	bigger	 reward	 in	order	 to	 tip	 the	scale	 of	 the	 cost-and-benefit	 nexus	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 latter.	 Hence,	 in	 support	 of	 the	explanatory	argument	of	this	thesis,	net	adoption	costs	play	a	decisive	role	in	rule	adoption	in	 the	 context	 of	 lack	 of	 membership	 prospects.	 Since	 the	 EaP	 does	 not	 envisage	membership	 prospects	 or	 any	 comparable	 energy-specific	 benefits	 for	 the	 partner	countries	 involved,	 its	 contractual	 outcome	 -	 AAs,	 have	 few	 chances	 to	 succeed	 in	 the	expansion	of	energy	sector-specific	market	rules	externally.		
3.2.		Failure	of	rule	adoption	and	the	competitive	EU	gas	supply	via	the	SGC	
Against	the	backdrop	of	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Georgia's	natural	gas	sector,	the	transportation/transit	of	Caspian	Basin	natural	gas	through	this	country	will	continue	to	be	subject	to	political	and	economic	bargaining	between	the	Georgian	government	and	the	relevant	public	and	private	actors	involved	in	the	SGC.	This,	in	turn,	renders	the	supply	of	energy	 across	 Georgia	 uncompetitive.	 As	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 I,	 competitiveness	 of	energy	supply	 is	expressed	 in	the	affordable	price	 formation	of	 the	energy	offered	 in	the	
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consumer	 markets,	 which	 is	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 factors	 unrelated	 to	 the	 changes	 in	global/regional	supply	and	demand	balance.600	 In	other	words,	under	competitive	market	conditions	the	transit	of	Caspian	energy	to	the	EU	consumers	must	not	be	affected	by	or	linked	 to	Georgia's	 interests	 in	having	 cheaper	domestic	 gas	prices	 or	 the	 attainment	 of	additional	 fees	 in	 return	 for	 providing	 the	 freedom	 of	 transit	 across	 its	 territory	 as	envisaged	by	the	EU	natural	gas	market	rules.	Nonetheless,	the	detrimental	impact	of	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Georgia	on	the	competitiveness	of	gas	supply	via	the	SGC	can	be	expected	to	be	less	intrusive	as	compared	to	Turkey.	This	is	supported	by	two	factors.		Firstly,	 unlike	 Turkey,	 successive	 Georgian	 governments	 have	 been	 pursuing	 less	aggressive	 energy	 diplomacy	 vis-à-vis	 its	 neighbours.	 In	 this	 context,	 Georgia	has	 never	aspired	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 middleman	 in	 the	 transportation	 of	 Caspian	 hydrocarbon	resources	to	the	Western/world	markets	-	buying	Caspian	gas	in	cheap	and	re-selling	it	to	the	Western	consumers	more	expensively.	They	have	only	 satisfied	with	 transit	benefits	and	 cheap	gas	volumes	 that	 they	have	been	 receiving	 from	 the	neighbouring	producers,	which	 I	 have	 argued	 are	 nevertheless	 substantial.	 Furthermore,	 it	 does	 not	 control	 the	transit	 pipelines	 traversing	 its	 territory,	 hence,	 its	 day-to-day	 political	 and	 economic	interference	to	the	gas	transit	across	its	territory	is	minimal.	Secondly,	 even	 though	Georgia	 is	 still	 an	 important	 component	 of	 the	 SGC,	 from	 the	 EU	perspective,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 in	 Georgia	 would	 only	 make	considerable	 difference	 if	 Turkey	 were	 also	 to	 apply	 the	 energy	 acquis.	 Otherwise,	 the	Europeanisation	of	Georgia	alone	would	make	the	country	an	island	surrounded	by	non-EU	regulatory	regimes,	as	 there	are	no	direct	 linkages	between	the	Georgian	and	the	EU	market(s). ⁠601	 Thus,	 energy	 Europeanisation	 of	 Georgia	 would	 be	 less	 relevant	 if	 Turkey	(and	Azerbaijan)	were	not	to	be	Europeanised	at	the	same	time.		This	is	true	not	only	from	the	competitiveness	point	of	view,	but	also	from	the	perspective	of	diversity	of	supplies	via	the	Georgian	section	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	The	country	plays	a	 transit	 role	 for	gas	supplies	originating	 from	the	Caspian	Basin	only	 through	 the	territory	 of	 neighbouring	 Azerbaijan.	 In	 this	 vein,	 if	 non-Azeri	 gas	 volumes	 (e.g.	 from	Central	Asian	 countries	 such	as	Turkmenistan	or	Uzbekistan)	were	 to	be	 shipped	 to	 the	
                                                            600	 Escribano	 and	 García-Verdugo,	 ‘Energy	 Security,	 Energy	 Corridors	 and	 the	 Geopolitical	 Context:	 A	Conceptual	Approach’,	p.	27.	601	This	point	was	highlighted	during	one	of	my	elite	interviews	with	a	key	DG	Energy/EC	official	who	did	not	authorise	 me	 to	 use	 attributable	 quotes,	 03/05/2015.	 Furthermore,	 in	 his	 speech	 during	 a	 High	 Level	Reflection	Group	 conference	 at	 the	 European	 Parliament	 on	 20/03/2014,	 in	which	 I	 took	 part	 as	 a	 passive	observer,	 the	 former	 EU	 Energy	 Commissioner,	 Günther	 Oettinger	 also	 underlined	 this	 curious	 fact	 that	"Georgia	 will	 become	 the	 first	 Contracting	 Party	 without	 being	 physically	 interconnected	 -	 neither	 for	electricity,	 nor	 for	 gas	 -	 with	 any	 of	 Energy	 Community	 Parties	 -	 Günther	 Oettinger,	 ‘Speech:	 An	 Energy	Community	 for	 the	Future’,	2014	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-238_en.htm>	 [accessed	24	March	2014].	
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European	 markets	 via	 the	 SGC	 using	 a	 trans-Caspian	 link,	 then	 they	 would	 have	 to	negotiate	their	pipeline	access	rights	in	Azerbaijan	first.	The	latter,	as	I	will	investigate	in	the	 following	 chapter,	 however,	 lies	 beyond	 the	 regulatory	 sphere	 of	 the	 EU	acquis	 and	unlike	Georgia,	has	not	even	committed	itself	to	any	regulatory	approximation	with	the	EU	rules.	 Therefore,	 the	 success	 of	 Europeanisation	 of	 Georgia	 would	 make	 a	 sizeable	difference	for	the	competitive	and	diverse	supply	of	energy	via	the	SGC	only	if	similar	rule	adoption	processes	were	to	take	place	in	Turkey	and	Azerbaijan,	too.		In	 the	 next,	 final	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 I	 investigate	 the	 outcome	 of	 Europeanisation	 of	Azerbaijan's	natural	gas	sector	in	order	to	present	the	complete	results	of	the	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	and	the	potential	of	market-based	EU	natural	gas	supply	via	it.			 	
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CHAPTER	VI:	EUROPEANISATION	OF	AZERBAIJAN's	NATURAL	GAS	SECTOR	&	SGC	
1.	Introduction	
The	 role	 of	 Azerbaijan	 in	 the	 development	 and	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor	 is	 central,	 for	 the	 country	 will	 serve	 not	 only	 as	 a	 supply	 source	 for	 this	alternative	energy	corridor	but	also	as	a	transit	route	between	the	Central	Asian	and	the	EU.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	market-based	 governance	 of	 the	 SGC,	 this	 dual	 role	 of	Azerbaijan	presents	certain	transit	risks	to	the	functioning	of	the	SGC.	These	transit	risks	can	 take	 the	 form	 of	 restrictions	 of	 access	 to	 transit	 capacity	 across	 the	 country	 for	political	 and/or	 commercial	 reasons,	 as	 well	 as	 excessive	 charges	 for	 the	prospective	transit	 of	 Central	 Asian	 natural	 gas	 to	 the	 European	markets.	 As	 I	will	 illustrate	 in	 this	chapter,	these	transit	risks	have	in	the	past	derailed	the	development	of	a	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline,	which	was	initially	slated	to	supply	Central	Asian	gas	to	the	Turkish	and	later	to	the	European	markets.	For	these	reasons,	given	that	supply	of	Central	Asian	gas	to	the	EU	is	an	integral	part	of	the	original	 SGC	blueprint	of	 the	EU,	Azerbaijan	has	been	a	 target	of	 the	EU	external	 energy	governance	strategies	ever	since	the	start	of	industrial	scale	gas	production	in	this	country	in	the	early	2000s.	This	effort	of	external	Europeanisation	of	Azerbaijan	has	been	pursued	by	the	EU	through	the	bilateral	EU-Azerbaijan	Memorandum	of	Understanding	in	Energy,	Eastern	 Partnership,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 multilateral	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 Baku	 Process	 and	Energy	Community	Treaty.	Similar	to	Georgia,	the	mode	of	the	external	EU	governance	vis-à-vis	Azerbaijan	is	under	the	membership	line.	Even	more,	unlike	Georgia	Azerbaijan	has	not	even	expressed	its	desire	to	become	a	member	of	the	EU	anytime	soon.	Therefore,	the	nature	of	 relations	between	Azerbaijan	on	 the	one	hand	and	 the	EU	on	 the	other	 is	 less	asymmetrical	than	the	one	between	the	EU	and	Turkey	or	even	Georgia.		Nonetheless,	Azerbaijan	has	been	included	into	the	EaP,	which	envisages	some	incentives	for	 the	 Eastern	 partners	 in	 return	 to	 their	 adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 including	 the	 EU	legislation	in	natural	gas	sector.	As	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	III,	although	the	nature	and	the	size	of	 these	 incentives	offered	are	much	 inferior	compared	to	 the	accession	process	(association	vs.	membership),	the	EaP	envisaged	similar	level	of	reforms	to	be	carried	out	by	 the	 partner	 countries,	 including	 Azerbaijan.	With	 these	 in	mind,	 it	 is	 the	 aim	 of	 this	
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chapter	 to	 investigate	 the	application	of	 the	EU	Third	Energy	Package	 in	Azerbaijan	and	analyse	the	role	of	the	domestic	costs	in	affecting	this	rule	adoption	process.		As	 I	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 this	 PhD	 takes	 advantage	 of	 the	 conceptual	 and	theoretical	 tools	 from	 the	 Europeanisation	 literature	 in	 order	 to	 reveal	 and	 analyse	 the	factors	 that	 will	 potentially	 affect	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 as	 an	alternative	energy	supply	corridor	to	the	European	Union.	Consequently,	this	will	enable	me	 to	 investigate	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 SGC	 to	 the	EU's	 conception	 of	 energy	 security,	which	includes	both	the	diversity	and	competitiveness	of	energy	supply	With	 this	 in	 mind,	 below	 I	 first	 provide	 the	 description	 of	 the	 level	 of	 legislative	approximation	 between	 Azerbaijan	 and	 the	 EU	 in	 natural	 gas	 sector.	 Then,	 I	 set	 out	 to	provide	 a	 thick	 analysis	 of	 the	 domestic	 factors	 in	 Azerbaijan	 that	 brought	 about	 the	current	 state	 of	 outcome	 in	 rule	 adoption	process.	 Finally,	 I	 assess	 these	 findings	 in	 the	context	of	natural	gas	supply	across	the	Azerbaijani	segment	of	the	SGC	and	its	potential	implications	on	the	competitive	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	this	corridor.	
2.	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	sector	of	Azerbaijan	
The	institutionalisation	of	the	bilateral	relations	has	been	one	of	the	top	priorities	of	the	EU	vis-à-vis	this	small	Caspian	country,	not	least	due	to	the	rich	energy	resources	that	it	is	naturally	blessed	with.	Although	for	years	the	EU	policy	 lacked	strategic	coherence	in	 its	relations	 with	 Azerbaijan602	 (and	 other	 Caspian	 hydrocarbon	 producers),	 its	 preferred	external	 engagement	 tool,	 namely,	 external	 governance	 has	 been	 rather	 systematic	 in	relation	to	this	country.	Since	 the	 start	 of	 the	 development	 of	 hydrocarbon	 resources	 in	 Azerbaijan	 in	 the	mid-1990's,	the	export	of	the	EU	rules	has	been	at	the	centre	of	the	EU-Azerbaijan	bilateral	and	multilateral	 interaction.	 At	 the	 bilateral	 level,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 energy	cooperation	was	 the	"Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	
the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy"	signed	in	2006.	The	MoU	 stated	 that,	 “the	 gradual	 harmonisation	 by	 Azerbaijan	 to	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	
would	 constitute	 a	 significant	 step	 towards	 Azerbaijan's	 objective	 of	 gradual	 economic	
integration	 and	 deepening	 of	 political	 cooperation	 with	 the	 EU”.603	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	
                                                            602	See	e.g.	Christie,	Lussac	and	Wolczuk,	The	EU	and	Its	Eastern	Partners:	Energy	Needs	and	Future	Prospects;	Lussac,	‘Ensuring	European	Energy	Security	in	Russian	“Near	Abroad”:	The	Case	of	the	South	Caucasus’.	603	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	p.	2.	
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document	declared	that,	“[t]he	gradual	convergence	with	the	EU's	 internal	energy	market,	
aiming	ultimately	at	its	integration,	remains	a	shared	priority	for	the	EU	and	Azerbaijan”.604	Although	 at	 the	 time	 of	 signature,	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 was	 less	 stringent,	 the	 MoU,	nevertheless,	 outlined	 structural	 reforms	 inter	 alia	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 unbundling	 of	Azerbaijani	gas	(and	electricity)	transportation	systems	from	supply	activities,605	as	well	as	ensuring	the	establishment	of	safe	and	secure	transit	systems	across	Azerbaijan	in	order	to	facilitate	the	potential	exports	of	the	Central	Asian	gas	resources	to	the	EU.606	The	MoU	has	 since	 become	 the	 primary	 document	 underpinning	 bilateral	 cooperation	 in	 energy	sphere,	 which	 had	 been	 institutionalised	 under	 "The	 Energy	 and	 Transport	 Sub-committee",	 set	 up	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 Partnership	 and	Cooperation	Agreement	(PCA).	In	support	of	the	MoU	and	the	implementation	of	the	PCA,	Azerbaijani	Ministry	of	Energy	later	concluded	a	Twinning	Contract	on	the	“Legal	Approximation	and	Structural	Reform	in	
the	 Energy	 Sector	 of	 Azerbaijan”	 with	 the	 German	 Federal	 Ministry	 of	 Economics	 and	Technology	 (BMWi),607	 which	 aimed	 at	 providing	 legal	 and	 technical	 assistance	 to	Azerbaijan	in	preparing	legislative	reforms	in	natural	gas	sector.	Furthermore,	following	the	establishment	of	the	EaP	in	2009,	the	EU	embarked	on	a	much	denser	 institutional	 interaction	 with	 Azerbaijan	 with	 a	 view	 to	 signing	 an	 Association	Agreement	 and	 deepen	 the	 economic	 integration	 and	 political	 association	 between	 the	parties.	 Although	 Azerbaijan	 never	 signed	 an	 AA	with	 the	 EU,	 bilateral	 energy	 dialogue	under	the	Eastern	Partnership	can	still	be	considered	as	the	pinnacle	of	the	EU's	efforts	to	export	its	domestic	natural	gas	legislation	to	this	country.	This	took	place	during	the	time	when	 the	 energy	 supply	prospects	 from	 the	Caspian	Basin	 to	 the	EU	has	 entered	 a	new	stage	with	the	establishment	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	Against	 this	 backdrop,	 despite	 the	 existence	 of	 multiple	 projects	 aimed	 at	 rule	 export,	however,	 regulatory	 developments	 in	 Azerbaijani	 energy	 sectors	 have	 not	 matched	 the	speed	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 (oil	 and)	 gas	 export	 pipelines	 towards	 the	 European	markets.	 The	 energy	 sector	 in	Azerbaijan,	 including	natural	 gas,	 is	 entirely	 regulated	by	two	 laws:	 Law	on	Gas	 Supply	 (30	 June	1998)	 and	Law	on	Energy	 (24	November	1998).	From	 the	 regulatory	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 is	 responsible	 for	 issuing	
                                                            604	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	p.	4.	605	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	p.	7.	606	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	a	Strategic	Partnership	Between	the	European	Union	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	Field	of	Energy’,	p.	8.	607	Sandtner,	Twinning	Project:	Legal	Approximation	and	Structural	Reform	in	the	Energy	Sector	of	Azerbaijan.	
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licenses	 for	 special	 gas	 supply	 activities	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Emergency	 Situations	 of	Azerbaijan	Republic	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 issuing	 licenses	 for	 the	 installation	 and	 operation	 of	natural	 gas	 infrastructure.608	 According	 to	 the	 Law	 on	 Natural	 Monopolies,	 the	 state	recognises	 the	 existence	 of	 natural	 monopolies	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 include	infrastructure	for	the	transportation,	distribution	and	storage	of	natural	gas.609	Firstly,	the	Law	on	Gas	Supply	(30	June	1998)	does	not	differentiate	between	gas	network	and	supply	activities	and	does	not	prescribe	unbundling	 -	separation	of	ownership	of	gas	transportation/distribution	 entities	 from	 the	 supply	 undertakings.610	 Within	 this	legislative	framework,	the	State	Oil	Company	of	Azerbaijan	Republic	(SOCAR)	acts	as	the	monopolist	 of	 the	 entire	 gas	 transportation	 and	 distribution	 networks	 and	 storage	infrastructure	in	Azerbaijan	through	its	Azerigaz	subsidiary.	The	latter	is	wholly	owned	by	SOCAR	under	the	Presidential	Decree	No.	366	dated	July	1,	2009.611	Accordingly,	Azerigaz	carries	out	all	 the	 transportation,	distribution	and	sales	of	natural	gas	 in	 the	 territory	of	Azerbaijan	 on	 its	 own	 or	 through	 its	 regional	 divisions.612	 In	 addition	 to	 owning	 and	operating	 the	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 pipelines	 through	 Azerigaz,	 SOCAR	 is	 also	involved	 in	 the	 exploration	 and	 production	 of	 natural	 gas	 in	 onshore	 and	 offshore	Azerbaijan,	both	on	its	own	and	through	the	production	sharing	agreements	(PSA)	it	has	signed	with	international	oil	majors.	In	this	regard,	the	company	is	considered	a	vertically	
integrated	undertaking	(VIU),	which	is	prohibited	under	the	EU	law.	Other	gas	producers	(consortia)	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 directly	 sell	 gas	 to	 the	 Azeri	 domestic	 consumers,	 as	 the	market	is	not	liberalised.613	Secondly,	 although	 third-party	 access	 to	 the	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 networks	 is	allowed	 under	 the	 Law	 on	 Energy	 and	 Law	 on	 Gas	 Supply,	 there	 is	 no	 guaranteed	(regulated)	TPA	regime	in	line	with	the	EU	legislation.	Third	parties	must	negotiate	their	access	 contracts	 with	 the	 pipeline	 operators,	 which	 then	 have	 to	 be	 endorsed	 by	 the	
                                                            608	Azerbaijan:	Follow-up	in-Depth	Review	of	the	Investment	Climate	and	Market	Structure	in	the	Energy	Sector	(Energy	 Charter	 Secretariat,	 2011),	 pp.	 66–69;	 Kamil	 Valiyev,	 Presentation	 on	 the	 Overview	 of	 Gas	 Market	
Regulation	in	Azerbaijan	(SOCAR,	Legal	Department,	2010).	609	‘The	Law	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic	On	Natural	Monopolies’	(Azerbaijan,	1998),	Article	5.	610	 ‘The	Law	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	“On	Gas	Supply”,	N	513-IG’	(Azerbaijan,	1998),	Chapter	I;	see	also,	
INOGATE	Programme:	Status	Report	2011,	p.	12;	Valiyev,	Presentation	on	the	Overview	of	Gas	Market	Regulation	
in	Azerbaijan.	611	 ‘Decree	No.	 366	of	 the	President	 of	 the	Republic	 of	Azerbaijan	 “Concerning	 Improvements	 in	 Petroleum	Industry	Management	Systems”’,	2009;	see	also,	Shahin	Abbasov,	‘Azerbaijan:	For	SOCAR,	Bigger	Means	Better	with	 Azerigaz	 Takeover’,	 EurasiaNet,	 26	 July	 2009	<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav072709a.shtml>	 [accessed	 28	 February	2014].	612	Azerbaijan:	Follow-up	in-Depth	Review	of	the	Investment	Climate	and	Market	Structure	in	the	Energy	Sector,	pp.	67–68.	613	Azerbaijan:	Follow-up	in-Depth	Review	of	the	Investment	Climate	and	Market	Structure	in	the	Energy	Sector,	p.	68.	
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competent	 state	 authority.614	 This	 allows	 the	 pipeline	 owner	 (SOCAR),	 as	 well	 as	 the	Ministry	of	Economy	(as	a	national	competent	authority)615	the	right	to	refuse	third-party	access	 to	 the	 transmission/transit	 lines.	 Tariffs,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 proposed	by	 the	pipeline	operator	and	approved	by	the	Tariff	Council	under	the	Ministry	of	Economy.616	National	 transmission	 lines	 are	 used	 not	 only	 for	 domestic	 gas	 delivery,	 but	 also	 for	exports	 to	Georgia,	 Iran	and	Russia.617	Therefore,	 from	 the	point	of	view	of	 cross-border	gas	transportation,	they	have	transit	value,	both	for	the	immediate	neighbours,	as	well	as	the	big	consumers	like	the	European	Union.		Last	but	not	 least,	Azerbaijan	 is	 the	host	 for	 the	major	 transit	pipeline	 -	 South	Caucasus	Pipeline	 (and	 its	 expansion	 version	 dubbed	 SCPx),	which	 constitutes	 the	 first	 leg	 of	 the	current	 design	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor.	 The	 pipeline	 has	 its	 own	 access	 regimes,	which	 does	 not	 envisage	 regulated	 TPA	 and	 unbundling	 mechanisms.	 BP	 owns	 the	majority	of	the	shares	and	operates	the	pipeline	under	the	Host-Government	Agreement,	while	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 shares	 belong	 to	 the	 international	 energy	 companies,	 which	 are	members	 of	 the	 consortium	 producing	 gas	 in	 Shah-Deniz	 field.	 Therefore,	 not	 only	 the	national	 transmission	 lines,	 but	 also	 the	 specialised	 export	 infrastructure	 are	 not	 in	compliance	with	the	principles	of	the	EU	acquis.	In	the	context	of	the	EU-Azerbaijan	MoU,	the	Azerbaijani	government	has	prepared	4	draft	laws	on	natural	 in	order	to	harmonise	the	Azerbaijani	natural	gas	market	structure	with	the	EU	model.	However,	 in	spite	of	considerable	work,	as	well	as	 the	mounting	pressure	from	 the	 European	 Union,618	 none	 of	 these	 drafts	 were	 (or	 expected	 to	 be)	 adopted	 by	Azerbaijani	 national	 parliament	 (Milli	 Majlis)	 and	 have	 been	 shelved	 ever	 since.619	 This	begs	 questions	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 factors	 that	 underpin	 the	 lack	 of	 political	 will	 in	Azerbaijan	in	adopting	the	EU	rules.		In	 general,	 the	 Azerbaijani	 government	 has	 always	 been	 keen	 on	 cherry-picking	 the	offered	 EU	 legislation	 on	à	 la	 carte	 fashion,	while	 ignoring	 those	which	 do	 not	meet	 its	
                                                            614	Azerbaijan:	Follow-up	in-Depth	Review	of	the	Investment	Climate	and	Market	Structure	in	the	Energy	Sector,	p.	68;	‘The	Law	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	“On	Gas	Supply”,	N	513-IG’,	Article	12.	615	‘Regulations	of	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic,	Addendum	II	Approved	by	Decree	No.504	of	 the	President	of	 the	Azerbaijan	Republic	Dated	28	December	2006’	 (Azerbaijan,	2006)	<http://economy.gov.az/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=122&lang=en>	[accessed	24	February	2014],	Articles	3.1.15	and	3.1.80.	616	Azerbaijan:	Follow-up	in-Depth	Review	of	the	Investment	Climate	and	Market	Structure	in	the	Energy	Sector,	p.	12.	617	Interview	with	an	official	from	SOCAR	Georgia	Gas,	21/04/2015.	618	This	was	personally	observed	by	the	author	during	the	attendance	of	the	13th	meeting	of	the	Platform	3	on	Energy	Security,	June	19,	2015,	Brussels.	619	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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national/elite	 interests.620	 The	 natural	 gas	 sector	 is	 especially	 sensitive	 in	 this	 regard.	Unlike	 oil,	which	 is	 important	mostly	 for	 commercial	 reasons,	 international	 gas	 trade	 is	inseparably	 intertwined	with	 (geo)politics	 and	 can	 bring	 strategic,	 as	 well	 as	 economic	dividends	for	the	country.	Thus,	it	is	quite	unsurprising	what	the	president	of	Azerbaijan,	Ilham	Aliyev	meant	by	"Oil	is	all	about	business,	while	gas	is	about	politics".621		In	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	domestic	 factors,	which	 condition	 the	 failure	of	 rule	 adoption	 in	Azerbaijan,	I	utilise	External	Incentive	Model	as	a	rationalist	explanation	of	policy	choices	pursued	by	the	government.	This	model	predicts	that,	"A	government	adopts	the	EU	rules	if	
the	 benefits	 of	 EU	 rewards	 exceed	 the	 domestic	 adoption	 costs".622	With	 this	 in	mind,	 the	following	 sub-sections	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 size	 and	 speed	 of	 reward,	 credibility	 of	
conditionality	 and	 the	 net	 domestic	 costs	 &	 veto	 holders	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 EU-sourced	energy	reforms	in	Azerbaijan.	
2.1.	Size	and	speed	of	final	reward:	strategic	vs.	normative	partnership	
In	general,	the	Azerbaijani	government	has	not	spared	an	occasion	to	define	and	reiterate	its	notion	of	closer	cooperation	with	the	EU	and	its	expectations	towards	the	EU	in	fulfilling	this	vision.	In	this	regard,	from	the	government's	viewpoint,	Azerbaijan	is	interested	in	a	
strategic	 partnership	 with	 the	 EU,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 normative	 one.623	 This,	 inter	 alia,	includes	the	recognition	of	territorial	integrity	of	Azerbaijan	by	the	EU,	as	well	as	using	the	EU's	political	weight	and	financial	support	to	foster	the	realisation	of	the	strategic	regional	energy	infrastructure.	The	latter	shall	enable	Azerbaijan	to	become	an	alternative	energy	source,	 as	well	 as	 transit	 route	 for	 the	 Caspian	 hydrocarbon	 exports	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 the	world	markets.624		In	 this	 regard,	 in	 the	 vision	of	 the	 government	of	Azerbaijan,	 the	 finalité	 of	 the	bilateral	partnership	 should	 be	 based	 on	 the	 in-kind	 support	 for	 the	mutual	 energy	 and	 security	interests	without	 engaging	 in	 rules/values-based	 interaction.	 As	 far	 as	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor	is	concerned,	in	practice	this	vision	translates	into	political	and	financial	support	of	 the	EU	to	 the	realisation	of	 the	SCPx,	TANAP	and	TAP	pipelines	 in	return	 for	new	gas	supplies	that	will	contribute	to	the	energy	security	of	the	European	Union.	
                                                            620	 Rashad	 Shirinov,	 ‘A	 Pragmatic	 Area	 for	 Cooperation:	 Azerbaijan	 and	 the	 EU’,	 Internationale	 Politik	 Und	
Gesellschaft,	2011.	621	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	EC/	DG	Energy,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	622	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	12.	623	Interview	with	Douglas	Carpenter,	EEAS,	16/05/2013,	Brussels.	624	Interviews	with	the	officials	from	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels	and	the	State	Oil	Company	of	Azerbaijan	Republic	29/06/2015,	Brussels.	
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In	terms	of	the	institutionalisation	of	the	bilateral	interaction,	the	Azerbaijani	government	voiced	its	preference	for	a	Partnership	for	Modernisation	(PfM)	agreement,	as	opposed	to	an	 Association	 Agreement,	 let	 alone	 for	 the	 eventual	 EU	 membership.625	 The	 PfM	 is	
"typically	 understood	 as	 technological	 modernisation	 and	 EU	 financial	 assistance	 –	 for	
example,	 in	 infrastructural	 investments	 and	 so	 on	 –	 and	 not	 as	 reforms	 leading	 to	 liberal	
democracy".626	 This	 excludes	 any	 binding	 commitment	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Azerbaijani	government	 to	approximate	 its	domestic	 legislation,	 inter	alia,	 in	natural	gas	sector	with	the	EU	acquis.	Hence,	as	far	the	external	incentive	model	is	concerned,	I	have	already	argued	above	that,	the	 EaP	 lacks	 sizeable	 ultimate	 reward	 to	 incentivise	 costly	 domestic	 reforms	 in	 the	partner	 countries.	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 the	 government	 is	 interested	neither	in	the	Association	with,	nor	even	in	the	ultimate	membership	in	the	EU.	Although	the	bilateral	negotiations	on	the	AA	were	lunched	in	2012,	Azerbaijan	ultimately	decided	not	 to	pursue	 this	 avenue,	mindful	 of	 the	dense	 reforms	agenda	 envisaged	 therein.	This	diminishes	the	EU's	capacity	to	encourage	reforms	in	Azerbaijan,	including	those	affecting	the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 and	 renders	 the	 size	 and/or	 speed	 of	 the	 final	 reward	 an	irrelevant	factor	in	fostering	rule	adoption	in	Azerbaijan.	
2.2.	Credibility	of	conditionality	and	reversed	asymmetric	interdependence	
Since	the	AA	or	the	ultimate	EU	membership	prospect	is	not	the	driving	force	behind	EU-Azerbaijan	 cooperation,	 credibility	 of	 conditionality	 does	 not	 determine	 the	 strategic	actions	taken	or	avoided	by	the	Azerbaijani	government	in	its	energy	reform	agenda.	Nonetheless,	the	access	to	the	EU's	gas	market	could	be	regarded	as	a	potential	reward	in	return	 for	 the	 domestic	 reforms	 in	 Azerbaijan,	which	 in	 turn	would	 ensure	 safe,	 secure	and	 economically	 viable	 transit	 of	 Central	 Asian	 gas	 across	 this	 country	 (especially	considering	that	gas	reserves	 in	Central	Asia	 far	outstrips	those	 in	Azerbaijan).	Although	from	 the	 international	 trade	 point	 of	 view,	 this	 access	 cannot	 entail	 any	 preferential	customs	treatment	of	Azerbaijani	gas,	for	the	country	is	not	a	member	of	the	WTO	and	is	not	eligible	 for	a	DCFTA	with	 the	EU.627	Despite	 this,	 the	EU	has	been	keen	on	providing	political,	 technical	 and	 financial	 support	 to	 the	 SGC	 through	 its	 Projects	 of	 Common	Interest	(PCI)	programme	and	high	level	political	engagement	with	different	actors	along	this	 corridor.	 Continuation	 of	 this	 support	 in	 return	 for	 domestic	 reforms	 in	 Azerbaijan	
                                                            625	Rettman,	‘Azerbaijan	and	EU	Race	to	Agree	“Modernisation”	Pact’.	626	 Grzegorz	 Gromadzki,	 ‘An	 Urgent	 Challenge	 for	 Today’s	 Europe:	 The	 Eastern	 Partnership’,	 Internationale	
Politik	Und	Gesellschaft,	2011,	pp.	11–28	(p.	19).	627	‘Eastern	Partnership	COM(2008)	823’,	p.	4.	
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could	 be,	 in	 principle,	 used	 as	 a	 form	 of	 conditionality	 in	 (natural	 gas)	 sectoral	cooperation.	However,	 such	 an	 expectation	 disregards	 the	 unique	 asymmetrical	 dependence	 in	 EU-Azerbaijan	bilateral	relations,	compared	to	other	EaP	countries.	 In	Georgia,	Moldova	and	Ukraine,	 the	 physical	 and	 regulatory	 integration	 of	 the	 energy	 markets	 with	 the	 EU	 is	strategically	beneficial	both	for	the	donor	(EU),	as	well	as	the	recipients	(EaP	countries).	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 EU,	 acquis	 will	 reduce	 transit	 risks	 across	 these	 countries,	while	from	the	perspective	of	the	EaP	countries,	the	EU	rules	will	facilitate	their	access	to	the	EU	energy	markets	as	an	energy	importers.	For	example,	following	the	Russia-Ukraine	political	and	ensuing	gas	crisis	in	2014,	Ukraine	was	able	to	cover	substantial	share	of	its	domestic	demand	using	the	reverse-flow	gas	imports	from	the	EU	itself.628	The	application	of	the	EU's	energy	market	rules	in	establishing	this	reverse	flow	capacity	ensured	that	no	non-market	 hurdles	 impinge	 upon	 the	 supplies	 to	 Ukraine	 from	 the	 West.629	 In	 other	words,	 from	the	Ukrainian	perspective,	 the	application	of	the	EU	rules	 is	not	only	a	 legal	commitment	 under	 the	EU-Ukraine	AA,	 but	 also	 a	 resource	 that	 can	 be	 and	 is	 currently	utilised	to	ensure	the	country's	energy	supply	security.	However,	 the	 case	with	 Azerbaijan	 is	 entirely	 different.	 Not	 only	 it	 does	 not	 depend	 on	external	gas	imports,	it	in	fact	acts	as	a	vital	alternative	gas	supplier	to	the	EU.	This	results	in	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 asymmetrical	 relationship	 between	 the	 EU	 and	Azerbaijan,	where	
"Azerbaijan	positions	 itself	as	a	donor	and	sees	the	EU	as	being	on	the	receiving	end	of	the	
equation".630	Through	 its	 state-owned	 company	 SOCAR,	 the	 Azerbaijan	 has	 assumed	 the	role	of	the	enabler	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor	by	providing	the	initial	gas	volumes,	as	well	as	investing	in	the	necessary	transit	pipelines.		Aware	of	the	high	stakes	that	the	EU	has	placed	on	the	SGC,	the	Azeri	government	does	not	only	 show	 resource-based	 reluctance	 to	 implement	 the	 EU	 acquis	 envisioned	 under	 the	existing	 mechanisms	 or	 sign	 up	 for	 new	 ones	 under	 the	 EaP	 umbrella.	 It	 is	 also	 well	positioned	to	change	the	agenda	of	the	bilateral	negotiations	to	suit	its	own	strategic	goals,	as	opposed	to	the	regulatory	agenda	of	the	EU.		
                                                            628	Roman	Olearchyk,	‘Gas:	Ukraine	Looks	West	to	Curb	Reliance	on	Russia’,	Financial	Times,	18	October	2013	<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6922826-3286-11e3-91d2-00144feab7de.html#axzz2tV3x1lmP>	 [accessed	16	February	2014];	 ‘EU	Reverse	Gas	 Flow	Capacity	 to	Ukraine	 to	Rise	 to	 40	Mcm/day’,	Reuters,	 23	 January	2015	 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/23/us-eu-energy-ukraine-idUSKBN0KW12A20150123>	[accessed	15	May	2015].	629	 ‘Reverse-Flow	 Woes’,	 The	 Economist,	 5	 November	 2013	<http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/11/gazprom>	[accessed	16	February	2014].	630	Anja	Franke	and	others,	‘The	European	Union’s	Relations	with	Ukraine	and	Azerbaijan’,	Post-Soviet	Affairs,	26.2	(2010),	149–83	(p.	163).	
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Increasing	oil	rents	have	played	an	important	role	in	switching	the	donor-acceptor	ends	of	the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 relationships.	 The	 country	 is	 not	 in	 desperate	 need	 of	 foreign	investment	anymore.631	Hence,	since	the	start	of	Azeri	oil	exports	to	the	world	markets,	the	government	is	more	self-reliant	than	ever	and	commands	a	bigger	scope	for	manoeuvre	in	determining	 the	 conditions	 of	 its	 hydrocarbon	 exports	 in	 the	 second	 phase632	 of	 their	development.	 Especially	 considering	 that,	 the	 Azeri	 government	 places	 political	importance	 to	 its	 natural	 gas	 export	 strategy,633	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that,	 the	 current	leadership	will	 unlikely	 sign	 up	 and	 carry	 out	 reforms	 that	may	 endanger	 the	 country's	(geo)political	and	economic	position	in	the	future.	In	 this	 regard,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 EU	 membership	 aspirations,	 more	 advantageous	negotiations	position	may	explain	the	Azeri	government's	ability	 to	resist	against	 the	EU	pressure	to	approximate	its	domestic	energy	legislation	with	the	EU	acquis.	However,	as	it	was	 the	 case	 with	 Georgia,	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 explain	 the	 underlying	 factors	 that	condition	the	government's	decision	to	not	to	carry	out	legislation	approximation.		Some	experts	have	pointed	out	to	the	lack	of	the	recognition	of	the	territorial	integrity	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	AA	as	the	underlying	reason	of	the	Azeri	government's	reluctance	to	sign	one.	The	draft	AA	that	were	to	be	signed	with	Azerbaijan	lacked	unambiguous	language	as	regards	the	EU's	recognition	of	the	territorial	integrity	of	Azerbaijan	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	 other	 EaP	 countries,	 namely,	 Georgia	 and	Moldova.	 In	 itself,	 this	 and	 other	 similar	factors	may	explain	the	general	political	reluctance	of	Azerbaijani	government	to	sign	an	Association	 Agreement	 with	 the	 European	 Union.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 lack	 of	 firm	 EU	recognition	of	Azerbaijani	territorial	integrity	does	not	necessarily	explain	the	underlying	reasons	of	the	failure	of	Azerbaijan	to	approximate	to	the	EU	acquis	through	other	avenues	of	 bilateral	 cooperation,	 like	 the	 "Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 on	 a	 Strategic	
Partnership	 Between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Azerbaijan	 in	 the	 Field	 of	
Energy"	 and	 relevant	 bilateral	 Twinning	 projects,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 regional	 multilateral	instruments	 such	 as	 the	 Baku	 Process	 and	 INOGATE	 technical	 assistance.	 Unlike	 the	
                                                            631	Shaffer,	‘Caspian	Energy	Phase	II:	Beyond	2005’.	632	The	first	wave	of	the	PSAs	between	Azerbaijan	and	the	international	oil	majors	were	signed	in	the	mid-and-late	1990s.	For	example,	the	PSA	on	the	giant	Shah-Deniz	field	was	signed	in	1996	and	the	field	started	the	first	gas	exports	in	2006.	This	PSA	covered	only	the	first	phase	of	the	development	of	the	mentioned	field.	In	this	phase,	 BP	 acted	 as	 the	 technical	 and	 production	 operator	 of	 the	 field	 development,	 while	 both	 BP	 and	Norwegian	 Statoil	 lead	 negotiations	 on	 the	 sales	 of	 Shah-Deniz	 gas	 to	 Turkey.	 In	 2013,	 the	 Shah-Deniz	stakeholders	 made	 a	 final	 investment	 decision	 (FID)	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	development	 of	 Shah	 Deniz	 field.	 However,	 in	 this	 latter	 phase,	 the	 commercial	 negotiations	 regarding	 the	marketing	of	the	produced	gas	was	lead	by	an	ad	hoc	team	of	negotiators,	while	the	gas	is	sold	by	the	newly	established	Azerbaijani	Gas	Sales	Company	(AGSC).	As	opposed	to	 the	 first	phase,	Azerbaijani	SOCAR	took	a	leading	 role	during	 the	SD	 II	 gas	 sales	negotiations	and	currently	owns	 the	biggest	number	of	 shares	 in	 the	AGSC.	633	Quoted	by	an	EC/DG	Energy	official	during	the	elite-interviews,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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Association	Agreement,	none	of	this	bilateral	and	multilateral	avenues	of	the	EU	external	governance	include	overall	political	or	security	aspects	of	the	EU-Azerbaijan	cooperation.	Hence,	the	reluctance	of	Azerbaijani	authorities	to	not	to	approximate	its	domestic	energy	legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 cannot	 be	 objectively	 explained	 by	 the	 government's	scepticism	about	the	EU's	lack	of	interest	in	Azerbaijan's	(hard)	security	concerns.	Furthermore,	 the	 keen	 interest	 of	 Azerbaijani	 authorities	 in	 the	 EU	 experience	 in	renewable	 electricity	 generation	 and	 considerable	 progress	 in	 that	 regard634	 justifies	further	 analysis	 into	 the	 failure	 of	 rule	 adoption	 in	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector.	 Quite	interestingly,	 the	 latter	 also	 allows	 us	 to	 account	 for	 the	 legitimacy	 argument	 in	 the	process	 of	 rule	 adoption,	 which	 is	 predicted	 by	 the	 Social	 Learning	 Model	 of	 external	Europeanisation.635	If	the	major	concern	of	Azeri	authorities	in	rejecting	the	EU	rules	were	conditioned	 by	external	imposition	 and	 overall	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 process,	 then	 this	policy	behaviour	 should	 also	 have	 been	 observed	 in	 the	 renewables	 (and	 in	 general	electricity)	sector,	too,	which	is	not	the	case.	Last	 but	not	 least,	Azerbaijani	 officials	who	 take	part	 in	 the	Euronest	 energy	 committee	also	indicated	reluctance	to	recognise	the	merits	of	the	EU	energy	acquis.	This	multilateral	instrument	 of	 cooperation	 under	 the	 EaP	 is	 designed	 to	 ensure	parliamentary	oversight	over	 the	 bilateral	 cooperation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Eastern	Partnership	 countries	 and	 provide	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 cooperation	 process	 through	 the	socialisation	 of	 the	 national	 and	 European	parliamentarians.	 In	 this	multilateral	 avenue,	too,	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU	rules	were	not	called	into	questions,	while	the	reluctance	of	the	rule	adoption	were	 justified	by	the	potential	domestic	costs	of	 the	partner	countries,	especially,	Azerbaijan	Republic.636		In	order	to	unearth	these	very	factors,	therefore,	it	is	necessary	analyse	the	net	domestic	costs	that	EU	acquis	would	incur	in	Azerbaijan	in	return	for	limited	benefits	that	could	be	
                                                            634	The	Azeri	government	has	adopted	"The	State	Program	on	Utilization	of	Alternative	Energy	Sources	(2005	–	
2013)"	and	established	the	State	Agency	on	Renewable	Energy	Sources	(SAARES).	According	to	the	former,	a	target	 of	 20%	 has	 been	 set	 for	 the	 share	 of	 RES	 in	 electricity	 production,	 as	 well	 as	 9.7	 in	 total	 energy	consumption	by	2020.	See	e.g.	‘Technological	Action	Plan	(TAP)	For	Mitigation	Technologies’	(The	Ministry	Of	Ecology	 And	 Natural	 Resources,	 2012),	 p.	 5	 <http://unfccc.int/ttclear/sunsetcms/storage/contents/stored-file-20130327152334804/TechnologicalActionPlan-Mitigation_Azerbaijan.pdf>	 [accessed	 29	 December	2013].	According	 to	 the	deputy	Chairman	 Jamil	Malikov,	 the	main	aim	of	 the	State	Agency	 is	 to	 increase	 the	share	RES	up	to	20%	of	energy	production	by	2020	"in	accordance	with	the	requirements	of	European	Union.	
[…]	Tariff		 policy	will	 be	 based	 on	 the	 subsidies	 of	 the	 government.	 Investments	will	 be	 stimulated	 and	 several	
concessions	 will	 be	 provided	 to	 producer	 companies”	 –	 see	 ‘Gobustan	 to	 Meet	 Its	 Demand	 for	 Energy	 from	Alternative	 Energy	 Sources	 from	 2015’,	 APA	 Information	 Agency,	 2013	 <http://en.apa.az/news/202060>	[accessed	29	December	2013].	635	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier,	‘Introduction:	Conceptualizing	the	Europeanization	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’,	p.	18.	636	The	author	observed	this	debate,	which	took	place	during	the	sixth	meeting	of	 the	Committee	on	Energy	Security	of	the	Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly,	12	February	2013,	Baku.	
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expected	 from	 the	 approximation	 process.	 I	 analyse	 these	 domestic	 factors	 in	 the	 next	section.	
2.3.	Net	adoption	costs	and	the	veto	holders	
In	the	run	up	to	the	Vilnius	summit	of	the	EaP	on	28-29	November	the	Head	of	the	Foreign	Relations	Department	of	 the	Azerbaijani	Presidential	Administration	Novruz	Mammadov	remarked	that,	"We	have	informed	the	European	Union	a	year	ago	that	we	cannot	accept	the	
Association	Agreement.	We	want	to	prepare	a	document	which	more	adequately	meets	 the	
level	of	our	relations	with	the	European	Union".	He	further	explained	that	such	a	document	is	to	"reflect	the	level	of	bilateral	cooperation	and	provide	mutual	respect	and	equality	of	the	
parties".637	This	statement	came	at	a	time,	when	officials	in	Brussels	have	long	been	frustrated	by	the	indecisive	progress	made	by	Azerbaijan	 in	 its	 integration	with	 the	European	Union.	This	includes	not	only	 the	 failure	of	 the	Azerbaijani	 state	authorities	 to	 take	on	new	political	commitments	under	the	EaP,638	but	also	to	fulfil	those	that	have	already	been	committed	to	under	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 Partnership	 and	 Cooperation	 Agreement,	 as	 well	 as	 through	membership	in	other	international	organisations.	
2.3.1.	Net	adoption	costs	
According	 to	 the	 Action	 Plan	 2011-2015,	 approved	 by	 the	 President	 for	 the	implementation	of	the	State	Program	on	Poverty	Reduction	and	Sustainable	Development	2008-2015,	 the	state	was	expected	to	start	 the	privatisation	of	 the	certain	enterprises	 in	energy	sector.639	Although	the	timeline	of	the	implementation	of	the	programme	nears	to	the	 end,	 no	 concrete	 actions	 have	 been	 taken	 in	 this	 direction	 and	 no	 immediate	 plans	exist	 to	open	up	state	energy	companies	and	domestic	market	 to	private	capital.640	Quite	the	 opposite,	 during	 the	 meeting	 of	 the	 energy	 security	 committee	 of	 the	 EURONEST	Parliamentary	Assembly	the	Depute	Speaker	of	Milli	Majlis	(Azerbaijani	Parliament)	Valeh	Alasgarov	retorted	to	the	call	of	the	MEP	Gerben	Yan	Gerbrandi	to	liberalise	Azeri	energy	
                                                            637	 ‘Novruz	 Mammadov:	 We	 Offer	 EU	 Bilateral	 Agreement	 for	 a	 Long	 Time’,	 Contact.az,	 2013	<http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/112500058907en.htm#.Ur7SFGRdU00>	[accessed	28	December	2013].	638	Rettman,	‘Azerbaijan	and	EU	Race	to	Agree	“Modernisation”	Pact’.	639	 ‘Decree	No.	3043	of	 the	President	of	 the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	on	“State	Program	on	Poverty	Reduction	and	Sustainable	Development	2008-2015”’,	2008.	640	‘In-Depth	Review	of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Policy	of	Azerbaijan’	(Energy	Charter	Secretariat,	2013),	p.	46.	
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sector,	 by	 arguing	 that	 privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 of	 state	 energy	 enterprises	 will	reduce	the	government's	income	by	25%.641		Thus,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 investigate	 the	 net	 adoption	 costs	 and	 the	 potential	 role	 of	 the	domestic	 veto	 players	 in	 order	 to	 unearth	 the	 underlying	 reasons	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 rule	adoption	in	Azerbaijan.	As	I	illustrated	above,	the	government	has	the	full	control	over	the	domestic	gas	market	by	exercising	monopoly	rights	over	the	domestic	wholesale	and	retail	markets,	as	well	as	the	main	transmission	and	distribution	networks.	This	control	creates	a	natural	monopoly	over	the	domestic	gas	transportation	and	distribution,	which	in	turn	allows	 the	government	 to	 save	 the	domestic	gas	market	 for	monetising	 its	own	share	of	natural	gas	produced	under	the	production	sharing	agreements	(PCAs)	in	the	country	and	keeping	 the	 other	 stakeholders	 of	 the	 PSAs	 off	 the	 domestic	 grid.	 In	 other	 words,	 this	means	legally	monopolising	the	domestic	gas	supply	and	avoiding	the	competition.		If	the	government	were	to	adopt	the	EU	rules,	it	would	have	to	liberalise	the	domestic	gas	market,	unbundle	 supply	 and	 transmission	activities	of	 its	national	 energy	 company	and	provide	 guaranteed	 third	 party	 access	 to	 all	 parties	 interesting	 in	 supplying	 domestic	consumers	and/or	seeking	access	to	cross-border	transportation	capacities.	Consequently,	this	 would	 result	 in	 losing	 the	 state's	 control	 over	 the	 energy	 networks	 and	 entail	economic	and	strategic	costs	for	the	government.		According	to	the	chief	negotiator	with	the	EU	on	energy	policy	at	the	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	at	 the	 EU,	 Rashad	 Novruz,	 by	 applying	 EU	 rules	 Azerbaijan	 "[would]	 be	 losing	 the	
ownership	control	over	the	resources,	the	means	of	distributing	and	transporting	them	[and]	
have	 anybody	 in	 the	 [domestic]	 market	 but	 [itself]".642	 In	 ratio	 to	 the	 size	 of	 population,	domestic	gas	market	in	Azerbaijan	is	relatively	large	-	with	11	bcm	gas	consumption	per	year;	this	provides	considerable	share	of	the	state	budget	revenues.	In	this	vein,	according	to	 the	 same	 state	 official,	 if	 the	 copy-pasted	 legislation	 were	 in	 place	 in	 Azerbaijan,	 it	would	 be	 really	 hard,	 if	 not	 absolutely	 impossible	 to	 revise	 later	 on.	 Therefore,	 the	government's	 concern	 is	 whether	 Azerbaijan	 needs	 the	 EU	 legislation	 "at	 this	 stage	 of	
development	[…]	when	the	role	of	state	in	economy	and	energy	is	increasing?!".643	Azerbaijan	is	the	only	country	among	the	EaP	members	that	owns	hydrocarbon	resources	and	 re-invests	 considerable	 amount	 of	 energy	 income	 back	 to	 the	 economy.	 The	Azerbaijani	economy	is	heavily	reliant	on	oil	and	gas	revenues,	which	make	up	circa	45%	of	the	domestic	GDP	and	over	70%	of	the	country’s	fiscal	revenues.	Oil	and	gas	sector	also	
                                                            641	 This	 debate	 took	 place	 during	 the	 sixth	 meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Energy	 Security	 of	 the	 Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly,	12	February	2013,	Baku.	642	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	643	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	
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accounts	for	92%	of	the	exports.644	Investment	into	non-oil	sector,	especially	construction,	education,	agricultural	sectors,	as	well	as	infrastructure	development,	is	mainly	driven	by	public	expenditures.	State	budget	in	2014	was	envisaged	to	be	around	20	bln	AZN	(Azeri	MANAT),	while	9	bln	AZN	 being	 transferred	 from	 the	 State	 Oil	 Fund	 of	 Azerbaijan	 Republic	 (SOFAZ).645	 The	SOFAZ	 is	 a	 sovereign	 fund	 of	 the	 country,	 which	 stores	 country’s	 oil	 and	 gas	 revenues,	excluding	 the	 taxation	 of	 the	 oil	 and	 gas	 companies	 operation	 in	 the	 country,	 which	directly	go	into	the	state	budget.	These	figures	indicate	that,	more	than	half	(around	70%)	of	 the	 state	 budget	 is	 made	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 (i.e.	 oil	 and	 gas	 taxation	 +	 SOFAZ	transfers)	and	the	government	cannot	afford	the	reduction	of	the	main	source	of	the	state	revenues.	This	is	especially	when	the	state	expenditures	have	become	the	main	stimulant	of	 broader	 economic	 (even	 if	 unsustainable)	 growth	 in	 the	 country.646	 Indeed,	 the	 Azeri	government	is	conducting	a	social	transfer	program	from	SOFAZ,	the	main	goal	of	which	is	to	 raise	 the	 minimum	 level	 of	 salaries	 and	 pensions	 in	 the	 county.	 Although	 not	sustainable	in	the	long-term,	such	a	policy	has	decreased	the	level	of	poverty	from	27%	to	just	under	2%.647	Hence,	any	reduction	 in	state	revenues	would	directly	 impact	upon	the	short-term	 well-being	 of	 its	 citizens	 and	 might	 adversely	 affect	 the	 (already	 shaky)	popularity	of	the	current	government.	The	EU	acquis	was	devised	while	having	the	interests	of	the	consumer	countries	in	mind,	who	 are	 dependent	 on	 foreign	 gas	 imports	 and	 suppliers.	 Although	 EU	 member	 states	receive	 tax	 revenues	 from	 the	 consumed	 gas,	 they	 do	 necessarily	 own	 these	 volumes.	Conversely,	Azerbaijan	 is	a	producer	and	net	natural	gas	exporter;	 therefore,	 the	 factors	that	condition	the	structure	of	its	domestic	gas	market	are	quite	different	from	those	of	the	EU.	Natural	gas	is	a	pipeline	bound	fuel	type	and	its	transportation	is	extremely	expensive	due	to	its	low	density	compared	to,	e.g.	oil.	Since	Azerbaijan	produces	both	oil	and	gas,	it	is	economically	better	off	 to	consume	gas	domestically,	while	exporting	oil	 to	 international	markets.	 However,	 given	 that	 it	 produces	 more	 gas	 than	 it	 needs	 domestically,	 the	government	 prefers	 to	 reserve	 domestic	 market	 for	 the	 government's	 share	 of	 gas	volumes	 and	 generate	 fiscal	 (and	 oil	 fund)	 revenues,	 while	 exporting	 the	 rest	 to	 the	international	markets.	 In	 this	 regard,	 as	 restructuring	 Azeri	 domestic	 gas	market	 under	
                                                            644	Azerbaijan	Republic,	2013	Article	IV	Consultation	(International	Monetary	Fund,	2013),	p.	4.	645	 ‘Azerbaijan	 State	Budget	Bill	 Envisages	Revenues	 at	AZN	18,384,000,000	 for	 2014’,	News.az,	 10	October	2013	<http://news.az/mobile/articles/83374>	[accessed	2	March	2014].	646	 Zulfugar	 Agayev,	 ‘S&P	 Sees	 First	 Azeri	 Deficit	 in	 Decade	 as	 BBB-	 Rating	 Affirmed’,	Bloomberg,	 2	 August	2013	 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-02/s-p-sees-first-azeri-deficit-in-decade-as-bbb-rating-affirmed>	[accessed	2	March	2014].	647	Shahriyar	Nasirov	and	Aitor	Ciarreta,	Analysis	of	Azerbaijan	Oil	and	Gas	Sector	(Bilbao:	ORKESTRA,	Instituto	Vasco	de	Competitividad,	2011),	pp.	5–6.	
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the	 EU	 design	 would	 undermine	 this	 business	model	 and	 entail	 financial	 and	 economic	costs	for	the	government,	it	is	quite	reasonable	that	the	latter	would	be	unwilling	to	let	go	of	its	sizeable	revenues,	in	order	to	conform	with	the	EU	preferred	market	design.		However,	 the	 factors	underpinning	the	 failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Azeri	gas	sector	are	not	 limited	 to	 the	 potential	 loss	 of	 state	 revenues	 and	 are	 conditioned	 by	 the	 potential	(strategic	and	economic)	opportunity	costs,	as	well.	The	latter	are	especially	germane	as	far	as	 the	 cross-border	 gas	 transportation	 in	 general	 and	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 in	particular	is	concerned.		In	this	vein,	in	addition	to	its	supplier	status,	Azerbaijan's	geographical	location	allows	the	country	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 transit	 corridor	 for	 the	 potential	 Central	 Asian	 (Turkmen,	 Kazakh	and	Uzbek)	gas	exports	 to	the	EU	and	other	European	markets,	while	bypassing	Russian	territory.	However,	the	role	that	Azerbaijan	could	potentially	play	on	this	issue	would	not	be	 (only)	 that	of	 a	mere	geographical	 transit	 corridor,	but	 (also)	 that	of	 a	 transit	player,	which	(could)	exercises	control	over	the	economic,	physical,	as	well	as	the	political	terms	of	gas	flow	across	its	territory.	In	doing	so,	the	government	aims	at	prioritising	the	interests	of	 its	own	hydrocarbon	industry	over	those	in	Central	Asia.	This,	 in	contrast	with	the	EU	
acquis,	 conditions	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Azeri	 government	 (and	 its	 upstream	 partners)	 to	control	 the	access	 regime	 and	 transit	 conditions	 to	 the	 pipeline	within	 the	 Southern	Gas	Corridor.	To	 start	 with,	 priority	 access	 to	 the	 European	 gas	markets	 has	 long	 been	 at	 the	 top	 of	Azerbaijan's	energy	policy	ever	since	the	start	of	gas	production	in	the	country	at	the	turn	of	the	XXI	century.	This	remained	an	issue	of	hard	bargain	also	during	the	negotiations	on	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	For	example,	the	construction	of	a	pipeline	across	the	Caspian	Sea,	 which	 was	 to	 connect	 Turkmenistan	 with	 the	 European	 markets	 via	 the	 overland	pipeline	 in	Azerbaijan,	Georgia	and	Turkey	(i.e.	SCP)	was	under	consideration	ever	since	the	 late	 1990s	 and	 was	 supported	 by	 the	 USA	 and	 later	 on	 by	 the	 EU.	 The	 Azeri	government	at	the	time	strongly	supported	the	project	in	order	to	increase	the	geopolitical	importance	of	 the	 country	 for	 the	West,	 especially	against	 the	backdrop	of	 its	 territorial	conflict	 with	 neighbouring	 Armenia.	 However,	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 giant	 Shah-Deniz	 gas	reserve	 in	 offshore	 Azerbaijan	 in	 1999	 changed	 the	 stakes	 and	 concomitantly	 the	 geo-economic	strategy	of	the	government.	Following	this	discovery,	the	"aggressive	play"	of	the	Azeri	 government	 for	 gaining	 the	 share	 in	 the	 Turkish	market	 stymied	 the	 US	 plans	 to	foster	 the	Trans-Caspian	Pipeline	 (TCP)	 in	 order	 to	 deliver	Turkmen	 gas	 to	 the	Turkish	
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market.648	 To	 that	 end,	 the	Azerbaijani	 government	 at	 the	 time	 ventured	 to	 increase	 the	proposed	 transit	 fees	 for	 Turkmen	 gas,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 reserve	 the	 75%	 of	 the	 South	Caucasus	Pipeline	for	its	own	gas;	although	prior	to	Shah-Deniz	discovery	it	was	ready	to	use	the	transportation	capacity	of	the	latter	on	equal	terms	with	Turkmenistan.649	Admittedly,	 the	 maritime	 dispute	 between	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Turkmenistan	 over	 the	ownership	 of	 the	 Kapaz/Sardar	 gas	 reservoir,	 which	 is	 located	 right	 on	 the	 expected	maritime	border	between	the	countries	(as	well	as	Russian	and	Iranian	opposition	to	the	TCP),	 has	 also	 contributed	 to	 the	 disagreement	 and	 the	 postponement	 of	 the	 Trans-Caspian	Pipeline	(TCP).	However,	even	if	an	agreement	were	to	be	reached	on	the	shared	development	of	 the	disputed	gas	reservoir,	Azerbaijan	would	still	have	 little	 incentive	 to	promote	 the	 Turkmen	 gas	 transit	 across	 its	 territory	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 its	 own	(prospective)	market	share	in	the	European	consumer	markets.		In	this	context,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Azeri	gas	reserves	are	not	limited	to	Shah-Deniz	only,	which	is	slated	to	export	10	bcm/a	to	the	EU	markets	via	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	starting	 from	2020.	The	offshore	gas	 fields	 like	Absheron,	Umid,	Babek,	 Shafag-Ashiman	and	Nakhchivan,	which	were	discovered	during	the	first	decade	of	the	XXI	century,	can	in	fact	double	or	even	triple	Azeri	gas	export	potential	to	the	European	markets.650	Hence,	it	comes	only	naturally	that	Baku	would	rather	prefer	to	commit	most	of	 its	export/transit	capacity	 for	 its	 own	 gas	 resources.	 Even	 the	 "fraternal"	 Turkish	 attempts	 to	 mediate	between	Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan	were	not	successful	if	not	annoying	for	the	political	establishment	in	Azerbaijan.651	Admittedly,	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	transit	of	Turkmen	gas	would	only	hurt	the	interests	of	Azerbaijani	energy	strategy.	Quite	the	opposite,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	II	of	this	thesis,	the	 scarcity	 of	 the	 initial	 export	 volumes	 from	 Azerbaijan	 ran	 the	 risk	 of	 making	 the	Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 commercially	 unfeasible,	 due	 to	 the	 high	 costs	 associated	 with	natural	 gas	 transportation.	 Turkmen	 gas,	 in	 this	 regard,	 could	 increase	 the	 commercial	viability	of	Azeri	gas	in	the	European	markets	due	to	the	economies	of	scale	principle	in	gas	transportation.	 According	 to	 this	 principle,	 the	 larger	 the	 volumes,	 the	 lower	 is	 the	 per	
                                                            648	Rasizade,	‘The	Mythology	of	the	Munificent	Caspian	Bonanza	and	Its	Concomitant	Pipeline	Geopolitics’,	pp.	144–145.	649	 Bilgin,	 ‘New	 Prospects	 in	 the	 Political	 Economy	 of	 Inner-Caspian	 Hydrocarbons	 and	 Western	 Energy	Corridor	 Through	 Turkey’,	 p.	 6390;	Mavrakis,	 Thomaidis	 and	 Ntroukas,	 ‘An	 Assessment	 of	 the	 Natural	 Gas	Supply	Potential	of	the	South	Energy	Corridor	from	the	Caspian	Region	to	the	EU’,	p.	1677;	Lussac,	‘A	Deal	at	Last:	A	Bright	Future	for	Azerbaijani	Gas	in	Europe?’	650	 ‘Shah	Deniz	Targets	Italian	and	Southeastern	European	Gas	Markets	through	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline’,	BP,	2013	 <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/shah-deniz-targets-italian-and-southeastern-european-gas-markets.html>	[accessed	30	June	2013].	651	 ‘Is	 Turkey	 Helping	 or	 Hurting	 the	 Southern	 Corridor?’,	 Natural	 Gas	 Europe,	 17	 September	 2012	<http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-southern-gas-corridor>	[accessed	17	September	2012].	
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unit	 cost	 of	 transportation.	 This	 could,	 in	 principle,	 make	 both	 Azeri	 and	 Turkmen	 gas	more	 competitive	 vis-à-vis	 other	 gas	 supplies	 in	 the	 EU	 markets.652	 Nonetheless,	 this	possibility	ignores	two	important	sticking	points	from	the	regulatory	point	of	view,	which	would	lead	to	different	outcomes	if	the	EU	law	were	to	apply	in	Azerbaijan.	Firstly,	during	the	negotiations	on	the	launching	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	Azerbaijan	voiced	its	readiness	to	facilitate	certain	(circa	5	bcm/a)	volumes	of	Turkmen	gas	via	this	corridor.	In	contrast,	Turkmenistan	was	not	interested	in	gas	volumes	less	than	30	bcm/a,	which	is	3	times	larger	than	Azeri	Shah-Deniz	II	export	potential	to	the	EU.	In	addition	to	the	massive	investment	required	for	the	construction	of	the	new	pipelines	along	the	SGC,	such	 export	 volumes	 would	 also	 create	 additional	 competition	 for	 the	 limited	 market	share	 in	 the	EU,	 as	well	 as	 in	Turkey	 and	Georgia,	where	Azerbaijan	holds	 considerable	market	share.	This	was	an	especially	germane	problem,	due	 to	 the	high	costs	associated	with	gas	production	in	Azerbaijan,	as	a	result	of	which	some	of	the	Shah	Deniz	consortium	members	 even	 divested	 their	 shares	 in	 this	 project.653	 In	 this	 regard,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	principles	of	the	EU	acquis,	 the	ability	to	control	the	access	regime	to	the	pipelines	along	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	has	allowed	Azerbaijani	government	and	the	upstream	industry	operating	 therein	 (both	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 and	 2013),	 to	 tailor	 it	 to	 their	 own	 energy	interests,	 as	 opposed	 to	 letting	 the	 market	 forces	 determine	 the	 capacity	 rights	 in	 the	relevant	transit	pipelines.	This	is	a	relevant	concern	for	Azerbaijani	government	given	the	fact	that	the	country's	oil	production	is	 in	decline.654	Currently	hydrocarbon	rents	account	for	45%	of	the	domestic	GDP	and	over	70%	of	the	country’s	fiscal	revenues.	In	the	future	the	government	will	have	to	 increase	 its	gas	production	from	the	above-mentioned	green	fields	and	export	thereof	to	the	EU	and	other	regional	markets	in	order	to	make	up	the	reduced	oil	revenues.	This,	on	 the	 other	 hand,	 explains	 the	 government's	 concern	 about	 large	 Turkmen	 volumes	flooding	the	markets	that	Azerbaijan	itself	targets	for	its	own	gas	exports.		Secondly,	 Azerbaijani	 government	 has	 in	 past	 voiced	 its	 readiness	 to	 allow	 (certain	
volumes	 of)	 Turkmen	 gas	 to	 transit	 its	 territory,	 which	 is	 a	 legal	 obligation	 under	 the	
                                                            652	Interviews	with	an	EC/DG	Energy	official,	03/05/2015,	Brussels	and	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	653	 Guy	 Chazan,	 ‘Azerbaijan	 to	 Supply	 Gas	 to	 Europe	 after	 BP-Led	 Consortium’s	 Deal’,	 Financial	 Times,	 17	December	 2013	 <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8bd77bf8-66ff-11e3-8d3e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2uGfw9A00>	[accessed	24	February	2014].	654	 Nailia	 Bagirova,	 ‘Azerbaijan	 Expects	 Decline	 in	 Oil	 Production	 in	 2015’,	 Reuters,	 28	 October	 2014	<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/28/azerbaijan-oil-output-idUSL5N0SN4PV20141028>	 [accessed	18	May	2015];	Jack	Farchy,	‘Baku	Seeks	Alternatives	as	Azerbaijan	Oil	Production	Declines’,	Financial	Times,	12	March	 2015	 <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b86cb5b4-be99-11e4-8036-00144feab7de.html#axzz3aTZxnT5n>	[accessed	18	May	2015].	
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Energy	 Charter	 Treaty	 (to	 which	 both	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Turkmenistan	 are	 members).655	However,	 general	 reference	 to	 the	 ECT	 obligations	 conceals	 an	 important	 regulatory	detail,	 which	 would	 determine	 the	 commercial	 viability	 of	 Turkmen	 gas	 exports	 via	Azerbaijan.	In	addition	to	defining	pipeline	access	regime,	the	EU	acquis	also	prescribes	the	principles	of	the	“transit”	regime,	while	prohibiting	differential	treatment	of	the	third-party	gas	from	domestic	 gas.	 In	 other	 words,	 EU	 acquis	 prohibits	 charging	 transit	 fees	 for	 the	transportation	 of	 third-party	 gas	 via	 national	 transmission	 and/or	 transit	 lines.	 In	 this	regard,	if	the	EU	acquis	were	to	apply	in	Azerbaijan	(and	to	the	pipelines	in	its	territory),	Azeri	government	would	not	be	able	to	demand	any	transit	fees	for	the	transportation	of	the	Turkmen	gas.	In	this	regard,	although	the	ECT	commits	its	members	to	provide	transit	passage	to	third	party	 gas	 across	 their	 territories,	 it	 does	 not	 prescribe	 a	 (regulated)	 mandatory	 TPA	regime	under	pre-published	 tariffs.	Furthermore,	unlike	 the	EU	acquis,	 the	ECT	does	not	prohibit	 charging	 transit	 fees	 to	 third-party	 gas.	The	 latter	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 gas	industry,	for	it	affects	the	competitiveness	of	gas	sold	in	the	final	consumer	markets.	As	I	indicated	 above,	 excessive	 transit	 fees	 across	 Azerbaijan	 was	 one	 of	 the	 factors	 that	stymied	the	construction	of	the	TCP	in	the	late	1990s.	Similarly,	elimination	of	the	transit	fees	 would	 diminish	 the	 transit	 country's	 incentives	 to	 invest	 into	 costly	 transit	infrastructure	 in	 its	 territory,	 especially	 if	 the	 third-party	 transit	 gas	 will	 end	 up	competing	against	its	own	gas	volumes	in	the	consumer	markets.	To	sum	it	up,	the	political	and	economic	rationale	behind	the	EU's	natural	gas	legislation	is	to	eliminate	all	non-market	hurdles	in	energy	supply	and	transit.	Hence,	if	Azerbaijan	were	to	 apply	 the	 EU	 acquis	 domestically,	 it	 would	 lose	 its	 ability	 to	 tailor	 the	 access/transit	regime	to	the	above-mentioned	pipelines	to	its	own	energy	security	interests.	Regional	(as	well	 as	 other	 domestic	 gas	 producers)	 would	 be	 able	 to	 gain	 transit/transportation	capacity	 in	 Azerbaijan	 on	 equal	 terms	 and	 compete	 against	 Azeri	 gas	 in	 the	 consumer	markets.	 This	 would	 likely	 to	 affect	 the	 economics	 of	 Azeri	 gas	 (and	 government's	revenues),	which	explains	the	government's	vested	interest	in	continued	control	over	the	domestic	 (and	 regional)	 pipelines.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 whoever	 controls	 the	 gas	pipelines	also	controls	the	economics	of	the	gas	sales.		Similarly,	Azerbaijan	aspires	to	become	a	lynchpin	energy	hub	for	the	Caspian	basin	energy	resources	and	thus,	is	in	very	much	need	of	a	"vertical	integration"	of	energy	assets,	both	
                                                            655	 This	 position	was	 expressed	 by	 Azeri	 authorities	 during	 the	 sixth	meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Energy	Security	of	the	Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly,	12	February	2013,	Baku.	
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in	the	region	and	beyond	-	in	Turkey	and	even	in	the	EU.656	To	that	end,	Azeri	authorities	made	sure	that	it	has	a	controlling	stake	in	the	TANAP,	which	will	carry	Azeri	gas	from	the	Turkish-Georgia	border	up	to	the	Turkey	-	Greece	border.	Depute	Speaker	of	Milli	Majlis	(Azerbaijani	 Parliament)	 Valeh	 Alasgarov	 remarked	 that,	 "the	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	
agreement	[between	Azerbaijan	and	Turkey	on	TANAP]	is	that	SOCAR‘s	share	in	the	project	
cannot	 be	 less	 than	 51%,	 […]	 which	 is	 important	 for	 Azerbaijan,	 as	 a	 gas	 producing	
country”.657	In	this	vein,	in	spite	of	Turkey's	candidate	status	(and	hence,	expectation	from	it	to	apply	the	EU	legislation	domestically),	TANAP	is	legally	underpinned	by	a	package	of	Intergovernmental	Agreement	between	Turkey	and	Azerbaijan	and	the	Host-Government	Agreement	between	the	Turkish	government	and	TANAP,	which	regulate	the	construction,	ownership	and	operatorship	of	the	pipeline,	as	well	as	the	transit	of	Azerbaijani	gas	to	the	EU.	This	enables	SOCAR	to	exercise	control	over	the	access	regime	 in	TANAP	and	tailor	it	its	own	commercial	(and	political)	interests.		It	is	also	important	to	note	that,	keeping	strong	governmental	control	over	the	natural	gas	network	also	allows	Azeri	authorities	to	rein	in	the	upstream	industry	operating	its	oil	and	gas	 fields.	 The	 production	 sharing	 agreements	 (PSAs)	 between	 the	 Azerbaijani	government	 and	 the	 major	 international	 oil	 corporations	 (IOCs)	 on	 the	 hydrocarbon	production	 in	offshore	 fields	were	signed	 in	 the	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s.	This	period	was	 characterised	 with	 the	 desperate	 need	 of	 the	 government	 for	 foreign	 direct	investment,	as	the	state	energy	company	SOCAR	could	not	afford	extracting	oil	and	gas	by	itself	due	to	the	lack	of	technological	expertise	and	financial	resources.658	As	a	result,	most	of	 the	 PSAs	 signed	 with	 international	 oil	 majors	 gave	 SOCAR	 minority	 shares	 in	 the	consortiums	 developing	 the	 fields.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 government	 lost	 control	 over	 the	investment	and	production	 rate	of	 its	own	production	 fields.	This	 eventually	 resulted	 in	sharp	criticism	of	IOCs	by	the	Azerbaijani	leadership	"in	failing	to	keep	promises".659	At	this	point	of	development,	the	political	establishment	in	Azerbaijan	cannot	force	the	re-distribution	of	shareholder	structure	in	upstream	gas	fields	due	to	the	fear	of	encroaching	nationalisation	in	consumer	countries.	However,	as	the	major	export	pipelines	are	still	in	the	 process	 of	 design,	 construction	 or	 expansion,	 SOCAR	 can,	 in	 principle,	 exert	 indirect	control	over	the	upstream	by	controlling	the	midstream.	Since	the	domestic	gas	market	in	Azerbaijan	 is	monopolised,	 international	 energy	 companies	 producing	 gas	 in	 Azerbaijan	
                                                            656	‘Summary	of	Comprehensive	Strategic	Development	Plan	of	SOCAR	-	2025’	(SOCAR,	2013).	657	 ‘Milli	 Majlis	 Ratifies	 Agreement	 on	 TANAP’,	 News.Az,	 20	 November	 2012	<http://news.az/articles/economy/72260>	[accessed	23	November	2012].	658	Shaffer,	‘Caspian	Energy	Phase	II:	Beyond	2005’.	659	 Ilham	 Aliyev,	 Opening	 speech	 by	 Ilham	 Aliyev	 at	 the	 meeting	 of	 the	 Cabinet	 of	 Ministers,	 2012	<http://en.president.az/articles/6439>	[accessed	5	January	2014].	
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cannot	 sell	 it	 directly	 to	 the	domestic	 consumers.	 For	 example,	Azerbaijan	 International	Oil	 Company	 (AIOC)	 produces	 gas	 in	ACG	 fields,	which	 is	 then	 supplied	 to	 the	 domestic	market	only	by	SOCAR.	Any	 third-party	access	 to	 the	domestic	grid	 (which	 is	practically	unlikely),	 therefore,	 must	 be	 negotiated	with	 the	 state	 company.660	 Thereby,	 by	 holding	firm	onto	 its	domestic	 transmission	 lines,	 as	well	 as,	 gaining	additional	 control	 over	 the	new	energy	highways,	Azerbaijan	is	trying	to	gain	back	an	 indirect	control	over	its	major	production	sites	in	the	Caspian	Sea.	
2.3.2.	Domestic	veto	holders	
In	 analysing	 the	 failure	 of	 Europeanisation	 of	 Azerbaijan's	 natural	 gas	 sector	 one	must	look	 into	 the	 role	 domestic	 stakeholders	 and	 veto	 holders.	 This	 is	 especially	 important	considering	the	clanic	structure	of	business	environment	in	the	country.	In	this	regard,	the	Ministry	of	Energy	is	a	state	agency	formally	mandated	with	setting	the	energy	policy	of	 the	 state.661	However,	 in	 reality	 the	Ministry	 is	 at	best	merely	 informed	about	the	energy	strategy	of	the	top	leadership	of	the	government,	let	alone	being	the	key	decision-maker	 in	 energy	 policy-making.	 The	 Ministry	 is	 rarely	 consulted	 outside	 the	general	political	and	economic	 issues	concerning	Azerbaijan's	 strategy	and	role	vis-à-vis	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	does	not	wield	any	real	weight	in	the	domestic	policy	scene.	In	his	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	political	economy	of	Azerbaijan's	energy	sector,	Samuel	Lussac	argues	that,	Natig	Aliyev,	Minister	of	Energy	of	Azerbaijan,	 is	 less	 informed	about	the	strategic	and	commercial	 issues	and	"[d]uring	a	meeting	on	gas	 transportation	 issues	
with	EU	officials,	he	was	believed	to	only	know	the	focal	points	President	Aliyev	presented	to	
these	very	same	officials	four	months	before".662	Against	this	backdrop,	it	is	no	surprise	that	the	 four	 above-mentioned	 legislative	 drafts	 on	 the	 approximation	 of	 Azerbaijani	 gas	legislation	to	 the	EU	acquis,	which	were	prepared	by	Ministry,	were	not	even	allowed	to	the	agenda	of	the	national	parliament.	This,	consequently,	speaks	of	the	 limited	role	that	the	Ministry	of	Energy	plays	in	the	determination	of	the	legislative	process	in	the	country.	Against	 this	backdrop,	 the	State	Oil	Company	of	Azerbaijan	Republic	de	 facto	 acts	as	 the	key	veto	holder	in	the	determination	of	the	energy	(natural	gas)	policy	in	the	country	and	also	aspires	to	become	a	key	regional	energy	player.663	Its	aspirations	to	vertically	control	the	entire	value	chain	of	energy	production,	transportation	and	distribution	in	Azerbaijan	
                                                            660	‘In-Depth	Review	of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Policy	of	Azerbaijan’,	pp.	46–47.	661	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	662	Lussac,	The	State	as	a	(Oil)	Company?	The	Political	Economy	of	Azerbaijan,	p.	23.	663	 Abbasov,	 ‘Azerbaijan:	 For	 SOCAR,	 Bigger	 Means	 Better	 with	 Azerigaz	 Takeover’;	 ‘Summary	 of	Comprehensive	Strategic	Development	Plan	of	SOCAR	-	2025’.	
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and	along	the	entire	route	of	the	SGC	do	not	only	reflect	the	government's	strategic	energy	goals.	 It	 is	 also	 conditioned	 by	 the	 corporate	 strategy	 to	 increase	 the	 visibility	 and	commercial	 power	 of	 the	 company	 in	 the	 entire	 region.	 The	 acquisition	 of	 the	 entire	distribution	 network	 in	 Georgia	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 gasification	 program	 by	 Azeri	SOCAR	 is	a	good	 indication	of	 the	regional	ambitions	of	 the	state	company.	Therefore,	 it	comes	as	a	 little	 surprise	 that,	 if	 SOCAR	 is	keen	on	acquiring	new	network	assets	 in	 the	neighbouring	countries,	as	well	as	in	the	EU,	it	will	be	unlikely	to	let	go	of	its	monopoly	in	the	domestic	market	in	Azerbaijan.	In	this	regard,	SOCAR	has	been	leading	the	negotiations	on	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	and	the	 sales	 of	 Azeri	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 regional	markets	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 government.	Even	during	some	of	the	key	meetings	of	the	EaP	Euronest	committee	on	energy	security,	it	was	 the	 senior	 SOCAR	officials	 (as	 opposed	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Energy)	 that	 presented	and	 defended	 the	 government's	 position	 on	 liberalisation	 process	 of	 the	 domestic	 gas	market	 in	Azerbaijan,	as	well	as	on	 the	 issues	of	gas	 transit	across	 the	country.664	 In	 this	vein,	 although	 the	 state	 company	 is	 not	 formally	 entrusted	 with	 legislative	 powers	 in	determining	 the	 energy	 policy	 in	 the	 country,	 it	 wields	 substantial	 informal	 powers	through	(also)	personal	networks	of	the	company	leadership.665	The	company	stands	to	lose	commercially	a	great	deal	from	the	liberalisation	process.	The	ability	 to	control	domestic	natural	gas	networks	allows	SOCAR	to	also	access	markets	 in	the	 neighbourhood	 other	 than	 the	 EU.	 For	 example,	 on	 March	 27,	 2009	 SOCAR	 and	Gazprom	signed	a	MoU,	which	laid	the	foundation	of	renewed	Azeri	gas	exports	to	Russia,	which	is	carried	out	by	Azerigaz,	a	subsidiary	of	SOCAR.666	Obviously,	 it	did	not	mark	the	strategic	realignment	in	Azerbaijan's	foreign	policy,	but	was	conditioned	by	a	commercial	imperative	 and	 laid	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 closer	 relationship	 between	 SOCAR	 and	Gazprom.667	 Azerbaijan	 produced	 twice	 as	 much	 gas	 in	 2012,	 as	 it	 consumed	domestically.668	 Market	 in	 Georgia,	 in	 this	 regard,	 is	 relatively	 small	 to	 consume	 the	remainder	of	Azeri	production,	while	Turkish	gas	purchases	from	Azerbaijan	were	limited	to	contractual	volumes.	Hence,	in	times	of	additional	capacity	Russia	was	able	to	provide	an	 option	 for	 marketing	 Azeri	 gas.	 Control	 over	 the	 monopolised	 domestic	 and	 cross-border	transmission	pipelines,	in	this	regard,	allowed	SOCAR	to	determine	the	terms	and	
                                                            664	This	was	personally	observed	by	the	author	during	the	multilateral	debates	that	took	place	during	the	sixth	meeting	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Energy	 Security	 of	 the	 Euronest	 Parliamentary	 Assembly,	 12	 February	 2013,	Baku.	665	Lussac,	The	State	as	a	(Oil)	Company?	The	Political	Economy	of	Azerbaijan.	666	‘In-Depth	Review	of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Policy	of	Azerbaijan’,	p.	48.	667	Denison,	‘The	EU	and	Central	Asia:	Commercialising	the	Energy	Relationship’,	pp.	7–8.	668	‘BP	Statistical	Review		of	World	Energy	June	2013’	(BP,	2013),	pp.	22,	23.	
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conditions	of	Azeri	gas	sales	to	the	neighbouring	countries,	while	ensuring	its	consistency	with	 the	 country's	 strategic	 interests.669	On	 this	 issue,	quite	 interestingly,	 the	position	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Azerbaijan	is	largely	in	line	with	that	of	SOCAR.670	Furthermore,	 unlike	 in	 Turkey	 and	 Georgia,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 link	 between	 the	 level	 of	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	on	the	one	hand	and	the	willingness	to	cooperate	with	the	EU	 in	 virtually	 any	 sphere,	 including	 energy	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 level	 of	democracy	 has	 been	 in	 steady	 decline	 in	 Azerbaijan	 ever	 since	 the	 country	 gained	 its	independence	 from	 the	USSR	 in	 1991.	 The	 Freedom	House	 classified	Azerbaijan	 as	 "not	free"	 in	 its	2014	Freedom	 in	 the	World	 report,	with	 its	 rating	 in	political	 rights	 and	 civil	liberties	 further	 declining	 to	 6	 in	 the	 1-7	 scale,	 while	 7	 being	 worst.671	 Furthermore,	following	 the	 2013	 presidential	 elections,	 OSCE/ODIHR	 reported	 "the	 worst	 vote	 count	
ever	observed	by	an	ODIHR	election	observation	mission	anywhere	 […]	with	58	per	cent	of	
observed	 polling	 stations	 assessed	 as	 bad	 or	 very	 bad".672	 Even	 if	 European	 Parliament's	small	 and	 questionable673	 delegation	 initially	 claimed	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 presidential	elections,	 the	European	Assembly	 later	on	rejected	the	conclusions	of	 its	own	delegation	and	fully	endorsed	the	findings	of	the	OSCE/ODIHR	mission.674	Such	a	poor	state	of	democracy	and	rule	of	 law	in	the	country	negatively	affects	the	rule	adoption	process	at	 two	 levels.	Firstly,	 the	entrenched	clanic	economic	 structures	 in	 the	country	 have	 vested	 interests	 in	 maintaining	 their	 monopoly	 rights	 and	 privelegies	 in	national	 economy,	 including	 and	 especially	 in	 energy	 sector.	 Like	 in	 many	 other	 post-Soviet	 countries,	 the	 political	 system	 in	 Azerbaijan	 is	 heavily	 intertwined	 with	 energy	sector	and	energy	sector	has	served	as	the	backbone	of	the	current	political	regime.	Hence,	introducing	 competitive	market	 conditions	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 under	 the	 EU	 template	would	not	only	reduce	the	governmental	rents	and	thereby,	undermine	national	interests	of	the	country.	Such	a	situation	would	also	go	against	the	interests	of	the	business	groups,	which	 are	 intimately	 related	 with	 energy	 sector	 and	 are	 also	 intricate	 elements	 of	 the	
                                                            669	In	addition	to	energy	supply,	SOCAR	also	performs	social	duties	in	the	country,	which	may	help	it	to	justify	position	against	liberalisation.	670	Interview	with	Rashad	Novruz,	Mission	of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	671	 Freedom	 in	 the	 World	 2014	 (Freedom	 House,	 2014)	<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf>;	Increased	 level	of	political	persecusion	opposition	and	 independent	media	was	also	recorded	by	 the	Human	Rights	Watch	organisation,	World	Report	2014	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2014).	672	Disgraced:	 Azerbaijan	 and	 the	 End	 of	 Election	 Monitoring	 	 as	 We	 Know	 It	 (Brussels:	 European	 Stability	Initiative,	5	November	2013).	673	 ‘MEPs	 Must	 Explain	 Trips	 to	 Azerbaijan’,	 European	 Voice,	 16	 October	 2013	<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/meps-must-explain-trips-to-azerbaijan/>	 [accessed	 22	 February	2015].	674	European	Neighbourhood	Policy,	Working	towards	a	Stronger	Partnership:	EP’s	Position	on	the	2012	Progress	
Reports	(2013/2621(RSP))	(Strasbourg:	European	Parliament,	23	October	2013).	
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political	equilibrium	in	Azerbaijan.	Therefore,	as	it	is	the	case	with	other	EaP	countries,675	the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 (especially	 those	 fostering	 competition	 and	 equality)	 in	Azerbaijan,	 would	 seriously	 impinge	 upon	 the	 vital	 business	 interests	 of	 the	 powerful	stakeholders,	which	use	their	monopolistic	position	to	influence	the	relevant	decisions	of	the	central	government.	Hence,	it	should	be	expected	that	powerful	stakeholders	(whether	SOCAR,	 or	 other	 informal	 power	 brokers)	 constitute	 a	major	 hurdle	 in	 rule	 adoption	 in	Azerbaijan.	Secondly,	 in	 view	 of	 political	 instrumentality	 of	 natural	 gas	 supply	 and	 transit,	 strong	government	 control	 over	 the	 sector	 can	 also	 provide	 leverage	 vis-à-vis	 the	 normative	pressures	 stemming	 from	 the	 EU	 –	most	 importantly,	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 certain	Commission	services	and	the	some	member	states.	Since	the	EU	regards	Azerbaijan	as	an	important	 player	 along	 the	 SGC,	 it	 is	 wary	 of	 aleanating	 the	 oppressive	 regime	 with	reforms	calls	or	sanctions	for	non-compliance.676	The	relevant	high-level	EU	officials	even	made	 little	 effort	 to	 hide	 their	 different	 views	 regarding	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 regime	 in	Azerbaijan.	During	their	2011	visit	to	Baku,	the	former	president	of	the	EC	Jose	Manuel	Barroso	and	the	 former	 energy	 Commissioner	 Günther	 Oettinger	 concentrated	 their	 discussions	 on	energy	 issues,	while	meeting	 only	with	 the	members	 of	 the	 government.677	 This,	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 "diluted"	 the	 preceding	 criticism	made	 by	 the	 former	 EU	 Commissioner	 for	Enlargement	 and	Neighbourhood	Policy	 Štefan	Füle,	 the	 former	EU	High	Representative	Catherine	 Ashton	 and	 the	 former	 president	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 President	 Jerzy	Buzek	during	their	earlier	trips	to	Baku,	all	of	whom	met	with	the	members	of	opposition	and	civil	society.678		Furthermore,	 following	 their	 successive	 visits	 to	 Baku,	 Neelie	 Kroes	 -	 the	 former	 EU	Commissioner	 for	Digital	Agenda	and	Günther	Oettinger	provided	diametrically	opposite	views	on	 the	political	 situation	 in	Azerbaijan.	While	 the	 former	 criticised	 the	officials	 in	
                                                            675	Laure	Delcour	and	Kataryna	Wolczuk,	 ‘Beyond	the	Vilnius	Summit:	Challenges	 for	Deeper	EU	Integration	with	Eastern	Europe’	(European	Policy	Centre,	2013),	pp.	2–3.	676	See	e.g.	Jakob	Hauter,	‘Nothing	Ventured,	Nothing	Gained?:	The	EU-Ukraine	Association	Agreement	and	the	Effectiveness	 of	 the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy’,	 IEP	Policy	Papers	 on	Eastern	Europe	and	Central	Asia,	April	 2013;	 Brzezinski,	 The	 Grand	 Chessboard:	 American	 Primacy	 And	 Its	 Geostrategic	 Imperatives;	 F.	Schimmelfennig	 and	 H.	 Scholtz,	 ‘EU	 Democracy	 Promotion	 in	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood:	 Political	Conditionality,	Economic	Development	and	Transnational	Exchange’,	European	Union	Politics,	9.2	(2008),	187–215	<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116508089085>.	677	2011	ECPRelease,	‘Press	Release:	Commission	President	Barroso	to	Travel	to	Azerbaijan	and	Turkmenistan’	(Delegation	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 to	 Azerbaijan,	 2011)	<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/documents/press_releases/president_barroso_to_travel_to_azerbaijan_and_turkmenistan.pdf>.	678	Jana	Kobzova,	Leila	Alieva	and	European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	The	EU	and	Azerbaijan:	Beyond	Oil	(London:	European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	2012),	p.	4.	
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Baku	for	routinely	suppressing	press	freedom	and	jailing	journalists,	the	latter	spoke	of	a	"strategic	partnership"	with	Azerbaijan.	The	 former	energy	 commissioner	 further	 added	that,	"it	is	arrogant	to	criticise	[...Azerbaijan]	from	a	Brussels	perspective,	[...	as	Azerbaijan	is]	 by	 far	 the	most	 advanced	on	 this	 [human	 rights]	 compared	 to	other	 countries	 in	 the	region	 -	 Kazakhstan,	 Uzbekistan	 and	 Turkmenistan."679	 The	 controversy	 took	 place	 in	 a	context	 where	 getting	 the	 government	 in	 Baku	 on	 board	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	was	one	of	 the	 top	priorities	of	 the	EC.680	Thus,	 cognisant	of	 this	important	 role	 it	 plays	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 SGC,	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	 in	Azerbaijan	ventures	to	ensure	its	firm	and	full	control	over	the	energy	sector	by	rejecting	any	 rules-based	 cooperation	 with	 the	 EU.	 Azerbaijan’s	 role	 as	 the	 enabler	 of	 the	 SGC	serves	as	a	“safety	net”	against	international	pressures	on	its	poor	governance	records	and	provides	 it	with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 “dictate”	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 its	 cooperation	with	 the	 EU.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 given	 the	 fact	 that,	 unlike	 Georgia	 and	 Turkey,	Azerbaijani	 government	 does	 not	 even	 aspire	 for	 membership	 or	 even	 association	prospects	with	the	EU.		That	being	said,	however,	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	democratisation	of	Azerbaijan	would	automatically	 lead	 the	new	government	 to	whole-heartedly	 accept	 the	EU	 rules	without	demanding	certain	sizeable	benefits	 in	return	(e.g.	membership	prospects).	Any	decision	to	adopt	the	EU	energy	acquis	would	still	have	to	be	analysed	in	light	of	the	relevant	costs	and	benefits	that	they	would	usher	in	as	I	have	argued	above	in	considerable	detail.		Obviously,	the	government	is	keeping	the	open(ended)	dialogue	with	the	EU,	probably	in	order	 to	 keep	 the	 Russians	 at	 bay,	 or	 conceal	 the	 vested	 interests	 behind	 the	 scenes.	However,	 it	 is	 highly	 improbable	 that	 this	 formal	 cooperation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	Azerbaijan	will	lead	to	the	genuine	Europeanisation	of	the	country.	To	 conclude,	 domestic	 veto	 holders	 representing	 the	 national	 interests,	 as	 well	 as	 the	vested	 business	 interests	 of	 the	 clanic	 structures	 also	 inhibit	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	Azerbaijan's	 natural	 gas	 sector.	 In	 overall,	 the	 government	 considers	 itself	 in	 a	 strong	economic	position	and	has	 less	willingness	 to	undertake	 the	reforms	dictated	by	 foreign	actors.	 It	 commands	 the	 necessary	 powers	 and	 economic	 resources	 to	 that	 end.	 The	package-reforms	exported	by	the	EU	run	the	risk	of	 increasing	the	transparency	and	the	rule	of	 law	 in	 the	country	and	present	unacceptable	challenge	 for	 the	power	base	of	 the	
                                                            679	 Andrew	 Rettman,	 ‘Azerbaijan	 Dangles	 EU	 Gas	 Bonanza’,	 EU	 Observer,	 14	 November	 2012	<http://euobserver.com/foreign/118199>	[accessed	23	November	2012].	680	 For	 example,	 Barroso	 called	 the	 deal	 he	 signed	with	 the	 president	 of	 Azerbaijan	 a	major	 breakthrough,	which	 "confirms	 Europe's	 direct	 access	 to	 gas	from	 the	 Caspian	 basin,	 thus	 enabling	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	Southern	 Corridor."	 ‘Press	 Release:	 Commission	 and	 Azerbaijan	 Sign	 Strategic	 Gas	 Deal’	 (EC,	 2011)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-30_en.htm?locale=en>	[accessed	31	January	2015].	
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regime	in	Azerbaijan.	Thus,	it	should	be	expected	that,	the	dialogue	on	the	upgrade	of	the	PCA	 between	 Azerbaijan	 and	 the	 EU,	 whether	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Association	 Agreement	 or	Partnership	 for	Modernisation	 Agreement	will	 be	 long	 and	 possibly	 open-ended.	 It	 will	have	less	normative	content,	entailing	legal	commitment	for	rule	adoption	and	will	rather	concentrate	 on	 the	 political/economic	 dialogue	 related	 to	 the	 realisation	 of	 certain	projects	of	common	interest.	
3.	Main	findings	and	implications	on	the	SGC	
As	I	argued	above,	the	export	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	to	the	partner	countries	is	one	of	the	core	aims	of	 the	Eastern	Partnership	established	 in	2009,	which	 the	EU	pursues	 in	 tight	synergy	with	its	Southern	Gas	Corridor	strategy.	In	doing	so,	the	bilateral	track	of	the	EaP	uses	 a	 more-for-more	 principle	 as	 an	 external	 incentive	 to	 foster	 approximation	 of	 the	partner	 counties’,	 in	 our	 case	 Azerbaijan's	 energy	 legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis.	 If	successful,	 this	 external	 EU	 policy	 action	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 eliminate	 transit	 risks	 to	energy	supply	via	this	country	by	absorbing	Azerbaijan	into	the	regulatory	sphere	of	the	EU	 single	 market.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 this	 chapter	 analysed	 in	 detail,	 Azerbaijan	 as	 a	 vital	natural	gas	supply	and	transit	country	along	the	SGC,	has	not	implemented	the	EU	natural	gas	 legislation	domestically	and	has	no	 incentive	 to	do	so	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	Rule	adoption	 in	 natural	 gas	 sector	 has	 neither	 taken	 place	 as	 part	 of	 the	 non-binding	 EU	programmes	that	Azerbaijan	has	been	participating	during	the	past	decade.	As	such,	 this	has	implications	on	both,	the	EaP	as	a	tool	of	external	(energy)	policy	action	of	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	competitiveness	of	gas	supply	to	the	EU	via	this	energy	corridor.		
3.1.	EaP	and	Europeanisation	of	Azerbaijan’s	natural	gas	sector	
This	 chapter	 argued	 that	 the	 expectations	 of	 huge	 domestic	 costs	 to	 be	 incurred	 by	 the	adoption	 of	 the	 EU	 rules	 constitute	 the	 pivotal	 factor	 explaining	 the	 failure	 of	Europeanisation	 of	 the	 natural	 gas	 sector	 in	 Azerbaijan.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 EU	 acquis	would	 decrease	 the	 energy	 revenues	 of	 Azerbaijani	 government	 by	 opening	 up	 the	domestic	gas	market	to	competition,	as	well	as	incur	opportunity	costs	by	facilitating	the	freedom	of	access	of	other	regional	suppliers	to	the	European	markets	through	Azerbaijan.	The	latter	would	likely	compete	against	Azeri	gas	in	a	way	that	may	not	be	favourable	to	country’s	national	interests.	Energy	sector	has	become	the	main	powerhouse	of	the	Azeri	economy	 and	 propelled	 the	 GDP	 growth	 in	 the	 past	 decade.	 Implementation	 of	 the	 EU	rules	 is,	 thus,	 seen	 as	 a	 risk	 to	 this	 progress.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Azerbaijani	 state	 energy	
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champion	SOCAR	exercises	powerful	(both	formal	and	informal)	veto	powers	against	the	adoption	of	the	EU	rules	in	the	country,	not	least	due	to	its	corporate	interests.	Under	 the	rationalist	explanatory	model,	 these	net	domestic	costs	weigh	heavier	against	the	expected	benefits,	hence,	 rendering	 the	rejection	of	 the	EU	rules	as	 the	most	optimal	policy	option	available.	Nonetheless,	 the	context	of	 the	cost	&	benefit	analysis	process	 is	also	important	for	explaining	the	 inability	of	 the	EU	to	 foster	 the	adoption	of	 its	rules	by	Azerbaijan.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 reward	 and	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 EU	conditionality	 are	 important	 contextual	 factors.	 As	 such,	 unlike	 Georgia,	 Azerbaijan	 has	never	 expressed	EU	membership	 aspirations,	 hence,	 this	 potential	 reward	 is	 not	 part	 of	the	latter's	strategic	preferences.	Therefore,	the	prospects	and	the	speed	of	its	attainment	does	not	provide	critical	benefits,	which	could	incentivise	the	Azerbaijani	government	into	adopting	 the	EU	rules	vis-à-vis	 the	expected	net	adoption	costs.	Furthermore,	 the	more-for-more	 principle	 of	 the	 EaP	 neither	 offers	 sizeable	material	 reward	 in	 energy	 sphere,	either,	 which	 is	 of	 great	 importance	 for	 Azerbaijan.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 membership	aspirations	 and	 energy	 specific	 sizeable	 rewards,	 consequently,	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	conditional	 reward/threats	 becomes	 less	 relevant	 under	 the	 current	 bilateral	cooperation/partnership	mechanisms,	including	the	Eastern	Partnership.		In	 the	 case	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 the	 credibility	 of	 conditionality	 becomes	 even	 a	 less	 germane	factor	due	to	the	country's	practical	role	as	the	enabler	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	both	as	a	supply	source,	as	well	as	the	major	investor	on	the	SGC	pipelines.	As	such,	even	if	the	EU	had	in	its	disposal	contractual	mechanism	to	punish	Azerbaijan	for	the	failure	of	rule	adoption,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 it	 would	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 exercise	 it	 without	 incurring	substantial	costs	 to	 itself	 (with	regard	to	 the	diversity	of	 its	energy	supplies).	Therefore,	under	current	circumstances,	conceptually	Azerbaijan	plays	a	role	not	of	an	accepter,	but	of	a	donor;	hence,	commands	a	better	position	 in	picking	and	choosing	 the	EU	rules	 it	 is	interested	to	apply	domestically	and	which	not.		
3.2.		Failure	of	rule	adoption	and	the	competitive	EU	gas	supply	via	the	SGC	
From	 the	 regulatory	 point	 of	 view,	 Azerbaijan	 presented	 an	 interesting	 and	 possibly	unique	case	study	for	investigating	the	interplay	or	rather	the	collision	between	the	supply	and	transportation/transit	interests	in	a	non-EU	supplier	country.	As	such,	the	existence	of	these	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 were	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 reasons,	 which	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	adoption	of	the	Third	Energy	Package	in	the	EU,	with	a	view	of	establishing	depoliticised,	liberal	and	integrated	natural	gas	market	 in	the	Union.	Similarly,	 the	policies	of	applying	the	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 along	 the	 SGC	were	 aimed	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 its	 problem-
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solving	 properties	 by	 depoliticising	 and	 liberalising	 the	 supply	 of	 natural	 gas	 via	 this	alternative	gas	corridor.	Since	 these	 efforts	 have	 so	 far	 failed	 along	 the	 non-EU	 segments	 of	 the	 SGC,	 as	 I	 have	investigated	 in	 Chapters	 IV,	 V	 and	 VI,	 each	 non-EU	 segment	 of	 the	 SGC	 will	 now	 be	governed	by	the	transit	and	market	access	rules	established	by	the	relevant	actors	that	do	not	 necessarily	 share	 the	 same	 transit	 and	 supply	 interests	 as	 the	EU.	 This	 is	 especially	salient	 in	 the	 Azerbaijani	 section	 of	 the	 SGC.	 Azerbaijani	 SOCAR	 and	 the	 upstream	companies	 operating	 the	 SCPx	 (first	 leg	 of	 the	 SGC)	 have	 vested	 strategic,	 but	 above	 all	commercial	 interests	 in	wielding	 producer	 control	 over	 the	 transit	 lines.	 This	will	allow	them	 to	 tailor	 the	 access	 of	 third-party	 gas	 producers	 in	 Central	 Asia	 to	 the	 relevant	transmission/transit	lines	to	the	attainment	of	their	own	strategic	and	commercial	goals.	Against	 this	 backdrop,	 the	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 is	 currently	 slated	 to	 bring	 10	 bcm/a	Azeri	 gas	 to	 the	 EU	 starting	 from	 the	 year	 2020,	 as	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 II.	 These	 volumes	could	 prospectively	 be	 tripled	 or	 even	 quadrupled	 if	 other	 potential	 regional	 suppliers,	such	as	Iran,	Iraq	and	Turkmenistan	could	secure,	at	least	similar	to	Azerbaijan,	favourable	transit	terms	to	the	SGC	transportation	capacity.	Failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Azerbaijan,	Georgia	and	Turkey,	however,	is	likely	to	hamper	these	prospects	to	a	certain	degree	and	time,	 for	 neither	 Azerbaijan,	 Georgia	 or	 Turkey	 are	 interested	 in	 providing	 free	 transit	without	getting	certain	benefits	in	return.	For	this	reason,	the	future	potential	of	the	SGC	remains	 uncertain,	 as	 the	 non-market	 transit	 hurdles	 can	 (and	 possibly	 will)	 create	capacity	bottlenecks	for	the	Central	Asian	and	Middle	Eastern	gas	supplies	to	the	EU.	This,	consequently,	will	diminish	the	competitive	EU	gas	supply	via	the	SGC,	for	its	functioning	is	also	affected	by	the	factors	unrelated	to	the	supply	and	demand	balance	in	the	markets.				
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CONCLUSIONS	
With	 the	 necessary	 agreements	 in	 place,	 the	 physical	 development	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor	 has	 entered	 the	 final	 home	 stretch	 with	 10	 bcm/a	 of	 qualitatively	 new	 gas	volumes	slated	for	the	EU	markets	in	2020	via	the	combination	of	SCPx,	TANAP,	TAP	and	IGB	 pipelines.	 Under	 the	 current	 supply	&	 demand	 projections,	 these	 new	 volumes	will	help	 to	reduce	 the	dependency	of	Bulgaria,	Greece	and	 Italy	on	Russian	gas	 to	a	varying	degree	 by	 diversifying	 the	 source	 and	 the	 transportation	 route	 of	 their	 external	 energy	supply.	In	the	meantime,	the	gas	markets	in	the	EU	have	also	evolved	since	the	first	 inception	of	the	 idea	 of	 the	 SGC.	 Organically	 grown	 from	 the	 spillover	 of	 the	 intra-EU	 economic	integration	processes	into	the	energy	sector,	the	Union	is	in	the	process	of	establishing	a	single	EU	natural	gas	market.	This	 is	underpinned	by	the	gradual	Europeanisation	of	the	member	 states’	 gas	 markets,	 both	 in	 hardware	 (development	 dense	 physical	interconnections	 among	 the	 national	 markets)	 and	 software	 (development	 of	 EU	 rules	governing	 the	 markets)	 terms.	 This	 slow	 but	 continuous	 progress	 in	 internal	Europeanisation	 is,	 consequently,	 turning	 the	 EU	 into	 a	 single	 geographical	 market	 of	almost	continental	scale.	These	 developments,	 seemingly,	 have	 also	 affected	 EU	 priorities	 with	 regard	 to	 the	diversification	of	the	external	energy	supplies	and	transport	routes.	In	relation	to	the	SGC,	this	is	manifested	in	a	subtle	shift	in	political	support	to	the	development	of	the	necessary	infrastructure	along	the	SGC	in	order	to	reach	out	to	new	energy	sources.	Previously,	if	the	major	emphasis	was	on	the	construction	of	the	massive	capacity	transit	pipelines	deep	into	the	 EU	 markets,	 now	 it	 has	 seemingly	 shifted	 in	 favour	 of	 any	 pipeline	 that	 brings	qualitatively	new	volumes	to	the	EU	borders.		Once	these	new	volumes	reach	the	external	borders	of	this	continental	market,	internal	Europeanisation	will,	in	principle,	ensure	that	gas	volumes	flow	where	they	are	needed	most	under	commercial	conditions.	From	this	viewpoint,	 the	development	of	new	 infrastructure	 to	deliver	new	gas	volumes	via	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	is	of	contribution	to	ensuring	the	EU	energy	security,	for	the	diversity	 of	 energy	 supplies	 and	 transportation	 routes	 is	 a	 crucial	 element	 thereof.	 As	opposed	 to	 concentrated	 energy	 provision,	 the	 diversification	 will	 allow	 the	 EU	 and	member	states	to	 increase	the	resilience	of	their	energy	system	by	reducing	dependence	on	the	dominant	supplier	-	the	Russian	Federation.		
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Nonetheless,	 the	 EU’s	 external	 energy	 policy	 vis-à-vis	 the	 SGC	 has	 not	 been	 limited	 to	political	 support	 to	 the	 necessary	 infrastructure	 developments.	 It	 has	 also	 involved	external	policy	actions	aimed	at	the	Europeanisation	of	this	alternative	energy	corridor.	In	this	regard,	by	putting	the	latter	at	the	heart	of	this	PhD,	the	first	research	question	of	this	thesis	 focused	 on	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 EU	 external	 energy	 governance	 vis-à-vis	 the	SGC,	while	the	second	research	question	invited	an	assessment	of	the	factors	that	impact	upon	the	success	of	the	external	energy	governance	in	question.	Having	 the	 first	 research	question	 in	mind,	 this	PhD	argued	 that,	 the	EU’s	 conception	of	energy	 security	 is	 the	 diversity	 of	 energy	 supplies	 under	 competitive	 market	 conditions,	
which	ensures	its	affordability	and	reliability.	In	this	regard,	even	though	the	establishment	of	the	necessary	infrastructure	along	the	SGC	is	to	contribute	to	the	diversity	of	the	energy	supplies	to	the	EU,	further	(a	new	dimension	of)	policy	measures	are	needed	to	ensure	the	
competitiveness	 of	 this	 energy	 corridor.	 Essentially,	 here	 competitive	 energy	 provision	refers	 to	 supply	 and	 transportation	 of	 natural	 gas	 under	 free-market	 conditions,	unaffected	by	the	(geo)political	bargaining	power	among	the	involved	parties.		On	this	latter	issue,	this	thesis	refers	to	the	emergence	of	transit	risks	along	the	Southern	Gas	 Corridor,	 which	 will	 affect	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 supply	 via	 this	corridor.	 It	 was	 argued	 that,	 the	 main	 transit	 countries,	 namely,	 Turkey,	 Georgia	 and	Azerbaijan,	have	the	ability	and	interests	to	tailor	the	flow	of	energy	resources	across	their	
sovereign	 territories	 to	maximising	national	 economic	 and/or	 (geo)political	 ends.	At	 the	practical	 level,	 this	 is	 effectuated	 by	 restricting	 third	 party	 access	 to	 national	 gas	transmission	and/or	transit	lines.	Additionally,	transit	risks	also	emerge	when	the	transit	countries	charge	excessive	and/or	non-transparent	charges	for	transiting	gas.		Therefore,	this	thesis	argued	that,	Europeanisation	as	an	extra	dimension	of	the	EU’s	SGC	strategy	 is	 aimed	 at	 eliminating	 these	 transit	 risks.	 By	 exporting	 its	 domestic	 rules	 on	
unbundling,	regulated	third	party	access	and	equal	treatment	of	transiting	gas,	the	EU	aims	to	establish	necessary	regulatory	conditions	along	the	SGC	within	which	the	flow/trade	of	energy	 can	 be	 ensured	 by	 the	 free-market	 principles	 (based	 on	 supply	 and	 demand	signals),	without	non-market	interference	of	the	state	and	non-state	actors	concerned.	In	addition	to	economic	rationale,	this	would	also	help	the	EU	to	depoliticise	external	energy	supply;	in	other	words,	ensure	that	external	supply	of	natural	gas	is	not	used	as	a	political	tool	in	international	political	interaction.		In	 investigating	 the	 potential	 practical	 role	 of	 the	 EU-sourced	 formal	 institutions	 in	 the	functioning	 the	 SGC,	 I	 analysed	 EU	 enlargement	 process	 vis-à-vis	 Turkey	 and	 the	 EaP	instrument	vis-à-vis	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.	By	taking	advantage	of	the	logic	of	calculus	of	
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Rational-Choice	Institutionalism,	this	PhD	argued	that,	at	the	broader	conceptual	level	the	regulatory	dimension	of	the	SGC	is	geared	towards	addressing	the	external	energy	supply	risks	by	expanding	the	boundary	of	the	EU	institutions	(relevant	energy	acquis)	to	absorb	the	 SGC	 countries	 and	hence,	 take	 advantage	 of	 their	 problem-solving	properties.681	 The	deployment	of	the	EU	institutions	externally	(Europeanisation)	would	allow	the	Union	to	determine	the	parameters	(rules)	that	condition	the	capacity	of	third	(Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan)	countries	to	make	energy	related	strategic	decisions	(the	conditions	of	right	of	supply	 and	 transit)	 along	 the	 SGC	 and	 tailor	 them	 to	 the	 EU	 preferences.	Ultimately,	 by	Europeanising	the	SGC	countries,	the	EU	would	gain	institutionalised	soft	power	over	them	by	constraining	their	strategic	policy	actions	within	the	institutional	framework	of	its	own	making.	In	this	regard,	I	argued	that	RCI	presents	a	flexible	theoretical	tool,	as	it	does	not	directly	favour	free-market	or	geopolitics	approach	in	its	conception	of	what	constitutes	a	rational	action	 in	 relation	 to	 diverse	 and	 competitive	 gas	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC.	 Rational	 action	 is	considered	as	the	deployment	of	 institutions	in	order	to	reduce	the	risks	stemming	from	the	behaviour	of	others	by	narrowing	down	the	strategic	policy	options	available	for	them.	In	the	SGC	context,	this	logic	entails	strategic	implications,	for	it	is	set	to	bind	the	strategic	capacity	of	one	group	of	 actors	with	 the	preferences	of	 another.	However,	 in	doing	 so	 it	does	 not	 contradict	 liberal	 precepts,	 for	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 external	 energy	relations	 based	 on	 domestic	 norms	 also	 envisages	 the	 export	 of	 the	 EU's	 free-markets	model	to	third	countries.	Hence,	by	accounting	for	the	role	of	the	formal	institutions	(EU	
acquis)	 in	 a	 strategic	 context	 (elimination	 of	 external	 transit	 risks),	 RCI	 better	 engages	with	 the	 first	 research	 question	 of	 this	 thesis	 on	 the	 politico-economic	 rationale	 behind	the	EU	policy	of	Europeanisation	towards	the	regulatory	governance	of	the	SGC.		In	order	to	engage	with	the	second	research	question,	the	External	Incentive	Model	as	the	first	order	adaption	of	the	RCI,	provided	a	tailor-made	analytical	tool	to	analyse	the	role	of	
domestic	costs	in	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	in	conditioning	their	willingness	to	adopt	the	EU	rules	in	natural	gas	sector	in	a	cause	and	effect	manner.	In	doing	so,	I	argued	that,	in	
the	absence	of	the	EU	membership	prospects	or	the	lack	of	membership	aspirations,	the	net	
domestic	adoption	costs	in	the	target	SGC	countries	serve	as	the	inhibiting	factors	of	energy	
Europeanisation	 of	 the	 SGC	 countries.	 Since	 these	 domestic	 costs	 stem	 from	 the	 SGC	
countries'	rational	national	interests	to	control	the	supply	and	transit	of	natural	gas	to	and	
across	 their	 sovereign	 territories	 in	order	 to	 further	national	 strategic	and	economic	 ends,	
they	 are	 intrinsically	 incompatible	 with	 the	 EU's	 conception	 of	 competitive,	 hence,	
                                                            681	 For	 a	 general	 theoretical	 and	 conceptual	 discussions,	 see	 Lavenex,	 ‘EU	 External	 Governance	 in	 “Wider	Europe”’,	p.	694.	
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depoliticised	 energy	 supply	 and	 transit.	 Consequently,	 the	 SGC	 will	 continue	 to	 be	influenced	by	 the	 (geo)political	 and	economic	motivations/interests	of	 the	 transit	 states	concerned,	which	will	render	the	EU	supply	of	natural	gas	via	this	corridor	uncompetitive	and	 politicised	 –	 i.e.	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 free-market	 dynamics	 as	 envisaged	 by	 the	 EU’s	notion	of	energy	security.	
Research	findings	in	Turkish,	Georgian	and	Azerbaijani	segments	of	the	SGC	The	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 in	 the	 Turkish	 natural	 gas	 sector	revealed	that,	although	 Turkey	 is	 an	 EU	 candidate,	 transposition	 and	 application	 of	 the	EU's	energy	acquis	in	the	country	has	not	been	easy	and	successful	ever	since	the	start	of	the	accession	negotiations.	As	was	investigated	in	Chapter	IV,	several	factors	have	played	inhibitive	role	in	the	way	of	Europeanisation	of	Turkey's	energy	sector.	Despite	Turkey's	a	quarter	of	a	 century	old	membership	application,	 the	achievement	of	 the	 final	 reward	 is	still	 uncertain	 if	 not	 impossible.	Nevertheless,	 this	 uncertainty	 in	 eventual	 membership	can	only	partially	explain	the	overall	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis,	as	the	application	of	the	EU	energy	acquis	to	Turkey	is	not	non-existent,	but	is	rather	selective.		That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 Turkish	 government	 is	 keen	 on	 capitalising	 on	 the	 EU	 experience	 in	certain	sectors	of	energy	system	(renewables,	electricity	sector	and	in	relation	to	energy	efficiency),	 but	 reluctant	 in	 others	 (natural	 gas).	 To	 this	 end,	 I	 have	 argued	 that,	 such	 a	selective	implementation	of	the	EU	acquis	can	be	explained	by	the	net	domestic	costs	that	Turkey	would	 incur	 in	adopting	 the	EU	natural	gas	 legislation	without	ensuring	credible	and	foreseeable	membership	prospects.		In	this	regard,	we	can	observe	that	there	are	two	opposite	trends	taking	place	in	Turkey's	energy	policy	in	relation	to	renewables	and	electricity	sector	on	the	one	hand	and	natural	gas	sector	on	the	other.	With	regard	to	 the	 former,	 the	Turkish	government	seems	to	be	keen	 on	 tapping	 into	 the	 domestic	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 and	 liberalising	 domestic	electricity	market.	 In	doing	so,	 it	 is	willing	 to	capitalise	on	 the	EU	practice	and	ensuring	market	convergence	and	integration	with	the	neighbouring	countries,	including	the	EU.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 national	 gas	market,	 the	 Turkish	 government	seems	to	be	paying	only	lip	service	to	harmonising	its	domestic	policies	with	that	of	the	EU	and	ensuring	freedom	of	gas	transit	across	its	territory.	In	reality	the	government	is	keen	on	 holding	 onto	 its	 formal	 capacity	 to	 exert	 control	 over	 the	 transit	 of	 gas	 across	 its	sovereign	 territory	 and	 hereby,	 influencing	 regional	 (and	 continental)	 energy	 trade	 and	(geo)	politics.		
 232 
In	 this	 vein,	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	 is	 exogenous	 to	 the	 process	 of	institutional	 reforms	 that	 it	 has	 enacted	 or	 refrained	 from	 enacting,	 in	 other	 words,	 to	institutional	outcome.	The	institutions	that	it	is	confronted	with	(EU	energy	acquis)	do	not	serve	as	a	basis/template	of	good	or	bad	behaviour.	They	rather	present	options	for	policy	choice,	 the	 selection	 or	 non-selection	 of	 which	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 costs	 incurred	 or	benefits	 accrued.	What	 constitutes	 a	 cost	 or	benefit	 is	determined	by	 the	 preferences	of	the	 (Turkish)	 government,	 which	 are	 or	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 acceptance	 or	 non-acceptance	of	the	EU	acquis	(formal	institutions);	however,	are	not	conditioned	(affected)	by	 them	 as	 the	 scripts	 of	 appropriate	 behaviour.	 In	 other	 words,	 preferences	 are	determined	outside	the	process	of	decision-making	on	whether	to	adopt	or	reject	the	EU	rules.		In	 practice,	 these	 preferences	 are	 related	 to	 Turkey's	 desired	 role	 in	 energy	 relations.	Turkey	is	a	growing	consumer,	as	well	as	a	key	transit	country	on	the	way	towards	the	EU	markets.	Therefore,	the	power	to	affect	energy	transit/trade	across	its	territory	feeds	into	the	political	and	economic	muscles	of	the	Turkish	government	and	plays	a	central	role	in	Turkey's	 economic	 and	 (geo)political	 strategy.	 Thus,	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 RCI,	 the	interaction	of	Turkey	with	the	EU-sourced	formal	 institutions	(in	our	case,	their	adoption	or	rejection)	is	juxtaposed	against	its	above-mentioned	preferences	in	a	strategic	setting,	the	 outcome	 of	 which	 is	 determined	 by	 a	 rational	 action	 -	 measuring	 expected	 costs	against	benefits.		As	 the	 empirical	 Chapter	 IV	 argued,	 structurally,	 it	 appears	 that	 institutionalisation	 of	Turkish	 natural	 gas	 sector	 under	 the	 EU	 template,	 without	 tangible	 progress	 in	 EU	accession	 negotiations,	 would	 confer	 upon	 Turkey	 considerable	 net	 domestic	 costs.	Therefore,	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	the	EIM,	the	Turkish	government's	choice	to	not	to	apply	EU	legislation	domestically	is	only	rational,	for	it	will	allow	Turkey	to	hold	on	to	its	national	control	of	energy	transit	across	its	territory	and	keep	on	taking	advantage	of	its	material	benefits.	From	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 central	 thesis	 of	 this	 PhD,	 this	 outcome	 will	 likely	 to	 carry	transit	 implication	 on	 the	 EU	 supply	 of	 natural	 gas	 via	 the	 SGC	 across	 Turkey.	 This	 is	rather	 because,	 market	 based	 energy	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC	 could	 only	 be	 achieved	 if	 the	regulatory	 regime	along	 the	 corridor	were	ensured	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 the	ownership	of	gas	 volumes	 transported	 via	 the	major	 infrastructure(s)	were	 irrelevant	 for	 the	 owners	and	the	operators	of	this	very	infrastructure(s).	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	the	separation	of	the	gas	 supply	 and	transportation	 activities	 of	 BOTAS	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 regulated	TPA	regime	within	Turkey,	would	have	allowed	third	countries	to	engage	in	direct	energy	
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relations	with	 the	 EU	without	 being	 hindered	 by	 the	 Turkish	 government's	 or	 BOTAS’s	commercial	 and	political	 interests.	Hence,	 as	BOTAS	 (or	 any	 other	 company	owning	 the	transmission	 lines)	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 discriminate	 among	 domestically	 destined	 or	transiting	gas	in	terms	accessing	Turkish	transmission	(or	transit)	lines,	energy	export	to	the	EU	or	any	other	consumer	markets	via	Turkey	would	then	be	determined	solely	based	on	market	fundamentals.	As	I	have	investigated	in	Chapter	IV,	this	has	not	been	the	case	in	the	Turkish	section	of	the	SGC.	Despite	 the	 progress	 achieved	with	 regards	 to	 TANAP,	 the	 necessity	 of	 establishing	EU-sourced	 regulatory	 regime	 in	 Turkey	 remains	 all	 the	 more	 relevant.	 The	 maximum	transportation	capacity	of	TANAP	is	only	31	bcm/a,	16	bcm/a	of	which	has	already	been	contracted	 for	 25	 years	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 SH	 II	 volumes	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 Turkish	markets.	The	remaining	available	capacity	of	TANAP	can	easily	be	 filled	with	volumes	to	be	 produced	 from	 other	 fields	 in	 Azerbaijan,	 such	 as	 Umid,	 Absheron,	 Babek,	 etc.	 As	TANAP	 does	 not	 envision	 regulated	 (mandatory)	 TPA	 regime,	 it	 will	 not	 guarantee	transportation	 capacity	 for,	 for	 example,	 Iranian,	 Iraqi	 or	 Turkmen	 gas	 when/if	 they	become	available.	This	will	 likely	require	 the	usage	of	 the	Turkish	national	 transmission	system	for	 the	 transportation	of	 these	Middle	East	and	Central	Asian	gas	volumes	to	 the	EU.	 This,	 consequenly,	 will	 still	 necessitate	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 favourable	 to	 transit	regulatory	 regime	 in	Turkey,	whether	 through	Europeanisation	 of	 the	Turkish	 domestic	legislation	or	based	on	intergovernmental	agreement	that	provides	equal	pipeline	access	opportunities	for	all	the	relevant	third-party	gas.	Therefore,	without	the	establishment	of	the	market-based	transit	regime	in	Turkey,	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	risks	being	limited	to	current	export	capacity	(10	i.e.	bcm/a),	which	will	provide	only	limited	contribution	to	the	improving	the	resilience	of	the	EU	energy	security.		Consequently,	 this	means	 that	under	current	circumstances,	 supply	of	natural	gas	 to	 the	EU	 via	 the	 Turkish	 segment	 of	 the	 SGC	 will	 not	 conform	 to	 the	 former's	 conception	 of	energy	 security,	which	 includes	both	 the	diversity,	 as	well	 as	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	supplied	 energy.	 Since	 competitiveness	 criterion	 requires	 the	 elimination	 of	 non-market	interference	 to	 energy	 supply/transit,	 in	 the	 case	of	Turkey,	 it	 can	be	 concluded	 to	be	 a	failed	effort.	Chapters	V	and	VI	analysed	the	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	markets	of	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	within	 the	 framework	of	 the	Eastern	Partnership.	The	 latter	has	declared	the	export	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 to	 the	 partner	 countries	 as	 one	 of	 the	 core	 aims	 and	therefore,	is	pursued	in	tight	synergy	with	its	Southern	Gas	Corridor	strategy.	In	doing	so,	the	bilateral	 track	of	 the	EaP	uses	a	more-for-more	principle	as	an	external	 incentive	 to	
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foster	approximation	of	the	partner	counties’,	in	our	case	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan's	energy	legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis.	 If	 successful,	 this	 would	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 eliminate	transit	risks	to	energy	supply	via	this	energy	by	absorbing	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	into	the	regulatory	sphere	of	the	EU	single	market.		Nonetheless,	 the	 empirical	 Chapter	 V	 revealed	 that,	 despite	 Georgia's	 EU	 membership	aspirations	 and	 its	 contractual	 (legal)	 commitment	 to	 approximate	 domestic	 energy	legislation	 with	 the	 EU	 acquis	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU-Georgia	 Association	 Agreement,	 rule	adoption	in	the	country	is	currently	hindered	by	the	expectations	of	certain	net	domestic	
costs.	Georgian	government	is	concerned	about	the	impact	of	the	EU	acquis	on	the	transit	benefits	 and	 cheap	domestic	 gas	 that	 the	 government	 currently	 enjoys	without	bringing	about	comparable	benefits	in	natural	gas	sector	in	specific	or	in	the	attainment	of	the	EU	candidate	 status	 in	 general.	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 minimise	 the	 economic	 and	 energy	security	costs	of	rule	adoption,	the	government	intends	to	tailor	the	depth	and	timeline	of	the	implementation	process	to	the	necessity	of	receiving	these	benefits	for	a	considerable	period	of	time.	Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 explanatory	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 goes,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 net	adoption	 costs	 in	 rule	 adoption	must	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 promised	 reward,	since	the	role	of	the	reward	is	not	symbolic	but	material.	The	promised	reward	in	return	for	 rule	 adoption	 carries	 out	 the	 function	 of	 augmenting	 the	 benefits	 against	 the	 costs.	That	is	to	say,	although	the	costs	are	assumed	to	be	pre-given,	as	they	are	underpinned	by	the	exogenous	preference	formation	of	Georgia	(to	be	able	to	benefit	from	energy	transit	and	purchase	benefits),	 their	weight	could	be	rendered	smaller	vis-à-vis	 the	prospective	benefits.	In	practical	terms,	this	would	require	the	EU	to	offer	Georgia	a	bigger	reward	in	order	to	tip	the	scale	of	the	cost-and-benefit	nexus	in	favour	of	the	latter.	Hence,	in	support	of	 the	explanatory	argument	of	 this	 thesis,	net	adoption	costs	play	a	decisive	role	 in	rule	adoption	in	the	context	of	 lack	of	membership	prospects.	Since	the	EaP	does	not	envisage	membership	 prospects	 or	 any	 comparable	 energy-specific	 benefits	 for	 Georgia,	 its	contractual	outcome	-	AAs,	have	 few	chances	 to	succeed	 in	 fostering	 the	adoption	of	 the	EU	energy	market	rules	along	the	Georgian	segment	of	the	SGC.	Against	the	backdrop	of	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Georgia's	natural	gas	sector,	the	transportation/transit	of	Caspian	Basin	natural	gas	through	this	country	will	continue	to	be	subject	to	political	and	economic	bargaining	between	the	Georgian	government	and	the	relevant	public	and	private	actors	involved	in	the	SGC.	This,	in	turn,	renders	the	supply	of	energy	across	Georgia	uncompetitive.	Under	competitive	market	 conditions	 the	 transit	of	Caspian	energy	to	the	EU	market	must	not	be	affected	by	the	non-market	interventions	by	
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the	Georgian	government	aimed	at	securing	cheap	prices	for	the	domestic	consumers.	Nor	it	must	be	linked	to	the	attainment	of	additional	fees	in	return	for	providing	the	freedom	of	 transit	 across	 its	 territory,	 as	 envisaged	 by	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 market	rules.	Nonetheless,	the	detrimental	impact	of	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	Georgia	on	the	 competitiveness	 of	 gas	 supply	 via	 the	 SGC	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 be	 less	 stark	 than	 in	Turkey.	This	is	supported	by	two	factors.		Firstly,	 unlike	 Turkey,	 successive	 Georgian	 governments	 have	 been	 pursuing	 less	aggressive	 energy	 diplomacy	 vis-à-vis	 its	 neighbours.	 In	 this	 context,	 Georgia	has	 never	aspired	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 middleman	 in	 the	 transportation	 of	 Caspian	 hydrocarbon	resources	to	the	Western/world	markets	-	buying	Caspian	gas	in	cheap	and	re-selling	it	to	the	Western	consumers	more	expensively.	They	have	only	 satisfied	with	 transit	benefits	and	 cheap	gas	volumes	 that	 they	have	been	 receiving	 from	 the	neighbouring	producers.	Furthermore,	Georgia	does	not	control	the	transit	pipelines	traversing	its	territory.	Hence,	its	day-to-day	political	and	economic	interference	to	the	gas	transit	across	 its	territory	is	minimal.	Secondly,	 even	 though	Georgia	 is	 still	 an	 important	 component	 of	 the	 SGC,	 from	 the	 EU	perspective,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 acquis	 in	 Georgia	 would	 only	 make	considerable	 difference	 if	 Turkey	 were	 also	 to	 apply	 the	 energy	 acquis.	 Otherwise,	 the	Europeanisation	of	Georgia	alone	would	make	the	country	an	island	surrounded	by	non-EU	regulatory	regimes,	as	 there	are	no	direct	 linkages	between	the	Georgian	and	the	EU	market(s).682	 Thus,	 energy	 Europeanisation	 of	 Georgia	 is	 less	 relevant	 if	 Turkey	 (and	Azerbaijan)	is	not	Europeanised	at	the	same	time.		This	is	true	not	only	from	the	competitiveness	point	of	view,	but	also	from	the	perspective	of	diversity	of	supply	via	 the	Georgian	section	of	 the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	The	country	plays	a	transit	role	for	gas	supplies	originating	only	from	Azerbaijan	or	through	it.	In	this	regard,	if	non-Azeri	gas	volumes	(e.g.	from	Central	Asian	countries	such	as	Turkmenistan	or	 Uzbekistan)	were	 to	 be	 shipped	 to	 the	 European	markets	 via	 the	 SGC	 using	 a	 trans-Caspian	link,	then	they	would	have	to	negotiate	their	pipeline	access	rights	in	Azerbaijan	first.	Therefore,	the	success	of	Europeanisation	of	Georgia	would	make	sizeable	difference	for	the	competitive	and	diverse	supply	of	energy	via	the	SGC	only	 if	similar	rule	adoption	processes	also	take	place	in	Azerbaijan,	too.	
                                                            682	This	point	was	highlighted	during	one	of	my	elite	interviews	with	a	key	DG	Energy/EC	official,	03/05/2013,	Brussels.	 Furthermore,	 in	 his	 speech	 during	 a	 High	 Level	 Reflection	 Group	 conference	 at	 the	 European	Parliament	 on	 20/03/2014,	 the	 former	 EU	 Energy	 Commissioner,	 Günther	 Oettinger	 also	 underlined	 this	curious	 fact	 that	 "Georgia	will	 become	 the	 first	 Contracting	Party	without	being	physically	 interconnected	 -	neither	 for	electricity,	nor	 for	gas	 -	with	any	of	Energy	Community	Parties."	 -	Oettinger,	 ‘Speech:	An	Energy	Community	for	the	Future’.	
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Similarly,	as	the	empirical	Chapter	VI	argued,	Europeanisation	of	the	natural	gas	sector	of	Azerbaijan	has	failed,	both	within	the	framework	of	the	EaP	and	many	other	preceding	EU	external	 governance	 instruments.	 The	 chapter	 argued	 that	 the	 expectations	 of	 huge	 net	domestic	costs	to	be	incurred	by	the	adoption	of	the	EU	rules	constitute	the	pivotal	factor	explaining	the	failure	of	this	attempted	Europeanisation.	EU	gas	market	rules	is	expected	to	decrease	 the	energy	revenues	of	Azerbaijani	government	by	opening	up	 the	domestic	gas	market	to	competition.	Secondly,	 it	would	also	incur	opportunity	costs	by	facilitating	the	 freedom	 of	 access	 of	 other	 regional	 suppliers	 to	 the	 European	 markets	 through	Azerbaijan.	 The	 latter	would	 likely	 compete	 against	 Azeri	 gas	 in	 the	 consumer	markets	(including	 the	 EU	market)	 in	 a	 way	 that	 might	 not	 be	 favourable	 to	 country’s	 national	interests.	 Energy	 sector	 has	 become	 the	 main	 powerhouse	 of	 the	 Azeri	 economy	 and	propelled	the	GDP	growth	in	the	past	decade.	Implementation	of	the	EU	rules	is,	thus,	seen	as	a	risk	to	this	progress.	In	addition,	Azerbaijani	state	energy	champion	SOCAR	exercises	powerful	(both	formal	and	informal)	veto	powers	against	the	adoption	of	the	EU	rules	in	the	country,	not	least	due	to	its	corporate	interests.	Under	 the	rationalist	explanatory	model,	 these	net	domestic	costs	weigh	heavier	against	the	expected	benefits,	hence,	 rendering	 the	rejection	of	 the	EU	rules	as	 the	most	optimal	policy	 option	 available	 for	 Azerbaijani	 government.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 with	Turkey	and	Georgia,	the	context	of	the	cost	&	benefit	analysis	process	is	also	important	for	explaining	the	inability	of	the	EU	to	foster	the	adoption	of	 its	rules	by	Azerbaijan.	 In	this	regard,	 the	 size	of	 the	 reward	and	 the	 credibility	of	 the	EU	 conditionality	 are	 important	contextual	 factors.	 As	 such,	 unlike	 Georgia	 Azerbaijan	 has	 never	 expressed	 EU	membership	 aspirations,	 hence,	 this	potential	 reward	 is	not	part	 of	 the	 latter's	 strategic	preferences.	 Therefore,	 the	 prospects	 and	 the	 speed	 of	 its	 attainment	 does	 not	 provide	critical	benefits,	which	could	incentivise	the	Azerbaijani	government	into	adopting	the	EU	rules	vis-à-vis	the	expected	net	adoption	costs.	Furthermore,	the	more-for-more	principle	of	 the	 EaP	 neither	 offers	 sizeable	material	 reward	 in	 energy	 sphere,	 either,	 which	 is	 of	great	importance	for	Azerbaijan.	In	the	absence	of	the	membership	aspirations	and	energy	specific	sizeable	rewards,	consequently,	 the	credibility	of	 the	conditional	reward/threats	become	 irrelevant	 under	 the	 current	 bilateral	 cooperation/partnership	 mechanisms,	including	the	Eastern	Partnership.		In	 the	 case	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 the	 credibility	 of	 conditionality	 even	 becomes	 a	counterproductive	 factor	 due	 to	 the	 country's	 role	 as	 the	 enabler	 of	 the	 Southern	 Gas	Corridor,	both	as	a	supply	source,	as	well	as	 the	major	 investor	on	the	SGC	pipelines.	As	such,	even	if	the	EU	had	in	its	disposal	contractual	mechanism	to	punish	Azerbaijan	for	the	
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failure	of	rule	adoption,	 it	 is	unlikely	that	 it	would	be	 in	a	position	to	exercise	 it	without	incurring	 substantial	 costs	 to	 itself	 (with	 regard	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	 its	 energy	 supplies).	Therefore,	 under	 current	 circumstances,	 conceptually	 Azerbaijan	 plays	 a	 role	 not	 of	 an	
accepter,	but	of	a	donor,	hence,	commands	a	better	position	in	picking	and	choosing	the	EU	rules	it	is	interested	to	apply	domestically	and	which	not.		Consequently,	 the	 Azerbaijani	 section	 of	 the	 SGC	 will	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 regulatory	regime	 that	 will	 not	 be	 in	 line	 the	 EU	 interests.	 Azerbaijani	 SOCAR	 and	 the	 upstream	companies	 operating	 the	 SCPx	 (first	 leg	 of	 the	 SGC)	 have	 vested	 interests	 in	 wielding	producer	control	over	 the	 transit	 lines.	This	will	allow	them	to	 tailor	 the	access	of	 third-party	gas	producers	in	Central	Asia	to	the	relevant	transmission/transit	lines	to	their	own	commercial	and	political	preferences.	
Policy	implications	The	Southern	Gas	Corridor	will	 initially	 supply	10	bcm/a	of	Azeri	gas	 to	 the	EU	starting	from	 2020.	 These	 volumes	 will	 help	 relevant	 EU	 member	 states	 to	 reduce	 their	 pre-existing	energy	vulnerability	stemming	from	over-dependence	on	a	concentrated	external	supply	 source.	 Prospectively,	 these	 alternative	 natural	 gas	 volumes	 could	 be	 tripled	 or	even	quadrupled	by	extending	the	corridor	to	include	Iran,	Iraq	and	Turkmenistan.	These	countries	have	vast	reserve	potential	and	linking	them	up	with	the	SGC	would	be	of	huge	contribution	to	the	diversity	of	the	EU	energy	supplies.	Nonetheless,	this	PhD	argued	that,	although	the	necessary	agreements	for	developing	the	SGC	 are	 in	 place,	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 unsuccessful	 in	 resolving	 natural-gas-specific	 transit	risks	across	Turkey,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.	Due	to	the	failure	of	Europeanisation	of	these	main	transit	countries,	the	transit	risks	(will)	affect	not	only	the	delivery	of	Azeri	gas	on	a	free-market	 basis,	 but	 also	 those	 from	 Iraq,	 Iran	 and	Turkmenistan.	One	possible	 policy	implication	 of	 this	 development	 is	 that,	 the	 SGC	 as	 an	 alternative	 energy	 corridor	 risks	being	 limited	 to	 its	 current	 supply	 capacity	 or	 at	 least	 to	 supply	 volumes	 only	 from	Azerbaijan.	This	 is	 rather	because	none	of	 the	SGC	countries	are	 interested	 in	providing	freedom	 of	 transit	 across	 their	 respective	 territories	 without	 getting	 certain	 economic	(and	 geopolitical)	 benefits	 in	 return.	 This,	 accordingly,	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 making	 Iraqi,	Iranian	 and	 Turkmen	 gas	 deliveries	 to	 the	 EU	 economically	 unfeasible;	 any	 non-market	costs	 of	 energy	 supply	 and	 transportation	 will	 have	 to	 be	 covered	 at	 the	 expense	 of	supplier	 profits,	 or	 passed	 on	 to	 the	 final	 consumers,	 while	 making	 it	 commercially	uncompetitive.		
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Additionally,	 due	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 Europeanisation	 and	 hence,	 depoliticisation	 of	 the	transit	 and	 supply	 regime	 along	 the	 SGC,	 the	 corridor	 could	 also	 bring	 about	 certain	(geo)political	risks	to	the	EU	energy	security.	As	I	argued	in	the	empirical	chapters	above,	the	political	establishments	of	the	relevant	SGC	transit	countries	have	vested	interests	in	linking	the	freedom	of	transit	and	supply	across/from	their	territories	to	the	attainment	of	certain	 political	 dividends.	 Thus,	 the	 negative	 implications	 of	 the	 failed	Europeanisation	transcend	 the	 immediate	 boundaries	 of	 commercial	 energy	 supply	 and	 run	 the	 risk	 of	ushering	 in	geopolitical	problems;	 ironically,	similar	 to	 those	problems	that	 the	SGC	was	originally	conceived	to	resolve.	
Further	academic	research	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	this	PhD	concentrated	only	on	the	energy	specific	aspects	of	the	EU	external	governance	vis-à-vis	 the	SGC	countries.	Hence,	other	aspects	of	 the	external	Europeanisation	 efforts	 -	 those	 targeting	 the	 general	 governance	 reforms	 in	 certain	 SGC	countries	 have	 remained	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research.	 These	 reforms,	 especially	those	aimed	at	the	establishment/improvement	of	rule	of	law,	democratic	governance	and	protection	of	human	rights	have	also	consequences	on	the	EU	energy	supply	through	and	from	the	SGC	countries.	The	latter	do	not	have	the	best	track	records	in	this	area.		On	 the	one	hand,	 this	raises	a	number	of	questions	as	regards	 the	prospects	of	practical	implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 legislation	 in	 the	 SGC	 countries	 (if	 they	 were	 to	 be	adopted)	 without	 reforming	 and	 strengthening	 of	 their	 governance	 institutions,	 both	legislative	 and	 executive,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 judicial.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 also	 raises	concerns	with	regard	to	the	compatibility	of	partnership	and	cooperation	with	autocratic	energy	 supply/transit	 countries	 along	 the	 SGC	with	 the	EU’s	 broader	normative	agenda;	indeed,	the	relationship	between	the	rational	energy	interests	and	normative	governance	values.	In	this	regard,	although	this	PhD	did	not	engage	these	important	questions	due	to	the	specific	focus	of	research,	as	well	as	the	time	and	space	constraints,	the	investigations	of	these	aspects	of	the	EU	external	governance	vis-à-vis	the	SGC	countries	merits	further	academic	attention.	Last	but	not	least,	this	thesis	concentrated	only	on	the	transit	risks	specific	to	natural	gas	transportation	 via	 the	 long-haul	 pipelines.	 Other	 risks,	 such	 as	 (military)	 security,	technical	or	even	market	risks	stemming	from	the	supply	and	demand	misbalance	in	the	consumer	markets	remained	outside	the	scope	of	this	research.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that,	 the	 investigations	of	 these	aspects	of	 the	EU	energy	 supply	via	 the	SGC	also	merits	new	academic	research,	especially	in	light	of	the	geopolitical	cataclysms	taking	place	in	the	
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Middle	 East	 and	 the	 Caspian	 Basin	 in	 the	wake	 of	 civil	 wars	 and	 intensified	 aggressive	geopolitical	plays	by	the	regional	states.		
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APPENDIX	I:	RESEARCH	METHODS	
As	noted	in	Chapter	I,	I	relied	on	the	"three	fundamental	actions	underlying	the	techniques	
of	 qualitative	 research",	 namely,	 "observing,	 asking	 and	 reading"683	 for	 investigating	 the	subject	matter	of	this	thesis,	which	I	will	explain	in	further	detail	below.	In	using	any	of	the	following	 research	 techniques,	my	main	motivation	was	always	 to	 infer,684	 guided	by	 the	theory,	beyond	the	immediate	empirical	data	and	try	to	relate	the	thick	description	about	the	problem	to	the	broader	theoretical	and	policy	issues.		
Document	analysis	The	 analysis	 of	 the	 institutional	 documents,	which	were	produced	by	 the	 legislative	 and	executive	bodies,	non-governmental	organisations,	 international	agencies	and	companies	and	other	institutions,	was	at	the	heart	of	this	research	endeavour.	In	general,	among	the	primary	 sources,	 I	 used	 the	 following,	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 publicly	 available	documents685:	• European	Commission	communications	and	reports,	• European	Council	and	the	Council	conclusions,	• Primary	and	secondary	EU	legislation,	• European	Parliament	resolutions	and	reports,	• Documents	produced	by	the	Eastern	Partnership	institutions,	• International	agreements,	• Statistical	material	produced	by	the	relevant	energy	companies	and	international	institutions,	such	as	BP	Statistical	Review,	World	Energy	Review	and	Natural	Gas	Statistic	by	the	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA),	etc.,	• Online	newspaper	articles,	• Domestic	legislation	of	the	non-EU	SGC	countries,	• Energy	policy	reports	and	strategy	documents	produced	by	the	governments	of	the	SGC	countries,		• Official	speeches,	Etc.	
                                                            683	Corbetta,	‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	p.	307.	684	 On	 the	 role	 of	 "inference"	 in	 social	 research,	 see	 e.g.	 Gary	 King,	 Robert	 O	 Keohane	 and	 Sidney	 Verba,	
Designing	 Social	 Inquiry:	 Scientific	 Inference	 in	 Qualitative	 Research	 (Princeton,	 NJ:	 Princeton	 Univ.	 Press,	1994).	685	In	addition,	secondary	sources,	such	as	journal	articles	and	books	were	also	utilised,	both	for	the	purpose	of	acquiring	data,	as	well	as	referring	to	pre-existing	analytical	positions	on	the	subject	matter	investigated.	
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In	 general,	 these	 primary	 sources	 provided	 me	 with	 open	 access	 to	 huge	 amount	 of	information,	which	has	not	yet	been	utilised	in	order	to	 investigate	the	subject	matter	of	the	 current	 research.	As	 such,	 the	 institutional	 documents,	as	 the	primary	 research	data,	allowed	me	to	construct	the	thick	description	and	analysis	of	the	institutional	reality	I	aim	to	 analyse	 guided	 by	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 this	 thesis.	 In	 doing	 so,	 in	 line	 with	
qualitative	 research	 in	 general,	may	aim	was	 to	 explain	why	and	how	 the	known	causes	(domestic	 costs)	have	 led	 to	known	effects686	 (failure	of	 rule	adoption),	although	both	of	which	I	had	to	describe	first,	as	the	empirical	terrain	was	very	new	to	academic	research.		In	general,	the	use	of	institutional	documents	had	its	own	benefits,	as	well	as	drawbacks.	In	terms	 of	 benefits,	 since	 these	 documents	 have	 been	 produced	 independently	 of	 the	actions/involvement	 of	 the	 researcher,	 they	 are	 both,	 'non-reactive'	 -	 "not	 subject	 to	
possible	distortion	due	to	the	interaction	between	the	researcher	and	the	subject	studied"687	and	 relatively	 sincere	 in	 providing	 information	 compared	 to,	 e.g.	 elite	 interviews.	 With	regard	to	first,	as	a	researcher	I	was	not	involved	in	the	production	of	data,	i.e.	preparation	of	 the	 institutional	 documents	 in	 question.	 Hence,	 they	 are	 not	 distorted	 by	 the	 act	 of	recording	by	 the	 researcher.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 additionally,	 the	authors	of	 these	documents	had	created	them	with	their	general	interests	(in	our	case,	energy	and	political	interests)	 in	mind	 and	were	 not	 solely	 targeting	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	 subject	matter	 I	 am	investigating	in	this	thesis.	Hence,	they	had	little	or	no	reason	to	"make	a	good	impression"	or	 follow	 the	 socially	 acceptable	 behaviour/politeness	 in	 positioning	 their	 viewpoints.688	For	example,	since	this	PhD	is	investigating	the	non-/compliance	of	the	SGC	countries	with	the	 EU	 energy	 acquis,	 the	 institutional	 documents	 provide	 a	more	 sincere	 and	 objective	source	of	data	 for	 that	purpose.	As	such,	e.g.	an	elite	 interviewee	 from	Turkey	can	claim	that	the	country	has	harmonised	its	domestic	legislation	with	that	of	the	EU	Third	Energy	Package,	or	an	 interviewee	from	the	EU	institutions	may	claim	the	opposite.	 In	doing	so,	they	express	their	personal	take	and	propagate	their	agenda	on	the	subject,	which	might	be	 (and	was	 validated	during	my	 investigations)	 affected	 by	 the	 political	 bias	 or	 official	policy	 line.	On	 this	 issue,	 especially,	 the	Turkish	officials	were	not	necessarily	honest	or	objective.		On	the	contrary,	the	institutional	documents	produced	by	the	Turkish	legislative	body	and	the	 government,	 for	 example,	 Turkish	 Natural	 Gas	 Market	 Law,	 provides	 objective	 and	"honest"	data	and	cannot	lie	about	the	compliance	or	non-compliance	with	the	EU	acquis.	
                                                            686	See	e.g.	Ariadne	Vromen,	‘Debating	Methods:	Rediscovering	Qualitative	Approaches’,	in	Theory	and	Methods	
in	Political	Science,	ed.	by	David	Marsh	and	Gerry	Stoker,	3rd	edition	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2010),	pp.	249–66	(p.	255).	687	Corbetta,	‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	pp.	287–288.	688	Corbetta,	‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	pp.	287–88.	
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Additionally,	since	those	documents	and	data	contain	therein	were	produced	outside	the	scope	of	 this	research	and	by	the	actors	other	than	the	researcher	(i.e.	me),	 they	are	not	
distorted	by	the	latter's	personal	input	into	the	production	process.	In	other	words,	the	use	of	 institutional	 documents	 brings	 authenticity	 and	 credibility	 to	 the	 data	 they	 provide.689	Hence,	the	use	of	institutional	documents	are	more	in	line	with	the	positivist	epistemology	and	ontology	of	this	PhD,	than	some	other	qualitative	research	techniques.	Nonetheless,	the	use	of	institutional	documents	had	also	a	number	of	drawbacks.	Firstly,	as	I	 indicated	 above,	 these	 documents	 were	 not	 particularly	 produced	 with	 the	 subject	matter	of	 this	PhD	 in	mind.	Hence,	 they	 lacked	some	 important	 information	 -	 they	were	
incomplete.	As	such,	being	an	already	existing	source	of	information,	I	had	no	possibility	to	"ask	further	questions"	to	fill	in	the	gaps	in	data	collection.690	Secondly,	 institutional	documents	would	not	always	provide	 the	"objective	representation	
of	the	institutional	reality	to	which	they	refer,	but	instead	provide	an	‘official’	representation	
of	it".691	For	example,	an	SGC	country's	compliance	with	the	EU	acquis	can	be	investigated	at	 two	 levels:	 firstly,	by	 the	availability	of	 legislative	 framework	 in	 the	country,	which	 is	ensured	by	the	adoption	of	the	necessary	legislative	documents.	As	such,	the	existence	of	certain	legal	prescriptions	should	not	be	automatically	equated	to	their	implementation	in	practice.	 For	example,	 this	 research	 revealed	 that	 although	Turkey	has	adopted	 some	of	the	legal	provisions	in	line	with	the	EU	acquis	(e.g.	unbundling	of	natural	gas	supply	from	transmission),	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 implement	 them	 in	 practice.	 This	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	practice	 known	 in	 Europeanisation	 literature	 as	 "Potemkin	 harmonisation",	 referring	 to	the	 difference	 between	 official/formal	 compliance	 and	 practical	 compliance.	 Hence,	 in	order	 to	 avoid	 this	 official	 bias	 given	 rise	 by	 the	 use	 of	 institutional	 documents,	 it	 is	important	 to	 triangulate	 the	 official	 data	 with	 other	 sources	 of	 information	 depicting	practical	institutional	reality.		In	 another	 example,	 the	 role	 and	 the	 real	 power	 of	 the	 domestic	 veto	 players	 in	 rule	adoption	cannot	necessarily	be	realistically	expressed	by	the	 institutional	documents.	For	example,	 in	 Azerbaijan	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 is	 officially/formally	 responsible	 for	 the	determination	of	 state	policy	on	energy,	both	 in	 relation	 to	domestic	 supply	and	 foreign	energy	 policy.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 real	 -	 practical	 distribution	 of	 powers	 is	 fairly	 different;	State	Oil	Company	of	Azerbaijan	(SOCAR)	holds	 the	"real"	powers	 in	 the	development	of	the	SGC	than	the	Ministry	in	question.	
                                                            689	See	e.g.	Tim	May,	Social	Research:	Issues,	Methods	and	Process,	4.	ed	(Maidenhead:	McGraw	Hill,	Open	Univ.	Press,	2011),	pp.	175–200;	Vromen,	‘Debating	Methods:	Rediscovering	Qualitative	Approaches’,	pp.	262–63.	690	Corbetta,	‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	pp.	287–88.	691	Corbetta,	‘The	Use	of	Documents’,	p.	306.	
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Hence,	 as	 such	 although	 the	 use	 of	 institutional	 documents	 provide	 absolutely	 crucial	source	of	data	for	analysis,	 it	 is	by	no	means	sufficient	and	need	to	be	complemented	by	other	research	techniques,	that	can	capture	both	"official"	and	"practical"	reality.	
Observation	In	this	context,	the	passive	participant	observation	provided	an	important	method	for	me	to	enrich	my	personal	knowledge	and	sharpen	my	sense	of	the	subject	matter,	but	not	for	the	 purpose	 of	 interpretation692	 of	 the	 social	 behaviour	 of	 a	 particular	 group,	 as	 this	method	 is	 usually	 associated	 with.	 Passive	 personal	 observation	 of	 the	 main	 policy	developments	 was	 key	 for	 practically	 understanding	 the	 formalised	 avenues	 of	 rule	transfer	 from	 the	EU	 to	 the	 SGC	 countries	 and	 their	 general	 effectiveness,	which	 cannot	necessarily	be	captured	in	the	institutional	documents	(such	as	meeting	minutes,	reports,	etc.).	 In	 specific	 terms,	 these	 formalised	 avenues	 of	 rule	 transfer	 were	 divided	 into	bilateral	and	multilateral	fora.	While	the	later	were	publicly	accessible,	the	former	largely	remained	outside	the	public	domain.	Each	of	these	formalised	avenues	had	their	benefits	and	drawbacks.		To	start	with,	at	the	multilateral	level	the	energy	committee	of	the	Euronest	parliamentary	assembly	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	provided	an	accessible	avenue	for	the	observation	of	the	 discussions	 by	 the	members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 EaP	 countries.	 As	such,	the	Euronest	PA	was	conceived	to	provide	parliamentary	(legislative)	oversight	over	the	 political	 and	 economic	 integration	 of	 the	 EaP	 countries	 to	 the	 EU;	 hence,	 serve	 as	 a	complementary	(to	executive	branch)	channel	 for	the	promulgation	of	national	 interests.	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 this	 research,	 this	 allowed	 me	 to	 have	 a	 comprehensive	understanding	 of	 the	 national	 energy	 interests	 of	 the	 SGC	 countries	 concerned	 (namely	Georgia	 and	 Azerbaijan)	 without	 being	 constrained	 to	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 executive	branch	alone.	Secondly,	by	observing	 the	discussions/negotiations	 in	real	 time,	 I	was	able	 to	sense	 the	difference	 between	 the	 "formal"	 and	 "practical"	 reality	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 propagation	 of	national	 interests,	 as	well	 as	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 real	 powers	 affecting	 the	policy	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 the	 investigations	 revealed	 that	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	memorandum	of	understanding	on	energy	(2006)	 include	the	non-binding	commitments	by	 the	 Azeri	 authorities	 to	 harmonise	 domestic	 legislation	with	 the	 EU	acquis.	 As	 such,	since	 the	 memorandum	 of	 understanding	 is	 a	 voluntary	 document	 expressing	 one's	
                                                            692	See	e.g.	Russell	A.	Jones,	Research	Methods	in	the	Social	and	Behavioral	Sciences,	2	Sub	edition	(Sunderland,	Mass:	Sinauer	Associates	Inc,	1996);	Piergiorgio	Corbetta,	‘Participant	Observation’,	in	Social	Research:	Theory,	
Methods	and	Techniques	(London ;	Thousand	Oaks,	Calif:	SAGE	Publications,	2003),	pp.	235–64.	
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intents,	it	could	be	assumed	that	Azerbaijan	has	interests	in	this	legislative	harmonisation	with	 the	 EU	 acquis.	 However,	 during	 the	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 meetings	 that	 I	 had	attended,	 which	 included	 the	 discussions	 of	 the	 policy	 actions	 stemming	 from	 the	mentioned	 memorandum	 (and	 other	 similar	 institutional	 documents)	 in	 their	 formal	agenda,	the	Azerbaijani	authorities	did	even	talk	about	legislative	harmonisation	as	their	policy	 priority.	 Compared	 to	 the	 EU	 officials,	 who	 made	 systematic	 references	 to	 the	benefits	of	 legislative	harmonisation	 in	 the	development	of	 the	SGC	and	 regional	 energy	cooperation,	Azerbaijani	officials	put	the	emphasis	on	the	necessity	of	the	EU	political	and	financial	support	to	the	development	of	the	SGC,	thereby,	their	"real"	interests,	as	opposed	to	"formally-declared"	ones,	which	I	cross-referenced	with	the	data	acquired	through	the	
elite	interviews	(discussed	below).	Additionally,	 as	 I	mentioned	 above,	 the	 practical	 distribution	 of	 power	 in	 policy	 choices	cannot	 be	 entirely	 captured	 through	 the	 institutional	 documents.	 In	 this	 vein,	 passive	participant	 observations	 came	 very	 handy	 in	my	 research	 endeavours.	 By	 attending	 the	relevant	multilateral	 and	 bilateral	meetings	 and	 listening	 to	 speeches	 and	 discussions,	 I	developed	a	sharp	sense	of	reality	as	to	who	are	the	real	actors	behind	the	policy	choices	made	by	the	countries	in	question.	This	was	especially	relevant	during	the	questions	and	answers	sessions.	For	example,	when	the	Azerbaijani	authorities	were	confronted	by	the	questions	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 potential	 contribution	 of	 the	 EU	 acquis	 to	 the	 future	functioning	of	the	SGC,	it	would	always	be	the	officials	from	SOCAR	would	take	up	the	floor	to	answer	them	during	the	Euronest	PA	meetings,	as	opposed	to	 the	MPs	or	 the	officials	from	the	Ministry	of	Energy.	With	 these	 in	 mind,	 I	 have	 attended	 the	 sixth	 and	 seventh	 meetings	 of	 the	 Energy	Committee	 of	 the	 Euronest	 Parliamentary	 Assembly	 on	 12/02/2014	 and	 04/11/2014	respectively,	 which	 took	 place	 at	 the	 European	 Parliament	 in	 Brussels/Belgium.	 In	addition,	 I	 observed	 the	 fourth	 meeting	 of	 the	 same	 committee,	 which	 took	 place	 in	Baku/Azerbaijan	on	12/02/2013	via	 live	public	broadcasting.	Since	the	agendas	of	these	mentioned	 meetings	 were	 long	 and	 comprehensive	 and	 included	 all	 the	 elements	 of	energy	partnership	with	the	EU,	I	took	specific	notes	only	in	relation	to	the	rule	adoption	in	 natural	 gas	 sector	 by	 the	 EaP	 countries.	 I	 used	 these	 notes	 as	 a	 primary,	 but	complementary	 source	 of	 information	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 research.	 Although	 the	meeting	minutes	were	 later	made	public,	 their	 quality	were	 not	 up	 to	 the	 standard	 and	hence	my	personal	notes	came	very	handy.			However,	 the	 Euronest	 meetings	 alone	 did	 not	 provide	 comprehensive,	 detailed	understanding	of	national	interests	of	all	the	EaP	countries,	which	are	under	the	focus	of	
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this	 thesis,	 namely,	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Georgia.	 Although	 the	 MPs	 from	 the	 former	 were	straightforward	 and	 consistent	with	 the	 executive	 in	 the	 views	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 EU	energy	 legislation	 on	 the	 national	 interests	 of	 Azerbaijan,	 representatives	 from	 Georgia	were	 less	 so	 open	 in	 their	 support	 or	 rejection	 of	 the	 EU	 natural	 gas	 legislation.	Furthermore,	 Turkey	 –	 important	 segment	 of	 the	 SGC,	 is	 not	 a	member	 the	 EaP,	 hence	Turkish	MPs	do	not	 participate	 in	 the	Euronest	 committees.	Hence,	 although	 this	 forum	provided	 me	 with	 detailed	 information	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 national	 particular	 group	 of	actors	(mostly	Azerbaijan),	its	findings	cannot	be	generalised	vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	the	SGC	countries.	 Therefore,	 observing	 the	 Euronest	meetings	 alone	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 a	 single	comprehensive	method	of	research	for	this	thesis.		Additionally,	I	was	only	a	passive	observant,	 I	did	not	have	a	chance	to	ask	questions	and	specify	the	issues,	which	are	important	for	this	PhD.	On	the	positive	note,	this	allowed	me	not	to	distort	the	data	I	was	collecting.	However,	it	also	meant	that	I	had	no	chance	to	ask	further	questions	and	fill	in	the	gaps	in	data	that	I	required.	Secondly,	 the	 bilateral	 track	 of	 the	 EaP,	 which	 is	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 Partnership	 and	Cooperation	 Agreement	 (PCA)	 committees	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 EaP	 countries,	provided	 me	 with	 a	 more	 intimate	 avenue	 for	 observation	 and	 collecting	 data	 on	 the	discussions	related	to	rule	transfer	to	the	EaP	countries	and	the	individual	positions	of	the	receiving	 countries.	 I	 attended	 the	 EU-Azerbaijan	 PCA	 sub-committee	 on	 energy,	transportation	 and	 environment	 on	 11/02/2014	 in	 Brussels/Belgium.	 The	 Mission	 of	Azerbaijan	at	the	EU	facilitated	my	attendance	at	the	meeting	and	my	research	credentials	were	verbally	presented	to	the	participants	during	the	meeting.	I	personally	requested	the	Mission	to	present	my	researcher	status	due	to	the	ethical	considerations.	In	general,	this	meeting	 provided	me	with	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 glean	 the	 views	 of	 the	 sides	 on	 the	matters	of	bilateral	 energy	 cooperation,	most	of	 all	 in	 relation	 to	prioritised	 interests	of	the	parties.	However,	as	it	was	the	case	with	Euronest	meetings,	the	information	acquires	is	only	pertinent	to	small	groups	and	as	is	usually	the	case	in	participant	observation,	the	results	cannot	be	generalised	over	other	groups.693		Last	but	not	 least,	since	a	great	deal	of	policy	debates	take	place	 in	the	public	domain	 in	Brussels/Belgium,	I	spent	several	months	in	Brussels	in	order	to	interact	with	the	relevant	public	officials	and	the	policy	discourse	they	carry	out.	I	attended	meetings	organised	both	by	the	public	and	private	actors,	as	well	as	research	organisations	in	order	to	improve	my	understanding	of	the	EU	energy	policy	in	general.		
                                                            693	Corbetta,	‘Participant	Observation’.	
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To	 sum	 up,	 I	 used	 the	 participant	 observation	 as	 a	 research	 method	 only	 in	 order	 to	complement,	fill	in	the	blind	spots	of	the	data	provided	by	the	institutional	documents.	
Elite	interviews	Although	passive	personal	observations	were	very	helpful	 for	furthering	my	grasp	of	the	energy	 affairs,	 they	 were	 not	 always	 useful	 for	 getting	 necessary	 data.	 Especially,	considering	that	energy	issues	are	very	sensitive,	not	all	information	is	publicly	disclosed.	Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 collect	 further	 qualitative	 data	 and	 glean	 the	 official	 but	 not-publicly	declared	views	of	 the	relevant	policy	actors,	 I	 conducted	semi-structured	elite	 interviews	with	 relevant	official	 figures	 involved	 in	 the	negotiations	of	different	aspects	of	 the	SGC.	Elite	interviews	also	came	handy	in	collecting	first-hand	information	on	the	issues,	which	were	not	necessarily	sensitive,	but	still	lacked	public	documentation	for	variety	of	reasons.	In	 order	 to	 carry	 out	 these	 elite	 interviews	 and	 be	 compliant	 with	 research	 ethics694,	 I	initially	 searched	 the	 potential	 interviewees	 online	 and	 approached	 them	 via	 email,	explaining	 my	 research	 and	 the	 contribution	 that	 I	 seek	 from	 them.	 The	 officials	 were	chosen	 taken	 account	 of	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	development	 and	negotiations	 around	the	 SGC.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 out	 to	 other	 potential	 interviewees,	whose	details	could	not	be	found	online,	I	also	used	the	snowballing	process.		Upon	 agreement	 to	 give	 an	 interview,	 we	 arranged	 the	 date	 and	 place.	 During	 the	interviews,	I	presented	each	and	every	interviewee	with	an	interview	consent	form	of	the	University	 of	 Sheffield,	which	 they	 read	 and	 signed.	 Not	 all	 interviewees	 allowed	me	 to	audio-record	the	interview.	In	those	cases	I	only	took	handwritten	notes.	At	the	same	time,	very	few	interviewees	allowed	me	to	use	attributable	quotes	in	my	thesis.	In	those	cases,	in	order	comply	with	the	research	ethics	I	used	anonymous	quotes	and/or	information	in	my	 thesis,	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 relevant	 officials	 by	 only	 citing	 the	 institution	 they	represented,	place	and	date	of	the	interview.	In	general,	elite	interviews	served	both	as	a	tool	of	data	collection,	as	well	as	analysis.	During	 the	 interviews,	 not	 all	 the	 interviewees	 were	 willing	 to	 be	 open	 and	 frank	 in	expressing	 their	 views	mostly	 due	 to	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 subject	matter	 discussed.	 In	order	to	overcome	this	problem,	I	tried	to	not	to	reveal	my	normative	position	in	advance	and	be	open	to	any	viewpoint.	At	the	same	time,	I	made	every	effort	to	be	prepared	to	the	discussions	by	carrying	out	background	research	on	the	interviewees	(whenever	relevant)	and	have	their	past	public	declarations	(if	available)	with	me	in	case	if	they	would	provide	opposite	view	during	the	interview.	
                                                            694	William	S.	Harvey,	‘Strategies	for	Conducting	Elite	Interviews’,	Qualitative	Research,	11.4	(2011),	431–41.	
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In	 total,	 I	 carried	 out	 16	 semi-structured	 interviews.695	 The	 questions	 of	 the	 interviews	were	designed	to	be	open-ended	and	organised	around	the	factors	that	this	thesis	seeks	to	attribute	 the	 institutional	 outcome,	 although	 the	 order	 of	 questions	 and	 precise	formulation	 varied	 from	 interview	 to	 interview.	 This	 was	 conditioned	 by	 the	 different	context	in	each	empirical	study	and	the	specialised	focus	of	each	interviewee.	In	general,	the	 contribution	 of	 elite	 interviews	 to	 my	 research	 was	 targeted	 and	 qualitatively	important.	They	allowed	me	to	unearth	some	of	the	empirical	facts	that	were	crucial	to	my	thesis,	but	not	necessarily	available	in	the	public	domain.		Nonetheless,	conducting	elite	interviews	also	involved	some	drawbacks.	These	especially	involved	 the	 credibility	 of	 information	 provided	 by	 some	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 which	needed	 to	 be	 validated	 through	 other	 research	 techniques,	 especially	 the	 institutional	documents.		
	 	
                                                            695	 In	 deciding	 the	 number	 of	 the	 interviews,	 I	was	 guided	 by	 the	 principle	 of	 “point	 of	 saturation”	 in	 data	collection.	 For	 great	 discussions	 on	 this	 issue,	 see	 e.g.	 Sarah	 Elsie	 Baker	 and	 Rosalind	 Edwards,	How	Many	
Qualitative	 Interviews	 Is	 Enough?	 Expert	 Voices	 and	 Early	 Career	 Reflections	 on	 Sampling	 and	 Cases	 in	
Qualitative	Research	(Southampton:	ESRC	National	Centre	for	Research	Methods,	University	of	Southampton,	2012)	<http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/>	[accessed	10	April	2013].	
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APPENDIX	II:	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWEES	
EU	 • Douglas	Carpenter,	Team	Leader	for	relations	with	the	South	Caucasus	responsible	for	EaP	bilateral	relations,	European	External	Action	Service,	16.05.2013,	Brussels.	• Filip	Alexandru	Negreanu	Arboreanu,	Assistant	of	the	MEP	Vălean	Adina-Ioana	in	charge	of	energy,	European	Parliament,	08.06.2015,	Brussels.	• Expert	 on	 Turkey,	 European	 External	 Action	 Service,	 21.04.2015,	 Brussels,	(requested	anonymity).	• Advisor	 to	 the	Director,	 European	 Commission,	 DG	 Energy,	 03.05.2013,	 Brussels	(requested	anonymity).	• Desk	 officer,	 European	Commission,	DG	Energy,	 07.05.2013,	 Brussels	 (requested	anonymity).	• Desk	 officer,	 European	Commission,	DG	Energy,	 04.06.2015,	 Brussels	 (requested	anonymity).	• Desk	officer	in	charge	of	energy	issues,	European	Commission,	DG	Neighbourhood	and	Enlargement	Negotiations,	26.05.2015,	Brussels	(requested	anonymity).	
Turkey	• Selim	Kuneralp,	Former	Turkish	Ambassador	and	Head	of	 the	Mission	 to	 the	EU,	10.04.2015,	Brussels.	• Counselor	 in	charge	of	energy,	Mission	of	Turkey	to	 the	EU,	13.04.2015,	Brussels	(requested	anonymity).	
Georgia	• Salome	 Salukvadze,	 Counselor	 in	 charge	 of	 EaP	 bilateral	 relations,	 Mission	 of	Georgia	to	the	EU,	24.04.2015,	Brussels.		• Teymur	 Valiyev,	 Head	 of	 Strategy	 and	 Innovations,	 SOCAR	 Georgia	 Gas,	23.04.2015,	telephone	interview.	• Senior	 diplomat,	 Mission	 of	 Georgia	 to	 the	 EU,	 16.04.2015,	 Brussels	 (requested	anonymity).	• Desk	 officer,	 Georgian	 Ministry	 of	 Energy,	 03.06.2015,	 Brussels	 (requested	anonymity).	
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Azerbaijan	• Rashad	 Novruz,	 First	 Secretary	 in	 charge	 of	 energy	 diplomacy,	 Mission	 of	Azerbaijan	to	the	EU,	03.05.2013,	Brussels.	• Officer	from	SOCAR	UK,	28.05.2012,	Skype	interview	(requested	anonymity).	• Senior	officer	from	SOCAR	Belgium,	29.06.2015,	Brussels	(requested	anonymity).	
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